Russia's Mistral class LHDs: updates

[Loachman]

George, can our current Griffons and Chinooks operate from a ship without modifications? In a pinch, probably yes, but for any extended use, would there be problems? As an example, the Seahawk does have a variety of modifications from the base Blackhawk frame to allow it to operate off ships.

430 Squadron had four Griffons embarked on Mistral (the name of the specific ship, and also one of that class) for several days a year or so ago.

There would be some awkwardness due to the inability to fold rotor blades. Currently, we tow Griffons using wheel sets that have to be attached to the skids. The skids then have to be raised up off of the ground/deck using a hand-pumped hydraulic system that is part of each wheel set.

 

[jollyjacktar]

Temporary re-allocation of some of the DDH and AOR folks who no longer have ships to sail?  ???

They were already sailing short in some trades, MAR ENG for example, and had been robbing Peter to pay Paul.  My trade too at times.  Some of the trades were losing guys at a frantic clip.  Maybe with the patch thundering in for the time being this might be one bit of quick clot onto the wound.  There has been bleeding with both the young guys and at my end with the pensionable guys.  Not that it was all going to the patch, as was when the CPFs were coming out, we've lost senior guys to industry with the various yards and defence contractors building/refitting ships.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Here we go again Kirkhill 

First of all, by its very definition, doctrine must lead, not follow (the reverse of what you propose). Why? Simply because doctrine is a set of accepted principles created specifically to guide everything we do. It exists independently from the type of equipment we have at any given moment. It provides guidance on our deportment that governs how we go about doing it.

For instance, the U.S. Monroe Doctrine: "if we catch a European finger in the Americas, we will cut it at the shoulder" guides the U.S. foreign policy since it was stated. Another example is the U.S. Army doctrine of Overwhelming Force, adopted after the Vietnam war, which led to the successful conclusion of  the Cold War and campaign against Saddam Hussein in Koweit.

The U.S. Navy has a doctrine, which we follow also in Canada, which is the Never Again Doctrine adopted after Pearl Harbour: basically, it states that warships have to be manned as if at war and operated accordingly at all times.

This leads to the second point: Doctrine has nothing to do with manning, at least not as far as determination of trades and operator's qualification go, but rather only in so far as manning levels are concerned.

Thus, we don't need Nelson era gunners, or craftsman, nor Fisher's era coal stokers.

Heck! You don't even need to go further than the arrival of the HALs. We went from boiler room artificers to diesel/GT propulsion. Did that require a change in doctrine? No. it may have changed the qualifications of the members of the Engineering department, but the doctrine remained the same and it dictated the calculation of the manning levels for the new ship's as it had for the old: "With this equipment to operate, what would be my wartime patrol watch requirement".   

 

[Kirkhill]

Here we go again Kirkhill 

First of all, by its very definition, doctrine must lead, not follow (the reverse of what you propose). Why? Simply because doctrine is a set of accepted principles created specifically to guide everything we do. It exists independently from the type of equipment we have at any given moment. It provides guidance on our deportment that governs how we go about doing it.

For instance, the U.S. Monroe Doctrine: "if we catch a European finger in the Americas, we will cut it at the shoulder" guides the U.S. foreign policy since it was stated. Another example is the U.S. Army doctrine of Overwhelming Force, adopted after the Vietnam war, which led to the successful conclusion of  the Cold War and campaign against Saddam Hussein in Koweit.

The U.S. Navy has a doctrine, which we follow also in Canada, which is the Never Again Doctrine adopted after Pearl Harbour: basically, it states that warships have to be manned as if at war and operated accordingly at all times.

This leads to the second point: Doctrine has nothing to do with manning, at least not as far as determination of trades and operator's qualification go, but rather only in so far as manning levels are concerned.

Thus, we don't need Nelson era gunners, or craftsman, nor Fisher's era coal stokers.

Heck! You don't even need to go further than the arrival of the HALs. We went from boiler room artificers to diesel/GT propulsion. Did that require a change in doctrine? No. it may have changed the qualifications of the members of the Engineering department, but the doctrine remained the same and it dictated the calculation of the manning levels for the new ship's as it had for the old: "With this equipment to operate, what would be my wartime patrol watch requirement". 

But I am going to chase the circle - Pugh and Boyd rule....  :nod:

Doctrine sets the desired capabilities - but if the desired capabilities do not exist  then what happens to doctrine?

Often desired capabilities are found to be unavailable due to lack of technology, lack of manpower and/or lack of budget.

The CAF generally and the RCN seem to be suffering on all three fronts.

The RCN chooses to align itself with the Doctrine of the USN and the RN.  Great.  Can you afford to do that?

For that matter can the USN and the RN afford their Doctrines?  On the evidence I would suggest not.

How is the 600 ship USN coming along?  How are the 13, 12, 11, 10.....Carrier Groups coming?  How about the 12 Darings?  Will all 7 Astutes get built?  Will RN Trident be modernized?  How many carriers will remain at sea with what aircraft complement?  How many Type 26s and what ratios of C1,C2, C3?

Or going backwards.  Did doctrine drive corvettes or did corvettes drive doctrine?

Time to go round the circle again and keep the focus on the center of rotation.....an affordable, functional, useful fleet that fits withing the budgetted dollars and PYs available.

:cheers:

Slainte....

PS - Your current enemies doctrines can be summed up simply.  "Confusion to the enemy".  "Slaughter the infidel".  I leave it to you to decide which enemies might apply to which doctrine.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Alright, some of my comments in yellow:

But I am going to chase the circle - Pugh and Boyd rule....  :nod:

Doctrine sets the desired capabilities No it doesn't. Doctrine has nothing to do with setting capability. I think you may be confusing doctrine with policy or strategy, which set the final aim. Doctrine provides guidance, at every type of levels, on how to go about achieving your aim, in the daily execution of it. - but if the desired capabilities do not exist  then what happens to doctrine?

Often desired capabilities are found to be unavailable due to lack of technology, lack of manpower and/or lack of budget.

The CAF generally and the RCN seem to be suffering on all three fronts.

The RCN chooses to align itself with the Doctrine of the USN and the RN.  Great.  Can you afford to do that?

For that matter can the USN and the RN afford their Doctrines?  On the evidence I would suggest not.

How is the 600 ship USN coming along?  How are the 13, 12, 11, 10.....Carrier Groups coming?  How about the 12 Darings?  Will all 7 Astutes get built?  Will RN Trident be modernized?  How many carriers will remain at sea with what aircraft complement?  How many Type 26s and what ratios of C1,C2, C3? All this is irrelevant to doctrine. You talk of the 600 ship Navy, for instance. This was driven by policy: The US had stated at that point of the cold war that "It could not envisage a scenario that would not entail deployment of at least two aircraft Carrier Battle Group in the North Sea". That policy set the requirement for a 600 ship Navy (which, BTW, it almost achieved, had it not been for the end of the Cold War). One of the doctrines of the US Navy at the time was still "Never Again" and that drove HOW the ship's captains were operating their ships, with combat watch set at all time at sea, as much as the senior commander's actions, such as always making sure they sailed their Carriers with a proper ASW screen set and AAW picket ship deployed- weapons ready.

Or going backwards.  Did doctrine drive corvettes or did corvettes drive doctrine? Neither. The corvettes were adopted because the UK needed large number of escorts in a hurry and they were the easiest and fastest ships to build in  numbers. They, in turn, drove the ASW tactics used around the convoys (such as Raspberry and Half-Raspberry, etc.). However, there was a doctrinal fight between the RCN and the RN on ASW in the North-Atlantic. which had nothing to do with tactics/corvettes or anything else: Right from the get go, the RN's doctrine was "safe and timely arrival of convoys", which merely required the escorts to drive away attacking submarines, while the RCN (who did not need the supplies on the convoy anyway) would have preferred (and often followed regardless of the RN's wish) the American doctrine of "full persecution and destruction of the ennemy", which required the escorts to prosecute any contact till satisfied that the enemy is destroyed or no further prosecution is possible regardless of delays or extra sinking in the convoy. Just re-read this (the doctrinal fight) carefully and you will see the difference form policy, strategy and tactics: We got corvettes because that's what you could get in a hurry (policy), you established convoys because that is an effective means to defeat unrestricted submarine warfare sea denial campaign (strategy), you created group method for fighting, like Raspberry , Half-Raspberry, etc. (tactics), but what guided you in how or why you used the various tactics, pushing subs aside or prosecuting fully, was doctrine.

Time to go round the circle again and keep the focus on the center of rotation.....an affordable, functional, useful fleet that fits withing the budgetted dollars and PYs available.

:cheers:

Slainte....

:cheers:

Santé.

 

[Kirkhill]

Fair enough

The U.S. Navy has a doctrine, which we follow also in Canada, which is the Never Again Doctrine adopted after Pearl Harbour: basically, it states that warships have to be manned as if at war and operated accordingly at all times.

So the USN's doctrine, and by inference Canada's doctrine, is: Whatever the hell we're doing we will never screw up again?  No sleeping on watch?

 

[Loachman]

First of all, by its very definition, doctrine must lead, not follow (the reverse of what you propose). Why? Simply because doctrine is a set of accepted principles created specifically to guide everything we do. It exists independently from the type of equipment we have at any given moment. It provides guidance on our deportment that governs how we go about doing it.

For instance, the U.S. Monroe Doctrine: "if we catch a European finger in the Americas, we will cut it at the shoulder" guides the U.S. foreign policy since it was stated.

But isn't that "Doctrine" really policy?

Anyway, we often have doctrine/reality gaps and buy equipment that forces a re-write of doctrine.

Griffon was/is a prime example.

We had excellent doctrine up until we were saddled with the LSVW of the helicopter world - really a copy of the US Army "Air Land Battle 2000" with some terminology changes.

Our doctrine stated, then, that there was continual requirement at brigade level for light helicopters for reconnaissance and fire direction (the brigade Loach Squadron of sixteen machines) and occasional requirement for Utility and Attack. Those both became continual requirements at Div level, with an occasional requirement for Medium Transport (Chinook) added. That became a continual requirement at Corps level. An independent brigade would see four utility helicopters added to its Loach Squadron as air ambulances.

That got tossed out, and each brigade got, for a while, a twenty-four Griffon Squadron.

Reconnaissance and fire direction completely vanished. There was a very robust air ambulance capability in its place, though. The continual requirement could no longer be met at all, and the occasional requirement was met six-fold and more.

And now, we've added another nice machine - but how many corps do we have? It was bought for "the" war, not "a" war.

"Ooohh! Shiney!" should neither drive doctrine nor shopping. Unfortunately, reality, too often, differs.

 

[Old Sweat]

And more often than we think, the introduction of new equipment or a  tactical innovation leads to creation of doctrine after the event. The introduction of the Kangaroo Armoured Personnel Carrier in Operation Totalize on the night of 7/8 August is a case in point. The six battalions mounted in the vehicles more or less motored in blobs behind tanks up to the dismount points just short of the objectives. Nobody really had any idea of the potential of the vehicles and their effect on the battlefield.

Six months later when the Royal Winnipeg Rifles assaulted Louisendorf in daylight with all four companies and the tac HQ mounted in Kangaroos, they moved with two companies up behind a British armoured regiment. During the assault the "battle group" detected a new enemy position. The CO issued radio orders to one of the depth companies and their troop of Kangaroos drove them onto the new objective, where they dismounted and cleared it. This just didn't happen out of the blue and the troops had adapted to a new "force enabler." 

It's not naval, but it is as good an example of adaption to a new thing as any.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I thought that good'ol CFJP-01 Canadian Military Doctrine had done a good job of describing exactly what it is that doctrine does:

The concept and purpose of doctrine

0103. Doctrine is a body of knowledge and thought that provides direction and aids understanding. The CF definition of doctrine is “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”1 It embraces established wisdom in the areas of problem solving, decision making and planning, and is sometimes defined as simply “what is taught.”

0104. Military doctrine provides the framework within which military operations are planned and executed. It represents the distilled insights and wisdom gained from experience. Doctrine is developed in the context of contemporary and emerging factors that influence the way that Canada intends to use military force. By building on lessons learned with an understanding of the future, military doctrine provides the rationale behind the organization and the employment of military forces and assists in the determination of appropriate roles and missions. A sound doctrinal framework provides the basis for operations and training, guides commanders and helps individuals to think more clearly in the fog of war.

0105. Military doctrine provides a common approach to the conduct of military arts and science based upon methodical thinking that is not bound by prescriptive rules. When combined with effective training, doctrine does not constrain individual initiative; rather it leads to consistent behaviour, mutual confidence and effective collective action. Well-developed military doctrine is inherently flexible, allowing commanders to seize the initiative and adopt unorthodox or imaginative courses of action as opportunities arise in the “battlespace.”

This said, I believe (and I blame myself for getting into this discussion) that we are straying very far from the actual topic of the thread.

So back on topic: We would have had the helicopters to employ the Mistral's in a useful manner, be they Chinooks or Griffons. However, their maintenance while onboard would have had to be modified to take into consideration exposure to salty air and humidity.

And Kirkhill: the USN doctrine we follow does not prevent all screw ups: see USS Cole and USS Vincennes incidents. But it does make you ready to deal with situations that develop quickly, unlike continental European nations navies outside of "normal" working hours.

As for sleeping on watch: I hope you were joking, because it is one of the most serious charge you can make against a seaman. We don't punish it by death anymore, but almost.

 

[Loachman]

We would have had the helicopters to employ the Mistral's in a useful manner, be they Chinooks or Griffons. However, their maintenance while onboard would have had to be modified to take into consideration exposure to salty air and humidity.

Daily engine washes, same as we do when near a coast.

Lack of blade folding would be the biggest problem - I'll have to ask 430 Squadron how much of an issue that was for them - and the skid landing gear on the Griffon would be the major difficulties/annoyances.

 

[Kirkhill]

As for sleeping on watch: I hope you were joking, because it is one of the most serious charge you can make against a seaman. We don't punish it by death anymore, but almost.

I thought the cure for the punishment was a pint inside and a pint on the back  >

See what happens when you allow progress?  No corporal punishment so now you either have to hang the poor bugger or ignore the transgression.  Can't even keel haul him.

As to the point on policy, doctrine, strategy, intent, vision....insert institutional buzzword of the day..... the fact remains, as Loachman and Old Sweat demonstrate that nothing is static and everything has to be constantly re-evaluated based on current circumstances.

They shall not pass.  That is a goal, an intent. 
All convoys will get through.
No subs in the Gulf of St Lawrence.

Doctrine would define, in general terms, how those goals would be accomplished with the tools available. It would set the broad parameters so that the guys on the field would know they are playing rugby and not badminton.


As an aside:
Never again....if that is indeed the case... then that clearly explains the difference between Blue Suiters and Green Suiters as observed in this Harvard Business Review article that I have previously cited.

To generalize, Navy and Air Force CMEs take a process-driven approach to management; personnel are expected to follow standard procedures without any deviation. This allows the CMEs to excel in highly regulated industries and, perhaps surprisingly, in innovative sectors. Army and Marine Corps CMEs embrace flexibility and empower people to act on their vision. They excel in small firms, where they are better able to communicate a clear direction and identify capable subordinates to execute accordingly. (Although the Marine Corps is part of the Department of the Navy, we treat it as a separate entity because of its distinctive organizational identity.)

And Loachman, wouldn't the issue of blade folding depend on the size of the hangars, their accessibility and the frequency with which the helos are utilized?

If they need to be used daily then folding blades.  If they only need to be installed once prior to self-deployment to a shore base then non-folding blades (almost said fixed blades but I am sure somebody would seize on that).

 

[Loachman]

Hangar space is tight enough in a regular hangar, and worse in the confined space on a ship. In this case, elevators would be the first constraint.

How long is the voyage? What's the weather going to be like? Blades and bits can be removed - we do this to move machines on C17s - but it's not very convenient, takes time, requires a test flight afterwards, and may be a little more "interesting" on a rolling ship. Mistral was reported to be very stable, but weather during 430 Squadron's short embarkation was ideal.

 

[George Wallace]

Another way of looking at it may be that the helos don't have to actually be transported by the Mistral, but airlifted or flown to an airhead that would act as a land base for them to offload whatever the Mistrals may transport by sea.  The Mistrals would only act as the 'floating' platform for the helos to load/offload troops and cargo.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Daily engine washes, same as we do when near a coast.

Lack of blade folding would be the biggest problem - I'll have to ask 430 Squadron how much of an issue that was for them - and the skid landing gear on the Griffon would be the major difficulties/annoyances.

Hangar space is tight enough in a regular hangar, and worse in the confined space on a ship. In this case, elevators would be the first constraint.

How long is the voyage? What's the weather going to be like? Blades and bits can be removed - we do this to move machines on C17s - but it's not very convenient, takes time, requires a test flight afterwards, and may be a little more "interesting" on a rolling ship. Mistral was reported to be very stable, but weather during 430 Squadron's short embarkation was ideal.

Actually Loachman, it is a little more than just engine daily wash. It is more like an everything and its dog wash, then generously oil and grease. But I doubt a Canadian Mistral would ever sail without one or two MH helicopter and their personnel will be glad to guide the Army air crew through the processes.

As for Hangar facility: they are excellent, capable of harbouring 16 medium size helos. The main hangar is 19,000 square feet, and you access it mostly from the rear elevator, which can handle 13 tonnes (I think that covers the Griffons all-right. That rear elevator is 2,400 square feet and the arrangement permits medium size helicopters, such as Pumas, to be transferred to or from the hangar with their four blades in normal operating configuration. To make matters even better, the "Russian" Mistrals have that hangar deck with their height increased to accommodate the lovely Russian Karmov helicopters with their double-stacked rotors system  . P.s.: The hangar also have overhead cranes to help with the work on any helicopter, a nice perk for a "field" deployment.

As for handling the "skidded" helicopters, remember that you would not do the handling by hand on the deck. The ship carries aviation tractors for that purpose.

Finally, the only helo that could pose a problem is the Chinook. The Mistrals only have one spot (number 6) that can handle the heavier helicopters (up to 33 tonnes), so depending on numbers you want to carry, you may have to park the Chinooks on the flight deck, either at the rear on the port side behind spot 5 (would not be my choice except for very short duration, or starboard side, forward of the superstructure, an area already designated for parking.

Oh! The Mistrals have a roll motion damper system.

 

[CougarKing]

Going, going... Gone?!!!

Defense News

France Says Egypt to Buy Mistral Warships

Egypt has agreed to buy two Mistral warships which France built for Russia before scrapping the sale over the Ukraine crisis, the French presidency said in a statement Wednesday.
President Francois Hollande and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi "have agreed on the principle and terms and conditions of Egypt's acquisition of the two Mistral-class vessels," the statement said.
The deal comes a little over six weeks after France and Russia reached an agreement to fully reimburse Moscow for the scrapped 1.2-billion-euro ($1.3-billion) deal.
The first Mistral had been due for delivery in 2014, while the second was to be delivered this year.

(...SNIPPED)

 

[CougarKing]

More confirmation that they're getting both ships with this announcement on the homepage of the French President:

Elysee.fr

Le Président de la République s’est entretenu avec le Président Sissi. Ils se
sont accordés sur le principe et les modalités de l’acquisition par l’Egypte des
deux bâtiments de projection et de commandement de classe Mistra

 

[MarkOttawa]

Very useful capability for Egyptians should they decide to intervene in a Libya or Yemen-type situation.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MilEME09]

Very useful capability for Egyptians should they decide to intervene in a Libya or Yemen-type situation.

Mark
Ottawa

Or I wonder if this might be a work around and Egypt goes and "sells" them to Russia

 

[Retired AF Guy]

Or I wonder if this might be a work around and Egypt goes and "sells" them to Russia

You could be onto something. Who knows??

 

[CougarKing]

Very useful capability for Egyptians should they decide to intervene in a Libya or Yemen-type situation.

Many of the news sources I've come across online say that the Saudis made a loan to allow the Egyptians to finance these 2 ships.

Other sources such as another article I posted about earlier in this thread say that Egypt was able to afford it with a Russian loan.

Yes, and there is also speculation on other defence forums that Egypt may just be acting as the middleman for selling them back to Russia.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Still, if the Saudis were indeed behind it, this gives them a big say in where, when and how they are used regardless of the fact they'll be flying the Egyptian naval ensign.

This would include contingencies such as a Yemen-type amphibious operation? Iran and the Houthis should probably beware of the Sunni Muslim coalition's new assault carriers. 

Anyways, here's info on the air group that Egypt will put on the 2 Mistrals:

WASHINGTON, Sept. 23 (UPI) --Russia has reportedly agreed to sell 50 helicopters to Egypt for the Mistral ships France initially intended to sell Russia.

Russian news agency Tass reports Russia will be supplying Egypt with Ka-52 Alligator family helicopters. Authorities in Moscow say they are not ruling out the delivery of the deck-based version of the helicopters, according to unnamed sources.

Source: UPI