Combat Team of tomorrow? Mechanized Infantry Company of tomorrow?

[Mountie]

I was reading an article from a few years ago.  Its titled "A New Look at the Infantry Company".  It deals with the US Army infantry company in the 21st Century Support and Stabilization Operations (SOSO) and Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN).  The theme of the article is about increasing the leadership within the company to support the fact that in today's world the infantry company is often operating as an independent combat group with several enablers attached or available to it (artillery, engineers, recce, mortars, CIMIC, PSYOP, intelligence, military police, military working dogs, etc., etc.).  Company and platoon commanders need to be able to control all these enablers as well as conduct community relations with local villagers, etc.

"Today, we are asking platoon leaders to do what company commanders did at one time and we are not giving them the resources to accomplish the mission. We are asking company commanders to do what battalion staffs do and they do not have a staff. The work that these leaders are doing now is outstanding. We see their resourcefulness daily at being thrown into new complex situations and continuing to make things happen. The young squad leader who has to go into town and deal with the local people must still know how to fight his squad. . .

(One must remember that US Army command ranks are currently different than Canadian ranks.  Company commanders are captains, company executive officers are First Lieutenants and platoon commanders are Second Lieutenants.) 

We suggest restructuring of infantry squads, platoons, and companies to provide more seasoned leaders. The platoon of today and tomorrow needs a captain as its commander with a lieutenant as executive officer. The captain has the maturity and experience level to coordinate all of the actions on the battlefield. He has more experience in dealing with nontypical missions of COE and SOSO than a lieutenant still learning to apply basic lessons. That same captain, along with the platoon sergeant and squad leaders, can mentor the young lieutenant. This would also give you a command structure to remain with the support element or vehicles. The lieutenant can then move through the staff sections and return back to the platoon a more experienced leader. Most importantly, experienced leadership is a combat multiplier that would make the platoon capable of greater independence, increased lethality, and overall effectiveness. Put bluntly: teaching green lieutenants would not cost lives, theirs and those of their Soldiers.

Moving on to the next level of command, the company, we recommend that the infantry company commander would become a major's slot. A smaller Army coupled with SOSO considerations in the COE means that company commanders face the same challenges that once went to battalion and brigade commanders. If you have any doubt on this point, review the stream of reports coming back from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Those same trends have been validated at the Joint Readiness Training Center since the beginning of the Global War on Terror. The potential benefits to unit effectiveness are in our opinion exponential. A standard company with three platoons has some 8-10 years total officer experience. Increased leadership in that same three platoon company would give the unit more than 25 years of experience in its officers.

"We also believe that such a structure would improve the current progression of an infantry officer....  As stated above, a major commands the company; he has 11-12 years experience. As a lieutenant, he first learned his trade under the wing of the experienced captain who commanded his platoon. After serving as an platoon XO, he went to company staff before returning as a captain to command his own platoon. As a captain with platoon command under his belt, he served on battalion and/or brigade staff. Now a major, he has attended all of the schools that he is suppose to including the career course and Command and General Staff College (CGSC). His executive officer is a senior captain who also is the operations officer for the company. A career course graduate, he has had his platoon command and been successful. All of the platoon leaders are captains who have had time on the staff and possibly have attended some schools. The fire support officer is a first lieutenant and is also the intelligence officer for the company operations. The logistical officer is a 1LT. The weapons platoon XO is a senior 1LT who is school trained in mortars and antitank. The rifle platoon XOs are 2LT or 1LT, learning their trade.

We see the need to do the same for the NCOs and other enlisted Soldiers of the company. The first sergeant we will now call the Battle 1SG. He will be able to be on the battlefield with the unit and go where he is needed to solve problems. Historically, he was the "Beans and Bullet" person. The platoon sergeants should be the Battle PSG again so they can be at the tip of the spear with the platoon commander to assist him better.

There are other sergeants first class within the company that are not maneuver platoon sergeants, but their duties are just as valuable like the operation sergeant and logistical sergeant. Both of them should be battle staff qualified.

As stated above, a major commands the company; he has 11-12 years experience. As a lieutenant, he first learned his trade under the wing of the experienced captain who commanded his platoon. After serving as an platoon XO, he went to company staff before returning as a captain to command his own platoon. As a captain with platoon command under his belt, he served on battalion and/or brigade staff. Now a major, he has attended all of the schools that he is suppose to including the career course and Command and General Staff College (CGSC). His executive officer is a senior captain who also is the operations officer for the company. A career course graduate, he has had his platoon command and been successful. All of the platoon leaders are captains who have had time on the staff and possibly have attended some schools. The fire support officer is a first lieutenant and is also the intelligence officer for the company operations. The logistical officer is a 1LT. The weapons platoon XO is a senior 1LT who is school trained in mortars and antitank. The rifle platoon XOs are 2LT or 1LT, learning their trade.

We think that bringing the leaders up both commissioned and noncommissioned officer in this manner we have provided them with the tools for success. Being successful is not only winning the battles, but keeping our great Soldiers alive. We have purposely not gone through each unit by type and have not addressed equipment issues. We understand there would be some variations due to units make up and missions. We are sure we have not arrived at the 100-percent solution, but we have provided another look at an Army that is in the process of change for the future. We know people do not like change; however, change is the only way to survive. "


Canadian companies are already commanded by Majors with a senior Captain as 2i/c.  Platoon commanders are often junior Captains.  So we are already very much in line with the proposal.  The only significant change would be the role of the CSM and Platoon Warrant and the addition of a Platoon 2i/c.  And possibly the addition of both an Ops and Log Officer at the Company HQ (the article suggests it but isn't completely clear).


Company Commander - MAJ
Company 2i/c - Senior CAPT (completed staff college)
Company Sergeant Major - MWO
Operations Warrant - WO
Company Quartermaster - WO
Possibly an Operations Officer and a Logistics/Administration Officer - Junior CAPT or LT.

Platoon Commander - Junior CAPT (has not completed staff college)
Platoon 2i/c - LT (new position)
Platoon Warrant - WO
Possibly a additional SGT to assist the Platoon 2i/c with administration.


I guess the question for discussions sake is whether the added officers and change in CSM and Platoon Warrant roles would benefit the operations of the company and be worth the extra PYs and associated costs of almost doubling the number of officers.

This is just for discussions sake.  I'm already ducking and taking cover from those that will fire with the "why change it" argument.

 

[George Wallace]

Very Civil Servicie.  More officer positions.

 

[WLSC]

Posté par: Mountie
« le: Aujourd'hui à 02:30:41 »
Canadian companies are already commanded by Majors with a senior Captain as 2i/c.  Platoon commanders are often junior Captains.  So we are already very much in line with the proposal.  The only significant change would be the role of the CSM and Platoon Warrant and the addition of a Platoon 2i/c.  And possibly the addition of both an Ops and Log Officer at the Company HQ (the article suggests it but isn't completely clear).


Company Commander - MAJ
Company 2i/c - Senior CAPT (completed staff college)
Company Sergeant Major - MWO
Operations Warrant - WO
Company Quartermaster - WO
Possibly an Operations Officer and a Logistics/Administration Officer - Junior CAPT or LT.

Platoon Commander - Junior CAPT (has not completed staff college)
Platoon 2i/c - LT (new position)
Platoon Warrant - WO
Possibly a additional SGT to assist the Platoon 2i/c with administration.

The system we have his good.  We dont need more officer in platoon level.  One his enought.  Our officer are form differently and even more so our NCO and WO.  We have a lot more dedpt in a cdn coy that a US one.  For them, to come to our level would be a big leep foword, not the opposite.  :2c:

 

[Mountie]

Very Civil Servicie.  More officer positions.

Why is it "very civil service" to add a platoon 2i/c?  We already have the operations officer at company level and armoured squadrons have (or used to have) an administration officer.  So the only addition is the platoon 2i/c.  Artillery gun troops have two officers at troop level.  So I don't think its a huge leap to the civil service.  Its just about giving the platoon a seasoned leader while giving the new LT a mentor to learn from.

 

[George Wallace]

Why is it "very civil service" to add a platoon 2i/c?  We already have the operations officer at company level and armoured squadrons have (or used to have) an administration officer.  So the only addition is the platoon 2i/c.  Artillery gun troops have two officers at troop level.  So I don't think its a huge leap to the civil service.  Its just about giving the platoon a seasoned leader while giving the new LT a mentor to learn from.

Umm!  The platoon already has a 2i/c.  The Platoon WO/Sgt fills that spot.  (S)He also provides some continuity and corporate knowledge that an officer parachuted in annually does not.

Armoured Sqn? Admin O?  Where?  We had a OC, 2i/c, Battle Capt and Troop Ldrs.  SSM (MWO) ran the A1 Ech.  SQ (WO) ran the QM.  ET (WO) ran Maint.  There was no Admin O.

 

[WanderingRoyal]

It is a fundamentally good idea to have a young Lt alone in his platoon, relying on his Senior NCOs in his epic battle with the Coy 2IC and in the epic struggle to keep the OC happy. It ensures that the first command experience is one throughly rooted in a shared experience with NCOs and troops. It keeps officers honest, at least for the first few years.

In a perfect world, I would expand the size of a platoon, allowing for the vehicles to be permanently manned, or, in a very bad case, be used as reinforcement. I would equip every Bn with heavier vehicles - something more close to BMP-3 with a robust anti-armour capability. Bring back the mortars and a fire support platoon. Ensure that recce assets are airmobile. This would make an mech infantry coy essentially independent.


Hold the tanks at the bde level, with a single squadron attached to a Bn. Throw them with the main effort. Use the tanks as the hammer they were designed to be.

 

[a_majoor]

We are grappling with a similar issue in the IA world, hammering out the shape and size of the IA company. Like modern Infantry Companies (although by design), the IA company meshes a multitude of disparate elements together to achieve its effect. This leads to a rather "inverted pyramid" structure with a large number of officers and Snr NCO's as planers and analysts processing information from a relatively small number of tactical teams on the ground. I'll see how this works first hand "real soon now".....

While IA may not be the best model, it is a good lead in to where I think this is going; a modern Infantry Company has a large number of "enablers" attached, and as noted upthread the care and feeding of enablers, and processing their input, takes a lot of time and resources from the COY HQ in order to sync and exploit all these goodies. For the Infantry, I suggest the model might be more along the lines of the old Combat Support Company, where Coy HQ was almost an administrative entity to the independent platoons (Anti-Armour, Mortar, Pioneer and Recce) rather than the integral command and control element. Since enablers are not independent entities that flow from the company to support other people, but rather flowing into the company to support them, the IA model might be worth looking at (so there would be a company level "**CC" construct to handle enablers coming in and distributed operations of platoons and elements going out).

Artillery batteries and Engineer squadrons operate in a similar fashion, maybe they have something to offer WRT organization and dispersed operations. I also like the Armoured model with an integral admin troop with each squadron, having a "admin platoon" as part of each company would be very useful for mobile and dispersed operations as well.

This is a bit of a nebulous idea right now, hence the lack of specifics.

For WanderingRoyal:

While a heavyweight IFV might be a good idea under some circumstances, I think going too far down that road ties us in knots (the debates over the CCV would seem to indicate this already). On the other hand, this *could* lead to an entirely different organizational model, since the vehicle would essentially be the support platform. Taking the argument to the extreme, a Merkava 1 can carry a section in the back with the ammunition racks dismounted, the section commander then has a 105,, cannon, .50HMG, 3 X 7.62mm machine guns, 8 X smoke grenade dischargers and a 60mm mortar at his personal disposal. Add a plow to the front and you pretty much give each section many of the attributes of the pioneer, anti armour and mortar platoons.

Indeed, this would be closing into the logical end point of unit evolution, regiments in the past had such sub units as integral artillery, but as weapons systems have become more powerful and smaller, the capabilities migrated downwards and became integral to battalions, then companies and then platoons (an Infantry platoon with Javelin or Spike ATGMs is far more dangerous than a 1930 era Regiment with its own anti-tank artillery battery)

My own sense of this debate is the organization and shape of the future unit should be more or less independent of vehicles and equipment (obviously some adjustments would be made to accommodate vehicle crew sizes or the number of people needed to operate crew served weapons), so what works in a LAV battalion would also work with BV-206 or dismounted Infantry as well.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

We are grappling with a similar issue in the IA world, hammering out the shape and size of the IA company.

Sigh.  Just because we FG IA dets (and we don't - we FG barely trained junior pers in an undefined and badly executed role) does NOT mean that they need to aggregate into a company (and a Bn and, even worse, an IA TF), with all of the C2 nodes etc.  Just create dets, and let them be employed.  Constructs need to be driven by FE, not FG.

 

[Mountie]

Armoured Sqn? Admin O?  Where?  We had a OC, 2i/c, Battle Capt and Troop Ldrs.  SSM (MWO) ran the A1 Ech.  SQ (WO) ran the QM.  ET (WO) ran Maint.  There was no Admin O.

Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance B-GL-394-002-FP-001  (Chapter 4 - Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron - Appendix 4A-7) & The Reconnaissance Squadron in Battle B-GL-305-002/FT-001 both include an Administrative Officer and describe the role as:

"Administrative Officer (AO). The AO commands the A2 Echelon and assists the 2IC with squadron administration. The AO provides additional staff support to SHQ and is employed as a duty officer." 

Infantry Recce Platoons are organized with a CAPT Platoon Commander, LT Platoon 2i/c and a Platoon Warrant.  So its not exactly a foreign concept.

 

[George Wallace]

Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance B-GL-394-002-FP-001  (Chapter 4 - Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron - Appendix 4A-7) & The Reconnaissance Squadron in Battle B-GL-305-002/FT-001 both include an Administrative Officer and describe the role as:

"Administrative Officer (AO). The AO commands the A2 Echelon and assists the 2IC with squadron administration. The AO provides additional staff support to SHQ and is employed as a duty officer." 

The 2i/c runs the A2 Ech.  If you want to call him an AO, I am sure you can, but I doubt he would answer.

 

[Infanteer]

The 2i/c runs the A2 Ech.  If you want to call him an AO, I am sure you can, but I doubt he would answer.

It's a separate position, if you read Mountie's post (or the attached doctrine).  There are AOs in both Squadrons and Companies now, although Squadrons seem to have enshrined them in doctrine (they are officers without profile in the Rifle Coys).

 

[GnyHwy]

Contrary to intuition, and AO is likely only needed during operations.  An artillery bty during operations had an AO as well.  Someone to absorb the monotonous paperwork that the BK (Bty 2ic) was responsible for.  In doctrine the BK was also responsible for overall gunline defence on operations.  Since then we have seen our btys dispersed into 2 or 3 troops, recent years on operations have seen the BK position pretty much disappear as the Bty 2ic was the FSCC O and worked in the TOC for the BG Ops staff.

Hypothetically, if we grouped the guns in six in Afghan there wouldn't have been a traditional BK to do local defence, as he was the FSSC O working in the TOC. But, if the gun troops would have been grouped that would make 6 Lt/Capts (jnr) on the gunline and a pretty easy decision would have been made as to who was the IC of the gunline.

In garrison now, I doubt they have a dedicated AO as the Tp Comds don't have local defence to worry about and handle their own Tp's admin.

 

[a_majoor]

In the Commonwealth tradition, the move away from the square was driven by casualties on the western front - triangular brigades were adopted to keep divisions up to strength by merging the fourth bn into the ailing three.  Of note, neither Canada nor Australia ever adopted this format in the First World War.

Binary formations were utilized in the Second World War, some to great success - US Army Armd Divs with CCA and CCB (yes, there was a CCR, but it was generally empty) and German Panzer formations which generally formed kampfgruppen around the Panzer and Panzergrenadier Regimental HQs - and some to great failure (the Italian Divisions).

The real crux of this is how much can a commander control in battle?  Jim Storr discussed a UK DERA study looking at Divisional activity in WWII, showing that at no time did any of the measured Divisions have all nine battalions employed at the same time.  Of the 81 days the measured divisions spent in combat, 43 featured only 3 battalions employed.  Thus over half the time divisions employed only 1/3 of their strength to defeat the enemy.  Looking further at this data, divisions only employed a majority of their forces 1/3 of the time.  He also looks at some work Dupuy did, looking at 200 engagements from the Second World War and concluding that the practical span of command for commanders is actually quite low - 1.7 subordinates committed on average to combat.  This suggests that, historically, Division commanders have put forth at most 8 companies during a majority of their actions.  Additional data from Suez and the Gulf 1 and 2 further support this view.

The "so what" out of this is that bigger formations are unwieldy, despite the notions of "combat power" we like to ascribe to them. Combat power is nice, but only if the organization is one that can be properly utilized by a human commander.  The Brigade is a system optimized to put 2-4 maneuver sub-units in the first echelon.

Going up a level to the unit, the Armoured Regiment of a CMBG should act as that third maneuver unit for the Bde.  We unfortunately see Armoured Regiments as force generators, probably as we have not had to conduct mobile warfare for about 70 years.  If we were to square battalions and armoured regiments, a CMBG of 1 Armd and 2 Inf units would give the Bde Comd the ability to create up to four square combat teams at any one time, with two COs to run that fight and a third in his hip pocket.  This fits very well with the research quoted above.

The core functions we should always look back to are Find-Fix-Strike-Exploit.  However, the elements executing these funtions do not have to be the same size - a Brigade does not need 1 Unit finding, 1 fixing, 1 striking and 1 to exploit.  Reserves/Counter-attack elements are generally better if they are smaller as they are more nimble and can react faster to a situation on the battlefield (i.e. it is easier to get a company moving down the road than it is a battalion).

Re reading this I was reminded of how our Soviet counterparts organized. A Motor Rifle Regiment was composed of three Motor Rifle Battalions and an Independent Tank Battalion, as well as an integral Artillery Battalion.

In the offense, they could go one, two or three up (depending on the terrain and tactical situation) and use the tank battalion to push through the breech and exploit. Similarly in the defense, the commander could create two or three "fire sacks" with the MRB's and keep the tanks back as the countermove force.

While this does not translate directly to our system (a MRB had integral tank companies, for example), this does speak to issues of span of command and how forces are organized for tasks. Perhaps we need to think farther outside the box in how we organize our limited forces to conduct various tasks.

 

[Mountie]

Back to the 2 vs 3 vs 4 companies topic....I was re-reading "3 Commando".  Its the story of a Royal Marine Commando Group in Afghanistan.  Several years ago the Royal Marines introduced a new organization called Commando 21.  Each of the three commandos (40, 42 & 45 Commando) was organized with:

Command Company (Main HQ, Tac HQ, Signal Troop, Recce/Sniper Troop, Mortar Troop, Anti-Tank Troop, Medium Machine Gun Troop & Assault Engineer Troop)
Logistics Company (2 x A Echelons, B Echelon (QM) Troop, Forward Repair Troop & Regimental Aid Post)
2 x Close Combat Company (3 x Close Combat Troop)
2 x Stand Off Company (Close Combat Troop, Anti-Tank Troop & Heavy Machine Gun Troop)

However, they deployed to Afghanistan with a modified organization:

Command Company (as above)
Logistics Company (as above)
4 x Combined Arms Company (2 x Close Combat Troop & Fire Support Group) - FSG having both Anti-Tank and HMG sections


So the discussion question is....if you had 9 infantry platoons + 1 recce platoon per battalion, how would you organize them?

Option #1: status quo with 3 companies of 3 platoons & no assault pioneer platoon
Option #2: 2 companies of 4 platoons + 9th platoon converted to an assault pioneer platoon;
Option #3: 4 companies of 2 platoons + 9th platoon converted to an assault pioneer platoon;
Option #4: 3 companies of 4 platoons + assault pioneer platoon but only 2 infantry battalions per brigade; (3 infantry & 1 recce platoon left over)
Option #5: 4 companies of 4 platoons & no assault pioneer platoon but only 2 infantry battalions per brigade (would require 4 additional platoons - PY's would have to be found from cutting elsewhere)

 

[Ostrozac]

I have to admit, I like the idea of having a fourth platoon in each company to be used as a heavy weapons platoon. Put the SF kits where they belong -- in pairs. My knowledge is highly dated, but I always thought that the Carl G and Light Role C6 were well employed in the platoon weapons det, but that the C6 SF Kit, 60mm and the ERYX were really hard to fit into a platoon battle. And if you decide to transition to COIN and settle into a nice Company FOB -- weapons platoon guards the firebase, all the rifle platoons patrol.

I don't know where the C-16 grenade launcher and it's ammo fit into the infantry battalion, if there isn't a weapons platoon in each company. It really seems too large and heavy to be a rifle platoon weapon.

 

[KevinB]

How about
BN with 3 rifle companies - a Cbt Spt Coy with Mortars, Recce/Snipers, Pioneers, Anti-Armor and a Machine Gun/GMG Pl.

you know from like 20 years ago
(well adding the C-16 to the HMG Platoon would be new). 

 

[Kirkhill]

How about
BN with 3 rifle companies - a Cbt Spt Coy with Mortars, Recce/Snipers, Pioneers, Anti-Armor and a Machine Gun/GMG Pl.

you know from like 20 years ago
(well adding the C-16 to the HMG Platoon would be new).

You radical, outside the box thinker, you!  ;D

 

[KevinB]

I think there may have been a reason for that...

I guess we had 4 companies for a while back then - but the 4th mainly got fleshed out when the MG Pl died.

Ideally it would be 4 Coy with the robust Cbt Spt Coy, but I would sacrifice a Rifle Coy for Cbt Spt coy.

Of course back then we also had a M/Cpl as a PL WO

 

[Kirkhill]

I think there may have been a reason for that...

I guess we had 4 companies for a while back then - but the 4th mainly got fleshed out when the MG Pl died.

Ideally it would be 4 Coy with the robust Cbt Spt Coy, but I would sacrifice a Rifle Coy for Cbt Spt coy.

Of course back then we also had a M/Cpl as a PL WO

But back then, equally, we got this advice on Crew Served weapons and load distribution (309(3) Annex B):

"5. Due to the fact that in every platoon headquarters there are three weapons (medium anti-tank weapon, light mortar and GPMG) and only three men to man them the platoon commander must decide which weapon(s) he wants manned.

6. Within the company the policy may be laid down by the company commander.  For instance he may decide he wants to form a GPMG section so he would order number 1 and 2 platoons to carry the GPMGs while 3 platoon carried the light mortar".

There was nothing preventing the OC from reallocating his available manpower to form a Support Section (or even a Support Platoon) within the body of his company. 

Or even, based on 309(3) 311 reorganizing even more radically with 2, 3 or 4 understrength platoons or two large platoons and a support platoon.

Max Flex was the order of the day.

4 Companies made (and make) sense if the Battalion is independently deployed.  It is less critical if the Battalion is deployed as part of a Brigade or even as part of a Battle Group.

 

[a_majoor]

I'm with Kevin here.

The 80's era Mech Infantry battalion structure that we had was pretty flexible, and in a wartime situation, could retain a great deal of its fighting power by feeding replacements into the combat support company (echoing Brutinel's response to the suggestion that the Canadian Machine Gun Corps be stripped of manpower to reinforce rifle companies....)*

Indeed, given funding and PY's, a similar organization would work for a LAV battalion. One caveat would be reorganize the logistics support company to provide Admin platoons for each company in the same manner as Armoured Squadrons have admin troops, to support the ability to move and operate in a dispersed manner. The C-16's would be have to be grouped in a support platoon in the combat support company, given their relative immobility. (pairing them with .50 HMG's would provide a pretty outstanding fire support capability). The only other change I might suggest would be to move Recce Platoon to the HQ Coy.

*of course this proposal is tantamount to loosing firepower of a great many men so as to add men to do the fatigue work. What would you
think of a manufacturer who, being short of hands to clean windows decided to stop his great machines so as to relieve men for that purpose?
The policy of reducing machine guns would not remedy the shortage of men in infantry brigades, but would undoubtedly lower their firepower.
Instead the number of machine guns should be increased proportionately to maintain, if not improve, their firepower.’