Who should own CAS & why it can't be trusted to an Air Force (from A-10 retirement thread)

[Kirkhill]

Faulty memory time:

A long time ago, between here and there, I vaguely recollect a plan to place Hornets closer to the maritime approaches and to operate out of Comox and (perhaps?) Greenwood.

I seem to recall the programme was announced, activated and then stood down with the Hornets being returned to Cold Lake and Bagotville.

IIRC the intent of the exercise was to be able to increase the ability to react effectively against surface threats.

Now I get that Comox is only an hour or so from Cold Lake.  And the ships only move 20 to 40 miles in that time.  So forward basing of the Hornets doesn't seem to me to be a major problem.  But it does leave the Air Force isolated from its RCN partners in the same way they are isolated from their Army partners.

A bigger question though is: if the RCAF is going to be assisting the RCN in protecting the maritime approaches shouldn't they have at least some Air to Surface variants of Harpoon in their arms locker -for both the Auroras and the Hornets?

Equally shouldn't they be investing in SDBs, Brimstones and Stand Off Weapons as well as AMRAAMs and ASRAAMs?

Or do they already have that gear in stores?

Is it only the Army that has a disconnect with the RCAF?

 

[dimsum]

Faulty memory time:

A long time ago, between here and there, I vaguely recollect a plan to place Hornets closer to the maritime approaches and to operate out of Comox and (perhaps?) Greenwood.

I seem to recall the programme was announced, activated and then stood down with the Hornets being returned to Cold Lake and Bagotville.

IIRC the intent of the exercise was to be able to increase the ability to react effectively against surface threats.

Now I get that Comox is only an hour or so from Cold Lake.  And the ships only move 20 to 40 miles in that time.  So forward basing of the Hornets doesn't seem to me to be a major problem.  But it does leave the Air Force isolated from its RCN partners in the same way they are isolated from their Army partners.

Unless things have changed, Hornets do operate out of Comox (and presumably Greenwood) but only in a limited short-term capacity.  I'm sure no one (well, no sqn members at least) would object to being posted to Comox vice Cold Lake  :nod:

 

[Zoomie]

Credit where credit's due, Max has done an excellent job of articulating why those of us in the combat arms cannot trust or rely upon RCAF fast air to kill people and break their stuff when they're really close to us and our day sucks.

I must have been reading a completely different thread.  This statement is disingenuous and spreads further hate statements.  Sorta like the LEO threads of the past.

The big problem I've read here is that of expectancy.  The battlefield commander owns his direct fire, indirect fire and CAS. It is up to him to use it as he sees fit.  He is well aware of when and where he has CAS support.  On station time is a factor of weather (must be VFR), fuel (limited weapons for longer onsta) - [if they tank via yo-yo you can expect a gap in 100% coverage]and the range to getting on station.  If he decides that you don't get CAS, he's determined that someone else is more important.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Ditch, exactly.

In the end, I hope operational commanders use their assets (air, sea, land, SF) that will end a conflict in the most efficient and effective manner, with us on the winning side, without gettng into turf wars. 

If you give all your air to the land commanders, you in fact do him a disservice.  You can't interdict the battlefield (supply, LOCs, etc) and you can't hit strategic targets that may well end the war rather quickly if hit at the right time.  In the end you need a balanced approach.

For those that wonder, pretty much every fighter pilot would accept a much greater tactical risk doing CAS than doing any other mission type.b

 

[Old Sweat]

I think hope all of us green suiters understand the priority that must be given to winning the air battle and the importance of missions beyond the control of FACs/JTACs. Our hangup often comes from what is perceived as an excessive desire of senior air commanders to go their own way rather than 'dancing to the army's tune.' Couple that to what seems to many as a rigid adherence to the rules - not flight safety and flying discipline rules which we accept I must add - and confidence suffers. We also understand that there is never enough air and it must be used wisely on priority targets. In a perfect world it would work that way, but in the CAF we do not have the resources to practice what both sides preach and the reputation of and confidence in the fast air community suffers.

p.s. In my experience in theatres like Norway and Germany we have much more confidence in the RCAF than the Brits have in the RAF.

 

[Transporter]

I think hope all of us green suiters understand the priority that must be given to winning the air battle and the importance of missions beyond the control of FACs/JTACs. Our hangup often comes from what is perceived as an excessive desire of senior air commanders to go their own way rather than 'dancing to the army's tune.' Couple that to what seems to many as a rigid adherence to the rules - not flight safety and flying discipline rules which we accept I must add - and confidence suffers. We also understand that there is never enough air and it must be used wisely on priority targets. In a perfect world it would work that way, but in the CAF we do not have the resources to practice what both sides preach and the reputation of and confidence in the fast air community suffers.

p.s. In my experience in theatres like Norway and Germany we have much more confidence in the RCAF than the Brits have in the RAF.

You just hit the nail right on the head.

 

[daftandbarmy]

p.s. In my experience in theatres like Norway and Germany we have much more confidence in the RCAF than the Brits have in the RAF.

No arguments there. The RNAS were always there. The RAF were always .. where?

 

[brihard]

I must have been reading a completely different thread.  This statement is disingenuous and spreads further hate statements.  Sorta like the LEO threads of the past.

The big problem I've read here is that of expectancy.  The battlefield commander owns his direct fire, indirect fire and CAS. It is up to him to use it as he sees fit.  He is well aware of when and where he has CAS support.  On station time is a factor of weather (must be VFR), fuel (limited weapons for longer onsta) - [if they tank via yo-yo you can expect a gap in 100% coverage]and the range to getting on station.  If he decides that you don't get CAS, he's determined that someone else is more important.

Ditch- nope, definitely not an attack on him nor on his community. The fast air pilots no more choose their missions or objectives that the infantry section commanders. It's no more his or any pilots fault that they are constrained into narrow prioritize room of other tasks than it is my fault that in the infantry we don't do forced beach landings. Capabilities and priorities have been decided at much higher levels.

Am I bitter about that? Yeah, kinda; I will maintain that a raison d'être of the RCAF should be to make bad people go away with much violent abandon when we need them to, and with greater ability to prioritize the needs of us on the ground than appears to be possible.

Max- my apologies to you right now for how that affected my tone. Uncalled for; my post is best read while imagining me to be wearing a really poo-eating grin. But you do explain well just why we in the combat arms are best to remain very skeptical. If you have a disconnect, it's because that's what you've learned as a result of your seat in our larger institution.

I cannot, however, see anything here that convinces me that a Canadian company in battle, if it needs CAS, will stand a good chance now or in the near future of getting it from Canadian fast air. The exclusive ownership by the Air Force of these assets has resulted in even the brighter minds in the fast air community being unable to bridge the gaps these conversations bring up between what guys on the ground say is needed and what the guys in the air think is needed. If it stings to hear that phrased in terms of trust and reliance, well, it is what it is. I'm open to being convinced otherwise. Afghanistan leaves me unwilling to give the benefit of the doubt. And I also recognize the strategic/tactical context, and accept that a platoon in battle may be acceptably left hanging if the aircraft are tasked to the enemy's divisional CP or brigade artillery. I'm not unrealistic about the 'big picture' in killing people and breaking their stuff.

 

[Good2Golf]

If the RCAF wishes to support fully (or at least optimally) its five core airpower capabilities (control of the air, attack, surveillance and reconnaissance, air mobility and support to joint operations and civil power) it must be mindful that the 'integrated' Vector of its strategic vision (Agile, Integrated, Reach and Power) is one where it has been, and will continue to be judged firmly, if not even harshly. 

Notwithstanding the Government of Canada's not having yet to task the Air Force to conduct missions where close air support missions within the counter-land core role are required (and this is certainly not the fault of any of those at the tactical level like SupersonicMax), either the Air Force must be ready to do so, and do so credibly, or there should be consideration given, both by larger Government and the RCAF itself, as to whether CAS is an airpower mission that can be credibly conducted.  The issue is credibility, and there are two elements to credibility; desire/will and past performance.  Clearly, past performance of CAS in the contemporary sense does not exist, and again, that's not the tactical level's fault.  The RCAF can only be judged on desire and will to support the Army, and this is the challenge space.  Resource constraints have made many aspects of integrated training and preparation difficult, yet again, not the tactical level's fault.  It should be with care, however, that an organization purports to be tightly integrated with a fellow service, and this is the challenge.  "Rubber hitting the road (tarmac)" to support integrated force generation comes primarily in the form of external to RCAF asets, and that is where the RCAF has a credibility challenge.  A once a year exercise where supported forces don't have an opportunity to engage in professional discussions at the coal face does not a credibility-growth plan make.

It is good that many in the fighter force are devloping and/or already have a fighting spirit and desire to support sister services, that's a fundamental strength in developing greater levels of integration.  It is, however, just a start point.


Regards
G2G

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Unless things have changed, Hornets do operate out of Comox (and presumably Greenwood) but only in a limited short-term capacity.  I'm sure no one (well, no sqn members at least) would object to being posted to Comox vice Cold Lake  :nod:

As i recall the plan was to have 2 aircraft on standby at Comox with planes and pilots and groundcrew rotating in and out.

 

[Journeyman]

I cannot, however, see anything here that convinces me that a Canadian company in battle, if it needs CAS, will stand a good chance now or in the near future of getting it from Canadian fast air.

Which is why I opted out of this discussion many pages ago.

The thread is just spiralling now; those of us with real operational experience from being in harm's way have no faith in the RCAF* and no expectation that things will change.  Conversely, the guys with their rockin' leather jackets and maybe a QDJM to keep their CD company just keep repeating "it's all good."


Thank you, USAF and your F-15Es for being there when they were needed. 

I'll return to radio silence now.


*  By RCAF, I'm not referring to the wrongly-uniformed tactical aviation folks.

 

[Baz]

*  By RCAF, I'm not referring to the wrongly-uniformed tactical aviation folks.

It's not just tactical, its also maritime... but we've been through that already as well.

As I've said, this is not just an RCAF problem... its a Western Air Force problem.  They honestly believe that Air Power can win, alone, every type of fight; and that the other services don't understand air.  If you accept that premise, that Air Power can win the fight alone, then there is no need to understand the other fights.  As well, the only kind of doctrine that matters is that developed by Air.

Therefore Unity Of Command becomes all air power should be commanded by an air centric HQ, not the supported commander should command all supporting forces.  Span Of Control (ie the Air HQ is trying to support too many things to really understand them all) is overcome by Air doctrine and procedures.  This is what is taught so why is it a surprise.

At the end of the day, its not just about CAS, its the same old discussion going all the way back to World War II about the best use of Air Power.  The answer, in my mind remains the same: it depends.  Air Forces don't see it that way.

This is also leading to the thought process that all other air fleets exist solely to support the Air Force winning the fight alone; this is prevalent in the RCAF right now: example is that MPA (Maritime Patrol Aircraft) and MH (Maritime Helicopter) are now ISR platforms in RCAF speak (http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/aircraft.page) 

The primary role of these aircraft is to “sense”, which is the function that provides a commander with knowledge to assist in the decision-making process both in combat and non-combat situations.

.  Except the primary role of MH is Naval Force Protection...  It also gives rise to thoughts like the whole purpose of ISR (not just air ISR, all ISR) exists to support that fight, so it should all be controlled by the Air Force; the USAF is trying to make that argument, the most notable example being BAMS (USN Broad Area Maritime Surveillance).  The USN is less than impressed that an aircraft that optimized for maritime surveillance with a capability to support Sea Land strike would somehow be controlled by the USAF.

Given all that, I'm not surprised that other services don't trust the Air Force to deliver CAS when it is needed, especially from being part of the "targeting enterprise;" and I'm also not surprised that Air Force types don't understand why...

 

[daftandbarmy]

Given all that, I'm not surprised that other services don't trust the Air Force to deliver CAS when it is needed, especially from being part of the "targeting enterprise;" and I'm also not surprised that Air Force types don't understand why...

The other problem IMHO is that other 'support' like the good ol' artillery, and NGS, (and the mortars and anti-tank assets removed from the Infantry) have been whittled down or eliminated to the point where the other services have to lean way too heavily on an Air Force that is materially and doctrinally ill equipped to meet the vast and growing need for organic precision and area fire support.

 

[KevinB]

I meant to post this some time ago.

I however get distracted by shiny things, and flashing lights easily.

http://breakingdefense.com/2014/08/doing-the-math-saving-a-10s-by-cutting-f-35s-2/

Interesting article - and while it throws back to the A-10 thread, it does highlight the USAF inability to rationalize

 

[daftandbarmy]

I meant to post this some time ago.

I however get distracted by shiny things, and flashing lights easily.

http://breakingdefense.com/2014/08/doing-the-math-saving-a-10s-by-cutting-f-35s-2/

Interesting article - and while it throws back to the A-10 thread, it does highlight the USAF inability to rationalize

From a Realpolitik point of view, the only thing that can save the A10s is probably a bunch of Senators in the states where they are produced or serviced.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Which is why I opted out of this discussion many pages ago.

The thread is just spiralling now; those of us with real operational experience from being in harm's way have no faith in the RCAF* and no expectation that things will change.  Conversely, the guys with their rockin' leather jackets and maybe a QDJM to keep their CD company just keep repeating "it's all good."


Thank you, USAF and your F-15Es for being there when they were needed. 

I'll return to radio silence now.


*  By RCAF, I'm not referring to the wrongly-uniformed tactical aviation folks.

:rofl:

 

[Loachman]

If only people higher up could have the clarity of thought that Journeyman occasionally exhibits.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

It's not just tactical, its also maritime... but we've been through that already as well.

Thank you for that.  I know some people are aware of the work '140 crews do with folks on the ground. 

 

[Good2Golf]

Thank you for that.  I know some people are aware of the work '140 crews do with folks on the ground.

The work the SGOD folks did both in AFG and LIB was well regarded by many high up in the food chain, and although technically it is one of the only three aircraft in the RCAF inventory to carry stowed kills (SK being the other un-loved stowed kills platform), it often gets pooh-poohed by the elitists in the fast-air clique. 

G2G

 

[Eye In The Sky]

GTG,

Copy that.  IMO, in the wider CAF community, it seems most people think that our fleet is a 1-trick pony.