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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

MarkOttawa said:
Why must the government continue to be so economical about the truth of the 2008 Commons' (not Parliamentary) motion as to be mendacious?
And why isn't MSM calling the government on it?

In other news, an interim report from a committee of senators says "stay & train" ....:
The country's chamber of sober second thought says Ottawa should think twice about leaving Afghanistan lock, stock and barrel next year.

In an interim report tabled Tuesday, the Senate's security and defence committee recommends the Canadian military remain in the war-wasted nation to train the Afghan army and police beyond the deadline set by Parliament ....
(Here's the report.)

....while the Defence Minister says armed UAVs are not being ruled out as a future option:
Defence Minister Peter MacKay has left the door open to arming Canada's reconnaissance drones in Afghanistan, even though the military has written off the idea.

Slapping munitions on the CU-170 Herons, which operate out of Kandahar Airfield, has been considered almost from the moment the leased unmanned aircraft arrived in theatre. The prop-driven planes, operated by remote control, are currently used only for surveillance and were acquired as a result of the Manley commission into the Afghan mission.

Heavily censored documents obtained under Access to Information by The Canadian Press show the air force commissioned a technical investigation into weaponizing the drones in late 2008, just as the Kandahar air wing, which also includes helicopters and transport planes, began flying.

The country's top military commander, Gen. Walter Natynczyk, on March 17, 2009, presented MacKay with the option to install missiles on the Israeli-made drones, which have been used in the skies above Gaza.

The plan was initially rejected, but MacKay said the option is not off the table.

"There's been no decision taken as to arming them," he said recently.

"They have tremendous utility when it comes to the protection of our forces, the allies and citizens. So we're looking at all the options. And we're having that discussion internally" ....
 
Two posts by BruceR. at Flit that are really worth reading:

Meanwhile, back in Afg 2: the Good Guys of Gizab
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_06_22.html#006744

The WashPost has a "ray of light" piece on Afghanistan.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/20/AR2010062003479.html?hpid=topnews

Gizab, a valley in Daikundi province (although that is disputed) with a majority Pashtun population (also disputed), is apparently steadfastly anti-Taliban. Good for them. People are wondering how to replicate that success, which is a good discussion. Three points.

The obvious fact is this is a place in completely marginal territory for the Taliban, hard up against or in the Hazarajat, the central Afghanistan refuge of the Shia Hazara people, who the Taliban in the past have done every depredation short of hunting for sport. The Pashtuns in this area are economically and socially interlinked with the Hazara, who form the overwhelming majority of the region's population. For them to be anything other than pro-peace given that situation (and the likelihood they'd be running for their lives the moment civil war ever breaks out again) would be surprising. Indeed, if the government can't keep these Pashtuns onside, it's fair to see it couldn't keep any...

Meanwhile, back in Afg 3: Dahla update
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_06_22.html#006745

Mark
Ottawa
 
For what it’s worth (politically): Continuing CF Afghan role post-2011
http://unambig.com/for-what-its-worth-politically-continuing-cf-afghan-role-post-2011/

Somehow I doubt this Senate committee (now with a Conservative majority and chair) report, in itself, will have much impact.  Hope I’m wrong, it may just push the discussion along...

Update:  Terry Glavin issues a call to, er, arms:
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2010/06/finally-leadership-thank-you-senator.html

"...
The debate has been joined. We have miles to go before we sleep.

Allons-y."

Meanwhile, Tom Friedman of the NY Times explains why it’s all useless anyway:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/opinion/23friedman.html?ref=todayspaper

Mark
Ottawa
 
Afghans need Canucks to stay: study
Kathleen Harris
The Edmonton Sun
23 June 2010

Canada must keep boots on the ground in Afghanistan beyond 2011 to train and mentor the country's army and police, a Senate committee recommends.

In a special report tabled Tuesday, the panel of Conservative and Liberal senators also unanimously recommends Parliament debate the role post-2011 at the "earliest opportunity." The study, calledWhere We Go From Here: Canada's Mission in Afghanistan, reviewed testimony from 18 retired and serving military brass, past and current ambassadors and Defence Minister Peter MacKay. It concludes that the "recurring theme" from witnesses is that the job in Afghanistan is not done and that Canadian troops should stay "in some capacity."

"With the surge of NATO forces now underway, gains are at last being consolidated instead of lost," the report reads. "The surge of forces is importantly fighting alongside soldiers of the Afghan National Army. Ultimately, this fight against the Taliban is their fight. It will be a key part of Canada's legacy in Afghanistan that Canadian soldiers helped prepare them for this fight."

The committee, chaired by Conservative Sen. Pamela Wallin and Liberal Sen. Romeo Dallaire, says, "Canada's important and highly-valued contribution to the development of the leadership, training and mentoring of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police must continue beyond 2011."

"From almost every witness, we heard a common refrain -- Canada's work is not yet done," Wallin told QMI Agency. "Most agreed that while the role might change or morph, they all believed that the unique skills of the Canadian Forces to both do battle and help develop civil society and governance are important to ensure that Afghanistan continues to become more able to defend and secure the country."

NDP MP Jack Harris believes the Liberals and Conservatives have a "plan afoot" to continue the mission. The deployment of troops past 2011 -- even in a training and mentoring role -- would constitute a "significant continuation" of the military role in Afghanistan, he said.

"The kind of training mission that is being contemplated is a combat training mission that would probably involve many hundreds of soldiers engaged in that activity," he said.

"We're opposed to the extension of the military mission."
 
More Pak paranoia:

India likely to get role in Afghan military affairs
http://pakistanpal.wordpress.com/2010/06/22/india-likely-to-get-role-in-afghan-military-affairs/

ISLAMABAD – The ongoing row between the NATO forces and allied European countries regarding provisions of training for Afghan National Army is paving way for Indian ‘legalised’ presence in Afghanistan...

The target of International Security Assistance Force to train 134,000 and 171,600 troops of Afghan National Army by October 2010 and 2011 respectively seems to be a far-fetched notion. Likewise, training 80,000 Afghan policemen this year and those of over 100,000 in 2011, as decided in London Conference on Afghanistan, also sounds nothing more than a far cry.

Pertinent quarters say that at least 5000 to 7000 trainers are needed to train the Afghan National Army and Police but complete non-cooperation shown by Western European allies is adding to frustration for American camp.

With the pressure building on Pakistan to launch military offensive in North Waziristan, India is digging its ground to come out of its covert embryo and ‘ legally’ present itself in Afghanistan.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Hell yes, we're gonna go:

Lawrence Cannon isn’t much for dancing
http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/06/23/lawrence-cannon-isnt-much-for-dancing/

In an interview with CTV this evening [June 22], the Foreign Affairs Minister was fairly dismissive of the Liberal proposal for a post-2011 mandate in Afghanistan and the Defence Minister’s reported “interest” in said proposal. The following is from the end of the conversation.

    Tom Clark. Would training the Afghan army in a non-combat role be considered development aide?

    Cannon. Well, you know, I’ve been prodded all around on that particular question. But Tom, I’m responding in the same manner. We are, I’m not going on a hypothetical that may be and perhaps and if this is done, no that’s not it. The position, the door is firmly closed. There’s nothing other than the resolution, not the resolution, I’m sorry, the motion that was adopted in the House of Commons.

    Clark. Then why is Peter MacKay open to this idea?

    Cannon. Well, Peter might be open to the idea, but this doesn’t mean that the Prime Minister and the Government of Canada is open to the idea.

Now, you could, conceivably, find a difference between interest and openness. But setting aside the question of a gap between the ministers, the conclusion of this exchange with Mr. Cannon is likely relevant.

    Clark. So you’re saying, resolutely, no question about it, all Canadian boots off of Afghan soil by July of next year? Period, end of story, you’re not going to change your mind, you’re not open to any other ideas.

    Cannon. That’s what the motion says and that’s the position of the government of Canada.

    Clark. And that’s not about to change.

    Cannon. That is correct.

    Clark. It won’t change at all.

    Cannon. That is correct.

    Clark. Everybody out.

    Cannon. That is correct. That’s what the motion says.

As noted, that’s not exactly what the motion says. Mr. Cannon did though also refer to the last Speech from the Throne, which included the following passage...

Mark
Ottawa
 
More on the Senate Committee report on post-2011 possibilities:

Afstan: Not rounding up some usual suspects
http://unambig.com/afstan-not-rounding-up-some-usual-suspects/

Take a look at the whole post by Brian Platt.

Mark
Ottawa
 
ROEs and the law of unintended consequences:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2010/06/28/the-side-effects-of-the-afghanistan-rules-of-engagement/

The Side Effects of the Afghanistan Rules of Engagement
BY HERSCHEL SMITH
20 hours, 24 minutes ago
From Strategy Page;

After a year of concentrated effort, NATO forces in Afghanistan have reduced civilian casualties, caused by foreign troops, 44.4 percent. There were 7.8 percent fewer battles even involving civilians, and 52 percent fewer civilians hurt by foreign troops. The most striking reduction (82 percent) was in civilian casualties from air strikes. All this is calculated by comparing the last three months with the same period from last year. All this despite nearly twice as many foreign troops in action, and much more combat. Meanwhile, civilian losses from Taliban action are up 36 percent.

Many Afghans are not happy with this policy, with foreign troops increasingly encountering angry Afghan civilians, who demand that NATO act more decisively in pursuing and killing Taliban gunman. Even if it puts Afghan civilians at risk. This is an unexpected side effect to the change in NATO rules of engagement (ROE) in Afghanistan. The ROE change was partly in response to popular (or at least media) anger at civilians killed by American smart bombs. As a result of the new ROE, it became much more difficult to get permission drop a smart bomb when there might be civilians nearby. Now American commanders have to decide who they shall respond too; Afghan civilians asking for relief from Taliban oppression, or Taliban influenced media condemning the U.S. for any Afghan civilians killed, or thought to be killed, by American firepower. What to do? So far, the decision often favors the survival of the Taliban.

Unexpected?  This was only unexpected among dolts.  I said as much ten months ago (“officials” have admitted that the new Afghanistan ROE have opened up new space for the insurgents”), nine months ago (“the Taliban will surround themselves with noncombatants, in the end making it more dangerous for everyone”), eight months ago (“giving the insurgents safe haven amongst the domiciles of villages sends the opposite message than we intend”), seven months ago (“give chase to and kill the enemy as the surest way to win the hearts and minds of the locals, and thus win the campaign”), and four months ago (“I had predicted that these rules would have the opposite affect from that intended, i.e., that they would fail to prevent noncombatant deaths and might even cause more than if we were to implement a more robust set of ROE or simply leave the rules unchanged”).

Let’s not hear any more about unintended consequences or unexpected side effects of the ROE.  I’ve said plenty and issued the appropriate warnings.  The slow to learn haven’t been paying attention, and perhaps should never have been entrusted with the responsibility they have been given.

Congressman Walter Jones (R-NC) is calling for a hearing on the ROE, and General Petraeus might be preparing to modify the rules of engagement, but I’ll take a wait and see approach on this.  The issue doesn’t pertain to whether there is such a thing as ROE, but whether Generals who should be talking strategy are issuing tactical directives to Lance Corporals and Sergeants in the field under fire and requiring approval of staff level officers a hundred miles away in order to bring combined arms to bear on the enemy.  It has to do with micromanagement of the campaign.  It’s simply something staff and flag level officers should not be doing.  The campaign will be won or lost based on empowerment of the troops down the chain of command.

As I chewed the cud over the dismissal of General McChrystal over the weekend, it occurred to me that there was more than just the irrational devotion to a single military doctrine to blame for the fiasco that is Afghanistan (see endnote).  General McChrystal worked much of his career in Special Operations Forces where he micromanaged many things, including at the tactical level.  General McChrystal was never the right man for this job, regardless of whether he has been a good commander of SOF.  This isn’t a commentary on the man, but rather, a commentary on the situation.  It’s time for the new rules to go.  They were a bad idea from the beginning, and nothing useful or constructive ever came from them.

Endnote: I do not support a singular focus in counterinsurgency (such as population-centric COIN), but do support multiple, simultaneous and equally viable lines of effort.  Also, my view of Special Operations Forces is that SOCOM should be abolished.  Not SF or SOF, but the separate command structure for these groups.
 
This from the Canadian Press, shared in accordance with the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright  Act:
When talk in Ottawa's halls of power turns to Afghanistan, he's known as the immovable object.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper, once considered a hawk in the mould of George W. Bush, appears more and more like a dove as Canada enters what could be its last summer of war in southwest Asia.

Publicly, Harper's Conservative government stands firm in its determination to end the country's combat mission in Kandahar on July 1, 2011, despite a growing chorus of voices at home and abroad urging it to reconsider — or redefine and renew its commitment.

The message privately is the same: The army comes home from war-wasted Afghanistan, to be replaced by development and diplomacy.

In a city that's accustomed to political back-room deals and obfuscation, the clarity and consistency of the refrain is startling, unnerving and even a little weird.

Many have a hard time believing Harper, who once famously declared Canada would never "cut and run" from Afghanistan, actually means what he says. They keep waiting for the other shoe to drop.

Last spring, the parlour-talk speculation suggested the prime minister, known as a masterful political tactician, was shrewdly allowing the opposition to manoeuvre him to the precise spot he wanted to be by pushing for some kind of renewed military commitment to Afghanistan.

The way the story spins out, the opposition and interested Canadians, worried about the country's already-steep investment in blood and treasure in Afghanistan, would push for a new mandate, and Harper gives in, extending the mission without having to suffer the political consequences.

It sounds calculated and disingenuous, and ignores one vital, fundamental fact: insiders say Harper himself is determined to end Canada's role in the fighting.

"If Parliament hadn't imposed a deadline, I would have done it myself," the prime minister reportedly told insiders last year.

That was before U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointedly asked Ottawa last winter to extend its time in Kandahar, and before Michael Ignatieff decided to make a post-2011 training mission in Afghanistan the centrepiece of Liberal party policy.

During a visit to Kandahar Airfield earlier this month, Liberal foreign affairs critic Bob Rae expressed the Liberal belief that Canada should linger in some capacity to help train Afghan security forces. Both the House of Commons and Senate defence committees also piled on in the days before Parliament's summer recess.

In a report last week, the Senate warned Canada's "standing" among its allies could suffer if Ottawa were indeed to walk away from Afghanistan lock, stock and smoking barrels. The subtext of the admonition — often repeated openly around the capital — is that leaving in the middle of the fight endangers relations with Washington.

Hogwash, says a defence analyst.

Rob Huebert, a political science professor at the University of Calgary, said Canada has more important interests in Afghanistan beyond appeasing the Americans.

"I'm not sure how much the U.S. has even paid attention to what an important role we've played up until this point in time," Huebert said.

"Do we get any credit for being there when the U.S. wasn't there? And the answer is: absolutely not. The U.S. is so focused on what the U.S. does, it often doesn't notice for good and bad what its closest friends and allies are doing."

Almost a decade after 9/11, Canada is still on al-Qaida's hit list, and that should be a bigger security concern than whether we've annoyed Washington, Huebert added. After all, he said, the stated purpose of having troops on the ground in the first place was to counter the terrorist threat.

The Americans may not realize we're there, but when the ramp goes up on the last Canadian military transport in Afghanistan, they'll know that we've left, said retired major general Lewis MacKenzie.

Then what?

Federal cabinet ministers routinely duck or soft-pedal when the questions come about the inevitable political fallout of the self-imposed July 2011 deadline.

They often use, as Defence Minister Peter MacKay did last week, the well-worn line: "We have to respect Parliament and the motion is clear. We can't be fighting for democracy in Afghanistan and ignore it at home."

But while the motion passed by the House of Commons in March 2008 commits Canada to end combat operations and withdraw from Kandahar by 2011, it does not require that the country leave Afghanistan entirely — a rider added by Harper himself during the last election campaign.

Canada's not the only one planning an exit, MacKay noted: U.S. President Barack Obama has also set July 2011 as a deadline to begin drawing down American forces.

"The expressions of interest in a role for Canada beyond 2011 from Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Rae and others are of great interest," MacKay said.

"But until such time as that motion reads differently, we will respect that motion."
 
A real must-read  from BruceR. at Flit on Afghan training, er, deficiencies:

Today’s essential Afghan reading: the SIGAR report
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_06_30.html#006748

The SIGAR report
http://www.sigar.mil/Seriousflawsinsystem.asp
on the problems with the ANSF Capability Milestone (CM) system is out, and worth a read. The clear implication is that prior to the arrival of Gen McChrystal and his team, ANSF mentoring had really been spinning its wheels.

The fact that this report was coming has been known by ISAF for some time: so long that the current official response that it’s now so out-of-date as to be unnecessary seems a little disingenuous…

This is significant: up until the month the SIGAR report’s conclusions were known, the DOD position was that the CM system was actually understating ANSF capability. Now that the SIGAR report has come out, along with other evidence that ANSF capability has been, if anything, historically overstated, they’re saying that in fact, they weren’t even measuring capability at all…

The reason a pure “potential measurement” system was not appropriate for units already in combat should be clear: combat tends to have an attritional effect on all three measurements. If the CM system had been purely an on-paper evaluation, and a truthful one, the units incurring heavy fighting should have seen their evaluation scores go DOWN, not up. And given the importance of a high CM rating to the Afghan defence ministry, this in turn would have led to Afghan units avoiding potential combat situations even more than they did, to keep from hurting their “scores.”..

Lots more worth the look.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Further to this post,

"The final countdown to end of Afghan mission"
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/49908/post-950578.html#msg950578

things don't look good for our government listening:

[yellow]Afghanistan asks Canada to extend its military mission[/color]
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Afghanistan+asks+Canada+extend+military+mission/3223595/story.html

Afghans will die if Canada does not play a part in the Afghanistan recovery after the planned military withdrawal in July 2011, Kabul's man in Ottawa said Wednesday.

But the commander of all Canadian troops overseas said the government has provided no indication of any such intentions beyond next summer's deadline.

Afghanistan's ambassador to Canada, Jawed Ludin, said even with Canadian troops in the country for the past eight years, there is still an enormous challenge to uproot Taliban militants from the country.

"The challenge is still there, but the guarantee for the success is also there," he said, urging Canadian troops to remain in Afghanistan to forge a stronger partnership.

"This is a question of life and death. For us there is no Plan B," he said.

"There is no doubt that Afghanistan is a country that needs everything it can get. From aid to development, to military assistance, too."

Despite that plea, the commander of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command Lt.-Gen. Marc Lessard said Canadian military commitment in the country will end next year.

"Technically Canada is leaving," he said, "We're handing over to another ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] ... whichever country, which will continue doing what we're doing so well right now."

It is exactly one year from this Canada Day that the Harper government is slated to officially begin its retreat from Kandahar. Combat operations are scheduled to continue until the July 1, 2011 deadline, and all troops are to be home by the end of next year.

When asked if the Canadian Forces plan an continuing, non-combat role for troops beyond next year, Lessard, who commands all Canadian forces overseas, said: "In fact, no. Because we haven't been [given] any, any, any indication" by the government [emphasis added]...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Further to above post:

Who cares about the Afghan government? And strong horses?
http://unambig.com/who-cares-about-the-afghan-government-and-strong-horses/

Mark
Ottawa
 
Senator Pam Wallin speaking to American crowds:
Speaking to about 200 people on hand at the Penrose House on Thursday for a Canada Day celebration, Canadian Sen. Pamela Wallin (pictured left) expressed dismay with the decision to end Canada's military participation in the Afghanistan conflict.

"I hope we can find some flexibility in the Canadian approach," Wallin said. "Our job is not done. That debate continues at home. We do have to continue in some way to make our contribution." ....
 
Loose lips sink generals, or…(plus hitting Canada for six)
http://unambig.com/loose-lips-sink-generals-or/

…you just can’t win with the Gray Lady...

Mark
Ottawa
 
A way of looking at things that would be most unusual in many Canadian circles--Realpolitik: do it, and do it right:

Diggers need freedom to win freedom
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/diggers-need-freedom-to-win-freedom/story-e6frg6zo-1225888205457

JULIA Gillard's elevation to the office of Prime Minister offers an opportunity to correct both the Rudd and Howard governments' feckless policy towards engagement in Afghanistan. Conveniently, the change in leadership in Canberra coincides with a change of command and a review of strategy in Afghanistan.

Australia has about 1550 soldiers in Afghanistan, mostly in Oruzgan province. The government's line on why we're there is that a Taliban victory and the prospect of Afghanistan again being used as a safe haven for terrorists would pose a threat to Australia. This is true: failure in Afghanistan would be a fillip for terrorist groups that have attacked Australians directly and undermine the stability of the region on which our security and prosperity depends. But that's not the most important reason why Australia is there.

As in Vietnam and Iraq, Australia continues to commit its blood and treasure in Afghanistan largely for the sake of its alliance with the US and, to a lesser extent, with other NATO countries. But instead of impressing its allies, Australia's heavily circumscribed commitment dismays them with its timidity.

The government has tried to minimise the risks of the deployment through three "nos".

The first no has been to the obvious step of taking over command in Oruzgan from the Dutch, who will pull out in August. With only a few dozen more soldiers, Australia could take command in Oruzgan, where it has been the junior partner of the Dutch since 2006. The US would make up for the departing Dutch troops with a battalion, which would be under Australian command, as well as any equipment Australia wasn't able to supply.

The second no has been to allowing Australian trainers to accompany the Afghan National Army's Fourth Brigade, whom they've been training, when the brigade is deployed outside Oruzgan. One battalion of the Fourth Brigade was sent to neighbouring Helmand province to join in the campaign for Marja; the Aussies were told to stay home. Mentoring, especially for combat, depends on relationships and trust, which means leading by example. Canberra isn't allowing the Diggers to do that.

The third no is to Australia's special forces, the second-biggest SF contingent in Afghanistan after the US, operating anywhere outside Oruzgan without permission from the Minister of Defence. A foreign officer has said this is like having a Ferrari but driving it like a Volkswagen. Australian special forces should operate, like the Brits and others, wherever in the southern region the multinational command deems they are required [meanwhile our government is loathe even to give a real clue what our SF do there]...

For the addition of a handful of soldiers and the discarding of two self-defeating restrictions, Australia would get enormously more bang for its buck. Taking command in Oruzgan, allowing trainers to fight with the Afghan brigade they're training and unchaining the special forces would show allies and the world that under Julia Gillard Australia had rediscovered its, er, backbone.

Whit Mason is managing director of Political Risk Analysis. He is also the non-resident fellow of the West Asia Program of the Lowy Institute for International Policy

Mark
Ottawa
 
And from BruceR. at Flit (his first link well worth the read):

Today's essential Afghan reading: Bing West

Reviewing Kilcullen:
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23564

Because they are partnered with our troops, Afghan soldiers are copying our rules of engagement and risk-avoidance procedures. Since they wear our heavy armor, they too cannot pursue the light and mobile Taliban forces. When the enemy initiates contact, the Afghan soldiers are trained to wait alongside our troops until our attack helicopters force the Taliban to flee. The Afghan soldiers will not be able to fight that way as U.S. resources are reduced. The Afghan security forces simply cannot take over the fight anytime soon.

Reminds me of what I wrote (point #7) fresh from the fight last August.
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_08_24.html#006507 [also wwtr]

Mark
Ottawa


 
Then there are the wimpy Kiwis (as an Aussie sees it):

NZ puts nation first, war second
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/nz-puts-nation-first-war-second-20100705-zxiq.html?rand=1278337537867

New Zealand may be a nation of warriors when it comes to football codes. But such courage does not extend to elected politicians in Wellington, whether they be conservatives or social democrats.

Last week John Key, New Zealand's National Party Prime Minister, revealed he had rejected a request from Kevin Rudd - made in about mid-May - to assist the Australian Defence Force contingent in Afghanistan. Australia has some 1500 personnel within Afghanistan as part of Operation Slipper. Rudd asked Key for between 20 and 50 troops to assist Australian operations in the Oruzgan province in southern Afghanistan.

Like Australia, New Zealand is a member of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. It has about 225 personnel in the country - some at the command headquarters in Kabul and others in central Afghanistan where the threat from Taliban forces is relatively light.

Rudd wanted Key to send up to 50 troops to assist Australia in Oruzgan where it is training the Afghan National Army and engaging in reconstruction projects. Clearly Key does not want to risk New Zealand lives in Oruzgan province, where international forces are experiencing casualties.

This is a particularly unhelpful decision. Right now US President Barack Obama's surge strategy is about to be put into effect. It may or may not work. But it is worth a try. The New Zealand Prime Minister's decision is not helpful to the US, which is leading the military effort...

it takes no particular courage for a New Zealand political leader to appeal to that nation's isolationist tendency and its considerable left-wing constituency. An act of real political courage by the National Party would be to increase its commitment in the dangerous areas of Afghanistan and to announce that New Zealand was rejoining the ANZUS Alliance, which it baled out of two decades ago.

The shemozzle that occurred when Clark and her fellow leftist Margaret Wilson effectively forced then New Zealand Labour prime minister David Lange to junk ANZUS over the issue of US naval visits is well documented in Michael Bassett's Working with David: Inside the Lange Cabinet.

The US Navy still does not have untrammelled access to New Zealand ports. New Zealand does have a navy but no effective air force. It has a proficient army, which the conservative Prime Minister does not want to deploy to assist an ally. Once were warriors, indeed.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Two more from BruceR.:

Today's essential Afghan reading: Tim Lynch
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_07_06.html#006751

More of this please:
http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3289
...
Look, it's real simple: you don't need to "arm the tribes." You don't need to train the Afghans to fight our way, either. You just need to train those willing to fight for the central government enough to be able to explain what they need from us, and then train a (much smaller) number of our soldiers to fight alongside them, in a manner that doesn't get in their way, bringing all of our nifty technological enablers along to ensure a victory. And that's a lot simpler challenge... if only because more of ours can read the manual, be it 3-24 or Seven Pillars. It worked in 2001, and it can work again. We really seem to be overthinking this thing.

Today's essential Afghan reading: Bernard Finel
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_07_06.html#006750

A must-read for would-be nation builders:
http://www.bernardfinel.com/?p=1402

...In growing the security forces so large, and attempting to extend the central government's reach, we have created a state so entirely dependent on cash transfers from foreign countries to continue that it is clearly unsustainable, even to its strongest supporters among its own people. The Afghan GDP will never, ever rise to the point where it can pay the army we've created for them at the wage levels we've set. Because it is clear the good times cannot last, it is only rational for the key players to be focussed on shorter-term profit-taking...

Now I’ve been very critical of our government for its unwillingness to continue any CF mission in Afstan post-2011, even a non-combat one training the ANA.
http://unambig.com/afstan-hell-yes-were-gonna-go/
But if training a seemingly ever-larger ANA is not the right way to go, then one might argue the government is making the correct decision.

Quite so. Except that the government has not made any case for its complete withdrawal position based on the argument that such training is not in fact what is needed. In fact I do not think the government has made any argument about its decision related–one way or another–to things military in Afstan. It’s been simply: “Out we go cause Parliament said so.”

Mark
Ottawa
 
As for civilian deaths:

Civilian Casualties Create New Enemies, Study Confirms
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/07/civilian-casualties-create-new-enemies-study-confirms/

Yes, we needed economists to tell us this. A new working paper 
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w16152#fromrss
published by the National Bureau of Economic Research finds “strong evidence for a revenge effect” when examining the relationship between civilian casualties caused by the U.S.-led military coalition in Afghanistan and radicalization after such incidents occur. The paper even estimates of how many insurgent attacks to expect after each civilian death. Those findings, however intuitive, might resolve an internal military debate about the counter-productivity of civilian casualties — and possibly fuel calls for withdrawal.

“When ISAF units kill civilians,” the research team finds, referring to the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, “this increases the number of willing combatants, leading to an increase in insurgent attacks.” According to their model, every innocent civilian killed by ISAF predicts an “additional 0.03 attacks per 1,000 population in the next 6-week period.” In a district of 83,000 people, then, the average of two civilian casualties killed in ISAF-initiated military action leads to six additional insurgent attacks in the following six weeks.

The team doesn’t examine the effect of CIA drone strikes in neighboring Pakistan, the subject of fierce debate concerning both the level of civilian deaths the strikes generate and their radicalizing effect.

A team of four economists — Stanford’s Luke N. Condra and Joseph H. Felter, the London School of Economics’ Radha K. Iyengar, and Princeton’s Jacob N. Shapiro — used the International Security Assistance Force’s own civilian-casualty data to reach their conclusions, breaking it down by district to examine further violence in the area in which civilians died. They examined the effect of over 4000 civilian deaths from January 2009 to March 2010 by looking at the sometimes-lagging indications of reprisal attacks in the same areas. To be clear, the team’s research is inferential, creating a statistical model to examine spikes in violence following civilian-casualty incidents, rather than interviewing insurgents as to their specific motivations.

But in their study, the researchers found that there’s a greater spike in violence after ISAF-caused civilian deaths than after insurgent-caused ones. “An incident which results in 10 civilian casualties will generate about 1 additional IED attack in the following 2 months,” the researchers write. “The effect for insurgents is much weaker and not jointly significant.”

In other words, even if the insurgents possess a “total disregard for human life and the Afghan people,” as an ISAF press release reacting to this weekend’s insurgent bombings in Herat put it, Afghans effectively would rather be killed by other Afghans than foreigners.

That’s not all. The researchers found that ISAF-caused civilian casualties corollate with long-term radicalization in Afghanistan. Plotting reprisal incidents of violence in areas where civilians died at coalition hands, the data showed that “that the Coalition effect is enduring, peaking 16 weeks after the event. This confirms the intuition that civilian casualties by ISAF forces predict greater violence through a long-run effect.” That’s consistent with intuitions that civilian casualties “are affecting future violence through increased recruitment into insurgent groups,” although they find no direct evidence for such a thing. Interestingly, the researchers found the opposite to be the case in Iraq: U.S.-caused civilian casualties are more likely to cause short-term retaliatory spikes than they are violence over the long term. (Yet.)...

Via Milnews.ca:
http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/CANinKandahar

Mark
Ottawa
 
Thanks for the mention.

I'm a bit uncomfortable with this conclusion:
Even if the insurgents possess a “total disregard for human life and the Afghan people,” as an ISAF press release reacting to this weekend’s insurgent bombings in Herat put it, Afghans effectively would rather be killed by other Afghans than foreigners.
I've wondered why there's rabid protests when ISAF is responsible for some civcas, and nothing when the Taliban is responsible for way more, too.  I don't know if I'd declare a "preference of who kills me" among Afghans, though.

One alternative guess:  this could be an indicator re:  who scares Afghans the most when it comes to demanding justice without fear of retribution.

Another:  this could also indicate who Afghans think will be around longer to either protect or kill them, based on history.
 
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