Combat Team of tomorrow? Mechanized Infantry Company of tomorrow?

[Infanteer]

I'd venture that all "manouevre" units will operate under the ISTAR threshold to some degree, although I think that you are certainly right that "combat teams" would operate at closer range against unseen enemies.

Although I think that, in the tactical sense, you are 100% correct, I think the "above/below" notion still is valid at the operational level.  Take Iraq as an example.  The fight against Saddam's regime was definitely "above the ISTAR threshold" - we basically knew where the bad guys were and who they were (CNN had an Iraqi TO&E), it was a matter of going in and getting them.  This would have been an area where the Cav could shine (just as the Marine LAR's did quite well).  Now, with places like Fallujah, Ramadi, and Najaf we are operating completely "below the threshold" in an operational sense.  In both cases, the Tactical threshold is constantly shifting.

As for organization, I'm in general agreement.   As I mentioned above, it may be worth exploring a single Troop instead of two separate capabilities.   What you propose is having "Scout Troops" and "Dragoon Troops" for the Cav (I've seen a paper in Armour magazine that goes along the same lines).   This may be better off for a proposal to allow Army to move to a Cav idea, however in the long run perhaps "Cav Troops" should be the goal.   Looking at an Aussie "Cav" unit, you would have a Patrol of 3 LAV's which have 3 LAV's - one LAV (or perhaps 2) will have a 4 man dismount team while the others will have surveillance equipment, extra weapons, and Mission essential stuff.   4 Patrols make up a Troop, and 3 Troops (along with the DFS/Mortar/Pioneers/HQ) make up the Cavalry Squadron Group.

I know it is pushing the argument down a bit, and my paper is only going to focus down to the Coy/Sqdn level, but I think this is a "Cav" topic (mixed vs separate Troops) that can be worthy of its own thread.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

If we get the new OCS for the Coyote we could put 2 scouts in each Coyote, which will make the Recce Tp more capable.  The LAV Platoons are there to give the Cav Sqn Team some combat power and increase its abilities in complex terrain.  I see three main Courses of Action for the Cav:

  a.  Recce Sqns and LAV Infantry Companies under one HQ

  b.  Cav Sqns with Recce Tps and LAV Pls

  c.  Cav Tps with a mix of Coyote and LAV in each Tp

I think that all three are viable.  The first option is the easiet to implement within the limits of Army politics.  The second is my preferred COA, as it gives to ability to task organize while retaining some concentration/specialization.  The third looks interesting, but it could result in having to constantly break up Tps when you need to concentrate something.  Again, with the possibility of the smaller Coyote OCS we could put scouts in each Coyote, making the Recce Tps a little more capable in complex terrain.  One reason that the US use Bradleys for recce is that each has two scouts in the back.  The veh stops short of ridges/defiles and the scouts do the peeking. 

I like the LAV Pls being concentrated so that they can win the types of engagemetns they will need to fight as part of the overall Cav battle.  Destroying an OP, a section sized security position, clearing a defile, ambushing an enemy Recce Patrol (mounted or dismounted) are the kinds of work I see the LAV Platoons doing.  For this I'd like to see them concentrated at Platoon level at a minimum.  The dismounted sneeking and peeking would be performed by the scouts in the back of the Coyotes.  An exeption would be urban stability operations (of varying intensities).  For these, the LAV sections could well be independent patrol entities on their own, although a Platoon would be needed as our QRF.  A Cav Sqn would make a nice little package for a place like Kabul (if it is not also charged with securing a large camp).

The nuts and bolts of the Cav structure could be its own thread.  I am waging my underground Cav campaign on this thread, however, as to me our new "combat team" is really a Cav team.  What is important to me is the acceptance of a role that we can perform with our equipment. 

Cheers,

Iain

 

[Zipper]

I think I agree with 2B here, that we should not go so far as the Aussies have gone with their Cav idea. Yes it is a great example that should be closely watched and some ideas implemented here. But their structure is based on the fact that they also have the heavy forces in-house to support them. Yes, we may be acting under a coalition (mores the pity), but that is not assured all the time.

I also don't think the above or below ISTAR is a great way of thinking either, as you can be above and still be facing a far heavier foe them we are prepared to meet.

Again, I'd like to avoid capbadges and beret colour for a moment and focus on capability.  

I guess I always wish to go here because I would like to avoid and make clear the fact that this new structure should not be some ad hoc, throw together, please everyone type of deal that we always seem to try for. The Infantry are the Infantry and should be made light and concentrate on what their best at. Hoofing it and killing things. And since the Armour as been left out to dry with no real purpose anymore (and don't tell me DFS is some kind of purpose), that they are the perfect ones to re-invent themselves along with the Arty boys (who have also taken one up the ass) in this particular idea.

Sad but true...

 

[Zipper]

If we get the new OCS for the Coyote we could put 2 scouts in each Coyote, which will make the Recce Tp more capable.   The LAV Platoons are there to give the Cav Sqn Team some combat power and increase its abilities in complex terrain.   I see three main Courses of Action for the Cav:

  a.   Recce Sqns and LAV Infantry Companies under one HQ

  b.   Cav Sqns with Recce Tps and LAV Pls

  c.   Cav Tps with a mix of Coyote and LAV in each Tp

I think that all three are viable.   The first option is the easiest to implement within the limits of Army politics.   The second is my preferred COA, as it gives to ability to task organize while retaining some concentration/specialization.   The third looks interesting, but it could result in having to constantly break up Tps when you need to concentrate something.   Again, with the possibility of the smaller Coyote OCS we could put scouts in each Coyote, making the Recce Tps a little more capable in complex terrain.   One reason that the US use Bradleys for recce is that each has two scouts in the back.   The veh stops short of ridges/defiles and the scouts do the peeking.  

To make further note on this 2B. I think I was pushing choice C because I see the other two options as a status quo type of organization or ad hoc if you will. You and others here have convinced me that going to an all arms type of unit (army) is the right way to go for us at this point. But the first two choices are just the throwing together of units of mech infantry from one of the existing infantry Coy's, and that of a coyote trp from an armoured regiment. So in other words, more of the same ad hoc silliness that has been going on far to long. If your going to go all arms then go all the way, or go home.

This would mean that there are no such things as "attachments". Engineers, Arty, Medics, etc. would be A PART of the unit and not just added to here and there as needed. Far from me to ever say that the Americans do anything right ( ), but maybe their on the right path (as are the Royal Marines) when it comes to this.

So in other words. If your in the PPCLI (light infantry), then your an Infantryman that is also perhaps trained as a medic, or an engineer, or a mortar operator, or a driver, or a pocket 105mm gunner, etc...

If your in the RCD (Cav), then your a Cavalryman that may be trained as a dismounted infantryman, or a recce scout, or a gunner, or a TOW operator, or a signaler, or an engineer (sapper), etc...

But you base training is that of an infantryman in both cases (at least QL2).

Thanks

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Ideally, I'd like for the various Troops and Platoons in this team to be together for a training year and have a couple of exercises before hitting TMST and deployment.  To me, they can come from different units as long as they train together in the field.

I think that the first "Cav" organization would probably be a Recce Sqn and a LAV Company under one HQ.  Put in some engineers, some mortars, a DFS Tp and CSS and go that way.  This isn't all that different from what we do, but the stated role would be.  Train for a year, go to Wainwright for TMST and away you go. 

Stepping back, I'd be interested in an Army with two manouevre branches: Infantry and Cavalry.  Infantry would look like Light Infantry and Cavalry would be the Coyote/LAV III folks (including the dismounts).  That being said, I'm somewhat pragmatic. 

Iain

 

[Zipper]

Stepping back, I'd be interested in an Army with two manoeuvre branches: Infantry and Cavalry.   Infantry would look like Light Infantry and Cavalry would be the Coyote/LAV III folks (including the dismounts).   That being said, I'm somewhat pragmatic.

Lol. So you convince me, then tell me it is hardly realistic? Argh! ;D

Aw well. Maybe one day the internal politics will give way to reason? Or should I say HA again?

 

[Mountie]

In an attempt to revive and old topic, how about larger but fewer companies?

The Force Employment element seems to be the rifle company group.  The current three rifle companies can be reformed into two larger companies.  These two rifle companies, each of four platoons, would be ideal for COIN/Peace Support missions.  A company group could control and AO with a FOB.  The company could send two platoon out on operations, while a third platoon can form the QRF back on the FOB and the 4th platoon provide FOB security.  The FOB security platoon can refit and rest half its strength in shifts.  The QRF can rest while being on stand-by.  The platoons can then rotate through the various roles.

By combining the three companies into two, the battalion strength is only reduced by a single platoon.  The PYs saved from the elimination of the 9th platoon, the 3rd company HQ and the weapons det from each of the eight remaining platoons could be used to form a small mortar platoon and anti-armour platoon.

Battalion Headquarters

2 x Mechanized Rifle Company
- Company HQ
- 4 x Infantry Platoon

Combat Support Company
- Company HQ
- Signal Platoon
- Recce Platoon
- Mortar Platoon (4 x 81mm mortars)
- Anti-Armour Platoon (4 x LAV-TUA)


The infantry platoons can also be slightly re-organized to better utilize PYs. 
Platoon HQ (LAV-III)
Weapons Section (LAV-III)
2 x Rifle Section (2 x LAV-III)

The weapons detachment would be eliminated and the 3rd rifle section would be converted to a  weapons section. 
Section Commander (SGT)
Section 2i/c / LAV Crew Cdr (MCPL)
2 x GPMG Teams (4 x CPL/PTE)
2 x Designated Rifleman (2 x CPL/PTE) *rides in the Platoon HQ LAV-III to allow room for Platoon Warrant and attached medic to ride in Weapons Section LAV-III.

I'm not suggesting its the best option in the world, but its an option that doesn't require additional PYs and it brings back mortars and TUAs, even though at a reduced number.  The 3 RCR Battle Group used this two-company organization when it formed TF 3-08 BG in Afghanistan.  The 1 R22eR/3 RCR Battle Group also used this organization when they deployed to Bosnia in 1992.

 

[ArmyRick]

Bringing back mortars or TUA is a fantasy at best at this point.

Just remember a larger company may allow more flexibility in terms of fire power, ground occupied and depth (in all ops) BUT it comes at the price of heavier sustainment (more vehicle for POL, more mouths means more IMPs, more guns means larger ammo loads to push) and it makes it a little more difficult in terms of control (its easier to direct 3 moving parts rather than four). However I do see some points to your argument.

Personally, no matter what way you cook up ORBATs, they all have advantages and disadvantages.   

 

[PPCLI Guy]

The trouble with two sub-units vice three is that you have very limited tactical flexibility - the solution to almost every problem becomes a column of coys.  Three provides substantially more flexibility, and four is optimal.

 

[a_majoor]

From a historical point of view, "Square" units of 4 were reformed to "Triangular" units of 3 because you usually had too much held back ("2 up"  in a square unit leaves 50% of the force out of the fight, while only 1/3 is held back in a triangular unit).

We would be much better off focusing on building full strength companies that are capable of doing the job rather than feeding understrength units into the fight (or pillaging multiple units just to get a single battlegroup on the ground).

 

[PPCLI Guy]

From a historical point of view, "Square" units of 4 were reformed to "Triangular" units of 3 because you usually had too much held back ("2 up"  in a square unit leaves 50% of the force out of the fight, while only 1/3 is held back in a triangular unit).

We would be much better off focusing on building full strength companies that are capable of doing the job rather than feeding understrength units into the fight (or pillaging multiple units just to get a single battlegroup on the ground).

Agreed, but what has changed is that we are now operating in non-contiguous battle spaces, where there is no "up" or "forward" to place the two.  Once you add in a requirement for force protection, the triangular units are less useful.  Another way to look at it is by functional elements: 1) firebase / block / fix, 2 ) assault / force de frappe, 3) reserve.  If you want more than one sub-unit on the assault, then you have to steal from somewhere to get your reserve - and still have not solved your force protection issues for your own LOCs and critical C2 / log nodes.  Add in a fourth functional element of FP, and you are at square formations with a useful reserve and a strong assault force as well as the ability to maintain your freedom of action within a non-contiguous battlespace.

 

[Mountie]

Another option would be two battalions of three large companies per brigade.  Instead of eliminating the third company in each battalion, the third battalion could be eliminated from each CMBG and its platoons added to the six rifle companies in the remaining two battalions.  This would leave three platoons, three rifle company HQ's, a combat support company HQ, a recce/sniper platoon and a battalion headquarters to be disbanded and the PYs used to created 2 mortar platoons and 2 anti-armour platoons in the remaining two battalions. 

A CMBG with 2 infantry battalions may be better anyway.  The artillery regiments only have 2 gun batteries now, the CER's only have the manpower to fully man 2 field squadrons at best.  So maybe eliminating the third infantry battalion and its supporting arms in order to fully man the remaining two would be a better option.  The managed readiness cycle would still work with 6 infantry battalions instead of 3.  Each brigade would have a year of reset, training and high-readiness/deployment with each of the two battalion groups being deployed or at high-readiness for 6 months of the year each.  The non-deploying units wouldn't be robbed of their manpower because each battalion group would be fully manned and able to deploy as a cohesive unit.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

A CMBG with 2 infantry battalions may be better anyway. 

Not if you intend to fight it - see my post above.  In the most recent series of CAX in 1 CMBG fought against a near-peer enemy, they deliberately organised as a 2 x BG org (2 Lav 1 Tk, and 2 Tk 1 LAV), with a Bde Recce Sqn and a LAV based FP Coy.  The HQ was forced to create a third C2 node in almost every case, usually based on a square cbt tm.  Even then, tactics frequently looked like a massed column of BGs.  There was little flexibility other than a rapid grouping and re-grouping of sub-units to maintain pressure on the enemy

 

[Infanteer]

Not if you intend to fight it - see my post above.  In the most recent series of CAX in 1 CMBG fought against a near-peer enemy, they deliberately organised as a 2 x BG org (2 Lav 1 Tk, and 2 Tk 1 LAV), with a Bde Recce Sqn and a LAV based FP Coy.  The HQ was forced to create a third C2 node in almost every case, usually based on a square cbt tm.  Even then, tactics frequently looked like a massed column of BGs.  There was little flexibility other than a rapid grouping and re-grouping of sub-units to maintain pressure on the enemy

In the Commonwealth tradition, the move away from the square was driven by casualties on the western front - triangular brigades were adopted to keep divisions up to strength by merging the fourth bn into the ailing three.  Of note, neither Canada nor Australia ever adopted this format in the First World War.

Binary formations were utilized in the Second World War, some to great success - US Army Armd Divs with CCA and CCB (yes, there was a CCR, but it was generally empty) and German Panzer formations which generally formed kampfgruppen around the Panzer and Panzergrenadier Regimental HQs - and some to great failure (the Italian Divisions).

The real crux of this is how much can a commander control in battle?  Jim Storr discussed a UK DERA study looking at Divisional activity in WWII, showing that at no time did any of the measured Divisions have all nine battalions employed at the same time.  Of the 81 days the measured divisions spent in combat, 43 featured only 3 battalions employed.  Thus over half the time divisions employed only 1/3 of their strength to defeat the enemy.  Looking further at this data, divisions only employed a majority of their forces 1/3 of the time.  He also looks at some work Dupuy did, looking at 200 engagements from the Second World War and concluding that the practical span of command for commanders is actually quite low - 1.7 subordinates committed on average to combat.  This suggests that, historically, Division commanders have put forth at most 8 companies during a majority of their actions.  Additional data from Suez and the Gulf 1 and 2 further support this view.

The "so what" out of this is that bigger formations are unwieldy, despite the notions of "combat power" we like to ascribe to them. Combat power is nice, but only if the organization is one that can be properly utilized by a human commander.  The Brigade is a system optimized to put 2-4 maneuver sub-units in the first echelon.

Going up a level to the unit, the Armoured Regiment of a CMBG should act as that third maneuver unit for the Bde.  We unfortunately see Armoured Regiments as force generators, probably as we have not had to conduct mobile warfare for about 70 years.  If we were to square battalions and armoured regiments, a CMBG of 1 Armd and 2 Inf units would give the Bde Comd the ability to create up to four square combat teams at any one time, with two COs to run that fight and a third in his hip pocket.  This fits very well with the research quoted above.

Another way to look at it is by functional elements: 1) firebase / block / fix, 2 ) assault / force de frappe, 3) reserve.  If you want more than one sub-unit on the assault, then you have to steal from somewhere to get your reserve - and still have not solved your force protection issues for your own LOCs and critical C2 / log nodes.  Add in a fourth functional element of FP, and you are at square formations with a useful reserve and a strong assault force as well as the ability to maintain your freedom of action within a non-contiguous battlespace.

The core functions we should always look back to are Find-Fix-Strike-Exploit.  However, the elements executing these funtions do not have to be the same size - a Brigade does not need 1 Unit finding, 1 fixing, 1 striking and 1 to exploit.  Reserves/Counter-attack elements are generally better if they are smaller as they are more nimble and can react faster to a situation on the battlefield (i.e. it is easier to get a company moving down the road than it is a battalion).

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Good post, Infanteer.

 

[McG]

Where a UK division of the Second World War typically only employed a fraction of its strength at any point in time, did the extra depth give it more stamina?  At a certain point, a brigade culminates but I would expect that the div level HQ and assets should still have the ability to keep going.  Having only 1/3 typically committed might reflect a good work to maintenance ratio for the div to continuously slog on wothout breaking any of the constituent brigades.

Is it a model of inefficiency where divisions had under utilized capacity, or is it a model of efficiency where fewer div HQs were able to employ the same number of brigades up to the peak tempo of the parts?

If it is a model of inefficiency, then small divisions sound like the way to go.  Otherwise, div size becomes more a variable of how one intends to fight.  "Shock troops" (Marines, Airborne, WWI Canadians) would be in small divisions that are either fully committed or not; otherwise divisions would be larger with enough depth to rotate brigades through proper work/maintenance cycles while keeping the HQ at full capacity.

… this is probably how our CMBGs should function for the traditional one BG mission under a Canadian-lead formation.  The HQ along with elements of Arty, Engr, CS and CSS deploy for a year during which time two seperate BGs from the CMBG take a six month term filling as one of the formation's manoeuvre units (with allies providing the others).

 

[Old Sweat]

It seems to me that the practice of only using one brigade at a time was also based on the doctrine of concentrating all the available artillery on one task at a time. Certainly the one brigade at a time principle also seems to have been used by the Canadians in Normandy once the initial phase was over.  Thus a division may well attack with no more than four companies up, although there were exceptions such as Phase One of Totalize.

I know we discussed this in some detail at Staff College and it was taught as a good thing. Also this was remarked upon, and not with a great deal of favour, by some German generals in their interrogations after capture.

 

[Infanteer]

Where a UK division of the Second World War typically only employed a fraction of its strength at any point in time, did the extra depth give it more stamina?  At a certain point, a brigade culminates but I would expect that the div level HQ and assets should still have the ability to keep going.  Having only 1/3 typically committed might reflect a good work to maintenance ratio for the div to continuously slog on wothout breaking any of the constituent brigades.

Is it a model of inefficiency where divisions had under utilized capacity, or is it a model of efficiency where fewer div HQs were able to employ the same number of brigades up to the peak tempo of the parts?

If it is a model of inefficiency, then small divisions sound like the way to go.  Otherwise, div size becomes more a variable of how one intends to fight.  "Shock troops" (Marines, Airborne, WWI Canadians) would be in small divisions that are either fully committed or not; otherwise divisions would be larger with enough depth to rotate brigades through proper work/maintenance cycles while keeping the HQ at full capacity.

… this is probably how our CMBGs should function for the traditional one BG mission under a Canadian-lead formation.  The HQ along with elements of Arty, Engr, CS and CSS deploy for a year during which time two seperate BGs from the CMBG take a six month term filling as one of the formation's manoeuvre units (with allies providing the others).

Old Sweat stole a march on me with regards to tactics of the Second World War.  Commonwealth doctrine was to attack on a narrow front to mass the 72 guns of the Division.  The Germans often cited this as a reason for bloody victory or failure; they were able to mass their defensive fires on the narrow frontage.  IIRC, Simmonds specifically tried to avoid this problem in TOTALIZE.

McG, I think you are right on both parts.  The research I referenced above was comparing formation growth over the last few decades.  Both Brigades and Divisions now are BIG - we all remember the 4 CMBG model at the Staff College weighing in at 8,000 pers.  Compare this to a Brigade in 1944 that weighed in at just under 3,000.

The studies of command suggested that units shed additional structures to command effectively and also operate efficiently.  Having a second echelon to be able to sequence operations is good.  But today, when formations are 1.5 to 2 times what was effectively fought before, there may be good reason for more numerous, smaller formations.

 

[Old Sweat]

Adopting the brigade group vice the brigade within a division in the late-50s had the effect of increasing the size and complexity of the command. At the same time we added an armoured regiment with a reconnaissance squadron to the brigade group, so there were 12 infantry/motorized and eventually mechanized companies and three tank squadrons for maneuver. In the mid-sixties the 4 CIBG war establishment was 6087, a bit more than half of which was taken up by the three battalions and the armoured regiment and reconnaissance squadron. Another 1250-1300 was made up of the artillery regiment, 1 SSM Bty and 4 Fd Sqn RCE. So, what was left, about a quarter of the brigade group, was command and tail. Note also that the brigade group operated within a British division of two infantry brigades.

I am not competent to discuss the pros and cons of the current war establishment, but let me add that 4 CIBG circa 1965 is as far removed from today's formations, as it is in the other direction from the brigade's that fought in the trenches of France and Flanders. Still, it seems to me that it is likely that much of growth of the brigade group by a third (see Infanteer's comment re the model he studied) has not been at the sharp end.

What does that mean for the combat team of tomorrow? Not a lot, except that we seem to have let everybody and her brother put a dog in the fight, or at least add a dog to watch the fight and bark advice from the sidelines.

 

[WanderingRoyal]

Old Sweat hit it right on the head. The size and complexity of conventional infantry forces are changing. There is an interesting commentary in the latest JOMO by the comamnder of 1 UK Div in Iraq 1991 where he noted that his division had a SWW corps' worth of firepower. With the "upgrading" of unit and formation supporting arms, we are increasingly seeing a Bn asked to do a Bde's work, and so on down the line. This means two things:

1 - You need an increasing amount of C2 to use everything effectively; and,

2 - You are bound to have fewer forces doing more stuff, leading to a severe weakness in sustaining casualties.

The problem with point  1 is that it is unlikely that everything will be used to its full capacity. The commander will be too concerned with managing his part on the ground to have time to make a solid plan for the increasing number of enablers. You can only expand a Bn staff so much before Bn HQ becomes cumbersome and isn't able to do what a Bn HQ is expected to do - to be up-front and mobile. The result is bloated Bn staffs and anemic CT C2. Having observed the 2 RCR OBG experiment and the massive, cumbersome "field" headquarters that went along with it, it seems to me that at that level the BG is really a small Bde and should act like it. We should also stop kidding ourselves to think that we'll end up with a Bde frontage of 2 BG's. In reality, we'll have a Bde Gp acting like a Div used to with siginficant lattitude given to both BGs. Infantry Bns will increasingly act as force generators above all else.

Well, this is the way it's going. But that presents further problems.

How do you sustain casualties? We're having the leathality of weapons increase while the number of soliders availiable decreases. One MLRS strike could theoretically render not just a Bn combat ineffective, but through the sheer number of casualties, the entire Bde.

I have one idea on how to address this. MTF.