Strong, Secure, Engaged: A Two-Year Review

[daftandbarmy]

Strong, Secure, Engaged: A Two-Year Review

The Trudeau government released its defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, in June 2017 with considerable fanfare around the publication’s fiscal underpinnings. It was stated that the policy review that led to the document was the most rigorously costed Canadian defence policy exercise ever. The policy was supported by external auditors and accompanied by several fiscal transparency initiatives. The document included a 20-year projection of the underpinning budget – in the accrual accounting format used in federal budgets – as well as a projection of cash spending, which is the accounting format used in the Estimates and reports to Parliament. The policy also included a projection of how Canada would measure up to the NATO spending targets to which it had committed as a member of the alliance, spending two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence and spending 20 per cent of that money on equipment purchase and related research and development. These spending projections are all a novel feature of Canadian defence policy under Strong, Secure, Engaged and they allow progress on the policy to be measured. While funding never tells the full story on any public policy file, it is a critical indicator of policy implementation.

Two years after the publication of Strong, Secure Engaged, the Trudeau government’s record of spending the money to implement its policy is a largely positive one. The government is struggling to spend as much on capital (equipment and infrastructure) as it hoped, and spending on equipment and related research and development as a share of the defence budget is falling short of expectations. However, spending on those procurement projects is rising in inflation-adjusted dollars for the first time in years. Meanwhile, total defence spending is meeting, or exceeding, the expectations set with the policy’s publication.

https://www.cgai.ca/strong_secure_engaged_a_two_year_review

 

[AlDazz]

Anyone remember Strengthen The Army Reserve (STAR).  After a positive start this seems to have faded into the underfunded reality of our current military.

 

[mariomike]

For reference to the discussion,

Strong, Secure, Engaged

Canada's Defence Policy

HOW DOES CANADA'S NEW DEFENCE POLICY MEASURE UP?

A Benchmark Analysis by Col Charles Davies (Ret'd)

June 2017

http://cdainstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CDA-Institute-Analysis-Davies-June-2017-2.pdf

 

[MilEME09]

Anyone remember Strengthen The Army Reserve (STAR).  After a positive start this seems to have faded into the underfunded reality of our current military.

I would argue the lack of qualified personal that can teach is the bigger killer, cant run courses if you do not have instructors and resources.

 

[OldSolduer]

I didn’t know this government had a defence policy other than to ignore the CAF hoping it will go away.

 

[Remius]

I would argue the lack of qualified personal that can teach is the bigger killer, cant run courses if you do not have instructors and resources.

This.

When it takes a reservist 4 years to get all of his leadership courses done you tend to lose them and get nothing for the effort.  The plq, dp, asa, rscc system the infantry reserve has is a mess and the results are finally catching up.  Glad to see they are fixing some issues and going back to the ISCC model but you highlighted one of the bigger problems.  We have plenty of recruits.  Not enough leaders.

 

[Jarnhamar]

[quote author=Remius]We have plenty of recruits.  Not enough leaders.
[/quote]

Shut down ceremonial duties and tasks for a few years.
Get more mbrs PLQ trained.
Train up recruits.

 

[MilEME09]

Shut down ceremonial duties and tasks for a few years.
Get more mbrs PLQ trained.
Train up recruits.

That and more instructors at the schools, perhaps which ever Div is not on high readiness should send extra instructors ti the schools for a bit to try and clear the back log.

 

[ballz]

That and more instructors at the schools, perhaps which ever Div is not on high readiness should send extra instructors ti the schools for a bit to try and clear the back log.

That's already what happens, but not being on road to high-readiness essentially makes zero difference. The Managed Readiness Program is a complete train wreck and after reviewing it 2 years ago and concluding that "status quo" was the best answer, I see the Army is now convening again to war game a change.

One of the biggest issues being whether you're in the support phase, the road to high-readiness, or on high-readiness, the units are told to do all the exact same things for training. That an with IRU, NEO, DART, and some others I am surely missing, pretty much everyone is on high-readiness at all times.

 

[daftandbarmy]

This.

When it takes a reservist 4 years to get all of his leadership courses done you tend to lose them and get nothing for the effort.  The plq, dp, asa, rscc system the infantry reserve has is a mess and the results are finally catching up.  Glad to see they are fixing some issues and going back to the ISCC model but you highlighted one of the bigger problems.  We have plenty of recruits.  Not enough leaders.

Which is what this report seems to have discovered, almost 10 years ago.... it's all about retention, which we continue to suck at

A CONFLUENCE OF FACTORS: CANADIAN FORCES RETENTION AND THE FUTURE FORCE

Major Mark N. Popov

ABSTRACT

Between 2000 and 2010, the Canadian Forces (CF) faced an attrition crisis that threatened its operational capabilities. Despite a comprehensive strategic retention plan that reduced critically high attrition, the CF’s large, experienced long-service demographic cohort is approaching retirement, leaving a much smaller mid-service cohort to replace it. The demands of the future security environment, workforce generational changes, the changing Canadian economy and the necessity for the CF to develop its own leaders from within make retaining a sufficiently large pool of experienced personnel a critical requirement. This paper outlines the CF manning situation, identifies future challenges, compares American, British, Canadian and Australian retention efforts, identifies internal CF dissatisfiers and recommends future research and retention activities.

It contends that although CF research is comprehensive and well-respected, it suffers from knowledge gaps that could be closed by amalgamating scientific research with CF leader assessments to create a full personnel picture. CF pay and benefits are competitive, but a confluence of internal dissatisfiers contributes to personnel attrition, which cannot be resolved by adding pay, benefits, leave or other motivators; retaining personnel is not an economic function. Mitigating attrition requires some modification of existing policies to reduce dissatisfaction, continued efforts to ensure CF employment is challenging and satisfying, and continued vigilance and effort by CF leaders to demonstrate they and the CF are connected to and appropriately value their personnel. Retention will always be critical to maintaining a healthy force.

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/297/286/popov.pdf

 

[Halifax Tar]

I would argue the lack of qualified personal that can teach is the bigger killer, cant run courses if you do not have instructors and resources.

My understanding, gained from my peers who have done postings with reserve units, is that they have people (reservists), but getting them to accept instructing tasking's for the summer was like pulling teeth; and often the Reg Force folks get pushed into the positions, because well "they said so".

 

[FJAG]

My understanding, gained from my peers who have done postings with reserve units, is that they have people (reservists), but getting them to accept instructing tasking's for the summer was like pulling teeth; and often the Reg Force folks get pushed into the positions, because well "they said so".

I wonder how much of that is the guarantee of getting a job.

Back in the 70s when I was RSSO with 26th Fd, I was also tasked as the CI for the National and Area Artillery Rank and Trade Schools run at Shilo. As such I controlled the manning slates and could guarantee individuals a full summer of employment as an instructor, firing troop member or admin staff. We had very few problems filling positions.

From the discussions I see in threads here, these days putting your name in for anything is hit and miss until the very last minute when it's too late to find alternate employment if things fall through. I can see where that has people looking elsewhere right from the start.

:cheers:

 

[MilEME09]

My understanding, gained from my peers who have done postings with reserve units, is that they have people (reservists), but getting them to accept instructing tasking's for the summer was like pulling teeth; and often the Reg Force folks get pushed into the positions, because well "they said so".

Part of this problem is many of full time jobs who can't give them the time off to do these taskings. As an example in Alberta to take reservist leave I legally have to give 30 days written notice to my employer. On top of this I am only entitled to 22 days per year, after that its upto my employer being nice and saying yes. This year I was confirmed on course less then 30 days, my employer was kind enough to give me the time off but many employers aren't as understanding to be told you gotta replace me in less then a months notice. While my employer knew of me going on course he wasn't prepared to waste resources, or hire anyone unless I was confirmed. Courses are great, I'm gone 9 weeks this summer, but many reservists will not go on course or tasking if it will cost them their full time job.

 

[brihard]

My understanding, gained from my peers who have done postings with reserve units, is that they have people (reservists), but getting them to accept instructing tasking's for the summer was like pulling teeth; and often the Reg Force folks get pushed into the positions, because well "they said so".

Yes- because most PRes NCOs aren’t on class B, which means we do something else to pay the mortgage. Our jobs aren’t going to let us just frig off each summer to instruct, and besides, why would I even want to take a huge pay hit to do so?

 

[Remius]

Yes- because most PRes NCOs aren’t on class B, which means we do something else to pay the mortgage. Our jobs aren’t going to let us just frig off each summer to instruct, and besides, why would I even want to take a huge pay hit to do so?

Which is why qualifying NCOs in a shorter time frame would help.  4 years from DP2A to RSCC is ridiculous.  By then most troops are done their reserve stint or have secured better jobs and become established doing something else.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Yes- because most PRes NCOs aren’t on class B, which means we do something else to pay the mortgage. Our jobs aren’t going to let us just frig off each summer to instruct, and besides, why would I even want to take a huge pay hit to do so?

When I was a rifle company OC this was one of the big issues. The other was the fact that the job was in Wainwright and, while Reg F staff had chances to take 'home leave' during the summer, the reservists were marooned on the prairie for months, and usually forbidden to bring their POMVs as well. More often than not they were also d*cked around endlessly, mainly for being reservists from what I understand.

They really liked the instructing jobs, most reservist NCOs are good instructors and really enjoy working with recruits etc, they just don't like getting treated like cr*p (more than once or twice) and, having the option, vote with their feet.

 

[Remius]

They really liked the instructing jobs, most reservist NCOs are good instructors and really enjoy working with recruits etc, they just don't like getting treated like cr*p (more than once or twice) and, having the option, vote with their feet.

Still happening.  Many vow never to return.  A lot follow through with that promise.