"Chariots on Fire" - IFV SOPs

[Haligonian]

No arguments on the tactical benefits of the Namer or Merkava I on the battlefield (although my understanding of the Merkava's troop carrying capability is that it's designed/meant for taking troops on board for short tactical advances rather than acting as a true APC), but are they practical for an expeditionary army like Canada's?

At 60+ tons we can only deliver one at a time on a C-17, so realistically we're looking at deployment by ship in order to deliver any meaningful sized force.  Then being a heavy tracked vehicle we'd need tank transporters/trains to move them from the (possibly distant) safe port to the front.

I'm personally of the firm belief that the military threats from Russia/China are not invasion of Western Europe or our major Asian allies, but rather quick campaigns where they can muster localized superiority of forces in order to seize limited objectives before NATO/Western forces can respond.  Is a slow to deploy heavy Canadian mechanized force able to respond in time to such a situation?

I'm not suggesting that there are no situations where Canada wouldn't have time to deploy a heavy force (planned interventions like Iraq or Afghanistan, Peace Keeping missions, or deterrent deployments like Latvia come to mind), but is that what our military should be fundamentally designed for?  In most of those situations Canadian involvement is as much a political requirement as a military requirement and that need could possibly be filled by other types of forces that may be more effective in a true major power military crisis.

Like so many discussions on this Forum, I guess it again comes down to the fundamental question of what is the real purpose of the Canadian military, and how should it be organized and equipped to fulfill that purpose.

I thought about the sustainment and deployability issues but when it came down to it, rightly or wrongly, Canada likes to go to mature theaters where it can take its time getting in there or forward deploy.  How many times have we deployed armoured vehicles by air?  How many times have we done it at short notice?  Were not going to be running anything like US Army SBCT's that are supposed to be able to deploy by C130 anytime soon.  LAV 6 is too heavy now anyway!

Latvia would be a perfect on going current mission where a platform like Namer could be employed if we were willing to pay the sustainment costs with HETs being a major one.

 

[daftandbarmy]

This is it.

I honestly argued the paper from the reverse perspective though by starting at the tactical level and assuming we wanted the ability to operate in conventional mechanized operations as part of the main force.  The argument sounds something like this (without reviewing the paper):  LAV is too light and is likely to result in massive casualties as sections are destroyed while mounted so we need something with tank like protection to accompany tanks.  It should also have tank like mobility.  The IFV as a concept puts an infantry carrier in the wrong place on the battlefield by virtue of its armament.  People are going to fight the vehicles and they will be subsequently destroyed as any light vehicle involved in the direct fire fight will be.  Even if the section is mounted at the time the section is likely to become irrelevant as they will have lost their tpt to keep up with the mobile fight.  We do combined arms, so, we should let tanks worry about the mounted combat and allow infantry to focus on the dismounted.  As part of this the trg requirements to keep mechanized infantry competent in crew skills while also maintaining dismounted skill sets (and now, potentially, a full suite of cbt sp skills as well) is too large and results in us being not sufficiently good at either.  I also traced the IFV development lineage to show that it is a concept uniquely suited to the Cold War defence of western Europe scenario where an opportunity to put additional kinetic energy penetrators and ATGMs on the battlefield to deal with the mass of the Warsaw Pact was a decisive factor over any specific operational requirement of the infantry.

The IFV concept, developed by those pesky Russians (and copied by the Germans with the Marder), reflects an atavistic 'fight to the death' philosophy - connected to national survival - that we in the Western World just don't get.

Regardless, if the Infantry can't keep up with the tanks, you're doing the enemy's job for them and we won't have any tanks left. Or much Infantry either.

 

[Infanteer]

Were not going to be running anything like US Army SBCT's that are supposed to be able to deploy by C130 anytime soon.  LAV 6 is too heavy now anyway!

The idea of Stryker C-130 deployability, which drove the whole "medium weight fad" of the early 00's, was proven wrong by RAND's study which found the vehicle was simply too heavy and the logistics tail too big to rapidly deploy, even using C-17s.  I've seen a layout for a contingency deployment of a Stryker Company - it takes something like a dozen C-17s to get the company deployed.

Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....

 

[FJAG]

The idea of Stryker C-130 deployability, which drove the whole "medium weight fad" of the early 00's, was proven wrong by RAND's study which found the vehicle was simply too heavy and the logistics tail too big to rapidly deploy, even using C-17s.  I've seen a layout for a contingency deployment of a Stryker Company - it takes something like a dozen C-17s to get the company deployed.

Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....

Gets me back to my days as the Unit Emplaning Officer for 2 RCHA as part of the ACE Mobile Force (L) and working around the edges of the ill fated CAST Brigade Group. We couldn't do it then with much lighter forces.

Makes one wonder why the Navy isn't investing in RORO LMSRs. Now that would be a Navy Reserve function well worth having.

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4600&tid=500&ct=4

Note the ships ability to support humanitarian missions. Should make it desirable for even a Liberal government. ;D

:cheers:

 

[GR66]

I thought about the sustainment and deployability issues but when it came down to it, rightly or wrongly, Canada likes to go to mature theaters where it can take its time getting in there or forward deploy.  How many times have we deployed armoured vehicles by air?  How many times have we done it at short notice?  Were not going to be running anything like US Army SBCT's that are supposed to be able to deploy by C130 anytime soon.  LAV 6 is too heavy now anyway!

Latvia would be a perfect on going current mission where a platform like Namer could be employed if we were willing to pay the sustainment costs with HETs being a major one.

This is the point I take issue with.  What military sense does it make to design your force structure to suit the kind of deployments you'd LIKE to make?  I guess it's OK when Canada's involvement in an operation has as much to do with showing political support for a particular operation rather than contribution our being a truly essential part of the military force.  What happens though when an enemy inevitably does something which requires a response which doesn't allow for a leisurely deployment to a safe disembarkation point in a mature theater? 

 

[daftandbarmy]

Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....

This  :nod:

 

[SeaKingTacco]

The idea of Stryker C-130 deployability, which drove the whole "medium weight fad" of the early 00's, was proven wrong by RAND's study which found the vehicle was simply too heavy and the logistics tail too big to rapidly deploy, even using C-17s.  I've seen a layout for a contingency deployment of a Stryker Company - it takes something like a dozen C-17s to get the company deployed.

Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....

Because, in Canada, we don't actually have a Defence Policy, so much as we have a Defence Theatre Policy.

It is all, literally, for show....

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The LAV 3 is likely the heaviest vehicle to succeed in places like Mali and generally well suited for that style of warfare, the French who been in Africa for centuries, have a whole series of light wheeled armour for those conflicts. They also have heavy armour and IFV's for fighting more traditional warfare. I have always been an advocate for Canada to have a light and heavy brigade and the proper equipment for both. We have zero idea where we will be fighting next and have always been since 1870 a expeditionary force, with a semi-permanent overseas deployment in the Cold war. 

 

[a_majoor]

I talked to an Israeli Officer once upon a time who mentioned that the space in the back of the Merkava is actually for ammo. The Golan Heights defensive battle during the '73 war convinced them they needed more on board storage for bullets.

The other key determining factor for Israeli armour is survivability of the crew, within the context of a defensive battle for national survival, hence the reason the Namur is so huge and the Merkava has the engine in the front etc.

I think this topic has been done to death in other sections of this forum but, as seen on comments on another page, if we have 'wheels' bogging down in Gagetown while 'tracks' float forward, I think we have a systemic issue.

Fully agree. The Merkava 1 can carry up to 80 rounds of 105mm ammunition if the rear is used as the ammo stowage area, but it can also be cleared of the ammo racks for an 8 man section or several litter born casualties. The Merkava is actually a very extreme example, but a similar philosophy can be found in a CV9040 (shooting in the attack with a 40mm canon overcomes everything below a MBT), or the German PUMA with the "C" up armour package (roughly equal to a Leopard 1) or the new German Lynx, which improves on the PUMA concept.

But as noted, the true answer lies in discovering "what is the purpose of the Canadian Forces", which will involve a full court press on all the DIME (Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military and Economic) fronts. Direct assault on a heavily defended position is a possibility, and HAPC's are the tool to use in that situation, but is assaulting dug in need peer enemies likely? Do we have the manpower and resources to support such actions? If I was looking into a crystal ball, I'd actually say we should be looking very seriously at naval warfare, with secondary considerations for amphibious operations, cyber and space in support of the Navy. Troops splashing ashore will need very different tools than 60 ton HAPC's, and deployments to failed states and countering insurgent movements also need different tools.

Should we really be looking at the USMC's new Amphibious Combat Vehicle?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Perhaps a specialist squadron within the Tank units for HPC's and Assault vehicles. After all with the size of our Combat troops, we will not need many. Perhaps a Namer type vehicle based on the Leopard II chassis, I suspect it would sell well and limit the logistical chain.

 

[a_majoor]

The big problem with "specialist" groupings is our entire force is essentially the size of most "specialized" forces in other militaries. We are already at the point that  we consume a large percentage of our resources maintaining "boutique" capabilities. A fairly easy to understand example is replacing over 1400+ M-113's with a hodge podge of incomparable LAV variants (Bison, Coyote, LAVIII and now LAV 6) and making up the deficit with T-LAV's, G-wagons and now TAPV's. While initially more expensive, the unit costs and O&M savings of buying 1400 LAV 3 chassis to do all of those things would have saved tons of money, training and other resources over the years....

The big problem with the LAV as we have it now is it is not very flexible, and as noted in the article which kicked off the thread, not being used in ways which are conducive to success. Even the evolution to bigger and heavier LAV 6.0 simply restricts mobility and reduces the ability of the commander to use speed  or manoeuvre to displace the enemy as an alternative to direct assault. Certainly we can all go to "Janes" and catalogue shop for what we think are the best vehicles to do the job, but the reality is we are stuck with what we have, barring some huge catastrophic event or change which forces a complete rebuilding.

I certainly don't know what the answer could be with the tools we have now, though.

 

[FJAG]

. . . Certainly we can all go to "Janes" and catalogue shop for what we think are the best vehicles to do the job, but the reality is we are stuck with what we have, barring some huge catastrophic event or change which forces a complete rebuilding.

I certainly don't know what the answer could be with the tools we have now, though.

None of us do although that doesn't stop us from developing our own favourite tables of organization and equipment at the drop of the hat.

I agree that "barring some huge catastrophic event or change which forces a complete rebuilding", we won't change in any meaningful way. Afghanistan was a huge event for us and, while not catastrophic and while it brought about some significant changes, it failed entirely in bringing about the complete rebuilding that we so desperately need.

I don't blame politicians for this. They're not experts in the military nor even in external affairs. I blame the military leadership which so far has failed entirely in coming forward with any viable alternatives to put before the politicians to restructure and equip the Forces for future roles (whether within existing budgets or expanded ones) What should be clearly obvious is that we have no continental enemies (We haven't fought with the US since 1814 [or that squabble in the 1860s]) so we should be configured for expeditionary expeditions on other continents with our most likely enemies and in cooperation with our most likely allies. We aren't and haven't been for many decades notwithstanding that we have operated in an allied environment.

I've said it before and will say it again: The CF needs to be rebuilt from the ground up (and not just fine tuned) before the next catastrophic event.

:cheers:

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The chances of the military being fundamentally changed for the better without a major conflict driving that change is almost zero. A change for the worst is quite possible. Going back to the LAV, my armchairing tells me that the LAV 3 is really the biggest and heaviest a wheeled AFV can practical be. Anything heavier needs to be tracked. The IFV idea has hit a wall, to make them tough enough to survive and take on all but MBT's, you must sacrifice troop carrying ability. One option is to go with a common chassis with a mix of HPC and IFV's (and SPG) working together to support the tanks. Each group of HPC's gets an IFV to support them, the HPC focuses on minimal firepower, but good carrying capacity for troops and stores. Literally you could build the HPC,IFV,SPG all on the Leo II chassis, this gives you lots of room, power to work with, plus logistics is eased.

The light Brigade is all based around the LAV 3, sacrificing some protection for speed, range and mobility. SPG's would be automatic 120mm mortars, IFV version would be what we have now and a Styker type LAV for troops and kit. alos perhaps some armed with the 90mm Cockerill gun to provide a means to give DF support verses hardpoints. Perhaps fit out IFV versions with ATGM's as well. 

Both brigades have different tasks and training focuses. A prolonged deployment may for a temporary change in training for one group to support the other.   

 

[a_majoor]

Each group of HPC's gets an IFV to support them, the HPC focuses on minimal firepower, but good carrying capacity for troops and stores.

I'm a bit unclear, here. Are you talking about having something like "escort" IFV's to help shepherd and shoot in the HAPC's? While in technical terms this isn't very difficult (A platoon of LAV 6.0 in a company sized unit of Stryker's or turret less LAV hulls) there may be a few organizational and operational issues.

I'm starting to think IFV's of the LAV variety should not be in Combat Teams at all, but be the main mounts of "Cavalry" or "Mounted Rifles" type units. They would have the speed and mobility to turn flanks, set up blocks or do a multitude of other tasks while the "heavy" unit rumbles forward with tanks and HAPC's. The "Cavalry" would need a portion of the force armed with ATGM's and mortars, but going back to the 1980's era Mechanized Infantry Battalion, we could arrange for a mounted Mortar Troop and a Mounted ATGM Troop in the "Support Squadron". The on board firepower of IFV's should suffice for flanking, screening and similar roles. and the addition of organic mortars and ATGM's in direct support (not to mention the flexibility offered by modern weapons with their much greater range, precision and ability to accept off board sensor information) should allow the commander to shape his battle or break contact if he is engaged on unfavourable terms. Obviously, different models could be used as well, but this would provide for a real role taking advantage of the LAV's performance and firepower attributes, as opposed to hugely expensive and vulnerable not quite battle taxies.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Yes "escort" or in the support squadron/platoon. what I am seeing is that the size of the vehicle grows in order to support a full section and a useful turret, add in the weight and mobility penalty that comes with it, having some dedicated IFV's with minimal troop room makes for a smaller, lighter vehicle, meaning less internal volume to protect. The HPC sacrifice firepower for internal volume while maintaining protection and mobility and keeping size manageable. the IFV's means the tanks don't have to necessarily dedicate themselves to HPC protection.   

 

[dapaterson]

The way things are unfolding with Saudia Arabia, the CAF may just end up with a heck of a lot more LAVs... and a big bump in defence spending to pay for them to boot...

 

[daftandbarmy]

The way things are unfolding with Saudia Arabia, the CAF may just end up with a heck of a lot more LAVs... and a big bump in defence spending to pay for them to boot...

That's exactly how the UK managed to upgrade to Chally 2

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/iran-sues-mod-firm-over-the-shahs-tanks-9101713.html

 

[Haligonian]

A concept to take a look at here might be the UK's STRIKE Brigade.

https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201709_newsbrief_37.4_owen_final.pdf

You can find more on it here.

https://uklandpower.com/
https://wavellroom.com/

The Brits are looking at what the French achieved in Mali as a potential base for a new Brigade construct that is supposed to be "an enabler for Division maneuver" while at the same time being able to perform in dispersed son of Mali type operations.  In a lot of ways it seems like a bit of a Frankenstein monster that is to make the best of a bad situation.  The use of the tracked AJAX in conjunction with the forthcoming wheeled mech infantry combat vehicle seems odd for a concept that is hanging it's hat on the ability of its wheeled fleet to force project rapidly.  The AJAX is being seen as both a reconnaissance platform and potentially a medium tank which is concerning. The doctrine for the concept/formation is not yet defined so in some ways it is probably whatever you want it to be.  As the author of the article notes, infantry mass has been key in most modern conflicts and this structure gives them protected mobility.  The question is whether increased mobility will be able to compensate for reduced protection when fighting a peer opponent.

A more aggressive new approach is what some folks in the US is proposing as the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Strike Group (RSSG).  An interesting take but well out of our means.  Some want the British Strike to be similar to this but in a lot of ways they are quite different.  The Strike Bde will contain a large amount of infantry while the RSSG uses cbt vehs to strike or to enable strike via its impressive array of organic fires.  They won't be doing much assaulting or digging.  You can read on the RSSG here, http://www.douglasmacgregor.com/rsggeneralpublic.pdf

Either way our allies are looking at new organisations to fight while we're still dismounting on the objective with a light vehicle in a square cbt tm construct.  It maybe time to accept that maybe we shouldn't be operating as part of the cutting edge against peer adversary.  We could likely create a formation tailored to follow and support heavier formations or to operate on the flanks as a security organisation.  Has this been discussed before....  :

 

[Infanteer]

Sticking with the theme of the thread, the French experience in Mali was based upon a fleet of aging vehicles that were pushed to the max.  However, the weight classes of these vehicles is telling:
AMX-10RC: 15 metric tons (mton - 33k lbs)
ERC-90: 8.3 mton (18k lbs)
VAB: 13.8 mton (30k lbs)

The real pig was their new VBCI, which tips the scales at 25.6 mton (56k lbs).

So, you have a true middle weight force that was able to project into Africa and, for all intents and purposes, run a successful expeditionary operation on a shoestring.  It was a perfect middle-weight force, with enough capability to overpower an irregular foe, yet not so heavy that it stresses sustainment, taxes local infrastructure, and slows deployment time down due to movement capacity.  However, with the VBCI and the Jaguar (replacement for the AMX-10RC and ERC-90), the French force will go from a 30k lbs force to a 55k lbs force.  Implications for deployability and sustainability should be evident.

In the meantime Canada's mid-weight force got heavier, with the LAV III (16.9 mton - 37k lbs - weighing more than any of the French legacy vehicles) upgraded to the LAV 6.0, coming it at a whopping 28 mton (62k lbs).  The US Stryker, which was supposed to deliver (but failed) global rapid deployability, weights in at 18 mton (39k lbs).  The British Strike project is in the worst shape as it is built around the Ajax, which comes in at 38 - 42 mton (83k - 92k lbs), but at least it has tracks.

At the other end of the spectrum, the HAPC's discussed in the original article come in, for the Israeli Namer, at 60 mton (132k lbs) and for the Russian T-15, 48 mton (105k lbs - Russian vehicles have always been smaller).  So, the LAV 6.0's 62k lbs is only half of the Namer and 60% of the T-15, and how much of that weight is dedicated to a 25mm manned turret?

This is all "back-of-the-napkin" work, but it seems that a family of vehicles in the 9-11 mton range (20k-25k lbs) could provide a solid basis for a agile mid-weight force that could project quickly and have enough of a balance of firepower, protection, and mobility to be of use in a theater with irregular threats or in certain tactical situations in a theater with a regular adversary.  A family of vehicles in the 50-60 mton (110k-132k lbs) could provide a solid basis for a heavy, world-beating force that could possess enough firepower, mobility, and projection to deal with any regular threat.  Instead, most (all?) Western countries are going to vehicles that are in the awkward middle: too heavy to be a true "medium-weight" force and too light to be a true "heavy-force" for close combat.  "Flabby-medium weight" vehicles seem to be the prise du jour.

The so what?  Canada has got its 62k lb bohunk, so we need to figure out how to use it as it isn't "medium-weight" and it isn't "heavy."  As Thucydides and Haligonian mentioned above, looking into a new concept would probably be useful.  "Mounted Rifles" (or whatever), which are light-heavyweights that don't accompany the tanks, but have enough firepower, mobility, and protection to hang around the big leagues in a prescribed fashion.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Sticking with the theme of the thread, the French experience in Mali was based upon a fleet of aging vehicles that were pushed to the max.  However, the weight classes of these vehicles is telling:
AMX-10RC: 15 metric tons (mton - 33k lbs)
ERC-90: 8.3 mton (18k lbs)
VAB: 13.8 mton (30k lbs)

The real pig was their new VBCI, which tips the scales at 25.6 mton (56k lbs).

So, you have a true middle weight force that was able to project into Africa and, for all intents and purposes, run a successful expeditionary operation on a shoestring.  It was a perfect middle-weight force, with enough capability to overpower an irregular foe, yet not so heavy that it stresses sustainment, taxes local infrastructure, and slows deployment time down due to movement capacity.  However, with the VBCI and the Jaguar (replacement for the AMX-10RC and ERC-90), the French force will go from a 30k lbs force to a 55k lbs force.  Implications for deployability and sustainability should be evident.

In the meantime Canada's mid-weight force got heavier, with the LAV III (16.9 mton - 37k lbs - weighing more than any of the French legacy vehicles) upgraded to the LAV 6.0, coming it at a whopping 28 mton (62k lbs).  The US Stryker, which was supposed to deliver (but failed) global rapid deployability, weights in at 18 mton (39k lbs).  The British Strike project is in the worst shape as it is built around the Ajax, which comes in at 38 - 42 mton (83k - 92k lbs), but at least it has tracks.

At the other end of the spectrum, the HAPC's discussed in the original article come in, for the Israeli Namer, at 60 mton (132k lbs) and for the Russian T-15, 48 mton (105k lbs - Russian vehicles have always been smaller).  So, the LAV 6.0's 62k lbs is only half of the Namer and 60% of the T-15, and how much of that weight is dedicated to a 25mm manned turret?

This is all "back-of-the-napkin" work, but it seems that a family of vehicles in the 9-11 mton range (20k-25k lbs) could provide a solid basis for a agile mid-weight force that could project quickly and have enough of a balance of firepower, protection, and mobility to be of use in a theater with irregular threats or in certain tactical situations in a theater with a regular adversary.  A family of vehicles in the 50-60 mton (110k-132k lbs) could provide a solid basis for a heavy, world-beating force that could possess enough firepower, mobility, and projection to deal with any regular threat.  Instead, most (all?) Western countries are going to vehicles that are in the awkward middle: too heavy to be a true "medium-weight" force and too light to be a true "heavy-force" for close combat.  "Flabby-medium weight" vehicles seem to be the prise du jour.

The so what?  Canada has got its 62k lb bohunk, so we need to figure out how to use it as it isn't "medium-weight" and it isn't "heavy."  As Thucydides and Haligonian mentioned above, looking into a new concept would probably be useful.  "Mounted Rifles" (or whatever), which are light-heavyweights that don't accompany the tanks, but have enough firepower, mobility, and protection to hang around the big leagues in a prescribed fashion.

Luckily we have the TAPV to close the dreaded 'tinker toy' gap