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Electoral Reform (Senate, Commons, & Gov Gen)

What do you want to see?


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Brad Sallows said:
If the Americans can make do with 100 senators, I don't see why we need so many.

That is true, the number is up for debate - I just used 100 off the top of my head.   Does 52 Sound better (5 per province and 2 for the territories)?

Perhaps the GG could be elected by the senate from among the senators.

Another possibility, with some interesting consequences to contemplate, such as:
- The CDS (and the CF) is managed by the DND but the "CofC" goes to the Senate?
- One House of Parliament has the Head of State while the other has the Head of Government - does this mean that the GG gets some new powers by being the head of a (now effective) Legislative Branch?

However, I still lean to a seperate office.   As I said above, I'm not to sure I want the GG to be a very partisan office, which they would be by default by being from Parliament.

I still lean toward letting each province decide how to elect/appoint its senators.

Possible, but I still don't like it because government appointments have not impressed me.   Take BC for example - would we want all of BC's Senators being chosen by the Liberal Government that, until recently, had 98% of the seats or the NDP government before it that held a mandate without even achieving the plurality of the popular vote?   I feel that people will lose faith in the accountablilty of the Senate if it can be percieved as an extention of the Provincial government.

Elected by the citizens of a Province using a STV system seems attractive for the Senate.
 
My purpose in having the provinces decide would be to impose a check, above Parliament, which more directly represents the interests of the provinces and further empowers the provinces relative to the federal government.  Given that, I see no reason for a provincial not to directly appoint senators (subject to the term limits) - it promotes unity of purpose and accountability.  The BC senators, for example, should represent the interests and wishes of the government of BC.
 
Ahh, I see - I should of guessed that, considering our past tete-au-tete over Provincial governments.

I do not wish the Senate to represent the Government of BC, bringing teh dynamic of a incestuous relationship between the Provincial and Federal governments (I view myself as a Canadian, not a British Columbian); I'm not interested in seeing the fiefs claw more away from our Government.  I desire Senators to represent me and the other constituents, albeit in a slightly different manner and makeup than my MP.  I want to vote for my Senator(s) rather than having them appointed - this way, if there is a problem with the Senate, than we have only ourselves to blame....
 
My personal feeling on the Head of State is that no matter who it is they should be apolitical. they should not have or have had any formal affiliation to a political party or be an outspoken idealogue for any party.
 
I believe, I'm pretty sure and I'm repeating myself â “ but no apologies, that a federal state needs a bicameral national legislature:

1. One chamber must represent the people in (roughly) equal number â “ a major flaw in the Canadian system which allows a PEI vote to count for four or five times a Toronto vote; and

2. The other must represent the partners in the federation: the provinces.

That's why I, too, favour electing the Senate from the provinces.  I believe that Senators should be elected at every provincial general election â “ by some system which reflects the will of the people â “ i.e. for Ontario, right now, the Liberals would have 12 senators (46+% of the votes in the 2003 general election), the Tories would have 8 (34+%) and the NDP would have 4 (14+%) and Nova Scotia would have 4 Tories (36+% of the popular vote in the last general election), 3 Liberals (31%) and 3 NDP senators (also 31%).

I have explained elsewhere how to start the process of legitimizing the Senate by persuading (shaming) senators into resigning and then appointing only senators elected (who, also, submit resignations before being appointed).  It would take a while but it took our US neighbours several years to get from the first generally elected senators (1904) to the 17th Amendment (1914).

I would prefer an equal senate but that is too difficult, now, and the whole thing need not come at once; an elected Senate will become 'effective' (legitimate) and equality can follow â “ as it often does.

The idea of electing a head of state â “ say every six or seven years â “ by the Senate, maybe even from the ranks of Senators, has some appeal â “ if the GG then, immediately resigns her (maybe his) Senate seat and moves over to Rideau Hall.  Perhaps the Senate could both nominate (from their own list of distinguished Canadians) and elect the GG every few years.

----------

P.S. Don't forget that I do not want Charles to become King of Canada so I want the GG to become a regent â “ standing in  for an unselected monarch.
 
Edward Campbell said:
P.S. Don't forget that I do not want Charles to become King of Canada so I want the GG to become a regent â “ standing in  for an unselected monarch.
I think there would have to be a lot more changes than just that to attain your goal.
 
Infanteer said:
A Lower House that is responsible to represent constituencies of equal amounts of citizens (yes, this means that PEI loses some seats).   This will probably be very similar to the current layout - the Lower House forms Cabinet and the Prime Minister is the head of government.  
This single member constituency could also be selected based on a transferable vote.  The lowest candidates would be dropped one at a time and their ballots transfered based on the voters' ordered preference.  The winning candidate would be the one that earned the higher preference of the majority of the voters.
 
Since there's an election going on, I thought it might be appropriate to put forward my idea for an elected senate. I think it would be an excellent step in the reforming of our government structure, which seems to be driving more and more folks bonkers (the west wants in, etc.) However, I also believe it could help in inter-government relations, in addition to national unity.

I believe that the House of Commons, in itself, does what it is supposed to do, in terms of representation. Everyone's vote is worth the same. But since their is so much talk of under representation to the regions of the country with less people, a triple E senate, I believe, would cure a number of problems of national unity. My model, though not quite triple E, would also provide the provinces with more power at a federal level, so, hopefully, this would bring about the killing of two birds, while also acting as a balance to the power of the reigning party.

Here's how it goes:

Elected body:
- Every province elects 8 senators, representing an equal geographic area. This will result in 80 senators.
- Every territory elects a senator, representing the whole territory. This will result in 3 senators, and 83 in total.

Non-elected body:
- Every provincial and territorial government dispatches a deputy to sit in the senate, to represent and promote the will of their respective governments. This will result in 13 senators, and 96 in total.
- Each party represented in the House of Commons dispatches one deputy to sit in the senate, to promote the will of their party. Under the last government, this would result in 4 senators, bringing the grand total to 100 senators.

Notes:
- All elected senators are independent candidates. The original senators were ment to provide a sober second thought, and being free from party lines will better allow that.
- Senators will be elected through first past the post. Given how they are independent, proportional balloting I don't see how it would work.
- If the senate did have a party system and proportional representation, would it not be just a more or less carbon copy of the house?

That's the base of it; it still needs to be fleshed out, but that's my idea. What do you think?
 
Zartan said:
I believe that the House of Commons, in itself, does what it is supposed to do, in terms of representation.

The House of Commons is inadequate because it is a single house that has centralized all of Parliaments power into a single body.  It is impossible for this single body to serve as a universal outlet for the democratic will of the Canadian people.

- Every province elects 8 senators, representing an equal geographic area. This will result in 80 senators.

The number is debatable - I've thought 6 would be a good number for each Province.  An interesting side proposal would be to divide the Senators up within each province as well to help split coverage and accountability up (for example, in BC have 3 Senators for Central/Northern BC and 3 Senators for Greater Vancouver and the Island).

Every territory elects a senator, representing the whole territory. This will result in 3 senators, and 83 in total.

I'm not too sure if you want to have a wide disparity between senators in Provinces and Territories - this defeats the regional nature of the Upper House.  Sure, Territories will get less based upon their separate status, but not much.  6 per Province and 2 per Territory - thus 6 Senators would represent a "Northern Province" in a Senate of 66.

Every provincial and territorial government dispatches a deputy to sit in the senate, to represent and promote the will of their respective governments. This will result in 13 senators, and 96 in total.

Why should provincial/territorial governments get a seat?  I disagree with this idea; there is no need to allow Provinces to get their hand in federal legislation - infact, I'd argue that this is an unconstitutional reach of provincial politicians into Federal jurisdiction.

Each party represented in the House of Commons dispatches one deputy to sit in the senate, to promote the will of their party. Under the last government, this would result in 4 senators, bringing the grand total to 100 senators.

The Green Party runs candidates in every riding - why should they not get a seat under this proposal?  Conversely, the Bloq is highly concentrated, only really representing a certain percentage of Quebec-based voters, so why should they get one under this proposal at all?  What (or whom) decides if political parties get a seat in a Legislative house based upon the sole fact that they are a Party?

I disagree with this idea as well - political parties are not Constitutionally recognized constituencies and there is no reason to empower them as such.  As Brad Sallows pointed out earlier:

Brad Sallows said:
As has been pointed out on several political blogs, the whole "party representation" issue is a red herring.  Political parties don't really have any particular constitutional standing.  Parliament is composed of riding representatives who are directly chosen by riding electors (voters).  Party affiliations are an afterthought which helps to simplify governance (ie. figuring out which clique can control Parliament or the balance of power in Parliament), and there are some institutional characteristics that have been grafted on over the years (eg. funding based on party status).

All elected senators are independent candidates. The original senators were ment to provide a sober second thought, and being free from party lines will better allow that.

No point trying to do this - Senators are going to be Legislators, so they should be able to run on platforms that highlight their platforms.

Senators will be elected through first past the post. Given how they are independent, proportional balloting I don't see how it would work.  If the senate did have a party system and proportional representation, would it not be just a more or less carbon copy of the house?

I think the STV model works best for the Senate, with each province (or half province) being considered a Multi-member constituency.  I believe in Senate reform as necessary for fixing the democratic deficit in Canada, but we don't really need to rewrite the playbook for this; the Australian Senate serves as an excellent model for a functioning regional-based Upper House:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Senate

But the proportional election system within each state ensures that Senate incorporates much more political diversity than the lower house, which is basically a two party body. Consequently, the Senate frequently functions as a house of review, intended not to match party political strength in the lower chamber but to bring in different people, in terms of geography, age and interests, who can contribute in a less politicised manner to the process of legislative enactment.
 
Furthermore, the Senate and the House of Commons are only two of three parts of the Parliamentary equation, and I believe that reform of the third body is essential as well.

The failing of our Constitutional order is that it allows unwritten convention to overtake the written "rules of the game" leading to unintended consequences.   I'm all for changing the rules of the game, but let's be upfront and clearly show how they work; if anything to avoid a reply of the "Confidence" vote/no-vote we saw in the spring.

One of the "unintended consequences" I believe has occurred is the shape of our political landscape today.   Our Westminster tradition (which has its strengths and is a tradition we should be duly proud of) is underscored by the principle of the Supremacy of Parliament.   Forget the fact that federalism in Canada has underscored this (a contradictory and yet necessary function), the heart of our national government is in Parliament.

Constitutionally, Parliament is defined as the following in the BNA Act:

17. There shall be One Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, an Upper House styled the Senate, and the House of Commons.

Thus, Sovereignty is a three part deal in Canada.   Unfortunately, unintended consequences have evolved Parliament from the "Sovereignty of Parliament" into the "Tyranny of the Commons" (clearly described in Simpson's The Friendly Dictatorship).   This "friendly tyranny" has managed to usurp the rudder of Canada by ensuring that power is concentrated two-fold; power that rightly is shared amongst Parliament is wielded by Commons and all this power centralized into a winner-takes-all party system that has the Party leader at the Apex of the structure.   The true sovereign voice of the people, the vox populi, is ignored as party machinery finds a clever way to rule through unintended concentration of power that is unprecedented in the Western Democracies.

I believe the general solution to be Checks and Balances.   Critics will deride the system of checks and balances of as "American" - but they are not; they've existed before.   One only has to view the structure of the Greek polis or of the Roman Res Publica to see checks and balances at work.   I'd argue that checks and balances aren't even "Republican" in nature - Westminster Parliamentary government is built on the foundational check and balance of the Magna Carta.   English (later British) rule has always been a battle of checks and balances - when the system was usurped, civil war rang out with a tyranny of the monarch (Charles I) and a Tyranny of the Commons (Cromwell).   Obviously, the balanced middle ground is the desired endstate.

Checks and balances can be, in my opinion, reinvigorated in Canada by simply reinstituting the Constitutional imperative that Parliament be composed of the Queen, the Senate, and the House of Commons.   I've tried to rationalize a way to do so with as little change to our Constitutional structure as possible.

The Governor-General is the ideal office for true executive head of the State (whether she be the Queen's representative or not is another debate irrelevant to this discussion   ;)).   My reading of the Constitution (more specifically, the BNA Act) leads me to find   main duties for our Governor General:
  • Heads the Queen's Privy Council for Canada (Section 11)
  • Appointment (which includes, but shouldn't, Senators) (Section 14)
  • Command of Armed Forces (Section 15)
  • Reservation - a fancy word for Veto (Sections 54, 55, 56, 57)
Unfortunately, unintended consequences have seen these duties fall by the wayside or be given to the Prime Minister (who isn't even mentioned in the BNA Act) in the name of "ceremonial".

Regardless, I think these 4 powers are excellent in defining the scope that a modern, real Governor General should have.

The Privy Council:   An odd organization that could be useful if modernized.   The PC is essentially the "Executive Council" for government.   It includes the GG, Cabinet (current and former), Chief Justices, and a variety of other characters who are accorded a spot for either pressing or honorary reasons.   The Queen's Privy Council for Canada should essentially be restructured as the "Cabinet".   It should contain the GG, the PMO, Ministers, and other important advisers and heads of agencies (for example, something akin to the US National Security Council, the Bank of Canada, etc, etc).   A more detailed discussion would be required to ascertain the role of a GG in this body (is it to retain a reserved, observer status?   Active member?) but it should be an organization that actively meets in whole or in part to govern Canada, and the GG should be part of this regular meeting (as the Constitution intended).

Appointment:   This is an important power - one that can help to eliminate cronyism and patronage if stripped away from the Prime Minister and his party hacks.   Make the power of appointment similar to that of the US, where the GG selects the person and the Senate approves of the selection to ensure a democratic "check and balance" is maintained.

Command of the Armed Forces:   This is a seemingly minor one, but I think it is very important.   The CDS is, alone among senior government officials, guaranteed by law direct access to the Governor General.   This relationship highlights the fact that deployments and missions are enacted by Parliament and executed by the GG - legislation sending the Forces away involves a final nod from the GG to the CDS (who, by law, is the only one allowed to give orders to the CF).   As head of our Armed Forces, the GG is responsible for ensuring that our military doesn't unduly suffer from negligent politicians (through reservation).

Reservation:   The equivalence to the American President's veto - and an essential power I think needs to be brought back.   The veto allows the GG to put a check on run-away houses, especially Commons which is the only legal source of Money Bills.   Reservation is, like the President's veto, a serious issue.   Again, like the US, the allowance of an override through a 2/3 majority vote in both houses should be included to ensure democratic imperative and act as a further check and balance.

Four key powers for our Head of State - four that are good at balancing out the relationships within Parliament (as constituted by Law) and yet unobtrusive to the daily running of the State.   Obviously, popular vote is required to give these powers the moral force of the vox populi.   With that in mind, I advocate the following:

1)   The Governor General be elected by a simple popular majority (no fancy electoral systems).   If a primary vote doesn't yield a winner, take the top two into a run-off.

2)   The Governor General be a long-term post, perhaps 8 or 10 years with no ability for re-election.   This measure will ensure that the position has, as the executive head of state, a real enduring quality (much like our Monarchy) and that the politics of re-election don't interfere with the ability to perform the duties.

3)   That the Governor General be that of an "Elder Statesman".   More of a representative (to foreign governments) and an observer.   The GG won't have legislative power and can't propose Bills.   As well, depending on how Cabinet-Privy Council would be structured, I'm not sure they should interfere too much in the running of the State (if Cabinet votes are required they have one vote) - they should attend to be aware of what is happening in Canada (especially for National Security and what not) so as to have an understanding of policies that they must give Royal Assent to.

4)   The Governor General's appointment powers need to be examined.   Judges, ambassadors, heads of Crown Corporations are given.   What about Cabinet members?   In the US, Secretaries are appointed by the President and serve at his pleasure, would the same work for Canada.   Unlike the US, which constitutionally forbids legislators from holding executive posts, our Westminster system conventionally gives Cabinet ministries to MP's.   In Canada, they all come from Commons, but there is nothing in law that says that Ministers can't come from the Senate or be private citizens.   As well, members of the Privy Council have a term that is defined as "time to time", which implies that they serve at the Governor General's pleasure - this means that if voted out they can still legally serve in Cabinet.   Conversely, if busy as an executive, are not these MP's and Senators neglecting their important jobs as representatives in the Legislature?   All these are valid points and, in the spirit of the best person for the job (as opposed to Art Eggleton), need to be considered in detail when addressing the scope of the GG's power of appointment.

5)   Perhaps the GG should be recallable?   Maybe by a 4/5's majority by both Houses?   Definitely an Impeachment clause.

Thus, a popularly elected GG serving as an effective Head of State acts as the third "check" in Parliament.

Commons loses power in this (along with a Triple-E Senate) structure, but it still maintains it's primacy by being the only body that can propose Money Bills.   This is good, although maybe it should now be given to all of Commons and not just to Cabinet members in order to encourage more debate and individual action on the Commons floor.    The Prime Minister should be a position that is Constitutionally enshrined as the Head of Government - I believe that there is still many important things for the Prime Minister to do along the lines of the day-to-day affairs of the State.   In defining the PMO, his duties should be outlined.   I think Commons should be mandated to votes every 4 years.   As well, I think we should lose the convention of Commons as a House of confidence in order to allow more free voting and dissention on the floor.   Remember that Edmund Burke quote, we have to work at eliminating factionalism and encouraging work towards the interest of Canada as a whole.

Anyways, just more thoughts for the grist mill.
 
Quote
Every provincial and territorial government dispatches a deputy to sit in the senate, to represent and promote the will of their respective governments. This will result in 13 senators, and 96 in total.

Why should provincial/territorial governments get a seat?  I disagree with this idea; there is no need to allow Provinces to get their hand in federal legislation - infact, I'd argue that this is an unconstitutional reach of provincial politicians into Federal jurisdiction.

Now Infanteer, I thought you and I just discussed this recently and I agreed with me that you were wrong. ;D

Ottawa was originally hand-servant to the "independent" colonies.  The Senate was to represent their interests in Parliament and federal legislation.  Otherwise why would the seats have been apportioned geographically in the first place.

 
Kirkhill said:
Now Infanteer, I thought you and I just discussed this recently and I agreed with me that you were wrong. ;D

Ottawa was originally hand-servant to the "independent" colonies.

It's my Republican "more perfect union" thing.  Ottawa was not (and shouldn't be) a hand-servant - Canadian politicians specifically tried to avoid this in 1867 while looking at what had just went on down South over the same issue. 

The Senate was to represent their interests in Parliament and federal legislation.  Otherwise why would the seats have been apportioned geographically in the first place.

The Senate has never worked this way - look how it is constructed; seats are apportioned by "Region" and not "Province".
 
Infanteer said:
The Governor General [should] be elected by a simple popular majority (no fancy electoral systems).  If a primary vote doesn't yield a winner, take the top two into a run-off.
That is awfully expensive when a preferential ballot could allow an "automatic" run-off with out the cost of reopening the polls, continued campaings, delays in taking office, etc.
 
MCG said:
That is awfully expensive when a preferential ballot could allow an "automatic" run-off with out the cost of reopening the polls, continued campaings, delays in taking office, etc.

I have no qualms against spending money to get things done right - if Canada is willing to bear the burden of funding parties, ensuring bilingualism, paying for ceremonial guards, running elections more frequently for minority governments, and a host of other things that keep democracy ticking then there is no problem with organizing a second run-off election if necessary.   The cost of an election is a drop in the bucket compared to a host of other things in which we could cut if we were worried about money.

A preferential ballot is not the panacea that many make it out to be.   It can be used effectively in multi-member ridings to give a more proportional balance to the election, but it only seems to complicate a straight-forward election of a single candidate to represent a single constituency (Canada).   A majority vote will ensure that no controversy arises in an election of more than one candidate and creates a clear-cut, legitimate successor to the office.
 
"panacea"
hey I got your big word right here:
thesaurus
your becoming more of an officer everyday
pardon me its the sleep deprivation talking
 
The major issue I have with our electoral system, is that many formerly-rural ridings have since been conjoined with urban centres, and now no matter how many of the rural residents vote, they are always vastly outnumbered but the urban voters. I know my old riding was staunchly conservative until it was almalgamated with the urban centre of Cornwall..... ever since, the MP has been elected within the city, and the voters from the farms, and rural areas as far away as a 45 minute drive are no longer represented, or campaigned to.

Since 60% of the Canadian population lives in an urban centre, rural voters are essentially irrelevant now.... which is stupid.
 
Just getting back to Infanteer's concern about the provinces interfering in "federal" jurisdiction

Section 22 - the 1867 Constitution Act

22. In relation to the Constitution of the Senate Canada shall be deemed to consist of Four Divisions:--

1. Ontario;
2. Quebec;

3. The Maritime Provinces, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island;

4. The Western Provinces of Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta;

which Four Divisions shall (subject to the Provisions of this Act) be equally represented in the Senate as follows: Ontario by twenty-four senators; Quebec by twenty-four senators; the Maritime Provinces and Prince Edward Island by twenty-four senators, ten thereof representing Nova Scotia, ten thereof representing New Brunswick, and four thereof representing Prince Edward Island; the Western Provinces by twenty-four senators, six thereof representing Manitoba, six thereof representing British Columbia, six thereof representing Saskatchewan, and six thereof representing Alberta; Newfoundland shall be entitled to be represented in the Senate by six members; the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories shall be entitled to be represented in the Senate by one member each.

In the case of Quebec each of the Twenty-four Senators representing that Province shall be appointed for One of the Twenty-four Electoral Divisions of Lower Canada specified in Schedule A. to Chapter One of the Consolidated Statutes of Canada.(12)

Pretty clear to me that the Senators REPRESENT the provinces.  Section 23 on qualifications say they must reside in the province they represent.  Ergo it seems to me that the provinces have always been intended to have a voice in the central government's legislation.

They were appointed - but not necessarily on the advice of the prime minister alone. The GG could act alone, on the advice of the Privy Council, on the advice of the Commons (not the PM - no mention of a PM at all) or could accept advice from the provincial legislatures for whom and to whom the GG was responsible via his deputies, the Lieutenants-Governor.
 
Kirkhill said:
Pretty clear to me that the Senators REPRESENT the provinces.  Section 23 on qualifications say they must reside in the province they represent.  Ergo it seems to me that the provinces have always been intended to have a voice in the central government's legislation.

They represent the provinces, not the provincial governments.  The difference is crucial; one between interstate federalism (provincial government representation in Parliament) and intrastate federalism (bringing regionalism within the central institutions).  I fully believe in a provincial voice in federal affairs (intrastate federalism); I argue that the current method of dividing seats up into "regions" is unfair, hence my support for a Triple-E Senate.
 
So you would have two provincial voices with the ear of the executive?  You would have both the provincial governments, speaking on behalf of their legislatures and presumably the citizenry as well as the Senate, independently found from the provinces (appointment or election) and thus also speaking for the provinces but independently of the provinicial governments, offering advice and opinion to the executive, the Governor General?  You would then only have the PM acting with the support of the Commons offering "federal" advice?

Remember that the rules say the GG decides - and I think we both think that is a good thing - the only problem has been the usurpation of the GG's power by the PMO by declaring that the GG is an illegitimate figurehead imposed by a foreign ruler.

If the GG were "re-legitimised" by whatever method, and able to act independently with the advice and consent not just of the PMO but also the Privy Council (apolitical expertise selected personally by the GG but with no legislative power), the Senate (provincial ambassadors offering advice and consent on Commons legislation), the Commons (the nation at large and law makers in central jurisdiction) AND the provincial legislatures (directly or indirectly via the Senate) then many of our checks and balances would fall back into place.
 
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