- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 50
Posted by "Bradley Sallows" <Bradley_Sallows@ismbc.com> on Wed, 29 Mar 2000 13:41:34 -0800
>The proposals to date will not work because the structural conditions which
have lead to the weakening of the Army Reserve have not been discussed, and
little has been done to fix them.
Would anyone care to identify any structural conditions which have led to the
weakening of the reserves? I have long wondered about the effect of direct
component transfers, for example.
>As many on this list have already observed, they joined their particular unit
because of the esprit de corps associated with their units
I think people join their unit because it is the only game in town, or in those
towns with multiple units, because it is the only one with the role of interest.
Regimental parochialism is something we instill after the fact. It‘s
unfortunate that we insist on turning soldiers into regimental fanatics in
wartime an inability to work together will probably cost lives as it has in the
past. CSS units are perfectly capable of instilling unit loyalty, if not branch
fanaticism.
We must learn to instill unit pride in such a way that it doesn‘t interfere with
cooperation between units, arms, and branches.
>Does anyone else find it odd that the proposals being floated by NDHQ for the
Reserve are similar to what has happened to the USAR?
Perhaps this is simply coincidence. We lack CSS capability in both the reserve
and regular forces and there is a notable lack of CSS reservists employed in
trade as operational augmentees drivers being the exception. From those two
facts one can easily conclude it might be a good idea to increase our reserve
CSS.
>how will the Army Reserve retain skilled applicants in the CSS once they
realize that the current AC/NC course structure caters to high school students
and not the skilled applicants.
This is the critical problem, and must be addressed before any reroling takes
place.
>With the senior positions at the centralized training establishments now mostly
held by Regs, the few opportunities left for reservists to learn the art of
command are at the Brigade HQ‘s.
"Art of command"? That is a bit of a stretch, don‘t you think? The training
schools and brigade HQs are all administrative organizations. There‘s not much
command and leadership once you get past the platoon level. Senior ranks would
benefit more from CPX, TEWTs, and so forth conducted within the scope of a
brigade.
>- Army Reserve units do not regularly conduct combined arms training.
This is difficult to do properly outside the scope of a concentration. Once we
get used to mastering our core BTS and we must fight against BTS creep if we
are ever to reach a level at which combined arms activities are useful we can
train together. In the past I‘ve seen some very lame attempts at combined arms
training which taught no useful lessons at all and in fact reinforced some
improper ones.
>all pursue their own unit training plans without co-ordination or co-operation
with each other - this within the context of Reserve Brigades.
Again, unless I‘m mistaken each reserve brigade exists purely for administrative
purposes to hold the gaggle of units in its geographical area together and
provide the requisite control and support.
>This has the net effect of encouraging parochialism.
I have observed parochialism being heavily overshadowed by simple unfamiliarity
with procedures and practices when different arms and services work together.
Parochialism mainly presents when two or more units of the same branch are
amalgamated into a single training element.
Brad Sallows
--------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: To remove yourself from this list, send a message
to majordomo@cipherlogic.on.ca from the account you wish
to remove, with the line "unsubscribe army" in the
message body.
>The proposals to date will not work because the structural conditions which
have lead to the weakening of the Army Reserve have not been discussed, and
little has been done to fix them.
Would anyone care to identify any structural conditions which have led to the
weakening of the reserves? I have long wondered about the effect of direct
component transfers, for example.
>As many on this list have already observed, they joined their particular unit
because of the esprit de corps associated with their units
I think people join their unit because it is the only game in town, or in those
towns with multiple units, because it is the only one with the role of interest.
Regimental parochialism is something we instill after the fact. It‘s
unfortunate that we insist on turning soldiers into regimental fanatics in
wartime an inability to work together will probably cost lives as it has in the
past. CSS units are perfectly capable of instilling unit loyalty, if not branch
fanaticism.
We must learn to instill unit pride in such a way that it doesn‘t interfere with
cooperation between units, arms, and branches.
>Does anyone else find it odd that the proposals being floated by NDHQ for the
Reserve are similar to what has happened to the USAR?
Perhaps this is simply coincidence. We lack CSS capability in both the reserve
and regular forces and there is a notable lack of CSS reservists employed in
trade as operational augmentees drivers being the exception. From those two
facts one can easily conclude it might be a good idea to increase our reserve
CSS.
>how will the Army Reserve retain skilled applicants in the CSS once they
realize that the current AC/NC course structure caters to high school students
and not the skilled applicants.
This is the critical problem, and must be addressed before any reroling takes
place.
>With the senior positions at the centralized training establishments now mostly
held by Regs, the few opportunities left for reservists to learn the art of
command are at the Brigade HQ‘s.
"Art of command"? That is a bit of a stretch, don‘t you think? The training
schools and brigade HQs are all administrative organizations. There‘s not much
command and leadership once you get past the platoon level. Senior ranks would
benefit more from CPX, TEWTs, and so forth conducted within the scope of a
brigade.
>- Army Reserve units do not regularly conduct combined arms training.
This is difficult to do properly outside the scope of a concentration. Once we
get used to mastering our core BTS and we must fight against BTS creep if we
are ever to reach a level at which combined arms activities are useful we can
train together. In the past I‘ve seen some very lame attempts at combined arms
training which taught no useful lessons at all and in fact reinforced some
improper ones.
>all pursue their own unit training plans without co-ordination or co-operation
with each other - this within the context of Reserve Brigades.
Again, unless I‘m mistaken each reserve brigade exists purely for administrative
purposes to hold the gaggle of units in its geographical area together and
provide the requisite control and support.
>This has the net effect of encouraging parochialism.
I have observed parochialism being heavily overshadowed by simple unfamiliarity
with procedures and practices when different arms and services work together.
Parochialism mainly presents when two or more units of the same branch are
amalgamated into a single training element.
Brad Sallows
--------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: To remove yourself from this list, send a message
to majordomo@cipherlogic.on.ca from the account you wish
to remove, with the line "unsubscribe army" in the
message body.
