Ricks Napkin Forces Challenge Part 2 BIG Numbers

[Kirkhill]

Tackling them one at a time.

I think you are conflating the issues.
The National Guard, and Reserves are not solely a domestic tool. In fact Domestically they are primarily a tool for Natural Disaster Response. As far as a Military Force, they are primarily Expeditionary.

Except when they are guarding subways and The Capitol.
They are everybody's Multi-Tool.

Pre 2018 I would have agreed, but the USMC now has been transformed into a very Pacific oriented force. They have given the ‘Army role’ over to the Army, and pivoted hard back to Amphibious and Littoral operations.

If by that you mean that they have given up tanks....

I know the US Army has talked up its new division focus but the Lego block, the Module, is still the Brigade Combat Team, at least for administration purposes. I counted the BCTs and allowed for the Marine regiments to stand in as BCT Equivalents.

This is what I ended up with

65 BCT Equivalents,
36 Regular and 29 in the Marine Reserves and the National Guard.

41 of the 65 BCTE were IBCTs (Light Infantry, including Abn and Marines),
19 Regular and 22 in the Marine Reserves and the National Guard

6 of the BCTE were SBCTs (Stryker borne infantry),
4 Regular and 2 in the National Guard

14 of the BCTE were ABCTs (Armored BCTs),
11 Regular and 3 in the National Guard

In addition there are 2 MLRs in the Marines and 2 ACRs in the Guard.

To my way of seeing things 2/3 of the US close combat force is Light Infantry. 1/3 of it is Combined Arms. Of that only 3 ABCTs of the Total Force 65 are NG ABCTs. 5 if you include the Guard's 2 ACRs.

Going a bit further, to the divisional level, the US is working to field 24 Divisions.

3 active USMC divisions and 1 USMC reserve division
12 active army divisions and 8 NG divisions.

The NG divisions seem to be something of a work in progress.
The BCTs are solidly established but the divisional enablers and the divisions themselves seem to be still in flux.

The 12 active Army divisions are found in three parent Corps,
I,III and XVIII with each Corps having 4 subordinate divisional HQs

But....

In XVIII Corps, while 10th Mtn, 82nd Abn and 101st Abn are up to strength 3 Inf is down a BCT. So three full strength divisions and one division minus.

In III Corps, 1 Cav, 1 Armd and 4 Inf (1x ABCT + 2x SBCT) are up to strength 1 Inf is down a BCT. So again, three full strength divisions and one division minus.

Then there is I Corps.
4 division HQs, 2 Inf, 7 Inf, 11 Abn and 25 Inf.
2 Inf HQ is permanently attached to 8th Army in Korea, but it has 0 BCTs on the ground.
7 Inf HQ is located in Seattle with 2 active SBCTs and one NG SBCT on call for 2 Inf.
11 Abn is now tasked to Alaska Command of NORTHCOM but it is down a BCT and the two BCTs it has are down an Inf Bn each.
25 Inf on Hawaii is similarly organized to 11 Abn, a division minus with two BCTs minus.

Why do I bring this up? I keep hearing the arguments for:

1, the 3 infantry battalion brigades and
2, the 3 brigade divisions and
3, the need for heavy forces and
4, the popularity of the heavy forces in the National Guard.

I am not seeing it.

I am seeing an extraordinary amount of variability in formation structure within the US field forces.

Canada can’t afford to do that. As it also needs an Army to do Army things.

When I say the CAF needs to look more like the USMC I am not talking about splashing ashore from Amphibs. I am talking about the tight integration of the Marines' elements and the focus on the expeditionary effort. I am talking about a Canadian Expeditionary Force, or if you prefer, a Force Mobile Command.

The RCMP isn’t organized anymore as a force with cannon and cavalry. You’d need to greatly increase its numbers and budget to make it a viable force for that.

Don't want Mounties with cannon etc. The rising threat is public disorder and general security. That is where the Mounties need more Mounties to manage they jobs they are currently doing.

Yellow SAR isn’t a military tool, even though it’s conducted by the RCAF, you’d need to dramatically increase its capabilities and budget to use as a patrolling force or anything beyond its current mandate.

That is precisely why I am separating the Civil from the Military. Yellow craft are Transport and SAR. They do not need to be armed. They do not need to conduct patrols.
Those jobs go to the RCAF assets assigned to NORAD/NORTHCOM.

The CCG, well it’s been very clear it doesn’t want any sort of LE role, and you’d be hard pressed to dramatically change its culture.

CCG works for DFO. DFO agents are armed. CCG transports Mounties on occasion. Mounties are armed.

If the threat becomes greater than can be managed with a 9mm and attitude then the Mounties have their own upgunned response teams. If that doesn't work then you can call in the NORAD/NORTHCOM elements.

Agreed on the Rangers, but I think you also need to be realistic in what they offer, and I think you’d get a lot more bang for one’s buck with have Arctic Coy’s that go out routinely with Ranger patrols.

Agreed on the Rangers - not looking for them to do anything more, militarily, than they currently are. When I talked about expanding their capabilities I was thinking of better equipping the community patrols in the north to manage civil emergencies.

I don’t think you would find a lot of Rangers who have any interest in that.

That speculation was based on adding to the ranks of the Ranger establishment a more military force to manage the threat in the urban environment.

I am looking for a clean separation between the Defence of Canada force and the Expeditionary Force and that separation extends to the Reserve structure.

I am looking at the Expeditionary Reserves as being ex Regulars. Perhaps they continue the Militia based structure. Perhaps they go the SuppList Individual Reserve route and the Militia becomes the Defence of Canada force.

If you actually believe that you have been asleep since WW2 and willfully the 1980’s.

No. Neither is true. I know how the Guard has been used. I also know that the consent of the governed is being tested in the US, and a lot of other places, and in the US the Guard's employment is, in my opinion, a contributing factor.

So set up for Expeditionary.
Or perhaps to support Expeditionary if you prefer to look at it that way.

But it’s heavily augmented by Federal funding even when not Federalized.

But that Federal funding comes from taxpayers that live in states and are paying taxes to supply emergency services. They are getting their own money back - if the Feds aren't spending more than they take and have to borrow to cover their obligations.

Let’s be honest the Guard was initially a check on the Federal Government. But now it’s simply a method of expansion for the active military.

That's an opinion. One I don't share.

Again, that isn’t the driving purpose anymore. There are still guard units being deployed overseas. The Guard has shifted…

The Federal government has shifted. The Federal Army has shifted. How far have the Guardsmen and their Governors shifted?

And?

The support wasn’t solely an issue related to the NG, that was issues related to any of the units that didn’t have an umbrella entity supporting them. Believe me you can find very similar complains about the supply in the detached regular army entities as well.

As for the other issues. Well, the did fix the Guard pay issues, as well as the other issues related to finance, as they forced mortgage companies and banks to freeze loans and mortgages for deployed members, so they wouldn’t need to pay while away.

As far as being gone for 18months, well a lot of units did that, not just ARNG.

See above re testing the consent of the governed. Ultimately everyone is a volunteer. Just because the President says a thing doesn't make it so.

I think a modern torpedo fort has value, coupled with sensors. If you have good OPSEC about it's capabilities and limitations, its mere presence puts a wrinkle in your opponents plans, which is really a forts primary purpose. A fort should be strong enough or capable enough to never have to fire a shot in anger.
Underestimating such coastal defense can come at great cost.

I don’t disagree in that. But I’d rather have additional purposes to fixed structures as well. As I don’t see an unmanned option viable for that.

The Choke Points are where they are. We have difficulty getting people to man Goose Bay and Cold Lake. Establishing outposts in the High Arctic would challenge recruiters. Luckily most of the Choke Points are proximate to existing hamlets - luck resulting from enforced relocations in some cases.

Those communities can be exploited as watchmen for the unmanned stations. And put a bit of coin in their pockets at the same time.

 

[GR66]

Disclaimer: I am not now or have I ever been a Russian SSN captain.

With that out of the way I'm wondering why the hell a Russian nuclear sub would choose to try to sneak through the extremely tight confines of the NWP to get into the Atlantic/Pacific rather then the much more open GIUK Gap. I'm all for preparing for military threats, but to my mind we should focus on the more likely threats.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Disclaimer: I am not now or have I ever been a Russian SSN captain.

With that out of the way I'm wondering why the hell a Russian nuclear sub would choose to try to sneak through the extremely tight confines of the NWP to get into the Atlantic/Pacific rather then the much more open GIUK Gap. I'm all for preparing for military threats, but to my mind we should focus on the more likely threats.

The GIUK gap is very closely monitored by various means. Very little, if anything, surface or subsurface transits those gaps unnoticed and untracked.

 

[FJAG]

Let’s be honest the Guard was initially a check on the Federal Government. But now it’s simply a method of expansion for the active military.

I agree with your side of the argument and would add the following:

In the beginning (a biblical twist?) the US was a collection of 13 states each with its own self defence militia. When they fought the revolution most of their force still was with a small continental "regular force". After the revolution the federal component of the US was a relatively poor entity which could only maintain a very tiny federal army. The bulk of the force remained the state militias. That carried through right through the civil war for both sides. States raised the vast majority of the units to fight - federalization worked better on the Union side than the Confederates. That carried on for the rest of the 19th century. There was a gradual change that started just before WW1, hit a milestone in 19333 (when the national guard role was severed from the state militia role) and really didn't culminate until post WW2 when you have the structure for today.

Yes. There is a dual function in the ARNG, but for quite some time now it has been a stable one where the state role and the federal role has been clearly defined as can be seen by the funding models that support the ARNG and pay for their respective training (and of course operational deployments - whether domestic or expeditionary). They are much more a "national" guard than a state militia.

In short I think @KevinB view of the ARNG as expressed over many posts is more accurate that @Kirkhill's, even though there is clearly a dual function still in existence.

Why do I bring this up? I keep hearing the arguments for:

1, the 3 infantry battalion brigades and
2, the 3 brigade divisions and
3, the need for heavy forces and
4, the popularity of the heavy forces in the National Guard.

I am not seeing it.

I am seeing an extraordinary amount of variability in formation structure within the US field forces.

What you are seeing is funding issues even for the massive US Army. There is a significant cost delta involved in equipping, training and maintaining an ABCT over that of a IBCT. To see where the US Army is putting its efforts, take a look at the Active component which has 32 manoeuvre brigades. 11 are ABCTs, 7 are SBCTs and only 14 are IBCTs. Of the IBCTs, 8 are specialist airborne and air assault and another 3 mountain. The fact that the ARNG provides 5 ABCTs and 2 SBCTs is not a sign of some some form of preference for IBCTs but is exactly the opposite. It's a sign that the US favours mech forces so much that it puts enough capital into 7 reserve force brigades of this type. And don't forget the mass of CS and CSS brigades that exist in the ARNG and the USAR which are all designed to favour heavy combat operations.

I'm not denigrating the usefulness of the IBCT here but merely saying that I think that your evaluation of the structure of the US Army based solely on current the mix of BCTs does not support your statement above. The four listed points are real. Do variations exist. Of course. But underlying that is the fact that even during the last two and one half decades when the focus was counterterrorism, the US did not lose sight of the need to retain heavy forces and are now in fact strongly pivoting back to that. The very structure of the divisions (with a reinforced armored division with major bridging capabilities) makes it clear what the army's purposes are to be and how heavy plays a central role.

 

[KevinB]

I agree with your side of the argument and would add the following:

In the beginning (a biblical twist?) the US was a collection of 13 states each with its own self defence militia. When they fought the revolution most of their force still was with a small continental "regular force". After the revolution the federal component of the US was a relatively poor entity which could only maintain a very tiny federal army. The bulk of the force remained the state militias. That carried through right through the civil war for both sides. States raised the vast majority of the units to fight - federalization worked better on the Union side than the Confederates. That carried on for the rest of the 19th century. There was a gradual change that started just before WW1, hit a milestone in 19333 (when the national guard role was severed from the state militia role) and really didn't culminate until post WW2 when you have the structure for today.

Yes. There is a dual function in the ARNG, but for quite some time now it has been a stable one where the state role and the federal role has been clearly defined as can be seen by the funding models that support the ARNG and pay for their respective training (and of course operational deployments - whether domestic or expeditionary). They are much more a "national" guard than a state militia.

In short I think @KevinB view of the ARNG as expressed over many posts is more accurate that @Kirkhill's, even though there is clearly a dual function still in existence.



What you are seeing is funding issues even for the massive US Army. There is a significant cost delta involved in equipping, training and maintaining an ABCT over that of a IBCT. To see where the US Army is putting its efforts, take a look at the Active component which has 32 manoeuvre brigades. 11 are ABCTs, 7 are SBCTs and only 14 are IBCTs. Of the IBCTs, 8 are specialist airborne and air assault and another 3 mountain. The fact that the ARNG provides 5 ABCTs and 2 SBCTs is not a sign of some some form of preference for IBCTs but is exactly the opposite. It's a sign that the US favours mech forces so much that it puts enough capital into 7 reserve force brigades of this type. And don't forget the mass of CS and CSS brigades that exist in the ARNG and the USAR which are all designed to favour heavy combat operations.

I'm not denigrating the usefulness of the IBCT here but merely saying that I think that your evaluation of the structure of the US Army based solely on current the mix of BCTs does not support your statement above. The four listed points are real. Do variations exist. Of course. But underlying that is the fact that even during the last two and one half decades when the focus was counterterrorism, the US did not lose sight of the need to retain heavy forces and are now in fact strongly pivoting back to that. The very structure of the divisions (with a reinforced armored division with major bridging capabilities) makes it clear what the army's purposes are to be and how heavy plays a central role.

Meanwhile in Canada the PRes are like Oliver Twist…

 

[Kirkhill]

The Eyes of Texas are Upon You....

Court ruling could overturn federal control of the National Guard

The National Guard has changed dramatically from its state militia roots, but so have the courts that will decide its fate.

www.armytimes.com

 

[Kirkhill]

@FJAG

First of all, a man after your own heart.

Get defence wrong and tax cuts won't matter – we need armoured mass now

Ex-Nato commander Hamish de Bretton-Gordon warns the Budget's lack of defence announcements is concerning and gives Russia the initiative.

www.forces.net

But now the rest

I agree with your side of the argument and would add the following:

In the beginning (a biblical twist?) the US was a collection of 13 states each with its own self defence militia. When they fought the revolution most of their force still was with a small continental "regular force". After the revolution the federal component of the US was a relatively poor entity which could only maintain a very tiny federal army. The bulk of the force remained the state militias. That carried through right through the civil war for both sides. States raised the vast majority of the units to fight - federalization worked better on the Union side than the Confederates. That carried on for the rest of the 19th century. There was a gradual change that started just before WW1, hit a milestone in 19333 (when the national guard role was severed from the state militia role) and really didn't culminate until post WW2 when you have the structure for today.

Yes. There is a dual function in the ARNG, but for quite some time now it has been a stable one where the state role and the federal role has been clearly defined as can be seen by the funding models that support the ARNG and pay for their respective training (and of course operational deployments - whether domestic or expeditionary). They are much more a "national" guard than a state militia.

In short I think @KevinB view of the ARNG as expressed over many posts is more accurate that @Kirkhill's, even though there is clearly a dual function still in existence.

I'll let the argument rest for now while noting that the argument is a live debate in the US.

What you are seeing is funding issues even for the massive US Army. There is a significant cost delta involved in equipping, training and maintaining an ABCT over that of a IBCT.

I think this goes to the heart of the matter. Whether US, Ukrainian or Canadian everything always comes down to money. Everyone would always like more money and there is never enough money to do things the way we would like. Ultimately everybody ends up stretching the available cash and doing what they can with what they have.

Canada needs to work with what it has and not what it wants. No government has ever given any Canadian General or Admiral what they have wanted. The same is true in America.

To see where the US Army is putting its efforts, take a look at the Active component which has 32 manoeuvre brigades. 11 are ABCTs, 7 are SBCTs and only 14 are IBCTs. Of the IBCTs, 8 are specialist airborne and air assault and another 3 mountain.

11 ABCTs

7 SBCTs (I think that might be a couple less just now)
14 IBCTs

As you note the IBCTs all have specialized roles. But they are ultimately IBCTs populated by Infanteers that think on their feet. The same, IMO, goes for the SBCTs, no matter how many there are. The SBCTs are also populated by Infanteers. The difference is between them and their ISV brethren is that they have an armoured bus to ride in rather than a GP vehicle. Some of them are going to get the Oversnow vehicle as transport but they are still going to be light infantry.

So 11 Combined Arms Units
And 21 Light Infantry Units.

2 Parts Light to 1 Part Armoured.

The fact that the ARNG provides 5 ABCTs and 2 SBCTs is not a sign of some some form of preference for IBCTs but is exactly the opposite. It's a sign that the US favours mech forces so much that it puts enough capital into 7 reserve force brigades of this type. And don't forget the mass of CS and CSS brigades that exist in the ARNG and the USAR which are all designed to favour heavy combat operations.

I agree on the preference issue. They don't have a preference for IBCTs. But needs must that is what they can afford. The critical issue is to create an organization that can be cookie cuttered. And that is the Brigade Combat Team.

The structure you know, HQ and Support, Support Battalion, Engineers, Fires, Cavalry, 3x Infantry.
Repeat as possible.
Adjust as necessary.
Equip as the budget allows.

The fact remains that the vast majority of the National Guard is equipped as IBCTs or SBCTs (18 to 21). Again I lump those two together because there is considerable evidence that the Strykers were acquired to carry Light Infantry to where they could fight like Light Infantry. Things go badly wrong when they start thinking of themselves as being equivalent to a Combined Arms force element.

The ARNG, as you note, only generates 5 ABCTs (actually I can only account for 3 ABCTs in the NG and 2 ACRs).
Given that the majority of the Armored force is found in the Active Army and not the National Guard, and that the National Guard is dominated by light forces it seems to me that the USArmy is of the opinion that the Combined Arms trade is a full time trade. Individuals can leap into tanks Ukrainian style and employ them effectively individually but can they fight a war and win battles effectively? Or would the result be the same as what we are seeing in Ukraine from both the Russian and Ukrainian forces.

I'm not denigrating the usefulness of the IBCT here but merely saying that I think that your evaluation of the structure of the US Army based solely on current the mix of BCTs does not support your statement above.

And I am not extolling the usefulness of the IBCT. My contention is simply that circumstances drive decisions. And even the US Army makes do with what it has available. That includes figuring out how to make the best use of the IBCTs that it can afford to field in numbers.

The four listed points are real. Do variations exist. Of course. But underlying that is the fact that even during the last two and one half decades when the focus was counterterrorism, the US did not lose sight of the need to retain heavy forces and are now in fact strongly pivoting back to that. The very structure of the divisions (with a reinforced armored division with major bridging capabilities) makes it clear what the army's purposes are to be and how heavy plays a central role.

I am not now, nor have I ever, been opposed to the maintenance of a heavy force. I am at odds with people who would sink every available penny plus tuppence more into the heavy force while ignoring the utility of light forces that we can afford and can generate.

The other thing I would point out is the structure of I Corps and its relevance to Canada.

I Corps is not a fully fleshed out Corps with 4 full strength divisions. Some of its divisions are understrength. Some of its BCTs are understrength. Some of its divisions are effectively at zero strength.

2 Inf Div in Korea is at zero strength. But it retains its HQ and its key enablers forward - its support elements, its Fires and, most critically, it Aviation Brigade. One thing that stands out for me is that every US division, no matter what its role, or status, always has an Aviation Brigade with a bunch of Hooks and Hawks. Sometimes they have Apaches but they always have Hooks. Even if they are an Armored Division.

7 Inf Div in Washington also has a full HQ and its enablers, including a Combat Aviation Brigade but it holds only two Active SBCTs and is responsible for one Guard SBCT. 7 Inf shares those SBCTs with 2 Inf in Korea.

11th Abn Div has recently been activated and an SBCT was redesignated an IBCT while waiting for their new BvS10s to arrive. That div, has an Aviation Task Force attached, with Hooks and Hawks, and a Div Arty HQ, but only has 2 BCT HQs subordinate and, as I noted both the Airborne BCT and the ex-Stryker BCT are short a battalion.

25 Inf Div on Hawaii is also short a brigade and battalions.

Why is this important to me?

Because it stresses the importance of both qualified HQs and Support and the existence of the necessary enablers to the US Army.

...

Canadian Context - Follow the I Corps model

Rather than trying to use our 12 combat arms HQs in one division and confuse regional commands with another 4 divisions then follow the US model.

The US forward deploys Army and Corps HQs (8th Army in Korea, V Corps in Europe) and uses them to create environments into which other elements can fall.

Consider reactivating the Canadian Corps but with 4 Division HQs.

1 Div HQ for the Ready Forces with all 12 Active Armoured and Infantry Unit HQs under command minus any actively assigned Units.
1 Div HQ for the NORAD/NORTHCOM role that may only have 1 Bde(-) under command but can take Canadian or US forces under command as necessary.
1 Div HQ for the Canadian Expeditionary Force that can be assigned national or multi-national elements.
1 Div HQ for the Canadian Army Reserve Force (whatever that may look like)

That ends up looking kind of like I Corps and kind of like the Marine Corps (if you squint hard enough).

That structure can be made to work with the number we have, as well as the numbers we might have if and when. We are not short of the necessary Flag Officers. Might as well give them something a little more productive to do with their time.

....

My take on the US system is that they can take some irregular citizen soldiers and put them into IBCTs where they learn individual skills and how to phone a friend. Their BCT contains all the same elements as every other BCT regardless of the means of transport to the fight.

IBCTs based on ISVs can learn their skills and then learn how to become adept at heliborne operations because every division has its own Aviation Brigade.

That means that every NG IBCT is a potential follow on to the 101st with a small delta. A larger delta to teach them to fall out of planes will find them gainfully employed with the 82nd or the 11th in Alaska or the 173rd Bde in Italy. A smaller delta could find them falling in on Strykers and being attached to an Armored Division for use like 4 Inf Div in III Corps - follow on and security troops as well as assault troops in complex environments.

Or perhaps they just get added to MP Brigades to take up security duties.

The IBCT is the natural home of every nation's Odd Job Men. It is a holding formation that has some base utility but which can become something else with a bit of time and money.

 

[FJAG]

So 11 Combined Arms Units
And 21 Light Infantry Units.

You're fudging the math there. In no way are SBCTs "light" infantry. They are mechanized infantry and when you see the divisional constructs, their main role is as part of the armored divisions. There is no doubt that the US Active army is heavily weighed to armored/mechanized and airborne/air assault joint forced entry elements.

(actually I can only account for 3 ABCTs in the NG and 2 ACRs).

An ABCT and an ACR have the same TO&E and the terms these days are almost synonymous. That may change with time as there may be further Force 2030 Corps force developments.

it seems to me that the US Army is of the opinion that the Combined Arms trade is a full time trade

I think the use of the word trade is wrong there. There are only two infantry specialties in the US Army - 11B is infantryman and 11C is indirect fire i.e. mortar. There used to be a 11M or Fighting Vehicle Infantry for the Bradley but that has been subsumed in the 11B field. Basically after infantry AIT each infantryman learns how to be airborne or air assault or Bradley or Stryker at his unit regardless of whether Active army or ARNG. I'm not sure based on the number of Active and ARNG ABCTs and SBCTs you can draw the conclusion that combined arms is a full-time trade. It quite clearly crosses the boundaries and isn't a trade at all.

Because it stresses the importance of both qualified HQs and Support and the existence of the necessary enablers to the US Army.

Okay, I'll ignore what's above this (11 Div, I Corps, 25 ID, 7 ID are all special cases) but I agree whole heartedly with the "importance of both qualified HQs and Support and the existence of the necessary enablers." If you parce the layout of my napkins above you'll note that much of the 30/70 structures major purpose is to create those qualified (in my language "deployable") HQs from the battalion through brigade to one deployable div HQ. The secondary purpose is to generate sufficient personnel and deployable HQ structures for both brigade and above brigade levels.

Consider reactivating the Canadian Corps but with 4 Division HQs.

IMHO only 2 Div HQs are required and can be justified based on numbers. The possibility that 1 Div will be deployed is a low contingency and the 30/70 structure is designed to allow force expansion if that does become a possibility. Essentially I see 1 Div as the force generator for Europe - if an expeditionary div level is needed it can come from a 1 Div forward element while 1 Div retains a rear element as force generator until such time as the whole division's deployment is needed. By that time 2 Div becomes the sustainment generator or a new 3 Div is mobilized (with all the essential equipment and pers training needed (basically a long term task)

There is zero justification for a ResF division and its counter to an integrated force structure.

The IBCT is the natural home of every nation's Odd Job Men. It is a holding formation that has some base utility but which can become something else with a bit of time and money.

I think you may be simplifying the work needed to turn the Mark 1 rifleman into a paratrooper or even air cavalry trooper of even Stryker or IFV crewman (when you consider that it needs a driver gunner and crew commander) But let's leave that aside. I do favour turning aviation over to the army and make it part of a division. I've left that off my Napkin but essentially - if I were king - 1 Wing would be turned into a field deployable aviation brigade, come under 2 Div, its resources concentrated in SE Ont and SW Que, and train primarily with 2 and 34 CLBGs (and to a lessor extent 5 CMBG and 36 and 39 CIRs.) I don't give a rat's ass as to whether its called 1 Avn Bde or 1 Wing and come under RCAF CoC as long as its dedicated fully to Army support and is under OPCON to 2 Div.

The biggest issue I have with the IBCT as the "odd job men" is that acquiring the equipment to upgrade them to an ABCT or even SBCT is the time challenging job. Small story - when I was with the Italian mountain artillery in the Alps, I chatted with one of their sergeant majors about their training and issues that they had. Their biggest challenge was the mules (8 of their 9 batteries each had around a hundred mules on strength). As he put it first you have to get a horse and a donkey together in a field. Then you wait a year for that to percolate. Then you wait around three to four years for the new-borne mule to mature and then and only then do you take your young soldier draftee and put him together with a mule for nine months to train them both. After all that you finally have 1/12th of a gun tractor.

 

[Kirkhill]

This one is long even by my standards.

BLUF.

WWUSD standard. What Would Uncle Sam Do.

Taking a different slant

A distinctly Pro-American one.

So my take on What Would Uncle Sam Do if he were playing with Rick’s Napkin…

1x Canadian Corps (0.4 rounded up)
2.4x Canadian Divisions (2 Divisions plus an extra Brigade)
6.5x Canadian Brigade Groups (6 Brigades plus a couple of spare Battle Groups)

Enablers

3x Aviation Wings
7x Cannon Regiments
3x Rocket Regiments

1x Anti-Air Missile Defence Brigade
3x Anti-Air Missile Defence Regiments


Splitting them between the Regs and the Reserves

Corps – Regular/Reserve
Divisions – 1(+) Regular, 1 Reserve
Brigade Groups – 3 (+) Regular, 3 Reserve

Aviation Wings – 1 Regular, 2 Reserve

Cannon Regiments – 3 Regular, 4 Reserve
Rocket Regiments – 1 Regular, 2 Reserve

Anti-Air Missile Defence Brigade – Regular/Reserve
Anti-Air Missile Defence Regiments – 1 Regular, 2 Reserve.
….

Rationale to follow

 

[Kirkhill]

Skip this bit if you don't want to see the workings.

....

Canada shares the North American continent with the USA. We have recognized the benefits of co-operation since at least the inception of NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

The US land area is 9,833,520 km2. Canada’s land area is 9,984,670 km2. Canada is marginally bigger than the US but for my purposes they are the same. To my way of thinking that makes the challenge of holding our countries roughly the same.

The US has an advantage in that it has more people to defend their lands than we do. Their population is 341,253,264 as of Sunday, March 10, 2024. Canada’s population is 39,007,358 as of the same date from the same Worldometer source.

We only have 11% of the population to hold an equivalent area. And we are somewhat poorer than the US. Canada’s nominal GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita is 61,381 USD. The US per capita GDP is 76,291 USD. We only have 80% of the economy that the US has.

Short form, co-operation works to our advantage. There are more of them and they are richer. If we do our share, to do our best, then the US has agreed to let us live in peace as an independent nation, sharing in their economy and sheltering under their umbrella.

It could be worse. We could have Russia or China for a neighbour.

….

So what is our share? We are obviously not being assessed on our land claims. The US is not expecting us to spend an equal amount to them. The two most common metrics are population, where we have traditionally used a 10:1 ratio, 10 Americans for every Canadian, and GDP. On the GDP front we are getting pressure.

The US feels that its friends and neighbours could be doing more. The standard that has been pushed forwards are 2% of GDP since 2014 in Wales. That is now rising to consider 2% as a floor with other friends and associates moving through 2.5% to 3%.

Another number that people forget is the commitment to international aid. That number stands at 0.7% of GNI (Gross National Income). I actually am a fan of adhering to that commitment. The government and I disagree on how that money should be spent. I would include military aid in the budget as well as humanitarian aid and would spend nothing on commerce and trade.

Currently we are only spending about 1.3% of GDP on defence, or 65% of the floor and less than half of the target zone our allies are working towards. And on foreign aid we are at about 0.35% of GNI in 2022, or about 50%.

There is one final financial metric. The amount spent on domestic security, or public safety and emergency preparedness. That number matters. It matters because the bargain with the US implies that if we look after our turf and our people then they don’t have to worry about us and are willing to let us share a common economy, keep the border open.

In 2022 Canada spent, at all levels of government, 15,548,164,000 CAD on policing. That compares to:

DND’s Main Estimates 2023-24 are $26.5 billion, comprised of various votes as well as statutory funding (mainly comprised of funding related to employee benefit plans totalling approximately $1.7 billion). The votes are:

Vote 1 – Operating ($17.9 billion);
Vote 5 – Capital ($6.1 billion);
Vote 10 – Grants and Contributions ($320 million);
Vote 15 – Payments in respect of the long-term disability and life insurance plan for members of the Canadian Forces ($447 million);

The largest portion of the budget is allocated to Personnel (34%), Operating (34%) and Capital (22%).

We seem to be spending on policing about 60% of what we spend on defense.

The UK spends about the same amount on “public order” at home as the spend on defence: about 2% in both cases for a total of 4% of GDP. And their foreign aid budget is on top of that.

….

Arguably the cost of membership in the OECD club, and the NATO club, and the NORAD club is 4 to 5% of GDP. Much of that is spent at home, in Canada, providing protection and services to Canadians, jobs, housing and pensions for Canadians and access to our neighbour’s markets. Paying a soldier 100,000 CAD instead of 50,000 CAD raises the budget but has minimal impact on the defence.

The foreign aid number may be a drain on the taxpayer but even that can find domestic utility if it is spent on things produced in Canada.

The biggest drain on the exchequer is likely to in the form of capital equipment. Lacking a strong defence industry of our own we have to buy our hardware and consumables (like ammunition) from abroad. And there is a standard for that as well. NATO requires its members to spend 20% of their budgets on capital expenditures. Like other numbers that is up for debate as well. Is that calculated on the basis of the price paid ex-works or the cost charged to the budget after passing through a Canadianized supply chain. And what civil infrastructure can be allocated to the calculation?

Finance and politics are not conducive to easy comparisons.

At which point I toss up my hands and decide to refer to the relative populations of the US and Canada.

Following on from that I adopt the WWUSD formulary: What Would Uncle Sam Do?

….

The USA: 341,253,264
Canada: 39,007,358

I will stick with the traditional 10:1 standard.

In military terms that has particular implications given the conventional 3:1 subordination ratio. 1 platoon has 3 sections. 3 platoons make 1 company. 3 companies make 1 battalion. 3 battalions make 1 brigade. 3 brigades make 1 division. 3 divisions make 1 corps. 3 corps make 1 army.

A company has 9 sections. A battalion has 9 platoons. A brigade has 9 companies. A division has 9 battalions. A corps has 9 brigades.

This is and Order of Magnitude Assessment.

My working standard is that if a corps has 9 brigades then, and Canada has one tenth of the population then when the US fields a Corps Canada’s equitable share would be to field a Brigade/Brigade Combat Team/Brigade Group. If the US fields Division then Canada should field a Battalion/Battle Group.

So what is the US fielding?

Because this is Rick’s Napkin Army I am only going to look at those things that impact the Army or the land combat element.

….

So what does the US field in terms of land combat elements?

First of all it fields 4 Corps

I Corps
III Corps
XVIII Corps
US Marine Corps.

Under those Corps it fields 15 Divisions in the active force:

1st Cavalry
1st Armored
1st Infantry
2nd Infantry
3rd Infantry
4th Infantry
7th Infantry
10th Infantry (Mountain)
11th Infantry (Airborne)
25th Infantry
82nd Infantry (Airborne)
101st Infantry (Airborne – Air Assault)
1st Marines
2nd Marines
3rd Marines

The US also maintains a reserve force of National Guard troops that are organized into 8 divisions available for both federal expeditionary service and domestic state emergencies:

28th Infantry
29th Infantry
34th Infantry
35th Infantry
36th Infantry
38th Infantry
40th Infantry
42nd Infantry

In addition the Marines have their own reserve division:

4 Marines

Total of 24 divisions with 15 active and 9 in reserve.

...

Since the Global War On Terror started the modular building block for the land forces has been the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). This was created by taking all the elements of a Division and dividing them equally among three subordinate Brigade Headquarters. Now there is a move to bring the BCTs back together under the Divisional commanders and have the commanders take back central control over assets that had been scattered among the brigades. But the BCT is still a basic building block administratively and, potentially, tactically.



The BCT comprises, generically:

1x HQ
1x Support Battalion
1x Engineer Battalion
1x Artillery Battalion
1x Cavalry “Battalion”
3x Infantry Battalions.

There is some variability but all the BCTs draw from that same basic structure.

The variability is expressed in three different types of BCTs:

ABCT – Armored Brigade Combat Teams
SBCT – Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (including the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Regiments)
IBCT – Infantry Brigade Combat Teams.

Collectively the US Army fields, by my count, 31 active BCTs including:

11x ABCTs – concentrated in III Corps
6x SBCTs – concentrated in I Corps
9x IBCTs – concentrated in XVIII Corps
5x IBCTs(-) – forward deployed IBCTs with only two of their three infantry battalions,

In addition those 8 National Guard divisions in reserve hold 26 BCTs:

5x ABCT
2x SBCT
19x IBCT.

Putting it all together and the US Army holds 57 BCTs

The USMC organizes itself differently. The closest Marine analogue to the BCT is the MEB or the Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

The three active Marine divisions form the basis of three Marine Expeditionary Forces. The three MEFs can be employed as three entities or they can be split up. They can be split into MEBs (brigades) or MEU (Marine Expeditionary Units, battalions). Currently the USMC fields:

3x MEBs
7x MEUs.

The seven MEUs can be considered as two more BCT equivalents. In addition the USMC fields a novel formation the MLR or Marine Littoral Regiment that could be considered as broadly equivalent to two more BCTs. The third one is building.

Taken collectively that gives, by my estimation, the Marines the basis for 8 more BCT equivalents.

I am not allowing any MEB/BCTEs for the Marine reserves. Just because.

57 Army BCTEs
8 Marine BCTEs

A land combat force combined of 65 BCTEs, active and reserve with 39 Active and 26 National Guard Reserve.

Now to apply some Canadian math and divide everything by 10.

….

4 US Corps = 0.4 Canadian Corps
24 US Divisions = 2.4 Canadian Divisions
65 US BCTEs = 6.5 Canadian BCTEs

The Canadian equivalent of a BCT is a Brigade Group.

….

Looking at the Active/Reserve divide yields this:

15 Active US Divisions = 1.5 Regular Canadian Divsions
9 Reserve US Divisions = 9.0 Reserve Canadian Divisions

39 Active US BCTEs = 3.9 Active Canadian Brigade Groups
26 Reserve US BCTEs = 2.6 Reserve Canadian Brigade Groups

….

In addition the US Army fields some critical enablers. I choose to focus on three:

Combat Aviation
Field Artillery
Air Defence Artillery.

….

Combat Aviation first.

Every US division has its own air force. Some have more. Some have less. All have some. That air force can supply close support, although that doesn’t apply to all divisions. It can also supply situational awareness or ISR and that seems to apply to most if not all divisions. What is supplied to all divisions is logistical support. Regardless of the nature of the division, regardless of whether it is comprised of ABCTs, SBCTs or IBCTs, every division has a heavy lift battalion (RCAF squadron) of CH-47 Chinooks (Hooks) and a utility battalion (squadron) of UH-60 Blackhawks. In addition there are separate brigades to support corps and theater operations.

In active service the Army fields, as noted, 12 divisions. Each has its own Combat Aviation Brigade (RCAF Wing). In the National Guard each of the divisions also has its own Combat Aviation Brigade for an additional 8 brigades. The 101st Division, in active service has the equivalent of an additional Aviation Brigade. The National Guard holds an addition 4 separate Aviation Brigades.

Collectively that suggests something like 25 Aviation Brigades (RCAF Wings) with another 3 or 4 more manned by the Army Reserves. The USMC has its own aviation assets. My estimate is that the US holds something on the order of 30 rotary wing aviation brigades.

30 US Rotary Wing Aviation Brigades = 3 Canadian Rotary Wing Aviation Wings.

…

On to Field Artillery.

Artillery is central the US way of war. They never leave home without it.

Sections have grenade launchers, platoons, companies and battalions have mortars. Brigades, divisions and corps have cannons and rockets. Every BCTE has a battalion (Canadian regiment) of cannons. With the move to regroup the BCTs under divisional control the DivArty is reasserting itself and taking control over the all the division’s cannons. Corps also have a Field Artillery Brigade for General Support and those are typically equipped with rockets.

The National Guard also equips its BCTs with a cannon battalion. And it also has separate General Support Field Artillery Brigades. These are equipped with a mix of both cannons and rockets.

Cannons can be towed 105mm or 155mm howitzers or tracked 155mm self-propelled howitzers. Rockets can be launched from either the tracked M271 MLRS or the wheeled HIMARS.

The Active force fields

31x Cannon battalions
13x Rocket battalions

The National Guard fields

42x Cannon battalions
15x Rocket battalions



Canadian math (add a bit extra to cover the USMC’s guns and missiles):

3.1 Regular Cannon Regiments
1.3 Regular Rocket Regiments

4.2 Reserve Cannon Regiments
1.5 Reserve Rocket Regiments.

….

Finally Air Defence (or Defense if you prefer)

In the US the Air Defense Artillery is separate from the Field Artillery. It covers everything from c-UAS and c-RAMs, through ManPADs and SHORAD to MRADs and Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense. Operationally it is known as Integrated Air Missile Defence. Multiple tools, multiple layers for multiple threats. And it is evolving, rapidly, as the threat evolves.

Organizationally Air Defence Artillery comprises 4 Anti Air Missile Defence Commands

10 AAMDC
32 AAMDC
94 AAMDC
263 AAMDC

It also contributes to the new Space Force. 263 AAMDC is a National Guard Command and, following on from the Air National Guard’s ownership of the NORAD role the Space Force’s 100th Missile Defense Brigade is also a National Guard responsibility.


Under the 4 AAMDCs there are

10x Air Defense Artillery Brigades.

Under the ADABs there are approximately

26x Air Defence Artillery Regiments (Canadian regiments).

21x Active ADARs
5x National Guard ADARs

It is noteworthy that this is a developing field with air defence, in the form of c-RAM and c-UAS being cascaded downwards so that all elements, down to the section level, have some means to defending themselves from aerial threats.

….


Canadian math:

10x US ADABs = 1x Canadian ADAB
21x Active US ADARs = 2.1 Active Canadian ADARs
5x National Guard ADARs = 0.5 Canadian Reserve ADARs.

And what does it take to man all of this?

 

[Kirkhill]

And how do we crew this lot? WWUSD with a bit of Canadian math

461,657 active US soldiers
174,577 active US marines
636, 234 active combatants = 63,623 Regular Canadian soldiers

176,171 reserve soldiers
32,599 reserve marines
208,770 reserve combatants = 20,877 Supplementary List Canadian soldiers


329,705 Army National Guard = 32,971 Canadian Militia soldiers.

....

Reiterating the structure

1x Canadian Corps (0.4 rounded up)
2.4x Canadian Divisions (2 Divisions plus an extra Brigade)
6.5x Canadian Brigade Groups (6 Brigades plus a couple of spare Battle Groups)

Enablers

3x Aviation Wings
7x Cannon Regiments
3x Rocket Regiments

1x Anti-Air Missile Defence Brigade
3x Anti-Air Missile Defence Regiments


Splitting them between the Regs and the Reserves

Corps – Regular/Reserve
Divisions – 1(+) Regular, 1 Reserve
Brigade Groups – 3 (+) Regular, 3 Reserve

Aviation Wings – 1 Regular, 2 Reserve

Cannon Regiments – 3 Regular, 4 Reserve
Rocket Regiments – 1 Regular, 2 Reserve

Anti-Air Missile Defence Brigade – Regular/Reserve
Anti-Air Missile Defence Regiments – 1 Regular, 2 Reserve.

Organizationally I don't think we are a million miles away from this. We're not short of the command structure.

We need bucks to buy the kit. We need the bodies but doubling the annual intake to 10,000 from 5,000 would work wonders. Especially if they were two years on the roles and then Supp Listed. The Militia/Primary Reserve needs some care and feeding from CADTC.