Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)

[PPCLI Guy]

It's not about being in touch with the grotty, ill-informed electorate.  Our elites know better what the people need than the people themselves and they're going to give it to us hard.

Right.  Like they are with National Security and Defence, which doesn't even make the list?  Do you hate "the elites" for allowing defence spending to be the single largest discretionary element of government spending (ie not transfers to other governments or individuals, or payment of interest) even though it doesn't register as a concern "with the Canadian people"?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I think Sanjin is going to quickly realize that all he can do is go on the defensive and hasty defenses against his own Cabinet to protect his department. I hope his COIN background does not blind him to the potential of conventional warfare in the near future and what is needed for that. A Liberal government with a charming and fluffy PM and a major financial crisis is not a good mix for DND. I can only hope that they can be persuaded that the NSPS is “infrastructure related” as is portion of the aerospace industry. One can argue that many of the shortages within the supply system can easily be met from within the country and should be a priority, but boots are not terribly sexy from a political point of view.

 

[Kirkhill]

Perhaps it is simply a case of there being nothing much that the government, particularly the federal government can do about any of those issues except tinker around the margins.  There are no revolutionary solutions to magic those problems away. 

They need headlines.  So they knock down straw men.

On the Security and National Defence front, well that is imposed by external circumstances and our local politicians should be eternally grateful that the Japanese didn't land, Indonesia doesn't sit off shore and that a generous / usefully self-interested neighbour shares the island.  Consequently it remains off the radar of the locals and thus of the ward-healers.

And, frankly, that isn't so bad given some of the alternatives. 

One thing that was said up thread though caught my attention: about the relative safety of times past versus modern times.

I accept that the instance of state on state violence is down.  I also accept that, pending the rise of Multiple Resistant Strains of all bugs, that our health is significantly better.

But.

The combination of nuclear weapons and the overwhelming strength of the US, militarily and economically, has caused people to look for alternative methods of achieving power and control.  No news there.

My sense of things though is that the efforts are driving us back in time to the situation prior to the Treaty of Westphalia.  The State was an artifact created to justify zones of control because prior to that existed Hobbes's state of war of all against all.  Ordnung muss sein and l'etat c'est moi were the outcomes.

But, again.

The enemies of the West (meaning the US and its acolytes, us) are tackling our supremacy exactly the same way that the Protestants took on the Catholics when the Catholics meant the Hapsburgs of Spain and France was little more than Paris.

The Pope divided the world between Portugal and Spain in 1494. This locked out sea going merchants from everywhere else and launched a couple of centuries of anti-establishment warfare.  This piled on top of pre-existing conditions like local authorities that refused to recognize central control and folks like the reivers and cossacks contributed to Hobbes's world.  The net effect, from 1494 to 1648 was a period of interests fomenting unrest to create chaos that could be exploited for local, short term gain.  Starting from 1648 the wars took on a different character as did society.  Central authority was imposed - and used to create armies to impose order. Usually the debate was whose order.  But some sort of order eventually was imposed.

That situation has broadly held from 1815 to the modern day.  And I don't know if 9/11 or the non-invasion of Ukraine will be seen as the point of inflection in the future.

But the future I see is one of privatised warfare - letters of marque being issued to biker gangs and to private security consultants, corporate security forces raised to protect own assets on land and at sea, borders being erased, the distinction between policing and soldiering disappearing - and a recreation of the environment that saw the raising of Dragoon Regiments.    Dragoons were raised as constabulary forces to maintain order at home amongst people that were similarly armed and equipped.  It was only after the domestic subjugation had been successful that Dragoons could be reformed as part of the army and used to confront opposing armies.

All this to say that, in my view, it is going to be a while before the Dragoons need to close ranks and form a mailed fist.  They are going to be needed in their original dispersed role and having to adapt to the operational environment in which they find themselves.

Because of our system of checks and balances and our history the Green Dragoons and the Red Dragoons* are separate and the Green Dragoons are not welcome to operate domestically - unless they are unarmed or unless the Red Dragoons ever found themselves ever overwhelmed at home.  That means that the Green Dragoons must find employment elsewhere and find themselves a willing paymaster.

Currently the Green Dragoons are paid by Her Majesty's Canadian Government - but HMCG seems to have little appetite to employ them in any role other than as Palace Guards.  Much like these guys.

http://media-2.web.britannica.com/eb-media/33/94133-004-7C39F857.jpg

So the question for you guys, the Green Dragoons in the army, is how do you maintain the skills you feel that soldiering requires, while being paid by a parsimonious and unappreciative paymaster, until events prove that you were right all along and are needed?


* The RCMP is officially a regiment of Dragoons.  Arguably amongst the largest in the world.

Edit to offer a solution:

Buccleuch's Regiment.  - Paid for by London to serve the Dutch
Stargate's, MacKay's and Hepburns Regiments of the Green Brigade. - Paid for by Stockholm to serve Vasa
Le Garde Eccosais. - Paid for by Paris to serve the Valois

And more currently:

The Sultan of Oman's forces with British advisors
The Sultan of Brunei with British trained Gurkhas.

You would prevent skill fade but you would not necessarily be loved at home.  Unless you died wearing a Canadian flag.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Unfortunately, like Captain Willard in the hotel room, we're all just 'waiting for a mission'. Re-orging everything before that happens would not be a good idea.

No doubt confusion shall reign until then.

And afterwards? A different kind of confusion, as per SOP.

 

[ArmyRick]

If I were king of the whole wide world (as my five year old says it), I would ask Canada a simple question
"Do you wish to participate in operations abroad or simply defend your land" and build the defence force from there.

Yes, I probably simplified it but thats me. I do not like the Half participating in operations overseas (No fighter jets but sure send in spec ops to help fight...er I mean train). Too me, its playing in the middle of the road and could result in p*ssing off our alllies and ensuring our enemies keep us on their hit list.

If we choose to say, be strictly a defence force, then we could look at that. If we choose to participate in missions around the globe (We do not have the ability or resources to act unilaterally, so we will always be in some sort of coalition). We can not always choose the mission, many times the mission for global stability will choose us (is fighting needed? Is it security presence? Maybe its just aircraft for observation?). Predeterming that we will only do UN peacekeeping missions is kind of like deciding you are only going to shovel your driveway today (even if it happens to be July, what I am getting at, is situation decides what is needed).

How do we get this through to vote chasing politicians?

 

[The Bread Guy]

One question, ArmyRick:  if you're going "all or nothing" one way or another, who defends Canada if we go with "all away team" option?  Or am I misunderstanding?

 

[Brad Sallows]

At a certain point, the quantity of people and equipment we have left to provide capability "X" descends below the point at which we can serve the political imperative of dividing everything 3 ways to keep regional noses in joint.  The sensible policy is to consolidate capability "X" in one location.

Stephane Dion got rolled, big time, by Jack Layton.  He is not an obvious choice for a position which is essentially submerged in the Biggest Game of negotiations.

 

[ArmyRick]

Its not an all or nothing options. Uou have misunderstood.

Its a case of Yes we will help with global stability or we will simply defend our own land. Thats the options.

Never did I say we committ all our forces abroad.

For example, NATO is going to conduct X mission in Y country. Lets say they ask Canada (knowing our capabilities) to commit a battle group, a helicopter squadron and a NSE, they are to provide security in a dangerous region with high likely of combat with small pockets of insurgents. Now, if we have those resources and we have decided to help with global stability, then we should not turn around to this example request and say something like "we will provide a company, a helicopter flight and our troops will not actively engage the insurgents, etc, etc."

The yes or no option is whether or not we participate overseas in global stability and we do not cherry pick the who/what/how based on political nonsense or vote chasing. Thats why I asked the big question of my fellow Canadians, do we participate overseas, YES or NO? The way we do it, can not always be pretermined. If we say no, then fair enough. Lets concentrate our ARmed Forces on protecting our land and conducting Dom ops/home security.

The cherry picking our missions for political reasons is what I have a problem with. If we are asked to send  3 frigates for a mission and we say no, it looks too aggressive, then not accetable. If we say no, we do not have 3 frigates available because of our own security, maintenance overhaul, etc, etc. That is different. We can not bake a cake without the ingredients.

This thought is coming from a few things
-The decision to pull fighter jets from Middle east but keep spec ops there to help train (both are efforts so to speak against ISIL)
-This mantra from some in our society who still insist "Canada returns to its traditional role of UN peacekeeping". That one really bothers me. If there is a suitable mission available and we have the resources then YAY for us. But if such a mission is simply not out there, then folks, come on, why bake a cake nobody is going to eat?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I don't think it's a simple matter of saying yes or no, ArmyRick.

Other than actual warfare under the NATO mutual defence clause (i.e. one of the members is attacked on its territory), I don't think that NATO external missions are carried out by having headquarters "assigning" responsibilities to member and then asking "are you in or out" on that  basis.

It is more like NATO develops an overall plan for the mission, identifies the equipment, resources and personnel required then turns to the members and asks them one by one what they would be willing to provide. In the course of these negotiations (and that is what they are), NATO headquarters may "suggest" they expected more from one member or the other and try to put pressure on the government of a given member to do more, but in the end it is a political  decision by each member as to what it will or will not provide - at which point NATO HQ has to make a call whether they want a specific member in or out of the mission on the basis of what that member is willing to provide.

But by experience (AFG), it is very difficult for NATO to refuse any contribution a member may wish to make to the mission, however much NATO HQ would have liked to see more provided by said member. For external operations, NATO is a political organization after all.

As for availability of "blue-helmet" operations, isn't there a mission still open in Cyprus we could help with?  ;D

 

[The Bread Guy]

Its a case of Yes we will help with global stability or we will simply defend our own land. Thats the options.

Seen - thanks for the clarification.

The yes or no option is whether or not we participate overseas in global stability and we do not cherry pick the who/what/how based on political nonsense or vote chasing.

As long as we have democratically-elected civilian oversight of the military, I'm afraid we're never going to reduce that element down to zero.

Thats why I asked the big question of my fellow Canadians, do we participate overseas, YES or NO?

I'd like it to be that simple, too, but sometimes events don't keep it that simple.  A month ago, if I said, "Canada should be fighting the anti-terror fight in Mali because, hey, you never know what'll happen in the neighbourhood," people would have ignored me.  Now, due to "events", it may not be such a dopey idea.  It'll always come down to the specific event when it comes to "should we go?"

 

[McG]

Two recent opinion pieces suggest that the the pending withdrawl of CF-18 fighters is a sub-set problem of Canada's lack of defence policy.

We need a re-think - National defence
The Chronicle-Herald
26 Jan 2016

The angst among some concerning Canada's non-invitation to participate in discussions among allies about the next stage of fighting the Islamic State will soon pass.

The Liberal government's campaign promise to bring CF-18 aircraft home was, by definition, a campaign promise.

That is, it was taken without the sort of briefings and understanding that a government should have before making a decision like that.

This sort of promise, without a better understanding of its consequences, should not have been made.

But, over the course of time, this decision should matter little.

The more substantive question this government should seek to answer is what kind of defence policy do we need - now and for the foreseeable future.

Clearly, "sunny ways" are not going to do it.

A recent open letter to the defence minister from two defence policy experts - David Perry and retired general George Petrolekas, two Fellows of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute - makes clear the world is not less dangerous nor less complex. (The letter is posted at http://www.cgai.ca/inthemediajanuary212016.)

Russia is increasingly aggressive.

China, notwithstanding its growing economic challenges, is increasingly provocative.

The Middle East and North Africa, after the teasing of the Arab Spring, are again being swallowed up by centuries-old antagonisms.

Our domestic defence needs are changing with the opening up of Arctic waters and the growing trade across the Pacific.

Then there's North Korea and international terrorism.

Meanwhile, our most recent thorough defence policy review was completed more than 20 years ago. Clearly the world has changed.

Canada needs a rational discussion on how to best protect our own interests and how to best contribute to global peace and security.

What kind of military do we need in this new environment?

What should our equipment look like and what sort of people do we need to operate this equipment?

How can we best assure our internal security? And what can we afford?

The open letter from Fellows Perry and Petrolekas is a helpful piece of advice for government, even if the paper suggests the shipbuilding contract awarded to Halifax's Irving Shipyard was motivated, in part, by notions of "regional benefit."

Where would they have the ships built, in Oakville?

A defence policy review is overdue. We should get on with it. 

Libs need coherent defence policy
David Akin
Winnipeg Sun
26 Jan 2016

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan says any talk that Canada's reputation has diminished among our military allies is backward. "On the contrary, they are not thinking less of us. I know for a fact our opinion is valued," Sajjan told me in an interview Monday night.

The opposition and many experts aren't buying it. They say the Trudeau government's intention to withdraw our fighter jets from the battlefield against ISIL in Syria and Iraq, combined with almost no details about what will replace them, is hurting our name.

"The Liberals' incoherent and indecisive messaging has diminished Canada's reputation on the world stage," Conservative MP James Bezan thundered at Sajjan in question period in the House of Commons Monday.

Sajjan, when I interviewed him later, said he's been spending his time since his appointment as defence minister on Nov. 4 "understanding the entire mission."

He should be a quick study. Saj jan is a decorated veteran of campaigns in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel and is the first Sikh to command a Canadian Army reserve regiment. He has been at the sharp end of the stick when Canadians were fighting the Taliban.

And yet, his boss wants him to pull Canadian Armed Forces off the battlefield against another terrorist group, ISIL.

"When you look at the entire picture, we need to look at what capability do we need to bring in based on the entire situation," Sajjan said.

But why do we need to take a 'capability' like the fighter jets out in order to bring a capability in? Can't we do both?

Sajjan answers: "There's many options you can look it if you want to get into what-if scenarios."

That answer, though, seems unsatisfactory and it's the kind of answer that has even some Liberals in Ottawa a little concerned these days. It's too vague.

But that's not Canada's only reputational problem when it comes to defence.

Our NATO allies think we're cheap.

The treaty that binds NATO countries together includes a commitment from each that every government will spend the equivalent of 2% of a country's gross domestic product on national defence and that one-fifth of that will be spent on equipment.

Canada is spending close to 1% of GDP and only 16% of that on defence.

In other words, we're not honouring our commitments to our NATO partners.

The Conservatives were as bad as the Liberals before them and the Liberals now seem set to copy the lousy Conservative track record.

Sajjan, like his Conservative predecessors, will argue it's not really about the quantity, it's about the quality of defence spending.

"Certain countries (spend) up to the 2% but they don't have the right capabilities to bring to bear. What use is that?" Sajjan said.

"We always have to be mindful to use the right metric. We're also going to make sure we are fighting in a smart way."

Our navy is rusting from the inside out. The "Buffalo" aircraft we use for search-andrescue in western mountain ranges went into service in 1967. I could go on.

No amount of smarts gets around equipment deficiencies like that.

We need a serious discussion in Parliament and realistic long-term plan to substantially boost funding for our own national defence. 

I wonder if the first author is suggesting that the CFDS was not a defence policy review or if the suggestion is that CFDS was not thorough?

 

[Journeyman]

I wonder if the first author is suggesting that the CFDS was not a defence policy review or if the suggestion is that CFDS was not thorough?

Canada First Defence Strategy  was neither a defence policy nor thorough.

It was nothing more than a shopping wish-list filled with mindless platitudes, which was embarrassingly shelved, quite rightfully, before the ink was dry.

I believe that the author was correctly pointing out that Canada has been without a comprehensive Defence White Paper in well over two decades.  Not mentioned is that most governments in the interim have been happy with that because, avoiding spelling out the realities of defence, security, and economy makes it more difficult for critics to hold their feet to the fire over failing to address such issues.



Yes, by "those governments," I include both Liberal and Conservative.

 

[Old Sweat]

It seems to me that we rarely have a coherent defence strategy or programme because (a) we have no real control over or even meaningful input into the international situation; and (b) the majority of our giant minds, movers and shakers and rest of us don't care. I am not sure the militia myth excuse is still valid, but its illegitimate children still are hard at work.

In the meantime we either excuse our selves to go to the washroom when the bill arrives or conveniently forget to bring our plastic to the table because "you guys make more money, so you should pay our share of the bill."

 

[Edward Campbell]

It seems to me that we rarely have a coherent defence strategy or programme because (a) we have no real control over or even meaningful input into the international situation; and (b) the majority of our giant minds, movers and shakers and rest of us don't care. I am not sure the militia myth excuse is still valid, but its illegitimate children still are hard at work.

In the meantime we either excuse our selves to go to the washroom when the bill arrives or conveniently forget to bring our plastic to the table because "you guys make more money, so you should pay our share of the bill."

We did, once ~ only once ~ have a coherent, achievable foreign (and consequential defence) policy. Louis St Laurent set it out, in outline, in his Duncan & John Gray Memorial Lecture at the University of Toronto in 1947. External Affairs Minister (later prime minister (1948-57)) St Laurent then set about giving real, measurable effect to his ideas and Prime Ministers Diefenbaker and Pearson did not waver, either, so, from 1947 to 1967 we had a workable national "grand strategy" that was tailored to its time and space (and we did have some advantages then that we don't have now, but our current socio-economic and geo-strategic situations are not too different from, say, Australia or the Netherlands or even the UK).

Louis St Laurent lived in, actually, a much more complex geo-strategic environment: we (they, I was only a small boy) didn't really understand, in 1945-48, the real and full extent of the Soviet-communist menace (George Kennan had only written his famous "containment" telegram in 1946) but we would soon be embroiled in both a long Cold War, with frightening implications, and a real Hot War (Korea) and in the politics and policies of nuclear deterrence and in trying to re-establish trade in a shattered global economy, and, and, and ...

... in comparison everyone, absolutely everyone, since St Laurent-Truman-Eisenhower has had an ever increasingly clear and more simple strategic problem. Nothing in the Arab uprising and the rise of China and all that compares with the fear and unknowns of the late 1940s and the dawn of both the nuclear age and the East-West split. There is no existential threat to our, Western, liberal, "way of life," and that is, primarily, why there is no compelling need for our, 21st century politicians ~ Barack Obama, David Cameron, Angela Merkel or Justin Trudeau ~ to do the kind of deep, long range, strategic thinking that was required of Truman, Eisenhower, Atlee, Churchill and St Laurent. Putin is a threat, but he's no Stalin and he lacks the means to be one, Xi Jinping's only real tie to Mao Zedong is in the jacket he wears a couple of times a year ...

                       

... and the Arabs and al Qaeda and Da'esh and whatever are, historically, familiar, twisting the lion's tail and so on ...

... of course there are threats, threats that we (that includes Canada) should address, but they are anything but existential.

I'm sorry that we, Canadians, cannot have anything even remotely like a useful grand strategy, but every prime minister since Pierre Trudeau has, more or less, mostly more, signed on to Pierre Trudeau's "poor little Canada, beset by its own, domestic, national unity problems, cannot take part in the grownups' work of making the world safe for free peoples and free trade" dogma ~ see the 1970 White Paper, A Foreign Policy for Canadians. But that's not, really, the politicians' fault ... they ask us what we want, we tell 'em, and then they parade fools and charlatans to lead us to where we want to go ...

... and we vote for 'em. But, absent a real, clear, well understood threat to our "fat, dumb and happy" lives ... why not?

 

[Kirkhill]

I choose to put this one here because it returns to a repeated refrain of mine:

" "Syrian safe heavens, protected both by air power and ground troops, have to be reconsidered": Dan Hodges.

Which is why another – contentious – proposal has to be brought back to the table. Syrian safe heavens, protected both by air power and ground troops, have to be reconsidered. There would be a price – both in terms of resources and inevitable casualties. But not as high as the price we will inevitably pay if the refugee crisis continues unchecked. And it is also easier to begin the work of constructing the necessary facilities to support Syria’s refugee population in areas where there is already some basic existing infrastructure. "

If you want a role, a justification, for the CAF, for an expeditionary capability, for a robust Combat Air Patrol capability with Air to Ground assets then this is where to look.

Building umbrellas.


PS - this article is about Britain, but as the article itself demonstrates it applies across the EU and the arguments echo here in Canada and the US.

Let's not delude ourselves: Britain just doesn't care about refugees anymore

Those of us who think Britain's response to the migrant crisis has been woeful must accept that public opinion has hardened – and change tactics

By Dan Hodges 1:01PM GMT 28 Jan 2016


We can carry on fighting. And perhaps we should. Those of us who pride ourselves on our progressive values can look at the government’s announcement that it is rejecting calls for Britain to offer sanctuary to 3,000 refugee children within the EU, and condemn them. We can align ourselves with Labour’s principled stance that no distinction should be drawn between refugees on the European mainland, and those who have sought asylum in the countries bordering Syria. We can look at David Cameron’s commitment to house 20,000 additional Syrian refugees over the next five years, and state – with justification – “that’s not enough”.

Or we can accept the truth: that we have lost, again.

"They met up with a bunch of migrants and said they could all come to Britain."
David Cameron

There is no longer an argument to be had about whether or not significant numbers of refugees should be admitted to the UK. The pendulum of empathy – which swung briefly following the publication of photos of little Alan Kurdi lying motionless on that Turkish beach – has swung back. The clashes at the Hungarian-Serbian border. The Paris attacks. Cologne. They are shaping public opinion now. And it will not be reshaped.

If the Prime Minister could reset the clock to 12:00 noon yesterday, I suspect he would find a different – and better – form of words to throw at his political opponents than “they met with a bunch of migrants in Calais, they said they could all come to Britain!”. But his phrasing was revealing. Not because it exposes some deep inner prejudice – that’s not part of Cameron’s make-up. But because it reveals what constitutes the centre ground of the ongoing debate over the refugee crisis. David Cameron’s political radar wasn’t switched off when he made those toxic remarks. It just didn’t detect any incoming political danger.

Which leaves those of us who are struggling to establish some sort of red line on immigration in general, and asylum in particular, back where we always find ourselves. Routed, and frantically looking around for somewhere new to dig in.

Let us start here. There is no longer any point in expending energy on morally comforting tokenism. The argument about whether to accept 3,000 refugee children from Europe, or whether to accept them from camps within region, is as relevant to the crisis we – or more importantly, they – are facing as debating whether to accept 3,000 refugee children from Mars. According to the latest figures from the UNHCR, there are 4,597,436 registered Syrian refugees. 39 per cent of them are under the age of 11. A further 13 per cent are between the ages of 12 and 17. To continue to use the children of Syria in a proxy argument over our willingness to “do our bit” is not an exercise in compassion but an exercise in grotesque self-indulgence.

There is also no longer any point attempting to delude ourselves the solution to the Syrian refugee crisis can be found in Europe. Yes, we have the resources to provide sanctuary. But we do not have the political will to provide sanctuary. Actually, blaming the politicians on this one is a cop out. We do not have the public will to provide sanctuary.

Sweden is preparing to expel failed 80,000 asylum seekers, and has introduced border controls with Demark. Denmark itself has just passed a series of new laws that include slashing benefits for refugees and seizing their personal assets. A plan to physically remove refugees from Danish urban centres to specially designated camps has also been mooted. Germany has begun deporting refugees to Austria as the backlash against Angela Merkel’s progressive stance on asylum grows. Austria has begun erecting a new border fence with Slovenia.

Poland rejected outright a proposal it accept a “quota” of 4,500 additional refugees. Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov has said it is time for the EU's external borders to be shut against new migrants and asylum seekers. This has brought him into line with Hungarian PM Viktor Orban, who has equated refugees with an invading “army”. In France a formal state of emergency is currently in force, reinforcing a warning from Human Rights Watch that fears of terror attacks and of the potential impact of refugee influx [have] led to a visible scaling back of rights in Europe and other regions”.

I personally find all this horrific. But there’s no point me – or anyone who shares my horror – pretending we are in the majority. You want “people power”? This is what it looks like.

The issue is no longer whether we shut the door on those seeking sanctuary. It’s now only about whether we choose to shut the door, or shut the door and throw away the key.

The consensus about meeting our obligations to those fleeing persecution – on our doorstep – has collapsed. So we have to try to construct a new consensus around meeting our obligations to them on their own doorstep.

Britain is currently providing over a billion pounds in in-region support for the Syrian refugees. The progressive argument now has to centre on significantly increasing that level of assistance. And the point needs to be rammed home that this is not about providing charity or handouts. It’s about directly investing in the security and stability of our nation and our continent.

A second focus has to be on how that investment is being targeted. We cannot solve the greatest refugee crisis of a generation with tents and desalination tablets. Our entire understanding of the scale of the challenge needs to change. We have to stop talking of refugee camps and start thinking in terms of refugee city states. The requirement is for proper housing, schools, hospitals, factories, recreational facilities. The number of displaced people currently equates to the populations of Greater Manchester and the West Midlands combined. Our response has to be commensurate with that.

"Syrian safe heavens, protected both by air power and ground troops, have to be reconsidered"

Which is why another – contentious – proposal has to be brought back to the table. Syrian safe heavens, protected both by air power and ground troops, have to be reconsidered. There would be a price – both in terms of resources and inevitable casualties. But not as high as the price we will inevitably pay if the refugee crisis continues unchecked. And it is also easier to begin the work of constructing the necessary facilities to support Syria’s refugee population in areas where there is already some basic existing infrastructure.

Or, we could forget all that, and simply carry on as we are. Banging our heads against wall, and convincing ourselves the progressive fightback on asylum is only another news cycle away.

It isn’t. We have lost another battle. The only question now is whether we want to lose another war as well.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/12127515/Lets-not-delude-ourselves-Britain-just-doesnt-care-about-refugees-anymore.html

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Any grand strategy at this point is going to smash unto the rocks of political  expediency of the moment. We really don’t know where we are going to fight next or how or with whom.

The sovereignty task is the baseline. Most of this falls on the RCAF and RCN shoulders. The Army should be tasked to have an arctic capable unit that can be moved quickly up north. Although the land threat is minimal, as part of the sovereignty “triangle” demands this ability, the purpose being to exercise that right and demonstrate to others that it is important to us. The skill sets maintained will pay dividends elsewhere. Naval Reserves units need to be formed up North, these can be manned by locals with shortfalls for the summer season filled by southerners and some RCN types. They operate light patrol vessel in the summer season and support Ranger, CCG, RCN exercises and SAR, other government departments (RCMP, CBSA, EC, Parks, etc) (Politically Canada needs to invest in significantly more Arctic and Northern infrastructure, but that’s another issue)

Having a expeditionary ready force is the next requirement. Pretty much the majority  of Canada’s army history is expeditionary. How to design this force is the question. Since we will not know who, where and what we will fight next, leads me to believe that a army that contains a “heavy brigade” and “light brigade” is required (we may be able to tag the light brigade with the Arctic tasking as well). The light can be designed around and train for COIN and UN type ops, the heavy brigade trains for mixed and near peer warfare. People will rightly point out that with our small army the requirements to cycle units through rotations regardless of their training and that is a reality. However with both brigades having a strong cadre trained in their respective skillsets, they can quickly adapt the training of each unit to fit the role required. Having the 2 skillsets maintained means that the army can deploy a useful force almost immediately and then set itself to the task of training the net roto.

The reserve units are another issue. Afghanistan clearly showed the importance of the reserves as a reservoir of personal, talent and skills to support long term deployments. I think the concept of “Ops tasking” units should happen again, those units should be selected by proximity to the above mentioned brigades and the ability to tap into a large population. Their role is to provide reasonable trained people to support the brigade and a high likelihood of being deployed. These units get a higher level of funding and equipment. The other Reserve units get selected to train to one or the other role and they stay in that role for a long period and get to submit troops for training and deployments to that brigade. This way everyone knows what their role is and what they training to, which helps with recruiting, training plans and retention. 

 

[Edward Campbell]

It seems to me that from a political/diplomatic standpoint you need to have a "Defence of Canada" force that is rather like 18th and 19th century "fencible" units: raised, trained and equipped for operations here, in Canada, and retained here, in Canada, even when the other, expeditionary, brigades are tasked with overseas operations. That's how you demonstrate a commitment to home or even continental defence.

 

[GR66]

It seems to me that from a political/diplomatic standpoint you need to have a "Defence of Canada" force that is rather like 18th and 19th century "fencible" units: raised, trained and equipped for operations here, in Canada, and retained here, in Canada, even when the other, expeditionary, brigades are tasked with overseas operations. That's how you demonstrate a commitment to home or even continental defence.

But what does a home defense unit look like in absence of any realistic threat of invasion?  Do conventional infantry/armoured units based on our current Reg/Reserve force models make sense?  Do units organized and equipped (and trained) to perform functions such as aid to civil powers, disaster relief, vital infrastructure protection, etc. make more sense?  Or can air and naval forces meet the political/diplomatic requirement you suggestt with support from a more traditional, expeditionary army when required?

 

[McG]

But what does a home defense unit look like in absence of any realistic threat of invasion? 

Gendarmier?

 

[Edward Campbell]

Gendarmier?

Maybe light infantry able to deploy to anywhere in Canada, on relatively short notice and conduct low intensity operations ...

    1. Airborne, almost certainly

    2. Since the "enemy" would likely be minimal ... maybe a Russian repeat of the (1943) German Weather Station Kurt ...

         

          ... then no need for tanks, artillery, mortars, HAWs or attack helicopters; but

    3. Need, probably, airborne infantry, engineers, signals (including air support signals), medical and logistics; and

    4. Need, e.g.

         

                                                                                                   

    5. Since short notice is required, then at least five, say six "teams" based around one company of infantry and one troop of engineers with airfield building equipment ~ two infantry battalions plus support in a light brigade?