• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors

dapaterson said:
You got the abbreviation wrong - it's CFT, not CFOUL-UP.  Outcomes are the same, though...

This just proves my theory about increasing the staff at DSNA.  Perhaps we can find a few retired CF members to come back on a Class B contract?  That wouldn't require any increase in civilian positions so that meets the spirit and aim of the reductions, right?
 
dapaterson said:
And our CMBGs have become administrative.  Operationalization is a good idea; but even that should save PYs as we return to more rational models, instead of needing a 40 pax bus for the G3 staff.

At the risk of putting too fine of a point on it, what is your experience with the CMBGs and what they do?
 
MCG said:
The only problem with reduction by attrition is that a job is not necessarily important just because the incumbent hangs around for a few more years, and another job is not necessarily unnecessary just because the incumbent chooses to leave government.  Reduction by attrition needs to be supported with work force adjustment so that people are moved to the important positions, and that it is the bottom priority positions that are allowed to go away.

So do it. Every other organization in Canada can seem to make it work.

Of course, DND would probably hire 2,200 people to oversee it. ;)
 
dapaterson said:
(True story: I was once in a session with a defence scientist who, after detailed interviews, questionnaires and assessments with all 21 level 1s, had concluded that the biggest challenge and problem in DND, needing immediate attention before anything else, was a lack of office space in the NCR.)

The funny, and absolutely disheartening, thing about this "true story" is that I believe him to be speaking the truth.
 
Tango2Bravo said:
At the risk of putting too fine of a point on it, what is your experience with the CMBGs and what they do?

To be fair, I am critiquing our ad-hoc Bde HQs that we deploy to theatre, not the actual established units in Canada.  But our creeping infection of PowerPoint-itis risks getting down to the CMBG level...
 
By analogy:

http://www.kathrynmarshall.ca/federal-politics/liberal-party-structure-holding-them-back/

LIBERAL PARTY STRUCTURE HOLDING THEM BACK
May 22, 2011Leave a comment

Before the Liberals paint the walls, they need to lay a new foundation. One of the biggest things holding the Liberal Party back from real change and renewal is their own internal party structure hampered by layers of bureaucracy and title holders. The way a party is structured affects its success as an organization and election fighting machine. It’s no wonder that the Conservatives and Liberals have exact opposite party structures.

Unlike the Liberals, the Tories have a very flat party structure. There’s a national council consisting of elected representatives from each province and territory who sit on council with the leader and they meet a few times a year to discuss party business. There’s no wings, no commissions, no special interest groups. There are no intermediate groups between the constituency associations and the national council. Every party member has an equal voice, regardless of their gender, age or ethnicity.  This is a structure that empowers the grassroots base of party activists, volunteers and members, not title holders and party bureaucrats.

The Liberal Party structure is in stark contrast to the simple, flat organization of the Conservatives. They’re bursting at the seams with commissions, special interest groups and regional organizations. It seems like they have a title for everything, and everyone.

In addition to their national executive, the Liberals have multiple commissions and groups like the National Women’s Liberal Commission, Young Liberals of Canada, Aboriginal People’s Commission and Senior Liberals Commission. Each of these commissions has their own mandate, policy, budgets, events, meetings and executive.  Combine their respective executives and staff and this adds a cast of 75 title holders.

The Liberal Party has affiliate organizations in each region of the country, each with their own board of directors, annual conventions, budgets, etc. The Liberal Party in Manitoba alone has 35 people on their board. Add together all the regional organizations this adds hundreds more title holders.

The Liberal Party also has a National Elections Readiness Committee with an astounding 37 people on the executive. With an executive that big, you’d think they would have actually been, well, ready for the election.

In 2006 the Liberals put together a “Renewal Commission”, which clearly failed to result in much renewal. What they need to do is cut commissions, not create more.

The layers of internal Liberal bureaucracy put barriers between the grassroots of the party and the executive. This top down approach puts the Liberals out of touch with their own base—which results in bad policy, bad decisions and kills on-the-ground organization.  The Liberals current structure is also inefficient, expensive and impossible to manage. Nothing gets done.

In the private sector, when a company is looking to change for better, they trim the fat. The Liberals need to do the same. If they want real renewal and change, they should start with a simpler party structure that empowers party members, not title holders.  And please, don’t create a commission to cut commissions.
 
Excuse me, but I guess this is not a good time to establish the Ministry of Silly Marches?
 
dapaterson said:
Given how rarely our tac HQs do anything but routine admin, maybe the solution is to reduce the number of HQs.

Actually, a good chunk of 1 CMBG HQ has been deployed for 3 months straight on domestic ops and training.
 
Last year I worked under two CMBG HQs (ie in subordinate units) on complicated DOMOPs. One them also generated a Task Force Afghanistan HQ at the same time. Even if there is not a brigade training event the Bde HQ does much more than administration.

Regarding the overseas HQs, the CMBG HQs provide the solid core of the TFA HQs. This makes the TFA HQ much more than an "ad-hoc" organization.

I love slamming my higher HQ as much as the next guy, but the CMBG HQs should be considered vital ground.

Cheers
 
Tango2Bravo said:
Last year I worked under two CMBG HQs (ie in subordinate units) on complicated DOMOPs. One them also generated a Task Force Afghanistan HQ at the same time. Even if there is not a brigade training event the Bde HQ does much more than administration.

Regarding the overseas HQs, the CMBG HQs provide the solid core of the TFA HQs. This makes the TFA HQ much more than an "ad-hoc" organization.

I love slamming my higher HQ as much as the next guy, but the CMBG HQs should be considered vital ground.

Cheers

Too bad we can't see our way clear to establishing them as proper Brigades HQ (Brigade HQs?) and man/equip them properly e.g., with the full suite of HQ & Sigs/Maint/other organic support. I assume they're trying to avoid having to promote a bunch of people to one star positions. We always seem to try and make an 'administrative' HQ perform like an 'operational' HQ then wonder why people are stressed out all the time.
 
114 General/Equivalents
358 Colonel/Equivalents
-----
472  Hold that thought


Historically there was no functional rank of Colonel.  Up until the Korean War and later, if a LCOL received a promotion it was to BGEN.  There may have been a few staff colonels but read few.  The problem is not a problem of 114 generals.  It is a problem of 472 officers above the rank of those commanding the military building blocks of battalions/squadrons/frigates/etc.  We have 60-70 LCOLs doing the job of LCOL but we have 472 with higher rank overseeing them.  Of course we also have endless LCOLs doing the paper shuffle.

The system will never end because everyone has invested so heavily in it.  Government ministers often have only as much control as the bureaucracy allows them.  Many errant ministers have had their political career shredded by their underlings so don't look for direction there. 

The US Marines  have developed a culture consisting of 1 officer per 10 Marines which is where Canada was 60 years ago.  If anyone needs a successful working bare-bones management model, they don't have to go very far.  Whose idea was it to put officers at desks to create a paper blizzard?  Was there something wrong with simply commanding and supervising?



 
daftandbarmy said:
Too bad we can't see our way clear to establishing them as proper Brigades HQ (Brigade HQs?) and man/equip them properly e.g., with the full suite of HQ & Sigs/Maint/other organic support. I assume they're trying to avoid having to promote a bunch of people to one star positions. We always seem to try and make an 'administrative' HQ perform like an 'operational' HQ then wonder why people are stressed out all the time.

Are you refering to the reserve CBGs or the regular force CMBGs? I don't have an establishment at hand, but the CMBGs have HQ and Sigs Sqns and are "operational" with deployable CPs. I do think that it was odd when we cut the Brigadiers from the CMBGs in the late 90s. They were the only Generals who actually had troops!
 
There must be some military C2 and national management of the CF and DND. I think that all organizational and C2 models have flaws and some do have more bureaucratic bloat than others.

There is, also, over and above internally imposed (by choice of organizational model) bloat a lot of externally imposed bloat. During my service i saw at least a couple of DG (one star) level organizations and at least one Branch Chief (two star) and two three star level organizations created out of thin air because the bureaucratic centre in Ottawa decreed that this, that or the other programme was the flavour of the month and DND is almost always used as something of a stalking horse on the principle that if DND and the CF can 'go along' so can every other department and agency. There were, at least in the times I was able to look in on the Executive floor of Fort Fumble, at least one DM and, maybe, one CDS who were willing to say "F__k off, rude message follows" when the centre gave those orders but there was never ministerial support. Those extraneous organizations still exist, still do little if anything but some clerical work, still consume resources - because parliament (we the people) says so.

Good, efficient and effective, HQs staffed with good, dedicated, well trained staff officers and NCOs (and there is a lot of good, rewarding staff work for senior NCOs - if we would only let them do it) are a great boon to units who are given difficult tasks.
 
daftandbarmy said:
Too bad we can't see our way clear to establishing them as proper Brigades HQ (Brigade HQs?) and man/equip them properly e.g., with the full suite of HQ & Sigs/Maint/other organic support. I assume they're trying to avoid having to promote a bunch of people to one star positions. We always seem to try and make an 'administrative' HQ perform like an 'operational' HQ then wonder why people are stressed out all the time.

Are you talking about the CMBGs?
 
Tango2Bravo said:
Are you refering to the reserve CBGs or the regular force CMBGs? I don't have an establishment at hand, but the CMBGs have HQ and Sigs Sqns and are "operational" with deployable CPs. I do think that it was odd when we cut the Brigadiers from the CMBGs in the late 90s. They were the only Generals who actually had troops!

CBGs. They seem to limp along, trying to be a real brigade but with no real 'oomph'.

They're mostly invisible to the units until some return gets missed, or an audit report goes missing, then everyone goes ballistic. It would be nice to see a 'real' Bde Comd running around exercising some proper, fully visible leadership and developing the COs, leading large scale Bde CT events etc as opposed to the 'post master General' type role we tend to consign them to these days. Unfortunatley, this isn't a great example to set for keen, bright Officers who take one look at the red tape politically charged nightmare that is the reality of higher level jobs within a CBG then leave, or worse, quit and stay.

But I guess that would mean adding to, and not diminshing, the leadership 'bloat'.
 
daftandbarmy said:
CBGs. They seem to limp along, trying to be a real brigade but with no real 'oomph'.

They're mostly invisible to the units until some return gets missed, or an audit report goes missing, then everyone goes ballistic. It would be nice to see a 'real' Bde Comd running around exercising some proper, fully visible leadership and developing the COs, leading large scale Bde CT events etc as opposed to the 'post master General' type role we tend to consign them to these days. Unfortunatley, this isn't a great example to set for keen, bright Officers who take one look at the red tape politically charged nightmare that is the reality of higher level jobs within a CBG then leave, or worse, quit and stay.

But I guess that would mean adding to, and not diminshing, the leadership 'bloat'.

Not at all.  Assign each CBG trained troops to form a "real" Bde" and we could make more robust CBG HQs and still have money and people.  With anArmy Reserve of 20K (all ranks), of whch about 15K are trained, four CBGs would be about right, each with 3700 or so trained soldiers.

Of course, the large number of piddly little Reserve units, each with their own Colonel Blimp, would then have to be culled rather ruthlessly.  With 4 CBGs, we would want about a dozen Infantry Bn HQs (instead of the 51 we have today) and so on down the line.

So yes, I'm all for more effective CBG HQs.  But to get there, we need to thin the herd in other areas as well.
 
dapaterson said:
Not at all.  Assign each CBG trained troops to form a "real" Bde" and we could make more robust CBG HQs and still have money and people.  With anArmy Reserve of 20K (all ranks), of whch about 15K are trained, four CBGs would be about right, each with 3700 or so trained soldiers.

Of course, the large number of piddly little Reserve units, each with their own Colonel Blimp, would then have to be culled rather ruthlessly.  With 4 CBGs, we would want about a dozen Infantry Bn HQs (instead of the 51 we have today) and so on down the line.

So yes, I'm all for more effective CBG HQs.  But to get there, we need to thin the herd in other areas as well.
There is plenty of room to clean-up the reserve structure in order to bring about greater effeciency and effectiveness.  However, I believe anything gained from cleaning the existing structure should be re-invested into a new reserve structure - fewer LCol and CWO, but more sgts, WOs and capts.  Of course, there is a whole other thread to explore that idea:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24381.0.html
 
Exactly. This isn't about saving money on the backs of the Reserves (again). Someone tried that last year and it probably cost more than they saved.

This has to be an across the board, all Services, no sacred cow initiative. I'm sure there is a ton of overpaid people sitting around doing squat besides, in some opinions, Reserve COs & Chiefs.
 
This is an intersting observation about HQ 'size creep'. I assume that we have expereinced similar issues:

THE COMMAND OF BRITISH LAND FORCES IN IRAQ
MARCH TO MAY 2003

ABSTRACT

This paper reports an analysis of the British Army’s operations in Iraq in March-April
2003. Comparisons are made with the similar deployment to Kuwait and Iraq in 1990-1.

Coalition land forces operated highly effectively and with considerable professionalism;
however, such professionalism should extend to a candid examination of shortcomings.
Formation headquarters have grown by about 25% since 1991. There appears to have
been an unwarranted growth in staff functions and rank inflation. There is evidence of a
tendency to plan excessively, and excessive but unfocussed staff activity which had no
positive output beyond the confines of the headquarters.

The net result of this misdirected activity was command and control of subordinate units
and formations which was criticized as being suboptimal. Orders which were required
were often produced too late, and there was a lack of passage of information from
headquarters to subordinates. Recognised operational procedures were often ignored or
broken, which was justified at the time as pragmatic rather than being seen as
symptomatic of a general problem. Such orders as were produced often lacked clarity
and, in particular, tended to give multiple and imprecise mission to subordinates.

http://www.dodccrp.org/events/9th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/068.pdf
 
daftandbarmy said:
This is an intersting observation about HQ 'size creep'. I assume that we have expereinced similar issues:

THE COMMAND OF BRITISH LAND FORCES IN IRAQ
MARCH TO MAY 2003

http://www.dodccrp.org/events/9th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/068.pdf

Favourite quote of mine:

Overall the evidence shows that HQs have become too large; contain too many overlapping functions; have officers of inappropriately high ranks; plan too much; and tend to be very busy. However, they are not particularly productive; and produce orders that are too big and which arrive too late.



Anyone who has read the Army's annual strategic plans, can I have an "Amen"?
 
Back
Top