Time to invest in more CAF logistics?

[Colin Parkinson]

I agree, more so in the reserves, problem is, doctrine makes proper CSS in the PRes next to impossible. By this i mean units are to keep 72 hours worth of stores on hand, that covers your weekend exercises, so only on a brigade EX would they need resupply, so that is one time a year they need the service battalion. Which always is a gong show because they do not practice any of the procedure for ordering supplies.

I think in part a lack of imagination on the units parts and coordination. The Res Svc Battalions should get the funds and task to support units in the field, even if it's a truck (2 in case of breakdowns) to deliver IMP's and blank or dummy ammo or field defense stores. The combat arms unit deploys on it's exercise, the Svc Battalion dispatches the trucks to meet them at a grid square in a tactical setting and the units exchange stores. Perhaps start with dummy and non-critical stores at first and then as things sort themselves out, add new elements like a tactical vehicle recovery and repair. 

 

[Lumber]

I think in part a lack of imagination on the units parts and coordination. The Res Svc Battalions should get the funds and task to support units in the field, even if it's a truck (2 in case of breakdowns) to deliver IMP's and blank or dummy ammo or field defense stores. The combat arms unit deploys on it's exercise, the Svc Battalion dispatches the trucks to meet them at a grid square in a tactical setting and the units exchange stores. Perhaps start with dummy and non-critical stores at first and then as things sort themselves out, add new elements like a tactical vehicle recovery and repair.

...

They don't do this? What the heck are they doing on exercise then? I suppose I could walk next door and ask them...

 

[MilEME09]

...

They don't do this? What the heck are they doing on exercise then? I suppose I could walk next door and ask them...

We have tried, successfully with a couple arty units to do such an EX. It proved eye opening and successful. As for what we do on EX, hide and harbour drills, DP's, CP's, over and over without a unit to actially work the other end.

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[Colin Parkinson]

...

They don't do this? What the heck are they doing on exercise then? I suppose I could walk next door and ask them...

The connections at your level are far more important and successful, then the formal agreements. In our area, all the QM's helped each other on a regular basis, a little honey, knowledge makes the world go smoother.  [

 

[dapaterson]

The problem is generally time constraints that result on supported units not wanting CSS but rather glorified GD personnel to do the crappy,  dirty jobs.

 

[Ostrozac]

So the remaining question is: How far forward will they deliver?  Are their drivers and pilots willing to wear body armour?  If not how big is the gap the Service Battalion has to fill?

US experience from Iraq suggests that corporations are willing to go extremely far forward and their employees are quite willing to wear armour and carry weapons. But it'll cost you.

The jury is still out as to whether using KBR et al to provide the equivalent of the US NSE for the Iraq War was the way of the future or an expensive boondoggle.

 

[Kirkhill]

US experience from Iraq suggests that corporations are willing to go extremely far forward and their employees are quite willing to wear armour and carry weapons. But it'll cost you.

The jury is still out as to whether using KBR et al to provide the equivalent of the US NSE for the Iraq War was the way of the future or an expensive boondoggle.

And if it really comes down to a situation of all other parameters zeroing-out and the only issue is dollars then that truly is a decision appropriate for accountants - and may vary mission by mission.

But I suspect, based on my read of history and in particular the histories of the Royal Waggoners and the Royal Waggon Train, as well as the Commissariat, that, at some point behind but close to the firing line, it is better for soldiers to assume the duty to assure security of supply.  Contracts and Unions can be problematic.

Deliveries to Kabul and Port aux Princes by DHL sounds reasonable.  And perhaps even into Basra and Baghdad.  I am not sure about KBR convoys on the Basra-Baghdad MSR.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Great discussion!
That is the doctrinal answer unfortunately the PYs don’t exist to calve off the IS pieces and do the tactical ATT. 
Again it comes down PYs too maintain that 3rd line capability and not created it every deployment on the back of the Svc Bn or stealing from the IS. 

You’ll hear little argument from me for many IS but it comes with the understanding that you limit employability with civilians (IE changing job desc, work hours etc).  The plus side is generally because they don’t have military admin commitments their overall productivity is usually greater.  A civilian mechanic is turning wrenches 70-80% productive (direct and indirect labour) if not more in a work day.  A military mechanic rarely hits 60% day in day out due to the military component of the job.
It isn’t and we have a good number already. 

Ex MR is not perfect but is highlighted some deep flaws in our CSS thought processes, knowledge and equipment.  Regardless if it is Ex MR or a deployment in Africa, maintainers need to order parts against a work order and Sup techs need to hand out/order a new part and take in the old parts for return to the system.  We weren’t able to do that very well for a variety of reasons.  The tanks and LAVs still ran but it took a ton of collective effort that wasn’t very efficient or effective and much of that boiled down to lack of solid processes and knowledge to use tools (not maint tools) properly.

It is a great discussion. It's amazing how rational these can be when politics don't get involved  [

The way I see the Service Battalions is that they should be 100% military, doctrinal beasts to fill that doctrinal requirement like any other unit in the Brigade. My SOH tells me that the Svc Bn should have 847 PY based on the Germany construct (39-106-702) to support a CMBG including 7-13-161 for Maint Coy (Not including RCEME in Admin Coy). For 3 x Svc Battalions that would mean a total of 2541 pers (117-318-2106) of which the Logistics requirement is 96-279-1623 for the three front line battalions.

If the IS functions went to mostly civilian or DHS/JIT system and military PYs were centred in the battalions this seems feasible based on current troop levels (if not more manageable since there would be less requirement to post people to Logistics hinterlands such as Shilo or Wainwright). The Svc Bn, then, would focus on provision of second line only, with third line provided by base/IS and POSSIBLY a real third line support element (we could likely combine all the CDSG PY into 1 x Div support unit with geographical "companies").

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

And if it really comes down to a situation of all other parameters zeroing-out and the only issue is dollars then that truly is a decision appropriate for accountants - and may vary mission by mission.

But I suspect, based on my read of history and in particular the histories of the Royal Waggoners and the Royal Waggon Train, as well as the Commissariat, that, at some point behind but close to the firing line, it is better for soldiers to assume the duty to assure security of supply.  Contracts and Unions can be problematic.

Deliveries to Kabul and Port aux Princes by DHL sounds reasonable.  And perhaps even into Basra and Baghdad.  I am not sure about KBR convoys on the Basra-Baghdad MSR.

Anything is possible if the right amount of money is thrown at the problem.

That said, if DHL delivered to a main support hub and the companies acted like the "third line" than that's where the service battalion would take responsibility for the movement and accounting of supplies from said main supply hub, essentially making it a Replenishment Point (this could be civilian-military as well, since the hub would resupply multiple organizations). Once the supplies are picked up at the RP than what happens to them after is the purview of the Brigade. This would also help to centralize contracting and other functions

 

[GR66]

DHL or KBR might be OK for conflicts like Afghanistan/Iraq where airspace isn't contested and they can get into theatre without too much risk, but will they be able to deliver to Warsaw while it's under artillery attack and the international airport has its runways cratered?  How will your FedEx 767 manage entering contested airspace?

 

[mariomike]

Are their drivers and pilots willing to wear body armour?

Hey, if DHL/Wal-Mart is willing to deliver to Chicago, Flint, Detroit and Milwaukee, then they brave more danger than most members of the CAF.

Second Chance is an American body armor manufacturing company and was the first one to use kevlar for body armor. The company was founded in the early 1970s by former U.S. Marine and pizza delivery owner/driver Richard Davis. Davis developed the idea of a bulletproof vest after shooting three armed robbers in self-defense during a delivery.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chance_(body_armor)

 

[Kirkhill]

Second Chance is an American body armor manufacturing company and was the first one to use kevlar for body armor. The company was founded in the early 1970s by former U.S. Marine and pizza delivery owner/driver Richard Davis. Davis developed the idea of a bulletproof vest after shooting three armed robbers in self-defense during a delivery.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chance_(body_armor)

Wow!

Well, I guess if you are willing to deliver pizzas to crack-houses for minimum wage and tips,  maybe KBR doesn't look so bad after all.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Interestingly, a Brigade Support Battalion for a US infantry brigade combat team has 65/17/795, 58/14/698 for a SBCT, and70/17/1265 for a ABCT. By the book, 4 Svc Bn has 39/106/702.

Distribution Coy (our S&T Coy) has only 5/2/135 for a  ABCT compared to 11/61/305 for S&T Coy, which makes me wonder if the US system is effective, and if so, why we have almost 2 x more pers....

 

[Fixate]

A few points:

1.  We do have the CF Joint Operational Support Group, but I'm not sure that's what you were looking at with your post above?

2.  I suspect we need to manage our CSS personnel a bit better as well (as part of a larger effort CAF wide).  The Service Battalions are large units, with 850+ PYs allocated to each.  If you look, they've built redundancies in these organizations.  Yet, I have spoken with people who have commanded within the Battalions and state that the rate of undeployable personnel is somewhat higher compared to other units, owing to "broken, unfit people".  I'd need to see numbers to know if it is indeed a problem, but it is something I've heard more than once.

3.  What is the problem exactly; are our Service Battalions not robust enough to handle multiple missions, or have we just not resourced them enough?

The resources are not there i think


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[Lumber]

Ok, I've been following this thread for a while and just ignoring some ignorance, but I can't ignore it any longer.

What is CSS and what is S&T?

Thanks

Navy-Guy

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Ok, I've been following this thread for a while and just ignoring some ignorance, but I can't ignore it any longer.

What is CSS and what is S&T?

Thanks

Navy-Guy

CSS = Combat Service and Support

It's essentially the Wagon Train that follows the fighting troops around making sure they get all the bullets, beans, water, fuel, spare parts, etc... To ensure the fighting troops can do there jobs.

S&T =  Supply and Transport

Basically the Army's version of a Replenishment ship.  All the trucks and stores required to keep the big machine moving.

 

[Lumber]

CSS = Combat Service and Support

It's essentially the Wagon Train that follows the fighting troops around making sure they get all the bullets, beans, water, fuel, spare parts, etc... To ensure the fighting troops can do there jobs.

S&T =  Supply and Transport

Basically the Army's version of a Replenishment ship.  All the trucks and stores required to keep the big machine moving.

So would an S&T deploy to a staging area of sorts, then the CSS would stock up and follow the troops out on a mission?

 

[MilEME09]

So would an S&T deploy to a staging area of sorts, then the CSS would stock up and follow the troops out on a mission?

S&T is part of a Service battalion which would also have your maintenance assets, depending on the tactical situation we deploy differently, Typically though we are in a harbor several Km back from the front. The job of S&T is to push supplies out to the A echelon elements of the combat arms, maintenance will push forward MRT's (Mobile repair teams) as needed to repair or recover damaged equipment. It should also be noted by doctrine the Service Battalion is responsible for rear area security, so we have to be close, but not too close to make sure supplies don't take to long to deliver, and so we don't find our selves over stretched.

 

[Infanteer]

70/17/1265 for a ABCT. By the book, 4 Svc Bn has 39/106/702.

Be careful, those U.S. numbers include the Forward Support Companies that act as "Admin Companies" for the battalions.

 

[Infanteer]

So would an S&T deploy to a staging area of sorts, then the CSS would stock up and follow the troops out on a mission?

Combat Service Support (CSS) is a land operations concept, nothing more.  Combat Manoeuvre is stuff that shoots and moves to take ground.  Armour and Infantry.  Combat Support is stuff that directly supports that manoeuvre.  Engineers, Artillery, Signals, Intelligence.  Combat Service Support is stuff that sustains it all.  Logistics, Maintenance, Health Support, Personnel Support.

Supply & Transport is an actual type of land operations sub-unit, normally part of a Service Battalion.  The Supply & Transport Company is responsible for stockpiling and moving supplies from the rear to the CSS sub-units of the Brigade's Battalions and Regiments (normally called Administration Company or Headquarters Squadron/Battery).  They are essentially the "link-man" in land operations sustainment and are thus considered "second line".