TRADOC Changes Deep Attack Doctrine

[tomahawk6]

General William Wallace, CG TRADOC has ordered changes in the Army's deep strike doctrine. The changes
reduce the role of the Apache as it has shown to be vulnerable to small arms fire. The new concept will feature the MRLS and unitary long range precision rounds, Army TACMS. The new doctrine uses the Apache in the close air support role.

http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-1665859.php

"Questions about helicopter survivability arose early in the Iraq war when 34 AH-64 Apaches undertook a deep-attack mission against a division of Iraq’s Republican Guard positioned south of Baghdad.


Every airframe was hit by ground fire, one Apache was downed, and 27 of the 33 that returned to base were so heavily damaged they couldn’t fly until repaired. Since 2001, the Army has lost 85 helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan to ground fire and combat-related accidents."

 

[ImanIdiot]

General William Wallace? At what point during the Battle for Baghdad did he scream, "FREEEDOMMMM!!!!!"? 

In all seriousness, that is some interesting info, and it makes sense, however I would think that a vehicle operating in close support would be just as vulnerable to small arms fire. Am I wrong?

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Tomahawk, can you elaborate a little more....as a non-subscriber, I'm not getting much from your link.


Matthew.  ;D

 

[GAP]

I was under the impression the lower sides of the Apache was relatively well armoured against small arms fire?? We used to sit on our helmets in the Huey and Chinook because the rounds would come right through and the "mental images" that evokes is easy to recall. Still shudder when I think of some rides and Hot LZ's

 

[tomahawk6]

The MRLS has great range depending on weapons load,  the Army TACAM the missile has a range of 300km and the basic rocket has a range out to 60km.


TRADOC cuts Apaches’ role in deep attack

By Greg Grant
Special to the Times


Because battlefield experience in Iraq has shown the AH-64 Apache is highly vulnerable to small-arms fire, it no longer will play a prominent role in the service’s deep-attack mission, said the Army’s head of doctrine.

Gen. William Wallace, who commanded ground forces in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and now heads the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, said he would shake up the way the Army conducts deep-attack operations.

“Less integration of Apache helicopters,” more Air Force ground-attack aircraft and “more use of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, perhaps even with unitary rounds that are long-range precision,” Wallace told reporters at the Association of the United States Army’s winter symposium in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., in February.

Questions about helicopter survivability arose early in the Iraq war when 34 AH-64 Apaches undertook a deep-attack mission against a division of Iraq’s Republican Guard positioned south of Baghdad.


Every airframe was hit by ground fire, one Apache was downed, and 27 of the 33 that returned to base were so heavily damaged they couldn’t fly until repaired. Since 2001, the Army has lost 85 helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan to ground fire and combat-related accidents.

Helicopter survivability has become a top priority, the Army’s aviation chief, Paul Bogosian, said in January at the Army Aviation Symposium in Washington. The Army has rushed cockpit missile warning systems and advanced countermeasures dispensers to equip all its helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan, part of a $1.5 billion Army investment to keep the helicopters flying.

Army aviators are changing their tactics and training to conduct running fire missions with guns and rockets to minimize their exposure to ground fire, Brig. Gen. Edward Sinclair, commander of the Army’s Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Ala., said in a recent interview.

A report by the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division, detailing lessons learned during the invasion and occupation of Iraq, said Army attack aviation was better suited to providing close-air support to friendly ground forces than in the deep-attack role.

The same report said the Army’s OH-58 Kiowas performed better than the Apaches in urban areas because their pilots were trained to fly close to the ground at high speed and use buildings and trees as cover.

Greg Grant is a writer for Defense News.

 

[GAP]

The same report said the Army’s OH-58 Kiowas performed better than the Apaches in urban areas because their pilots were trained to fly close to the ground at high speed and use buildings and trees as cover.

So really, this article is more about tactics than the airframe. correct??

 

[A O G 101]

So really, this article is more about tactics than the airframe. correct??

Correct ;D

 

[tomahawk6]

Tactics + airframe vulnerabilities = change in mission
The attack helicopter brigade that was shot up attempting the deep attack was a wake up call. Actually it shouldnt have been considering we didnt want to send Apache's into Yugoslavia due to the air defense threat.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Tactics + airframe vulnerabilities = change in mission
The attack helicopter brigade that was shot up attempting the deep attack was a wake up call. Actually it shouldnt have been considering we didnt want to send Apache's into Yugoslavia due to the air defense threat.

When I got a look at the Iraqi defences, 57 mm AAA etc. to be honest my first thought was that the brigade CO had an attack of the stupids.It Must have been like shoving( pick your body part /appendage of choice) into a meatgrinder.

 

[devil39]

My understanding is that there were significant diconnects in the planning of the 11 Avn Regiments cross FLOT operation that resulted in SEAD and CAS no longer being synchronized with 11 Avn Regiment operation.  Bad int suggested also in article by GEN Crosbie Saint at link

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_200407/ai_n9413232/pg_7

Does this mean no more cross FLOT air assault operations also?  I would suggest the real failure is the lack of synchronization as a result of "fog of war".