• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

Hi Karel, thanks for responding. I believe the figure you quote from naval-technology is statute miles, not nautical miles. The number I got for DZP (4000 nm) was from Wikipedia. If naval-technology is correct, that 5000 mile number would equate to 4350 nm, roughly, leaving a 350 nm discrepancy between those two sources of information. This does point to the difficulty around getting accurate information on ship ranges. It seems inordinately difficult finding this information. I was hoping someone on this forum had some insight into this as it applies to the CSC and the general belief that the RCN is looking for some long legs on their new ships.
 
calculus said:
Hi Karel, thanks for responding. I believe the figure you quote from naval-technology is statute miles, not nautical miles. The number I got for DZP (4000 nm) was from Wikipedia. If naval-technology is correct, that 5000 mile number would equate to 4350 nm, roughly, leaving a 350 nm discrepancy between those two sources of information. This does point to the difficulty around getting accurate information on ship ranges. It seems inordinately difficult finding this information. I was hoping someone on this forum had some insight into this as it applies to the CSC and the general belief that the RCN is looking for some long legs on their new ships.

Hi Calculus,it seems you're right about the miles and nautical miles,sorry for that.the number i can find so far is indeed 4000NM,but will ask on the Dutch Defense Forum to be sure.

here's another detailed piece about the DZP-class.(there is another but taht's in dutch,i can read it,but not everyone here can)

https://thaimilitaryandasianregion.wordpress.com/2016/01/02/de-zeven-provincien-class-frigate-netherlands/
 
How fast will Irving be able to float RCN CSCs?  Though to be fair Naval Group has now done eight FREMMs and is well down the learning curve:

Naval Group Launched 8th FREMM Frigate 'Normandie' for the French Navy

On 1 February 2018, Naval Group floated the FREMM multi-mission frigate Normandie, just 12 months after the start of hull assembly in the building dock on the Lorient site. The completion of this milestone represents an important step, demonstrating the industrial and technological mastery of Naval Group, ensuring compliance with a very tight schedule to be able to deliver, as foreseen, six of the FREMMs ordered by OCCAR (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation) on behalf of the DGA (French Defence Procurement Agency - Direction Générale de l’Armement) to the French Navy (Marine Nationale) before the end of 2019.

The eighth FREMM frigate to be built in Lorient and the sixth in the series ordered by OCCAR on behalf of the DGA for the French Navy, the FREMM Normandie was taken out of its building dock in Lorient where it was assembled on time: just 12.5 months since the first block was positioned on the keel block line.

...Six FREMM frigates were already delivered between 2012 and 2017. The Aquitaine in 2012, the Provence in 2015, the Languedoc in 2016 and last but not least the Auvergne in April 2017.

The FREMM Bretagne, floated in September 2016, will be transferred to Brest, where it will be based, in the second quarter 2018.

On the international market, Morocco took delivery of the Mohammed VI in 2014 and Egypt took delivery of the TahyaMisr in 2015.

The two final frigates, Alsace and Lorraine, will be delivered to the French Navy before the end of 2022.
These frigates will be equipped with strengthened air defence capacities [emphasis added]. The assembly of the FREMM Alsace in the Lorient building dock will start in spring 2018.

FREMM technical characteristics
Heavily armed, the FREMM Normandiedeploys as its sister ships the most effective weapon systems and equipment, such as the Herakles multifunction radar, the naval cruise missile (MdCN), the Aster and Exocet MM 40 missiles or the MU 90 torpedoes.
• Overall length: 142 metres
• Width: 20 metres
• Displacement: 6,000 tonnes
• Max. speed: 27 knots
• Implementation: 108 persons (including the helicopter detachment)
• Accommodation capacity: 145 persons
Range: 6,000 nautical miles at 15 knots [emphasis added]
https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/february-2018-navy-naval-defense-news/5914-naval-group-launched-8th-fremm-frigate-normandie-for-the-french-navy.html

FREMM_Normadie_Naval_Group.jpg

Mark
Ottawa
 
Irving assigned CSCs in 2011 under NSPS (now just NSS, don't want Harper-era acronyms, eh? not that his gov't did any great job on shipbuilding),
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol12/no2/doc/Shadwick%20En%20Page%2077-80.pdf

if lucky (very) we'll get first one around 2024/25:
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-equipment/canadian-surface-combatant.page

'Nuff said.

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
How fast will Irving be able to float RCN CSCs?  Though to be fair Naval Group has now done eight FREMMs and is well down the learning curve:

Mark
Ottawa

They'll deliver them as per the timetable set by their customer, the federal government. The federal government has the power to take over government if Irving does not deliver.
 
MTShaw said:
They'll deliver them as per the timetable set by their customer, the federal government. The federal government has the power to take over government if Irving does not deliver.

Are you saying the federal government would take over Irving when they fail to deliver on the timetable?  :rofl:
 
 
whiskey601 said:
Are you saying the federal government would take over Irving when they fail to deliver on the timetable?  :rofl:

Probably not. What I was trying to state were facts. Cynicism is useless. Skepticism fine.  But by being overtly cynicism is like killing the messenger before he leaves his original starting point.

Oh yeah: "'Nuff sad" only serves to stifle conversation and debate. Give me a break,
 
Don’t confuse cynicism with pragmatic realism. What has Irving done or suggested that demonstrates corporate leadership that might make the process faster, more efficient etc. As has been pointed out and borne out time and time again, this is not about building ships, it is all about transferring money to a region of voters and creating some east coast jobs.
 
whiskey601 said:
Don’t confuse cynicism with pragmatic realism. What has Irving done or suggested that demonstrates corporate leadership that might make the process faster, more efficient etc. As has been pointed out and borne out time and time again, this is not about building ships, it is all about transferring money to a region of voters and creating some east coast jobs.

I think you're being a wee bit too cynical. My understanding, based on second and third hand information (perhaps better described as "bar talk" and rumours) is that the original political "guidance" was in the shape of a question: 'Can (or, better, how can) we rebuild our shipbuilding industry so that it can, reasonably, complete contracts for the Navy, the Coast Guard and private firms?'   

As I understand it, and you and others will know better than I, international trade law excludes "national security" contracts from most of its provisions, allowing nations to subsidize (spend almost as much as they wish) their defence contractors. That is, I believe, what we are doing ~ or, at least, it is what the mandarins aimed to do ~ with the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy: to spend heavily on rebuilding capabilities and then getting, for our money, a few warships and Coast Guard vessels.
 
That was the original intent; the strategic big picture part of building an industry offsets the giant sticker shock of the projects.

The issue is that the original mandarins have all since moved on to somewhere else, so there is a lot of extra stuff getting tacked on now. Pretty much anything that is wet and will be operated by Canada (including RIBs, zodiacs, canoes etc) is being rolled into the 'small ship and RRM pillar, which is taking the focus away from delivering ships to the RCN and CCG (even though that's where basically all the budget goes).

The 2016 annual report is available on the PSPC website though if you want to give it a read through;

https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/rapport-report-2016-eng.html
 
From report above on NSS on JSS:
https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/rapport-report-2016-6-eng.html

"...Concurrently, the Government of Canada will engage in contract negotiations with Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards for the construction phase, presently scheduled to start in 2019..."

THAT. WILL. NOT. HAPPEN.

And not timeline for (one only) construction of new CCG icebreaker.

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
From report above on NSS on JSS:
https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/rapport-report-2016-6-eng.html

"...Concurrently, the Government of Canada will engage in contract negotiations with Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards for the construction phase, presently scheduled to start in 2019..."

THAT. WILL. NOT. HAPPEN.

And not timeline for (one only) construction of new CCG icebreaker.

Mark
Ottawa

I agree if only through incompetence of the original engineers of the OOSV screwing up the schedule. Even if they were to start the JSS' in 2019-2020, they're not in Kansas any more. 
 
MarkOttawa said:
From report above on NSS on JSS:
https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/rapport-report-2016-6-eng.html

"...Concurrently, the Government of Canada will engage in contract negotiations with Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards for the construction phase, presently scheduled to start in 2019..."



THAT. WILL. NOT. HAPPEN.

And not timeline for (one only) construction of new CCG icebreaker.

Mark
Ottawa

To be fair, that was drafted in March of 2017, so it's not up to date.
 
MarkOttawa said:
From report above on NSS on JSS:
https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/rapport-report-2016-6-eng.html

"...Concurrently, the Government of Canada will engage in contract negotiations with Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards for the construction phase, presently scheduled to start in 2019..."

THAT. WILL. NOT. HAPPEN.

And not timeline for (one only) construction of new CCG icebreaker.

Mark
Ottawa

Depends on a few things.  First was that article about starting the build for the JSS due to design delays on the CCG ships.  Second is the fact the gov't could change priorities and say basically that the JSS takes priority over all other builds, as soon as you are finished what you are working on Seaspan get going on it.  Third could be how negotiations with Davie go on icebreakers and other ship types.

Technically Seaspan could start cutting steel for some of the blocks in 2019 at a slow pace, while waiting for space in the drydock to start putting them together.  Just start really slow yet still technically meet the 2019 timeframe.
 
Seaspan appears ready to start on some blocks of the JSS, this year. Partly out of delays getting the design issues for the SV done, but I suspect also to "marry" the Feds to the original commitment to build the JSS at Seaspan.
 
Looking like L3 Tech is positioning itself to feast on both the Australian bid as well as ours if the Type 26 is selected.  Lots of homegrown talent/tech that can be utilized if its selected.

http://www.janes.com/article/77694/l3-technologies-added-to-bae-systems-sea-5000-bid-team
 
As for new USN frigates, which they will get long before RCN gets CSCs:

Handicapping the Navy’s Frigate Competition
By Jerry Hendrix

The horses in a major new defense-acquisition program are approaching the starting gate, but it’s not too late to handicap the race and place bets on the eventual winner. The process is easier in this competition because, unlike recent previous major program buys, the Navy limited this competition to proven “mature” designs, to include submissions from foreign ship-builders so long as they partnered with an American shipyard. The net result is a competitive field made up of participants with established track records and approximate prices...

Logic and history suggest that the two LCS programs should have the inside-track advantage. They are established, currently in production, and familiar to the Navy’s lead decision-makers...

That there is a competition at all for the new frigate suggests, however, that the Navy is less than enamored with the two LCS variants, which have tarnished reputations for having short endurances and even shorter times between breakdowns...

Many naval track watchers consider the General Dynamics’–sponsored, Spanish-designed, F-100 frigate to be the purest thoroughbred multi-mission frigate on the oceanic circuit. In fact, given its Aegis-based 3-D air-search radar, superb active and passive sonar systems, and 48 VLS weapons tubes, it can do everything that an American Arleigh Burke–class destroyer can do, only just a little less of it. It can do area air defense, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, and it can certainly provide more than adequate convoy escort, but these abilities come at a cost...

Fincantieri offers the last horse in the frigate race. The FREMM (Fregata Europea Multi-Missione) frigate combines a sleek multi-mission, stealthy hull form with the endurance (6,500 nautical miles) of a long-distance performer. Ten FREMMs are already in service, six for Italy and four for France, so the ship’s construction and operating costs and maintenance reliability are well established. Fincantieri builds two variants of the design: One is superbly focused on anti-submarine warfare, and the other has a more general purpose and is able to perform all missions reasonably well. It is, as of yet, not clear which variant, or perhaps an amalgam of both, Fincantieri will offer to the Navy. One question raised by naval analysts with regard to both the FREMM and Navantia’s F-100 design is whether the two European ships can meet Naval Sea Systems Command’s stringent survivability standards. But the fact that these two designs made it through the first elimination race suggests that FREMM and the F-100 met the Navy’s survivability standards. What is clear, based upon its established track record, is that Fincantieri’s FREMM will be able to offer a reliable and highly advanced ship, equipped to perform local air defense, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare missions as well as convoy escort, for around $800 million per ship.

Based upon its spacious design, combat capabilities, and cost, FREMM emerges as a clear front-runner. It has a Goldilocks-like appeal: neither too expensive nor too under-equipped. In fact, it’s a robust hull with room for mission growth...

Jerry Hendrix — Jerry Hendrix is a retired U.S. Navy captain, an award-winning naval historian, and a senior fellow and director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program at the Center for a New American Security.

fincantieri-marine-fremm-frigate-italian-navy.jpg

Italian Navy FREMM-class frigate Carlo Bergamini (Fabius1975/Wikimedia)
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/02/us-navy-frigate-competition-finalists/

Mark
Ottawa
 
whiskey601 said:
I thought the FREMM was out for CSC anyway?
FREMM was indeed rejected by the Liberals.
Proposals submitted outside of the established competitive process will not be considered

Recent media coverage referenced a proposal submitted outside of the established competitive process  alleging the ability to deliver CSC ships at a reduced cost. Establishing and respecting a bid and evaluation process that is consistently applied to all potential bidders is fundamental to a fair, open and transparent procurement. Without common requirements and criteria, it is impossible to consistently and effectively evaluate proposals. The submission of an unsolicited proposal at the final hour undermines the fair and competitive nature of this procurement suggesting a sole source contracting arrangement.  Acceptance of such a proposal would break faith with the bidders who invested time and effort to participate in the competitive process, put at risk the Government’s ability to properly equip the Royal Canadian Navy and would establish a harmful precedent for future competitive procurements.  To be clear, any proposals submitted outside of the established competitive process will not be considered. It should be noted that a fairness monitor has been engaged to oversee the procurement process, and agrees with this approach.

With respect to suggestions that significant savings could be realized through this alternative process, this is far from evident.  It is important to note that a warship project budget must cover more than just delivering the ships. It must also include the costs associated with design and definition work, infrastructure, spare parts, training, ammunition, contingencies and project management. Typically, the acquisition of the ships themselves only represents about 50-60% of the project’s overall budget. As well, any prices cited without the context of applicable terms and conditions as indicated in the RFP (such as scope of work, divisions of responsibilities, intellectual property rights, warranties, limitations of liability, indemnities, etc.) are effectively meaningless.
https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/news/2017/12/update_on_the_canadiansurfacecombatantrequestforproposals.html
 
FUTURE CANADIAN SURFACE COMBATANT-THE ONLY OPTION

David Dunlop, RCN PO1NCIOP (Retired)-NATO/QGJM/CD2

Now that the Canadian government has entered the decision phase for the bids entered for the rights to build 15 Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) ships, it is time to give an opinion as to which of the three bids entered will be the best fit for Canada’s Future Naval Fleet. The backbone of this future Canadian Naval Combat Fleet will be vessels that will see Canada through the next few decades, and must be judiciously chosen. There are several new designs of warships being presented to Canada and pros and cons with all of them. Spanish, Dutch and British companies have all answered the Requests For Proposals (RFP’s) within the time-frame. Spain is offering their F-100 Christopher Columbus Class, the Dutch with their De Zeven Provincien Class and the Lockheed-Martin (LM)/British Aerospace Electric (BAE) consortium offering their Type 26 Frigate. The Italian/French consortium RFP was disqualified as they had not submitted official proposals within the time limit. Canada expects to make a decision on the winning bid by the Spring of 2018.

All companies (including Germany) have Multi-Purpose Frigates either in service, under construction or planned that can “do the job”. The German Type 126/MKS 180 Saxony Class is particularly interesting, with it’s strengthened hull for Arctic Operations, but there is only one design for Canada that offers a balanced “plug & play” approach, and that design is, without question, the LM/BAE consortium Type 26 Frigate. This ship exceeds Canada's high-level requirements, will be deployable worldwide for extended periods and would be more than capable of replacing our Anti-Air, Anti-Surface and Anti-Submarine capabilities with one single Class of ship. The Australian Navy has the BAE Type 26 frigate on their short list to replace their aging frigates as well. No other ship design compares to meet Canadian Naval requirements, including the Italian/French FREMM Class, the German Type 126/MKS 180 Frigate, the Spanish F-100 Christopher Columbus Class or the Dutch De Zeven Provincien Class.

The LM/BAE Type 26 Frigate is a cutting-edge warship that is simply the best fit for Canada's future work-horse Navy. It is a modern new warship with all the capabilities Canada require’s in a CSC. The Type 26 is infinitely adaptable, can easily be re-configured and the RCN can “tweak” the design to cater its own development requirements, which is where, the Type 26 has the potential to excel. A re-configurable mission bay can accept containerized loads to allow the rapid re-loading of the vessel. Such loads might include aid/rescue packages, underwater vehicles, boats or Naval Drones.

The Type 26 Frigate is 149.9 meters (492 ft) in length and has a maximum beam of 20.8 meters (69 ft) with a displacement of 7,000+ tons. A CODELOG (Combined Diesel Electric or Gas Turbine-MT 30) configuration is deployed in the ship, giving it a top speed in excess of 29+ knots with 4 x 20V 4000 M53 Diesel Generators. It has a MK 41 VLS system that can accommodate Surface, Air and Land Attack Missiles. It has a 5” 62 caliber Mk. 45 Medium Range Gun along with 2 X 30mm, 2 X CIWS & 2 X Mini-Gun Systems and can be fitted with future Canadian torpedo’s and counter-measure’s. It will accommodate Canadian Hull Mounted & Towed Array Sonar systems that are vital to long-range submarine detection. Its large Flight Deck can easily handle the CH 148 Cyclone helicopter in it’s hanger, with the ability to land Heavy Lift Chinook Helicopters. It’s hanger facilities are also large enough to accommodate Maritime UAV’s along with a flexible Mission Bay.

It can undertake a wide range of roles from high intensity conflicts including Anti-Submarine/Anti-Surface Warfare and Area Air Defence, along with the ability to aid in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. The Type 26 is flexible, versatile and highly survivable with an extremely low acoustic signature. It exceeds all Canadian Naval requirements, and will accommodate Canada-specific modular design sub-systems with open systems architecture. These same features will minimize ownership costs and facilitate Canadian industry playing a major role in through-life support and upgrades, delivering long term economic benefits to Canada. Its low acoustic signature, crucial to evading detection from submarines, will translate into safety and survivability of the crew, and the ability of the ship to successfully complete its missions. Accommodations are included for 208 crew, with a core complement of 118 sailors.

A major part of the ship design will be the new Lockheed-Martin state-of-the-art LM CCM 330 Combat System (CS), that will meet all of Canada’s Naval C4ISR requirements. It may only have one draw-back. Ice capability in our North. If it had a more strengthened hull however, that would certainly go a long way to meet the strategic needs for a truely “Blue” Three Ocean Canadian Navy. It also works well within our own time-frame as BAE has already started construction of their Type 26 Frigate in July of 2017, about three years ahead of Canada’s future Naval Frigate requirements.

The LM/BAE Type 26 Canadian Surface Combatant is simply the right solution for Canada’s Future Naval Fleet and at a final cost of between 60/70B CAD, they are still well worth the investment and of course will be built here in Canada.

David Dunlop is a retired RCN Petty Officer 1st Class Naval Combat Information Officer with over 41 years experience as a Tactical Data Coordinator for Command.
 

Attachments

Back
Top