Canada's tanks

[FJAG]

Should Boxer be the Warrior replacement though? This is another case of the abandonment of tracked IFV?

In my opinion Boxer is not the right vehicle to accompany Challenger 3. But then I have a well-know track fetish.

IMHO, the whole move to the middle weight force was a solution to a problem that wasn't really there - the so called rapid deployability of light armoured forces by air. We got LAVs the Americans got Strykers. Luckily for the Americans, they kept the Bradley. Just as importantly they are replacing M113s with AMPVs. We've been forced to go for ACVS for LAV compatibility.

Unfortunately CCV wasn't a track specific project. Two final contenders were wheeled and only one tracked. That's why it died. No one could explain to the folks with their hands on the purse strings when money became tight that there was any real difference between the LAV UP which was already on the books and something like a VBCI or a Piranha V for the several billion they would cost. The CV9035 was an obvious choice but tracks weren't part of the specifications and so irrelevant. I'm simplifying the issues but there you have it. (Maybe we should have gone on with the CCV and ashcaned the TAPV instead)

 

[suffolkowner]

In my opinion Boxer is not the right vehicle to accompany Challenger 3. But then I have a well-know track fetish.

IMHO, the whole move to the middle weight force was a solution to a problem that wasn't really there - the so called rapid deployability of light armoured forces by air. We got LAVs the Americans got Strykers. Luckily for the Americans, they kept the Bradley. Just as importantly they are replacing M113s with AMPVs. We've been forced to go for ACVS for LAV compatibility.

Unfortunately CCV wasn't a track specific project. Two final contenders were wheeled and only one tracked. That's why it died. No one could explain to the folks with their hands on the purse strings when money became tight that there was any real difference between the LAV UP which was already on the books and something like a VBCI or a Piranha V for the several billion they would cost. The CV9035 was an obvious choice but tracks weren't part of the specifications and so irrelevant. I'm simplifying the issues but there you have it. (Maybe we should have gone on with the CCV and ashcaned the TAPV instead)

No tracked IFV for us or the French or the UK, although AJAX is tracked it seems to lack Infantry
LAV's maybe should have stayed lighter although that is not the trend and even the LAV 6 is small compared to Boxer

TAPV is gonna be looking real strange especially if we end up with 1500 JLTV as well for the LUVW-SMP plus whatever we get for NGFV

 

[markppcli]

Should Boxer be the Warrior replacement though? This is another case of the abandonment of tracked IFV?

Almost certainly. The idea warrior was going to be upgraded while operating boxer and the Ajax family was always a bit absurd. Boxer have operational history with ifv variants already while the modifications made to ASCOD have proven troublesome.

That said I really don’t like the weapons mounts on Boxer.

 

[GR66]

Honestly, I know it sounds ass backward, but I would first find the IFV with the best weapon system and protection system configuration and design my section size and tactics around that. If the overall platoon size is too small due to limited dismounts then add a fourth section and a fifth vehicle. I actually think we already did that once with the LAV which was a dramatic change from the section configuration in our M113s days.

Realistically when your kid doesn't match your doctrine you only have two choices...go out and buy the kit you need to match your doctrine or adjust your doctrine to match your kit. Unfortunately, Canada seems to think it can follow a 3rd path by having a doctrine on paper that doesn't match the kit, but pretend that the kit will magically appear (along with the personnel) when needed.

 

[markppcli]

Realistically when your kid doesn't match your doctrine you only have two choices...go out and buy the kit you need to match your doctrine or adjust your doctrine to match your kit. Unfortunately, Canada seems to think it can follow a 3rd path by having a doctrine on paper that doesn't match the kit, but pretend that the kit will magically appear (along with the personnel) when needed.

It helps to have made up formations that bare no similarity to existing formations for staff college so no one has to deal with some awkward truths.

 

[suffolkowner]

Almost certainly. The idea warrior was going to be upgraded while operating boxer and the Ajax family was always a bit absurd. Boxer have operational history with ifv variants already while the modifications made to ASCOD have proven troublesome.

That said I really don’t like the weapons mounts on Boxer.

are the UK Boxers armed with anything other than a 50 cal?
kinda puts them in the APC family before even looking at the lack of tracks?
Seems more like a Bulldog replacement than a Warrior one

 

[markppcli]

are the UK Boxers armed with anything other than a 50 cal?
kinda puts them in the APC family before even looking at the lack of tracks?
Seems more like a Bulldog replacement than a Warrior one

They were procured as the fv432 replacement but that’s now expanding with the warrior upgrade being abandoned. The boxer is at present armed with a .50 RWS about 2/3 or 3/4 back from the front, which is my biggest gripe even if they did replace it with an autocannon.

 

[Kirkhill]

Boxer Armoured Vehicle — Details and Variants - Think Defence

The ARTEC Boxer is a wheeled or tracked armoured vehicle, this article describes its capabilities, modules and variants

www.thinkdefence.co.uk

On the plus side the Boxer is an 8x8 Pick Up truck with a Camper in the bed.



The camper can be changed and modified. The pickup remains the same.

 

[FJAG]

It helps to have made up formations that bare no similarity to existing formations for staff college so no one has to deal with some awkward truths.

That's not really the problem that some people make it out to be.

I went through the old six-month army command and staff course in the 1970s and believe me, the orbats we were using were nothing like the combat groups we had in Canada nor the mech brigade group we had in Germany. However, contrary to popular opinion, army officers aren't stupid. We all understood we were learning tactics and procedures that could be adjusted to the circumstances and that the model we were using was aspirational designed to teach all elements of divisional level operations in modern warfare.

I expect today's officers are no different. They may not have air defence, but need to know how to employ it. They may not have rocket artillery but someone in the coalition will have it and our people will need to know how to employ it.

My concern is within the battalions where young soldiers and officers are more and more cynical having to deal with what they don't have. That's a more profound issue from that of a more senior staff officer in training.

Let me reassure you that officers all the way up the chain of command understand the awkward truths. Understanding them and having the ability to deal with them are two different things. That's not to say that mistakes don't get made - they do - but for the most part folks are trying to do the best they can with the hand that they've been dealt.

 

[markppcli]

That's not really the problem that some people make it out to be.

I went through the old six-month army command and staff course in the 1970s and believe me, the orbats we were using were nothing like the combat groups we had in Canada nor the mech brigade group we had in Germany. However, contrary to popular opinion, army officers aren't stupid. We all understood we were learning tactics and procedures that could be adjusted to the circumstances and that the model we were using was aspirational designed to teach all elements of divisional level operations in modern warfare.

I expect today's officers are no different. They may not have air defence, but need to know how to employ it. They may not have rocket artillery but someone in the coalition will have it and our people will need to know how to employ it.

My concern is within the battalions where young soldiers and officers are more and more cynical having to deal with what they don't have. That's a more profound issue from that of a more senior staff officer in training.

Let me reassure you that officers all the way up the chain of command understand the awkward truths. Understanding them and having the ability to deal with them are two different things. That's not to say that mistakes don't get made - they do - but for the most part folks are trying to do the best they can with the hand that they've been dealt.

My concern is that the only experience we have with any of this is theoretical and academic and the doctrine and theory re build has minimal real world experience to back it up.

I would rather our staff college focused on fighting the battle with what we do have so I’m not reading the Inf Bn in Operations and reading about four companies.

 

[KevinB]

I've always wondered about this system. Ejection of the expended casing is done by the new round entering the pivoting chamber and pushing the old casing out.

It’s fairly neat in most CTA setups as to how they work, either by a flipping or rotating chamber

That begs the question as to whether there is an override to eject an expended casing without introducing a new round so that the expended casing isn't left for a long time in the chamber after firing or a new round introduced long before needed.

Yes, but the benefits of CTA ammo is the casings are generally all polymer or hybrid materials that don’t retain heat.

The fact the casing completely encapsulates the projectile also ensures that the bore is sealed and the ‘chamber’ doesn’t get fouled during the firing cycle.

 

[FJAG]

My concern is that the only experience we have with any of this is theoretical and academic and the doctrine and theory re build has minimal real world experience to back it up.

Yeah. That's a real concern. I'm one of those guys who believes that skill and talent in the operational arts comes from a combination of academic pursuits and practical experience. Skimp on either one and you cheapen the product you're trying to develop.

I would rather our staff college focused on fighting the battle with what we do have so I’m not reading the Inf Bn in Operations and reading about four companies.

Have you ever considered the fact that if you were sent off to war with only what you have you would die very quickly.

I'll be blunt. I felt relatively comfortable with going off with the equipment that I had in my day because it was basically on a par with the oppositions. Even in a light combat group destined for Norway we had the right gear and when I was part of a flyover battery for Germany, it was to a 24 gun regiment supporting a full armoured regiment and two full mech battalions (with mortars and TOW) with appropriate air defence, air cover and divisional artillery support.

While I fully believe that your individual soldiers and officers are a better product than in my day, I'm far from satisfied with the state and amount of equipment. Your VOR rate is 50% of a stock of equipment that is already far too small for the army you have. Your combat development process lags by years if not decades. Your reserve force ... well, there you are. Essentially the government limits most acquisitions for the low stocks required for current ops - much of it on UOR - and has no depth of equipment - and more importantly ammo - for any serious affray.

At the very least, your cohort needs to be taught and trained about how to go to war properly with the hope that at some point the equipping of the force will be brought up to the standard of the training and education before you need to deploy for real. I think that the greatest impediment to the conceptual aspect of the army is the fiction of the medium weight, adaptable force. It's hard to train a force to be a Swiss Army Knife. The army would be much better off with one brigade fully equipped as a heavy brigade with a combat support brigade trained for Europe (this is where the tanks and IFVs come in) and another brigade as a light brigade for everywhere else. The third manoeuvre brigade I'd break up as the RegF core for training and mobilizing with a reorganized and restructured ARes (with an appropriate equipping program). That all leads to my favourite hobby - napkin forces.

 

[markppcli]

Yeah. That's a real concern. I'm one of those guys who believes that skill and talent in the operational arts comes from a combination of academic pursuits and practical experience. Skimp on either one and you cheapen the product you're trying to develop.

Have you ever considered the fact that if you were sent off to war with only what you have you would die very quickly.

Mate, I’ve set in the trip wire in Europe. I’m acutely aware of my life expectancy.

I'll be blunt. I felt relatively comfortable with going off with the equipment that I had in my day because it was basically on a par with the oppositions. Even in a light combat group destined for Norway we had the right gear and when I was part of a flyover battery for Germany, it was to a 24 gun regiment supporting a full armoured regiment and two full mech battalions (with mortars and TOW) with appropriate air defence, air cover and divisional artillery support.

Yes

While I fully believe that your individual soldiers and officers are a better product than in my day, I'm far from satisfied with the state and amount of equipment. Your VOR rate is 50% of a stock of equipment that is already far too small for the army you have. Your combat development process lags by years if not decades. Your reserve force ... well, there you are. Essentially the government limits most acquisitions for the low stocks required for current ops - much of it on UOR - and has no depth of equipment - and more importantly ammo - for any serious affray.

Yes

At the very least, your cohort needs to be taught and trained about how to go to war properly with the hope that at some point the equipping of the force will be brought up to the standard of the training and education before you need to deploy for real. I think that the greatest impediment to the conceptual aspect of the army is the fiction of the medium weight, adaptable force. It's hard to train a force to be a Swiss Army Knife. The army would be much better off with one brigade fully equipped as a heavy brigade with a combat support brigade trained for Europe (this is where the tanks and IFVs come in) and another brigade as a light brigade for everywhere else. The third manoeuvre brigade I'd break up as the RegF core for training and mobilizing with a reorganized and restructured ARes (with an appropriate equipping program). That all leads to my favourite hobby - napkin forces.

We have the same opinions but for the last point - I don’t think giving people tools in staff college makes them drive to get us the right equipment. Rather I tend to the opposite where we are building the idea of “in a real war we’d have X.” Despite the fact we have no mechanism to get X.

 

[OldSolduer]

We have the same opinions but for the last point - I don’t think giving people tools in staff college makes them drive to get us the right equipment. Rather I tend to the opposite where we are building the idea of “in a real war we’d have X.” Despite the fact we have no mechanism to get X.

When a real war starts we will be in the same state as we were prior to WW2. Under equipped and too few troops.

 

[Kirkhill]

If you don't have the troops or the equipment and the current training appropriate to a given mission who is the criminal agreeing to send you on that mission?

Your missions must match your capabilities as they exist.

 

[OldSolduer]

If you don't have the troops or the equipment and the current training appropriate to a given mission who is the criminal agreeing to send you on that mission?

Your missions must match your capabilities as they exist.

Tell that to The Winnipeg Grenadiers - deployed to Hong Kong without adequate training and equipment. NO ONE was held responsible for that travesty.

 

[Kirkhill]

Tell that to The Winnipeg Grenadiers - deployed to Hong Kong without adequate training and equipment. NO ONE was held responsible for that travesty.

I understand you have a Lessons Learned programme?

 

[Maxman1]

Tell that to The Winnipeg Grenadiers - deployed to Hong Kong without adequate training and equipment. NO ONE was held responsible for that travesty.

And the Royal Rifles of Canada.

 

[KevinB]

When a real war starts we will be in the same state as we were prior to WW2. Under equipped and too few troops.

Except in this day and age, the ability to raise trained troops and equipment is a much longer lead item than 80 years ago…

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

We aren't talking about Canada's tanks anymore, but hey.

For the Canadian Armed Forces, doctrine is the set of underlying principles that guide our actions. Doctrine is rather broad at higher levels, and tends to get tighter as it gets to lower levels. If we are discussing the Canadian Army's primary armoured fighting vehicles, I am not sure how the Leopard 2 or LAV 6 somehow exist outside of our written (or unwritten underlying) doctrine?

As a former Canadian Army Command and Staff College instructor (Directing Staff), the goal of the Army Operations Course is to develop the ability of seasoned Captains to plan operations at the battle group and brigade level. They use the formal estimate at the battle group level and the Operational Planning Process at the brigade/formation level. There is an order of battle that is used to develop those skills. The battle group when I taught there was fleshed-out, but it had three rifle companies with LAV 6, a tank squadron with Leopard 2s, an artillery battery with M777, an engineer squadron, a combat support company and a combat service support company. I think the only real deviation from existing field BGs on an MR would have been that the staff college LAV companies had ALAWS in them and the combat support company had TOW. ALAWS was an actual program, and ,lo and behold, we are getting something through UOR. So I am not seeing the big problem? The brigade level tutorial has a fleshed out CMBG. For the purposes of teaching you could substitute allied battlegroups and capabilities (which is done for the higher-level enablers), but having a CMBG allows the students to explore Canadian doctrine and organizations.

I thought it made sense to teach students with a fulsome tool-kit. They are learning to consider factors and make deductions. The process is the important part at that stage. At their units on exercise and operations as Ops Os etc they then use the planning process to consider the tools that they have at hand. When assigning tasks to sub-units on an MR, the Ops O would have to consider their weapons just like they did on AOC.

I think with collective training it is more important to have the training match the actual organization. Which is certainly done in field training - CAXs can have some variations.

Back to tanks, we have world-class ones. It would great to have more, but there it is. As for the next tank? Who knows. I am an amateur in google trawling, but I am not seeing a paradigmatic breakthrough in tank technology. APS will likely shift to dealing with FPV drones, and I think they will have more success against those than some other threats. I think many other changes we are seeing in future tank concepts are changes for their own sake with no real bump in combat capability - like the failed Future Combat Systems program of two decades ago. But I am naturally skeptic.

As for training and equipment, I would have liked to have seen ALAWs finalized in 2015 but dismounted TOW was put into the eFP and there were allied capabilities. The CA is working on some formation-level capabilities. Nothing is ever perfect and the bag only holds five pounds, but I am not seeing any real training shortfalls for our forces.