"Trading Saber for Stealth" or "Are We a One Trick Pony?"

[Matt_Fisher]

BTW, wouldn't the American Civil War count as a "failed state" scenario?

As would the Metis' Northwest Rebellion...

 

[Kirkhill]

Ahhhh wait a while you youngsters....by my count, a personal study I undertook, Britain, that gloriously stable country of my birth, hadn't gone more than 25 years on average, between Billy the Conk showing up in 1066 and the present day without having an insurrection. 

Off track, it is often claimed that that was the last time that Britain was invaded......except for William of Orange in 1066, the various times that the French and Spanish showed up to assist the Scots, Irish and Borderers or the Norwegians in the Western Isles landing to assist the highlanders against Edinburgh (The fact that other than the Orange Revolution all other insurrections failed doesn't negate the fact that all those folks successfully conducted tactical landings and established bridgeheads from which the conducted extende operations).

Failed state....like everything else you have to keep working at it .

 

[a_majoor]

Back on the road again ("Back on track" having negative connotations these days  )it seems the argument is bogging down into picking a particular recce task and tailoring the force to match (such as with the Illtis/G-wagon and proposed Duro APV for low intensity and SASO operations), when what is needed is a force capable of supporting Full Spectrum Ops.

The former USSR had a very good set up, the regimental and divisional leading march parties consisting of a platoon of three BRDM recce vehicles supported by a T-64 or T-72 tank. The Recce vehicles were small and nimble enough to operate in a semi-stealthy manner, but were armed and armoured enough to deal one on one with "our" recce screen. Should there be more opposition than the recce guys could handle, (such as elements of an American Armoured Cavalry screen) the tank could provide fire support to extract the recce party. If the recce unit had BMPs or BMP-76's, then there was some more fighting power than a BRDM, and the possibility of dropping off small parties of dismounted scouts. Since the former Soviet Army was essentially a "one block war" force; the inability to interact with the local population wasn't considered a big loss...

In our context, a LAV-recce would provide the ability to advance with some fighting power, and be able to carry dismounted scouts who could carry out any number of useful tasks in any level of the spectrum of conflict. If we want to follow the Soviet model some more, LAV DFSVs (mounting the 105mm CT_CV turret, which actually works) would be attached to each troop, providing overwatch and firepower when required. In low intensity situations, the LAV DFSVs can be withdrawn and used for convoy escort or as mobile OPs (utilizing their FCS optics). Reading the various LAV threads and reports of Stryker Brigades in Iraq, the speed of the LAV gives these units tactical and operational mobility, able to displace 100km or more in a rapid road move where Tank and M-3 CFV based forces would have to be mounted on transporters. Being able to appear and move through the AOR faster than the enemy can react will be one of the tenants of 21rst century recce doctrine, and the ability to deal with enemy reaction will be the other half of that coin.

There are arguments to add a separate assault troop, but if we want to go that far we might as well create a composite Cavalry regiment so we have sufficient manpower and our own "on board CSS" capabilities as well. This has been argued before, and I would say it is a great idea, especially if it is backed by complimentary "Mounted Rifles" battalions which combines the mobility of Cavalry with the greater staying power of Infantry.

In a low/medium intensity environment, the Cavalry (Armoured Recce) can fan out over a wide area using their speed to check out lots of locations, and the dismounted scouts to quietly piquet areas of interest or dismount and walk through the market talking to people (among other things). As the situation is developed (a thwarted ambush here, a patrol snatching a bad guy there, HUMINT developed in this neighbourhood, a vehicle loss due to a mine at point x...) a picture emerges of the enemy. At this point the Mounted Rifles, who were out of sight 200 km away make a sudden appearance in towns x and y, flooding the area with dismounted presence patrols, setting up clinics and establishing themselves in the local police stations. The Cavalry (Armoured Recce) continue their wide patrol patterns to see if the enemy are being flushed out of the two places or attracted to them (or perhaps they guessed wrong, and the enemy is still at z).

All of these activities can be supplemented by surveillance assets, UAVs etc., and can be enhanced by integrating units down to the vehicle level into an information network, but all in all, this is just good, old fashioned recce done with modern vehicles and equipment.

 

[couchcommander]

In our context, a LAV-recce would provide the ability to advance with some fighting power, and be able to carry dismounted scouts who could carry out any number of useful tasks in any level of the spectrum of conflict.....Being able to appear and move through the AOR faster than the enemy can react will be one of the tenants of 21rst century recce doctrine, and the ability to deal with enemy reaction will be the other half of that coin.

In a low/medium intensity environment, the Cavalry (Armoured Recce) can fan out over a wide area using their speed to check out lots of locations, and the dismounted scouts to quietly piquet areas of interest or dismount and walk through the market talking to people (among other things). As the situation is developed (a thwarted ambush here, a patrol snatching a bad guy there, HUMINT developed in this neighbourhood, a vehicle loss due to a mine at point x...) a picture emerges of the enemy. At this point the Mounted Rifles, who were out of sight 200 km away make a sudden appearance in towns x and y, flooding the area with dismounted presence patrols, setting up clinics and establishing themselves in the local police stations. The Cavalry (Armoured Recce) continue their wide patrol patterns to see if the enemy are being flushed out of the two places or attracted to them (or perhaps they guessed wrong, and the enemy is still at z).

All of these activities can be supplemented by surveillance assets, UAVs etc., and can be enhanced by integrating units down to the vehicle level into an information network, but all in all, this is just good, old fashioned recce done with modern vehicles and equipment.

I have to say I really have to agree with you here, a_majoor (and I don't normally, lol). LAV's provide the protection our recce units require in theater against the threats they are likely to encounter (mine, IED, RPG... to a certain extent, but then again if the enemy really wants to kill you they will almost always find a way), while being mobile and "stealthy" enough to approach location relatively unannounced (minus dust, and assuming you guys manage to keep OPSEC intact.... heh), deploy their troops, and then support them if required.

The interesting thing I noticed and think is appropriate is something Caron wrote on the Army website (don't laugh, there was actually something good) about how the Recce units will have to be taking on more of the skills and "attitude," as he put it, of traditional special forces, while regular units would have to be taking on the skills and attitude of Recce.

Now this idea, IMO, has a lot of merit, especially with the idea of regular units taking on the skills and attitudes of Recce. Realistically, in cases of insurgent warfare such as we see in Afghanistan,   the need to deploy a traditional, large, fighting force, ie battalion, brigade, etc. into combat is largely nonexistant (and this idea has been demonstrated ad naseum), rather we find ourselves having more and more need for "recce", especially in the role a_majoor has described (long range, highly mobile, platoon level or even lower patrols going from village to village unannounced, dismounting troops, gathering intel, identifying possible insurgent bases so that we can focus our efforts (or even insurgents if lucky), supported by UAV, satelite, sniper overwatch, coyote, whatever, then moving on, all within a great information management system (so that the UAV/sniper/Coyote can talk directly to the patrol and send them images, etc.). As well it would be good if they could, at the same time, do things which are NOT traditionally recce, such as providing presence, supporting local authorities, etc.  

The need for this, IMO, is so great that in reality this role should not be the one covered by Recce alone, but by the majority of combat units. Support for these units, should they get into a situation, or need to, as a_majoor put it, flood the location to flush out insurgents, could be done via helicopter borne quick reaction force (as well it would be good, though possibly impractical, to have these units have the option of heavy artillery support, should they need it, but that would limit the patrols to within the effective range of the nearest fire base, though preaditor aircraft with hellfire would probably suffice, or even better, gunships). These smaller units then could, of course, be combined (and should of course still be trained to operate in large formations) should, for some reason, a company or battalion sized force be required.

Where does Recce go from here then, with the regular mechanized infantry and light infantry taking on it's traditional roles, I dunno? I foresee it taking on more "spec ops" roles myself, ie nabbing particular high value targets, but that is just an uninformed opinion.

Thanks,

 

[George Wallace]

The interesting thing I noticed and think is appropriate is something Caron wrote on the Army website (don't laugh, there was actually something good) about how the Recce units will have to be taking on more of the skills and "attitude," as he put it, of traditional special forces, while regular units would have to be taking on the skills and attitude of Recce.

I really don't think that this is true.   Recce (Armd anyway) has always been doing this type of thing.   Just now, people outside of their (Recce) circle are starting to realize it.

Now this idea, IMO, has a lot of merit, especially with the idea of regular units taking on the skills and attitudes of Recce. Realistically, in cases of insurgent warfare such as we see in Afghanistan, the need to deploy a traditional, large, fighting force, ie battalion, brigade, etc. into combat is largely nonexistant (and this idea has been demonstrated ad naseum), rather we find ourselves having more and more need for "recce", especially in the role a_majoor has described (long range, highly mobile, platoon level or even lower patrols going from village to village unannounced, dismounting troops, gathering intel, identifying possible insurgent bases so that we can focus our efforts (or even insurgents if lucky), supported by UAV, satelite, sniper overwatch, coyote, whatever, then moving on, all within a great information management system (so that the UAV/sniper/Coyote can talk directly to the patrol and send them images, etc.). As well it would be good if they could, at the same time, do things which are NOT traditionally recce, such as providing presence, supporting local authorities, etc.

Again, this is not a new consept.  It is what we have always done and what we are currently reinventing in that creature called ISTAR (Which, I guess is already being renamed.  : )

The need for this, IMO, is so great that in reality this role should not be the one covered by Recce alone, but by the majority of combat units. Support for these units, should they get into a situation, or need to, as a_majoor put it, flood the location to flush out insurgents, could be done via helicopter borne quick reaction force (as well it would be good, though possibly impractical, to have these units have the option of heavy artillery support, should they need it, but that would limit the patrols to within the effective range of the nearest fire base, though preaditor aircraft with hellfire would probably suffice, or even better, gunships). These smaller units then could, of course, be combined (and should of course still be trained to operate in large formations) should, for some reason, a company or battalion sized force be required.

Again, you are talking about the ISTAR concept of doing things.

Where does Recce go from here then, with the regular mechanized infantry and light infantry taking on it's traditional roles, I dunno? I foresee it taking on more "spec ops" roles myself, ie nabbing particular high value targets, but that is just an uninformed opinion.

ISTAR probably puts more emphasis on Recce than at any time previously.  Recce will likely become the nucleus of any ISTAR organization, with everyone plugging into the Recce CP.  Currently Recce Sqn CPs are beginning to look like Bde or Div CP complexes when they set up.

 

[a_majoor]

The US Army is experiencing some growing pains as they learn to adapt to the new environment. This article in "Armor" magazine has an interesting overview of Recce from the American point of view. Perhaps most telling, the author describes the blending of roles between Infantry and Cavalry recce, and also observes the Infantry seem to be more adaptable to the changing roles, particularly in the SBCTs, which are equipped with LAV derivatives.

One other observation (which seems very valid) is that the heavier Cavalry formations often become "ad hoc" combat teams, using their superior firepower and protection to conduct meeting engagements somewhat to the detriment of their primary role. Being able to survive the effects of first contact and making a clean break are probably better ways to think of the Armoured recce's requirements for firepower and protection.

"The Future of the Reconnaissance Professional" http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/ArmorMag/mj04/3kearns04c.pdf

 

[Infanteer]

And keeping in line with the idea of "Trading Saber for Stealth", here is a critic of the new modualar brigade design; the new US Brigades, which are supposed to have more hitting power, actually seem to be getting less as they cash in maneuver units for "RSTA" units:

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/melton.pdf

 

[a_majoor]

Although armoured recce "should" stay out of BUAs and other urban terrain, 2Bravo's review of "Thunder Run" brings up some interesting observations of what can happen in a fast moving battle, especially when the centre of gravity IS the urban terrain. We don't always get to choose the time and place of the battle.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/36532/post-296821.html#msg296821

I enjoyed the book not only for its accounts of modern combat at the soldier's (especially the tanker's) level but for the glimpse it sheds on the contemporary operating environment.   The mixing of combatants with non-combatants, the complexities of urban terrain and the importance of information operations/psy ops all come out.   The virtually complete lack of intelligence on the enemy until contact is made by the tanks is also interesting (scouts couldn't go in first because they were too vulnerable and UAVs have a hard time looking into buildings).   Friendly fire issues come out such as SF guys in Toyotas looking    lot like "technicals."   Relief columns coming up to friendlies engaged in a 360 fight are also a fratricide risk (due in part to the range of the weapons and the "template."

Right there seems to be an excellent summary as to why the Illtis/G-wagon/"SUV" recce model will not work, and also a refutation of the "ISTAR will solve all our problems" attitude. ISTAR is a great assist to operations (it more or less sets a firm ceiling to enemy activity), but the "Mud/light" recce concept needs to be examined very closely. If we want to go that way, the vehicle needs to be very mobile, well protected and have enough firepower to cover a fast withdrawl. A 21rst century Lynx or Ferret scout car is superior to the jeep/SUV model. I believe Matt Fisher pointed out a concept vehicle with all the seats facing out for 3600 coverage, which would be an interesting layout for a vehicle when combined with the protection, mobility and firepower required to survive.

The comment about intermixing of combatants and non combatants, the need for Info Ops/PSYOPS and so on would speak to a need to get dismounted troops in there somehow. I don't see it as a hard infantry task, dismounted patrolmen can do this, and armoured recce troops have the mobility to cast a very wide net with this sort of activity. I realize there are a lot of Armoured people on the board who disagree with this analysis, but operational experience would seem to support this idea.

 

[George Wallace]

Right there seems to be an excellent summary as to why the Illtis/G-wagon/"SUV" recce model will not work, and also a refutation of the "ISTAR will solve all our problems" attitude. ISTAR is a great assist to operations (it more or less sets a firm ceiling to enemy activity), but the "Mud/light" recce concept needs to be examined very closely. If we want to go that way, the vehicle needs to be very mobile, well protected and have enough firepower to cover a fast withdrawl. A 21rst century Lynx or Ferret scout car is superior to the jeep/SUV model. I believe Matt Fisher pointed out a concept vehicle with all the seats facing out for 3600 coverage, which would be an interesting layout for a vehicle when combined with the protection, mobility and firepower required to survive.

The comment about intermixing of combatants and non combatants, the need for Info Ops/PSYOPS and so on would speak to a need to get dismounted troops in there somehow. I don't see it as a hard infantry task, dismounted patrolmen can do this, and armoured recce troops have the mobility to cast a very wide net with this sort of activity. I realize there are a lot of Armoured people on the board who disagree with this analysis, but operational experience would seem to support this idea.

I think you forgot what ISTAR is:
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
As such it has nothing to do with Recce in "the Illtis/G-wagon/"SUV" recce model".  ISTAR is the collection and dissemination of info from as many sources as possible on the Battlefield.  ISTAR is going to employ Armd Recce, Recce Platoon, Sniper Dets, EW, SIGINT, HUMINT, CIMIC, UAVs, Satellite, MET, AWACs, anything available to get info.  So "a refutation of the "ISTAR will solve all our problems" attitude" is a false statement.

"Thunder Run" will probably be a good document to show that we need dedicated Armd Recce Vehicles, as well as "Funnies" for 'specialized' tasks.  I am thinking that these "Funnies" will likely have lifespans more or less equivalent to those of the Normandy Landings.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I thought about this thread while reading the book in question.  I think that it casts some doubt on both "light recce" as well as a reliance on ISTAR.

The Spartan Brigade who fight the battle go in without very much specific intelligence.  There are those who beleive that the ISTAR process will take away the "Advance to Contact", and the experience in Baghdad seems to run counter to this.  They find the enemy by bumping into him.  They take a lot of hits and do suffer losses but the tanks (and even Bradleys) absorb a lot of punishment.  The HMMVW scouts escort at least one supply column making the run (all those truck drivers deserve a bravery medal) but they were certainly not out finding the enemy.

I suppose, in a sense, that the ISTAR process was still working in that the information found by bumping into the enemy was being transmitted, ananlysed and acted on.  Targeting was happening (everything from mortars to Paladin to A10s to JDAMs).  Nevertheless, most of the enemy were found in contact, not out of contact.  I guess that a couple of points come to mind.  Sneek and peek will only get you so far, especially in complex terrain.  The elements doing the "reconnaissance" need to be survivable.  When you are moving the other guy will get a shot in from time to time no matter the technological gap.  This means that the "reconnaissance" elements may well have to be combat elements. 

Cheers,

2B

 

[Steel Badger]

It seems to me that the idea of recce elements being outlined in this thread lean more towards a PanzerAufklarungs Abteilung style unit  vs a "Surveillance" unit ( a la Coyote / UAV ).

The requirement to fight for information and the fact that Recce units in Iraq are locating the enemy on contact also reinforces the need for a heavier organization. (MGS and Coyote don't seem to cut it)

The Armoured Cavalry concept laid out by 2Bravo, Art Majoor and many others here seems to be the way forward.....

I also agree that instead of a Duro or Eagle...we should be looking at a 21st century Ferret or FOX for the "light" element of the Amd Cav Regt.

I had the pleasure of attending a brief by COL Randy Gangle USMC recently about USMC Ops in OIF 1 and 2. He was quite clear that while Strykers were good for flank protection / route protection in open areas , they were found to be unsuitable for recce / fighting veh in urban areas.....

The lessons drawn by the USMC was that the close cooperation of Tanks and Infantry in Recce and Main Fighting formations was essential....In and out of urban environments.....




I am wondering if the MCV90 or its 120 brother could fill this role for a Canadian

 

[a_majoor]

I think you forgot what ISTAR is:
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
As such it has nothing to do with Recce in "the Illtis/G-wagon/"SUV" recce model".  ISTAR is the collection and dissemination of info from as many sources as possible on the Battlefield.  ISTAR is going to employ Armd Recce, Recce Platoon, Sniper Dets, EW, SIGINT, HUMINT, CIMIC, UAVs, Satellite, MET, AWACs, anything available to get info.  So "a refutation of the "ISTAR will solve all our problems" attitude" is a false statement.

"The ISTAR will solve all our problems" attitude is the point of this thread and the reason Major Taylor wrote his paper. ISTAR can and will be a valuable addition to the commander's tool kit, and certainly sets boundries to what the enemy can do without being discovered (the ISTAR threshold).The Modular force model the Americans are touting is very much based on the idea that high tech surveillance can reduce or even eliminate the need for traditional recce. The high technology tools the Americans deployed in Iraq had difficulty in determining the enemy location and intentions, while their recce units deployed in HMMVWs were unable to carry out their mandate to discover enemy location and intentions either.

Given the reporting in Thunder Run, and other supporting information from AARs, personal communications from people who have been there and so on, we can see there is a distinct gap between the ISTAR/surveillance model and the "light" recce model in medium and high intensity combat operations. Understanding the gap allows "us" to set the parameters to design and equip a recce organization. Such an organization can be "powered down" to operate in  SASO and humanitarian ops, but still be effective throughout the spectrum of operations.

 

[George Wallace]

It seems to me that you and some others are concentrating solely on the Surveillance aspects of ISTAR and forgetting or totally discounting the Intelligence gathering, Target Acquisition and Recce aspects in your dissertations.  Surveillance is only one part of all of the ISTAR business.

 

[a_majoor]

Not at all. ISTAR is one of the tools which is supposed to supply "Information Dominance" for our forces and create a "Transparent Battlefield" to lift the fog of war for the commander. Much of Canadian ISTAR is built around high tech toolkits and the US RSTA model is even more so. If anything, the actual act of doing Recce patrols is only a small part of the equation.

What Major Taylor is getting at (and I agree) is that getting Information Dominance or creating a transparent battlefield is an impossibility, and that a robust recce element must be added to the mix in order to gain and maintain some situational awareness. The SUV recce isn't going to cut it, and ISTAR isn't going to create the transparent battlefield. Armoured recce which can survive contact and fight for information if necessary will be an important part of ISTAR, but commanders will be relying on a direct feed from their recce elements a few bounds ahead rather than waiting for the information to be processed and disseminated by the ASCC.

 

[George Wallace]

What Major Taylor is getting at (and I agree) is that getting Information Dominance or creating a transparent battlefield is an impossibility, and that a robust recce element must be added to the mix in order to gain and maintain some situational awareness. The SUV recce isn't going to cut it, and ISTAR isn't going to create the transparent battlefield. Armoured recce which can survive contact and fight for information if necessary will be an important part of ISTAR, but commanders will be relying on a direct feed from their recce elements a few bounds ahead rather than waiting for the information to be processed and disseminated by the ASCC.

I agree.  So, we will need to have some 'specialized Tools' to do this.  We will, of course, need a versatile 'generic' veh that will be capable of doing, say 90%, of the job, and then a small fleet of 'special vehs' for the other 10%.  We may even have to separate that 10% away from Recce and form them into a Special Operations Unit.  If that becomes the case, it is now removed from the Armd Recce equation, and place into the SF equation.  We see various 'specialized' Units around the world, such as the SBS, and would probably have to create another "JTF2" org for those tasks.

ISTAR/RSTA are basically the same thing, just the acronym is arranged differently.  We do need to use all the tools to gather Int.  We have to be able to disseminate and put it to use almost immediately.  We will never, as you say, be able to be 100% on any or all info gathered, but we must continue to strive to get as much as we can.  One veh, is not going to be the "Be All, End All".  We will definitely have to get specialty vehicles.

Now back to my coffee..NATO Standard.

 

[Kirkhill]

It seems that some of the discussions end up demonstrating a considerable degree of binary thinking as opposed to thinking in terms of probabilities.  

While ISTAR may aim for a Transparent Battlefield, or FCS may aim for a radically new vehicle system, just as you lot aim for the centre of mass, it is not necessary for a bulls-eye for the project to achieve the desired effect on the target.  It is even possible that even a clear miss on the target may have an appreciable effect on the battlefield.  

"Advance to Contact" is practiced by all combat troops, it seems to me, precisely because complete transparency is "impossible" (one of those binary words).  Technology may not provide all answers but it can reduce the unknowns and the unknowables making it easier for commanders to make decisions as to where threats are more likely ,where to put troops and how best to employ them.  It reduces the number of guesses and assumptions that a commander has to make making it more likely that an "average" commander is going to be able to conduct operations well rather than requiring an especially gifted or lucky commander (Wasn't it Napoleon who said he would rather have a lucky commander than a good one?).

A commander tasking a two-man sniper team to a flank and having them lie there quietly for two days reporting nothing may be seen as a waste of a sniper team.  They didn't kill anybody.  On the other hand for two days the commander could operate secure in the knowledge that there were no enemy forces reported in the snipers area of observation and that information was gained at the expense of only two pairs of eyes.  The rest of the battalion was available for other duties.

Negative information is as valuable as positive information.  The more areas that can be checked off the list as threats then the fewer the potential targets and the greater the opportunity for commander to concentrate available forces and probably achieve the desired overmatch conditions. Once it has been determined that the enemy isn't in 90% of the terrain then efforts can be focused on the other 10%.

Once the probable locations for the enemy have been determined and Intelligence has determined the probable size and composition of the force likely to be expected then the commander(s) can more precisely allocate and tailor troops for the probable tasks.  The better the quality of the information, the fewer the assumptions, the less the variety of kit that needs to be taken along and the more likely there will be a positive outcome.  Always things will go wrong but good info reduces the number of times bad things happen.  Info doesn't eliminate bad things.

A commander wants as much info as possible to reduce the number of bad decisions and it seems to me that it is better to reduce the proportion of manpower necessary to gather information to a minimum while maximizing the proportion of manpower available to act on that information.   With that in mind most of our formations have only had about 5 or 10% of the available manpower dedicated to supplying information - including recce regiments, squadrons, platoons, troops and FOOs.  The rest, that isnt allocated to support roles is tasked to "ACT" roles.

Those in the "ACT" roles must be able to act whether or not they know exactly who is in what room with what weapon.  The enemy isn't static so even if you know his exact dispositions on entering a room the situation can change by the time you get inside.  There is always an amount of uncertainty and as an individual infanteer or tank you are always recconoitring your own surroundings and adjusting the plan to suit the circumstances.

To me it doesn't make as much sense to allocate more troops to the dedicated recce role and then tie them up in fighting, even if it is "fighting for information" as it does to increase the observational capabilities of those allocated troops so that they can gather more information of better quality allowing the commander to concentrate the rest of the force available against the suspected threat areas. With good information then the advancing commander can better tailor the force to anticipated enemy forces.  This may mean taking more 7.62 and CG-84 rounds and leaving the mortars and ATGMs back if it is verified that there is no tank threat and that fire support by other means is available on 10 seconds notice.

If fighting is to be done then task troops that are dedicated to fighting and leave the observation troops with all their specialised kit out of it.  They are too useful to be tied up in the fight.  Give them weapons and vehicles suitable to increase their chances of survival, not to take on the enemy toe to toe.

Here's a thought - or a question - infantry practices advance to contact, as does armour.  Does arty? In a brigade advance to contact who leads? Recce Squadron? An Armoured Regiment or an Infantry Battalion?  Or some combination of the above?  Is it conceivable that an Arty Regiment could lead a brigade with the UAV troops and FOOs forming the core elements of the forward screen with the Recce Squadron tasked in their support while the rest of the brigade Armoured and Infantry are held in reserve ready to react to the enemy not neutralized by the Arty?

I am pretty sure that the DS solution is "it depends".

Information doesn't replace tanks. Precision munitions don't replace boots on the ground.  Information and Precision Munitions may reduce the number of tanks or boots necessary in certain situations, in other situations they are not going to change the nature of the battlefield at all.  They will probably always make available tanks and boots more effective.  In that they will also probably always have a knock on effect and reduce the amount of effort that is dedicated to supporting the fighting and the information troops.

2 cents

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Ideally your "leading edge" will be all-arms.  There are alot of tools available in the toolbox.

To me, the backbone should be armoured reconnaissance.  It has endurance, meaning that it can stay "on station" for pretty much as long as it needs.  A Coyote patrol can conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and target aquisition.  Give it two more dismounts (2 scouts in each veh) and you have an enhanced recce capability in close terrain as well.

On to this structure you can add FOOs.  A LAV FOO can do most of the things that a Coyote can, although of course it is specialized at target acquisition.  Putting FOOs up with Recce Sqn is pretty much SOP.  We had many combined OPs overseas with one FOO team integrated with a Coyote Patrol.

Dismounted elements will, of course, have a lot to offer here.  Whether they are infantry or armoured is perhaps a moot point here.  I don't like the idea of "light recce" vehs to carry the dismounts.  Put them into something with protection.  Snipers teams also offer tremendous capabilties.  The issues here, however, are tempo and force protection.

EW is another powerful tool in this area.  We have also put EW teams into our Coyote patrols overseas.

UAVs and helicopters give oustanding capabilities, although there are limitations.  Both have endurance issues, can be effected by weather and they can also announce your intentions.  They are great, however, for checking gaps.  UAVs face limitations in urban terrain, however, and most bad guys are not going to announce their presence by firing RPGs at them.

All of this is tied in through the ISTAR process. The ISTAR process uses all sensors (not just dedicated ones) to answer the questions.  The management of this information is key but is beyond the scope of this thread.

Finding the bad guys if they are attacking is relatively easy.  Finding them when they are dug-in and/or mixed into the population is trickier.

If we had a Task Force advancing in a "war of the snakes" situation against a rogue warlord or rebel faction we could use EW, UAVs and higher level assets to gain the big picture.  It will probably come down, however, to reconnaissance assets going in to find the bad guys.  If you have infinite time you could send in dismounted patrols and hope that nobody gets shot requiring an evac from a tight spot.  We'd probably have to go in mounted.  Coyotes and LAVs give some standoff due to their turret optics, but buildings will always be a problem.  At least they have some firepower to either destroy security posts or drive the enemy to ground to get out of contact.  I still think that we will find many positions when we see the RPG signature.

If the recce elements cannot survive this first contact, however, we will probably find that they are not used and that the "combat" units will go in blind.  Most of our "light recce" experience is peacetime without the threat of actual casualties.  This is the point made by the author and I think that he is on to something.

Cheers,

2B

 

[a_majoor]

This should be interesting; the CF just purchased the Mamba/Nyala mineproof as the recce vehicle (at least for Afghanistan). Unless this is a very different vehicle than the one I think it is (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RG-31), it is a wheeled APC similar to the ADI Bushmaster(http://www.adi-limited.com/2-01-010-040-030.html) or Force Protection Buffalo(http://www.forceprotection.net/models/buffalo/specs/buffalo_spec.pdf) or Cougar (http://www.forceprotection.net/models/cougar/specs/cougar4x4_spec.pdf). None of these vehicles resemble any of the concepts being advocated in the Our 'maybe' new recce vehicle thread (http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/35535.0.html).  Rather than sitting down and hammering out the requirements and then organizing and equipping based on what we understand, our Armoured cousins will have a hodge podge of vehicles with widely varying capabilities, mostly purchased for reasons of expediency rather than part of a greater plan.

While the Nyala is a good vehicle, is it compatible with the ability to do stealthy "mud" recce, or fast moving armoured recce in high intensity operations? It really dosn't seem to be either Sabre or Stealth.

Tying together Coyote surveillance vehicles, Coyote DFS, Nyalas and G-wagons into a semi coherent package (including training and logistics support) should be quite fascinating to watch.

 

[Infanteer]

This is what happens when you put the cart before the horse....

 

[blacktriangle]

This should be interesting; the CF just purchased the Mamba/Nyala mineproof as the recce vehicle (at least for Afghanistan). Unless this is a very different vehicle than the one I think it is (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RG-31)

Excuse me, Sir,

I am not sure if this is of any help to you, but I read a post (from a member of the armour school I think) in the "our maybe new recce vehicle" that we are getting the rg 32 version of the nyala. If this is the case, it looks quite different from the Rg-31.

http://www.armyrecognition.com/moyen_orient/Emirats_arabe/IDEX_2003_Pictures_Gallery/IDEX_2005/pictures_4/RG32M_army_recognition_IDEX_2005_01.jpg

I'm sure someone will correct me if I'm wrong... I have no mil experience. I just like reading the topics. :-\