Canada's tanks

[TangoTwoBravo]

Is there, in a modern Army not constrained by low budgets and an inability to recruit and retain people, a role, in a formation, for a dedicated anti-armour unit?

Support weapons were concentrated in divisional level support battalions in WWII and I guess one of the lessons learned, by Korea, was that was not the best way to go. In the late 1960s we had, in service, a broad range of anti-armour weapons, with the infantry battalion having both man pack MAWs and vehicular mounted ATGMs while heavier ATGMs were 'brigaded" in a (largely notional) divisional anti-armour battalion (3R22R). There was one "working" ATGM coy of 3R22R in 4CMBG but some of us wondered if the organization was about anti-armour or having some role for a 13th infantry battalion in a 4 brigade army.

I am not sure that recruiting and retention really factor?

I think that certain weapons should be permanently distributed at a fairly low level. Infantry platoons and companies should be able to destroy small numbers of enemy tanks without requiring assistance from higher. I think that man-portable ATGM like Javelin should belong to the infantry battalion and pushed down to platoon/section level.

If a support weapon is so complex as to need very specialized training then perhaps that belongs in specialized units. The CA has tried various organizations for mobile TOW, ranging from battalion platoons to brigades companies. I think it belongs with infantry battalions, but if something like Javelin is widely distributed within the battalions then perhaps a Bde ATGM company makes sense. Somebody would have to run it in garrison. Not sure.

I am all for more ATGM with the infantry if it means that tanks can be seen as something other than a system to "protect the infantry from enemy tanks."

 

[Edward Campbell]

I am not sure that recruiting and retention really factor?
...
I am all for more ATGM with the infantry if it means that tanks can be seen as something other than a system to "protect the infantry from enemy tanks."

1. I worry that we, you are being worked too hard and put away wet and that we, the taxpayers, will never agree to pay the bill for making our military both able, appropriate for a G-7 nation an d effective.

2. Bingo! I was taught, eons ago, that the role of armour inv the battle group and brigade group was "punch," to lead local counter attacks and then the main counterstroke.

 

[GR66]

1. I worry that we, you are being worked too hard and put away wet and that we, the taxpayers, will never agree to pay the bill for making our military both able, appropriate for a G-7 nation an d effective.

2. Bingo! I was taught, eons ago, that the role of armour inv the battle group and brigade group was "punch," to lead local counter attacks and then the main counterstroke.

Looks like autocorrect was trying to correct your sentence to accurately portray Canada's Defence policy.

 

[FJAG]

1. I worry that we, you are being worked too hard and put away wet and that we, the taxpayers, will never agree to pay the bill for making our military both able, appropriate for a G-7 nation an d effective.

2. Bingo! I was taught, eons ago, that the role of armour inv the battle group and brigade group was "punch," to lead local counter attacks and then the main counterstroke.

Ditto. There was ample ATk and arty with the infantry in their defensive position. The tanks started the whole affair off with the guard battle; passed through, handed the fight off to the infantry; and went in with the reserve where they waited to deliver strong counterattacks. "Never penny-packet tanks" was dogma.

In Shilo we did counterattacks with the Germans with battle groups that were typically 2 to 3 Leo companies with a Marder company and a battery in support. Attacks were quick and violent.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Ditto. There was ample ATk and arty with the infantry in their defensive position. The tanks started the whole affair off with the guard battle; passed through, handed the fight off to the infantry; and went in with the reserve where they waited to deliver strong counterattacks. "Never penny-packet tanks" was dogma.

In Shilo we did counterattacks with the Germans with battle groups that were typically 2 to 3 Leo companies with a Marder company and a battery in support. Attacks were quick and violent.

Hence the 'speed & violence' part of the role.

 

[KevinB]

TBH the whole 3 Inf : Armoured cookie cutter CMBG has never made sense to me when one looked at how one would want to use one’s force in actual combat.

Sure it makes the managed readiness paper concept much easier, but makes no sense as far as an actual combat force would want to be setup.

For the heavy units the 2:1 Armor to Inf in the Armor heavy CAB’s make a lot more sense when you are pushing iron onto target.

At the end of the day Canada has enough tanks for basically an Armored BDE and that is it.

I still fail to understand why Canada doesn’t reorganize to a Armoured Bde for Europe, and then retains two Bd wide other contingencies.

A “Shmedium” LAV Bde
B Light Bde

Both for domestic and other area deployments.

 

[Kirkhill]

Cold War-era tank confirmed on frontline for first time​

The Cold War-era Leopard 1 tank is being used by Ukraine against Russia, it has been confirmed for the first time.
The AFP news agency filmed a freshly-painted Leopard 1A5 – a model which first entered service in the 1980s – near the front-line and interviewed its crew.
“We’ve already had combat missions with this tank, and on the Russian side, they’ve lost a lot of fighters because of it,” said tank crew member Grigorii, whose surname and rank were not disclosed.
“We can hit targets at distances of up to 3.5 to 5km,” added another called Vitalii. “We can, at a distance that does not allow us to be destroyed, shoot at them.”
The tanks are expected to be used primarily from range because of their light armour, which leaves them vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades and drone explosives.
The tank was donated by Denmark and then refurbished and delivered by Germany, which has delivered 30 out of a promised 195 refurbished Leopard 1A5s to Ukraine so far.

Ukraine-Russia war: Finland closes entire border with Russia

Finland will close its entire border with Russia on Wednesday night after accusing Moscow of orchestrating a surge of asylum seekers.

www.telegraph.co.uk

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I am trying to think of tanks in service that are not "Cold War Era" in their design? The Leopard 1A5 actually has fantastic fire control including a thermal sight.

I don't see anything remarkable in fighting at long range. Even the best-protected tanks are going to use terrain to further protect them and will engage on their terms if possible - which usually means fighting at long range. Why on earth enter into RPG range if you don't have to? The thing to watch for is that cannon accuracy and hitting power does drop with range while ATGMs do not suffer accuracy or penetration due to long range.

If Leopard 1A5s are being use in fairly static areas then I expect that long-range sniping will be the order of the day. And I would expect the same of other tanks in those situations.

Anyhoo.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Also what do we intend to replace destroyed tanks with ? Or is it a use until they are consumed and then the crews become infantry ?

Looking at the present situation, if we can assume

• A- 5 tanks is the minimum we need of a combat variant for domestic/training requirements
• B- the 34 remaining A4's + 5 tanks per combat variant are enough to sustainably meet domestic training requirements

It's conceivable that once the A6M's are through R&O that we could have 30 tanks in Latvia, a full doctrinal squadron with 150+% equipment allowing for replacements/reinforcement.

 

[Fabius]

If we look outside NA and Europe there are a number of post cold war era design tanks, the Korea K2 and Japanese Type 10 are examples.

They share most characteristics though with the modernized Cold War base design US and European MBTs .

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

If we look outside NA and Europe there are a number of post cold war era design tanks, the Korea K2 and Japanese Type 10 are examples.

They share most characteristics though with the modernized Cold War base design US and European MBTs .

True - I shouldn't forget about the rest of the world!

Still, if we look at a typical US heavy division, most of the major combat systems could be characterized as Cold War designs. Lots of upgrades, but the base model and design would be from the Cold War.

 

[quadrapiper]

Looking at the present situation, if we can assume

• A- 5 tanks is the minimum we need of a combat variant for domestic/training requirements
• B- the 34 remaining A4's + 5 tanks per combat variant are enough to sustainably meet domestic training requirements

It's conceivable that once the A6M's are through R&O that we could have 30 tanks in Latvia, a full doctrinal squadron with 150+% equipment allowing for replacements/reinforcement.

How many ARVs do you need to complement the domestic training establishment? One present when a training area is active? More?

 

[Fabius]

True - I shouldn't forget about the rest of the world!

Still, if we look at a typical US heavy division, most of the major combat systems could be characterized as Cold War designs. Lots of upgrades, but the base model and design would be from the Cold War.

The success of the US Army’s Big Five ( Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Blackhawk and Patriot) program from the late 1970s is impressive in terms of linking doctrine to equipment requirements across the force to industry.

The fact as you point out that the systems are the same just upgraded I think is testament to not just how robust the designs are but also to their commitment to continuous updates of largely unseen sub system capabilities such as power generation, thermal resolution, communication digitization, barrel calibres, lengths and chamber sizes. Almost none of which are immediately obvious.

This is especially true when you include items such as the M109 that predate even the big five.

 

[Fabius]

Looking at the present situation, if we can assume

• A- 5 tanks is the minimum we need of a combat variant for domestic/training requirements
• B- the 34 remaining A4's + 5 tanks per combat variant are enough to sustainably meet domestic training requirements

It's conceivable that once the A6M's are through R&O that we could have 30 tanks in Latvia, a full doctrinal squadron with 150+% equipment allowing for replacements/reinforcement.

Not aimed at this quote specifically but I really dislike the thinking that we are good using a less capable system in Canada for domestic training requirements. It’s a common problem and it encourages the institution to continue to think small in terms of only needing to field a BG inside a MN Cdn led Bde vs how we would mobilize and deploy all three CMBGs in the event of an actual war against a NATO peer opponent .

 

[KevinB]

The success of the US Army’s Big Five ( Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Blackhawk and Patriot) program from the late 1970s is impressive in terms of linking doctrine to equipment requirements across the force to industry.

The fact as you point out that the systems are the same just upgraded I think is testament to not just how robust the designs are but also to their commitment to continuous updates of largely unseen sub system capabilities such as power generation, thermal resolution, communication digitization, barrel calibres, lengths and chamber sizes. Almost none of which are immediately obvious.

This is especially true when you include items such as the M109 that predate even the big five.

I suggest that using the term updates is a little shaky and potentially disingenuous (though I don’t think you mean it that way).

Bradley doesn’t have a single remaining original component other than the M242 Chain Gun. The Hull is different, the engine is different, etc. The Abram’s isn’t much different in that respect as while it externally resembles the original XM-1, it really isn’t the same at all.

The Patriot is the most oddball of them all, because the launcher is about the only semi original item left in it. The radars are different, the missiles are different etc.

I don’t see them so much as updates, but more sub generations of design, the Bradley morphing from a fairly light amphibious IFV to a rather hefty H-IFV double its original weight but with 4x more the protection and nearly the same range and more offensive and defensive capabilities. The Bradley was a success despite a troubled origin, as the Army (and FMC, and now BAE) have worked to develop it from its inception to a much more different but capable system.

A lot of the update/upgrades haven’t necessarily been implemented due to planned growth, but more lack of the next best thing to replace it, and Industry and DoD doing what they can to keep the systems as cutting edge as they can, working the system from PIP’s instead of new programs.

Keep in mind we have had a number of lemons over the years, gratefully most of those shuffled off like the SGT York to a early demise before larger acquisitions where made, but the Apache lives on more due to failure to replace it (AH-66 Comanche anyone?) and thus the need to update the airframe without a ‘real’ replacement.

 

[FJAG]

It’s a common problem and it encourages the institution to continue to think small in terms of only needing to field a BG inside a MN Cdn led Bde vs how we would mobilize and deploy all three CMBGs in the event of an actual war against a NATO peer opponent

It's been a problem for several decades now. The one major exception was the Leo2 purchase which was spurred on by Afghanistan where only a 3/4 squadron was deployed but several more squadrons were purchased. Much of that was spurred on by the decision to cancel the MGS making cash available. Even then though only 20 A6Ms, 20 A4Ms and the rest A4s.

Essentially we first borrowed and then purchased only 20 A6Ms because that was all that was readily available. The rest were all second hand Dutch A4s. We converted 20 of those to A4M Can so that they could be used as operational tanks to replace the A6Ms in theatre so that they could be maintained/overhauled. (Just as an aside, when Germany trained with Leo1s in Shilo, they were shipped home at least every second year to be overhauled and replaced before the next springs training - sand is hard on tanks)

The point though is that we seem to be in a rut where we buy just what we need for a given operation and not to equip the whole army as to some doctrinal plan. M777s went the same route and we never had enough of those to fully equip a doctrinal artillery regiment. We reorganized the regiments to fit the available equipment and personnel.

 

[Prairie canuck]

Slowly ship all the Leopards to Latvia and then it becomes urgent to replace the tanks at home and since nobody in Europe is in the mood to sell their Leopard IIs right now then it becomes apparent the only quick option is to purchase M1s. Just sayin. (has anyone found a sarcasm smilie yet?)

 

[KevinB]

M1’s aren’t a quick option either, unless you want the M1A1SA’s and can get them with DU, then you have a pool of about 650 or so that could be available inside a few months.

There are no real new MBT options at this point, as everyone who is making them has a several year backlog.

I’m still of the opinion that to buy into AbramsX as the M1A3 is the best option for Canada, and invest in a production facility to make 36-48 a year in Canada, than can be doubled or tripled as needed.

I suspect the US Army and GDLS would be very enthusiastic as well.

 

[FJAG]

M1’s aren’t a quick option either, unless you want the M1A1SA’s and can get them with DU, then you have a pool of about 650 or so that could be available inside a few months.

There are no real new MBT options at this point, as everyone who is making them has a several year backlog.

I’m still of the opinion that to buy into AbramsX as the M1A3 is the best option for Canada, and invest in a production facility to make 36-48 a year in Canada, than can be doubled or tripled as needed.

I suspect the US Army and GDLS would be very enthusiastic as well.

I can't help but think that switching its facility to AbramsX could be quite a profitable venture for GDLS London for a long time. Buying a couple of regiments worth over the long term should give it a good kick start.

 

[Kirkhill]

To much of the world those three images are the same.

The same thing applies to these vehicles.

The form has been set. There have been lots of upgrades.