Army Reserve Restructuring

[FJAG]

Coming back to this topic and your point, a major change to the role and organization of the Canadian army reserves would need to come from a PM and Defence Minister in concert with the minister of global affairs. Former Army Commanders have tried to reorganize the reserves (at least two major attempts during my career) and these have foundered on the shoals of politics. The reserve can draw on a web of political influence that an army commander cannot. So the reserves soldier-on in their current form, contributing to the role and tasks of the Canadian Army even if they are inefficiently organized and not equipped for the fight tonight.

Firstly, I agree with the general point that reform of the reserves must come from the PM, MND and MGA. I think that the RegF side of the army (and DND) overestimate the political influence of reserve units. There is certainly some, but it's not as strong as it once was. The last few plans to reform the reserves foundered primarily, IMHO, because they were bad plans. LFRR received strong opposition from within various agencies including from retired senior RegF officers.

Reforming the reserves should not be a goal in and of itself. It should be an consequence of a political decision about the role of the Canadian Army. That would then drive how the reserves would be organized, equipped and trained. If government states that they want to have a Canadian Division deployed to Europe within two months in the case of Russian aggression with another Division as a follow-on and another for homeland defence against credible threats then the necessary reforms would occur if they were serious. There would be a real price tag, not to mention opposition from MPs from the ridings of units affected. Form should follow function.

Again, opposition from MPs from the ridings of reserve units affected presupposes that the plan is so poor that it causes outrage. I would think that a good plan that affects reserve units in a positive way would receive support.

Again I fully agree that any such reorganization must be one that comes from a political decision that affects the army as a whole vis a vis its role and specifically contemplated visions. Reforming the reserves in and of themselves is generally a Titanic deck chair reshuffle.

That said though, doesn't it also behoove the Canadian military to fully and frankly inform the government of perceived shortcoming in the military and have contingency proposals (including costings) for how to mitigate those shortcomings? And let's be honest, the reserves are far from the effective force that they could and should be. I know that those of us sitting on the outside looking in do not have access to the discussions between the MND, CDS and DM, but it strikes me that I have yet to see a CDS or senior GOFO resign in protest over government inaction.

 

[dapaterson]

Good for the Army needs to be the deciding factor, not perpetuating ineffectiveness in the name of tradition. The latter has a strong influence, unfortunately...

 

[MilEME09]

Again, opposition from MPs from the ridings of reserve units affected presupposes that the plan is so poor that it causes outrage. I would think that a good plan that affects reserve units in a positive way would receive support.

There are ways to reform without changing the geo footprint of the Reserves, the problem is the elephant in the room of protecting regiments rather then amalgamation. Look at Col. Hunt of 41 Brigade folding the SALH A Sqn into the KOCR, the pitch forks were out within an hour of the order coming out, but sometimes you gotta push through the change for the better of the army.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Good for the Army needs to be the deciding factor, not perpetuating ineffectiveness in the name of tradition. The latter has a strong influence, unfortunately...

Wait... are we talking about the Arbour Report now?

Canada’s military a ‘broken system’ that’s a ‘liability’ to the country, report finds - National | Globalnews.ca

The Liberals brought in Louise Arbour for advice on addressing the sexual misconduct crisis following exclusive reporting by Global News into allegations against top leaders.

globalnews.ca

 

[PrairieFella]

I've said it before, I'll say it again. We have to be careful with tradition and identity in the reserves. I agree 100% reform and consolidation is needed, but the baby shouldn't be thrown out with the bath water. One of very few things holding together a lot of reserve units is morale and tradition, especially as I situational apathy, rust out and maintenance deficits make it harder and harder for reservations to do the job they signed up for.

 

[MilEME09]

I've said it before, I'll say it again. We have to be careful with tradition and identity in the reserves. I agree 100% reform and consolidation is needed, but the baby shouldn't be thrown out with the bath water. One of very few things holding together a lot of reserve units is morale and tradition, especially as I situational apathy, rust out and maintenance deficits make it harder and harder for reservations to do the job they signed up for.

In the case mentioned above, the A sqn traditions live on at Coy level, in the words of the last Reg Force CO of the RHRC "Esprit de corp is built on tradition, and the tradition of a unit is based on its history and accomplishments" If we act to rash and erase the history of a unit morale will absolutely tank, but when amalgamating we are really substituting one history for another.

 

[PrairieFella]

In the case mentioned above, the A sqn traditions live on at Coy level, in the words of the last Reg Force CO of the RHRC "Esprit de corp is built on tradition, and the tradition of a unit is based on its history and accomplishments" If we act to rash and erase the history of a unit morale will absolutely tank, but when amalgamating we are really substituting one history for another.

You're not wrong, I'm just saying it should be carefully considered. Absorbed units can keep their accoutrements at the subunit level, which happens frequently in the UK. When possible, the larger, healthier units should have their traditions kept, since the potential for mass releases is minimized.

We shouldn't just wholesale blow up the regimental system at the reserve level is what I mean to say.

 

[markppcli]

I've said it before, I'll say it again. We have to be careful with tradition and identity in the reserves. I agree 100% reform and consolidation is needed, but the baby shouldn't be thrown out with the bath water. One of very few things holding together a lot of reserve units is morale and tradition, especially as I situational apathy, rust out and maintenance deficits make it harder and harder for reservations to do the job they signed up for.

Are they really holding together though ? Like let’s look at Winnipeg where we have 3 Bn / Reg HQs holding onto that tradition and putting a collective Coy + in the field. Is that really a success story that should be used to temper reform? If that was changed how long before that turn over happens and it’s no longer a factor ? Five years ? Maybe ten?

Traditions are valuable as long as they hold value. Esprit de Corps is incredibly important - in fighting and operational units. To be quite blunt if we never intend on employing the King’s Own Flin Flon Fencibles on operations, short of a massive mobilization that would take years to equip anyways, how valuable is their esprit de corps?

The real question is how do we structure the Army to meet our required and desired operational out puts, and then how do we develop esprit de corps / regimental pride within the units we intend to employ.

 

[PrairieFella]

Are they really holding together though ? Like let’s look at Winnipeg where we have 3 Bn / Reg HQs holding onto that tradition and putting a collective Coy + in the field. Is that really a success story that should be used to temper reform? If that was changed how long before that turn over happens and it’s no longer a factor ? Five years ? Maybe ten?

Traditions are valuable as long as they hold value. Esprit de Corps is incredibly important - in fighting and operational units. To be quite blunt if we never intend on employing the King’s Own Flin Flon Fencibles on operations, short of a massive mobilization that would take years to equip anyways, how valuable is their esprit de corps?

The real question is how do we structure the Army to meet our required and desired operational out puts, and then how do we develop esprit de corps / regimental pride within the units we intend to employ.

I can guarantee you you will lose half a unit's strength in a lot of places if the history and traditions are gone. If that is part of the Army's calculus and they carry on with reforms, have at it, the orders are ours to follow.

Let's say the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders are blown up and reformed as the Manitoba Infantry Battalion, what is actually achieved? Sure, you can get rid of HQ 5 or 6 positions but you risk losing one of the final pieces holding people in. Still have no new kit, you still have institutional problems, you still have ammo allocation issues, you still have IT choke points, etc. Nothing is actually achieved except rearranging.

One thing that is always lacking in the reserve reform discussion (minus FJAG's well-charted plans) is how do we actually integrate the reserves into something more useful and rewarding than it is now. Most discussions are 1. Blow it up 2.??? 3. Profit. This is why reservists get our hackles up when these sorts of things are bandied about. We want to be useful but there are about ten thousand more important steps the CAF can take in that regard before changing what's on our berets/slip ons.

 

[markppcli]

I can guarantee you you will lose half a unit's strength in a lot of places if the history and traditions are gone. If that is part of the Army's calculus and they carry on with reforms, have at it, the orders are ours to follow.

Let's say the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders are blown up and reformed as the Manitoba Infantry Battalion, what is actually achieved? Sure, you can get rid of HQ 5 or 6 positions but you risk losing one of the final pieces holding people in. Still have no new kit, you still have institutional problems, you still have ammo allocation issues, you still have IT choke points, etc. Nothing is actually achieved except rearranging.

One thing that is always lacking in the reserve reform discussion (minus FJAG's well-charted plans) is how do we actually integrate the reserves into something more useful and rewarding than it is now. Most discussions are 1. Blow it up 2.??? 3. Profit. This is why reservists get our hackles up when these sorts of things are bandied about. We want to be useful but there are about ten thousand more important steps the CAF can take in that regard before changing what's on our berets/slip ons.

I think that’s a colossal misunderstanding of what I’m saying. So let’s go through the points one by one:

1. We’ll lose 50 percent. Okay, maybe. Which 50 percent though and 50 percent do what exactly. Because right now we simply count numbers with a minimal amount of actually tracking what output that provides. What is the operational output of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles - by which I mean what is their role in the CAF and what purpose do they have ? By what metric do we track this?

2. We’d create minimal savings in people or equipment via reorganization. Firstly let’s look at what we actually have, which is somewhere around 70 regiments, Bns, and independent squadrons or batteries. Some how the engineers and gunners can function as independent sub units but not the maneuver arms but that’s a different conversation. We then group these into ten CBGs, for which we have divisions upon divisions to manage. Now what exactly would be the number or radios or trucks we need for a 41 CBG, or 37 CBG? How about 1 CH? We can’t say because per point one they don’t have an output - or a task and purpose, and not a set organization. We need to rationalize the organization to make equipping and managing the army something that can be done in a logical manner. We should be able to look at the Army, see a unit, see its task, and know what equipment it needs and how many people it has. Logically organized, credible armies do this. We are the unique exception.

3. Organization - I’ve actually posted on this topic many times. Yes the army needs to organize to meet operational requirements. That can mean having a combination of part time and full time people working in units depending on its readiness state. It can mean having formations in reserve or ready. Or some blend between the two. However the present structure is absolutely farcical. The maintain over 50 Bn / Regiments when the only reason is tradition is absurd. And yes, I agree we’d inevitably have some people quit - but like I said before in five years they’d be replaced.

 

[MilEME09]

I think that’s a colossal misunderstanding of what I’m saying. So let’s go through the points one by one:

1. We’ll lose 50 percent. Okay, maybe. Which 50 percent though and 50 percent do what exactly. Because right now we simply count numbers with a minimal amount of actually tracking what output that provides. What is the operational output of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles - by which I mean what is their role in the CAF and what purpose do they have ? By what metric do we track this?

2. We’d create minimal savings in people or equipment via reorganization. Firstly let’s look at what we actually have, which is somewhere around 70 regiments, Bns, and independent squadrons or batteries. Some how the engineers and gunners can function as independent sub units but not the maneuver arms but that’s a different conversation. We then group these into ten CBGs, for which we have divisions upon divisions to manage. Now what exactly would be the number or radios or trucks we need for a 41 CBG, or 37 CBG? How about 1 CH? We can’t say because per point one they don’t have an output - or a task and purpose, and not a set organization. We need to rationalize the organization to make equipping and managing the army something that can be done in a logical manner. We should be able to look at the Army, see a unit, see its task, and know what equipment it needs and how many people it has. Logically organized, credible armies do this. We are the unique exception.

3. Organization - I’ve actually posted on this topic many times. Yes the army needs to organize to meet operational requirements. That can mean having a combination of part time and full time people working in units depending on its readiness state. It can mean having formations in reserve or ready. Or some blend between the two. However the present structure is absolutely farcical. The maintain over 50 Bn / Regiments when the only reason is tradition is absurd. And yes, I agree we’d inevitably have some people quit - but like I said before in five years they’d be replaced.

To add to your point mark, with the reserves, losing 50% in some areas is only 25-40 troops, some units are really hurting for personal, only the QoR last i checked was even in the green, if a unit is say under 15% TES, there is not many left to actually care about a units traditions to be merged into a new regiment, so lets go the british way, keep traditions at the coy level and merge them all into a single regiment per ARes brigade.

 

[daftandbarmy]

To add to your point mark, with the reserves, losing 50% in some areas is only 25-40 troops, some units are really hurting for personal, only the QoR last i checked was even in the green, if a unit is say under 15% TES, there is not many left to actually care about a units traditions to be merged into a new regiment, so lets go the british way, keep traditions at the coy level and merge them all into a single regiment per ARes brigade.

And continue to kick the can down the road?

The perfect Canadian solution!

 

[MilEME09]

And continue to kick the can down the road?

The perfect Canadian solution!

No we must convene a committee to study the issue! then another one to study the study!

 

[KevinB]

With an actual mission and equipment, I think you’d find a lot more bodies and higher esprit de corps, regardless of what the units got called.

None of the ARes units have done anything as a unit in 80 years. So I wouldn’t hang a lot of stock in folks who cling to being a certain thing.

 

[MilEME09]

With an actual mission and equipment, I think you’d find a lot more bodies and higher esprit de corps, regardless of what the units got called.

None of the ARes units have done anything as a unit in 80 years. So I wouldn’t hang a lot of stock in folks who cling to being a certain thing.

As a RCEME type, I have more pride in my corp then my unit, service battalions don't have battle honors, our history is a soup sandwich of amalgamation and splitting of units since ww1, worthy of a lowly single cabinet in the museum as a foot note, and its not like units have much time in the training year to actually take a hard look at, and teach regimental history, there's barely enough time for actual training.

 

[quadrapiper]

To add to your point mark, with the reserves, losing 50% in some areas is only 25-40 troops, some units are really hurting for personal, only the QoR last i checked was even in the green, if a unit is say under 15% TES, there is not many left to actually care about a units traditions to be merged into a new regiment, so lets go the british way, keep traditions at the coy level and merge them all into a single regiment per ARes brigade.

Maybe don't fuss so much about regiments, since most are a fancy paint job on a platoon or company (or gaggle of distributed companies) already: with the reserves, be liberal with "regimental" identities. Lock them to geography, to stand up or return to the supplemental order as demographics dictate, and figure out what the practical output of the PRes is supposed to be: whether IA, formed units, or some other notion. Be liberal, too, with funding for adventure training, ranges, and things like bands. The last, and similar organizations, may offer a replacement for "mess culture," as drinking all night has become less popular.

Make, and I know I've suggested this before, the regiment something that hangs off whatever's actually present: let the Regimental Colonel and RSM be the Capt and Sgt IC the platoon- that the area can support, and that for whatever reason is deemed worth maintaining. Maintains whatever fractional value the local connection, history, Colours, and our very own funny hats might have, avoids questions of amalgamation and related politicking, and removes an impediment to setting up a structure that makes best sense for whatever it is the Army Reserve should actually be doing.