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Four horses drive American policy

a_majoor

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Not the four horsemen of the Apocalypse (despite the shrill protests from the left) but rather four schools of thought which underly American politics and culture: Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, Hamiltonian and Wilsonian, named after the Presidents who articulated these policies and ideas and put them into action.

This article speaks about the relatively lesser known and apprieciated "Jacksonian" school; it is less of a policy and more of a cultural expression of the collective "who we are" of the United States. The Jacksonians are described in detail in this article, suffice to say there is a boiling undercurrent in the body politic which is essentially saying "we are in this war now, so lets prosecute it to the fullest extent and win the damn thing". Further provocations by Iran, North Korea or the Al Qaeda might have the opposite of the intended effect, rather than dishearten the American People they may be provoked into unleashing the "terrible swift sword".
 
Wow! there's a loaded one.....

I'll have to read that article again - to see if I understand it.

It's a little hard from a British-Canadian perspective to know how I would
label my values relative to this article. Sort of Jacksonian - Sortta not.

Further provocations by Iran, North Korea or the Al Qaeda might have the opposite of the intended effect, rather than dishearten the American People they
may be provoked into unleashing the "terrible swift sword".

You don't have to be a "Jacksonian" to this coming.

On the day of 9-11 - I knew someone was going to get it.

 
The 1999 National Interest article became a 2001 book, "Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World". It is well worth the read for those wishing to understand the several competing streams in policy formulation.

It is important remember that policy is rather like a bridge game: it is rare, very rare, that one player holds all the cards in one suit. Mostly the current administration has one strong suit and several weak ones; I would argue that President Bush, for example, is holding five or six Jacksonian cards, three or four of them "winners." That's enough to control the game for a bit but, most likely, insufficient to win the game and the rubber. The (isolationist) Jeffersonians are still strong, ditto the (hard headed, even money grubbing) Hamiltonians and the (idealistic, moralizing) Wilsonians.

There is, I think, a strong trend towards a mix of Jeffersonianism and Hamiltonianism afoot in America as the 2008 election looms. There is a kind of greedy, grubby populism loose in the land which plays upon Americans' traditional and deep rooted isolationism. The idea of an engaged, active America working 'in the world' with the view that America's interests and those of the world are coincident is recent: say, 1945 to 1995. I think it is the 'right' idea but I think it has lost its lustre.
 
greedy, grubby populism

I dont agree with that characterization at all,although that might be the view of our elitist socialist democrats. What is really going on in the US is a struggle between two very different idiologies - socialism/communism vs conservative values. Has anyone ever wonder where the worlds communists went ? They became socialists as that ideology doesnt bear the stigma of communism. Communism is a failed economic model as is socialism. Look at the socialist economies of europe to gauge their success as opposed to the US economic model.

America's socialists are trying to destroy america's traditional values and replace them with multiculturalism.Gay marriage,abortion on demand and wide open borders are just a few controversial topics.The socialists have taken over America's universities and public school systems. Many school systems are disfunctional because socialists just cant seem to run anything. Their solution to problems is money and more money.They think that most Americans dont pay enough in taxes.Big brother will take care of you from cradle to the grave and its all free. Of course most of us know there are no free lunches.
Someone has to pay for the freebies if not in personal taxes but maybe sales taxes.

The socialist view of the world is more in convergence with the enemies of freedom/democracy than with its defenders.They feel that if the enemy can be bought off or ignored. The socialist doesnt want to fight for any reason. Those who speak out against the socialist view are racists, hicks and uneducated because they are the smartest people and those of us in flyover country just are not able to make our own decisions.

Right now the socialists in America are at the tipping point. America decided to give them a shot at governing in 06 and so far the experiment has been a failure.Congress has a lower approval rating than Bush something around 11%. They would rather punish and harass the administration rather than work for the common good. In 08 the democrats may lose ground in their effort to take control of the government.I certainly hope so for the good of the country.
 
Readers here should pay more attention to how tomahawk6 describes the struggle in America than they do to how I, or others, describe it. In the end American policy will be made by Americans, elected by, beholden to and reflecting the values of one or the other wing of American politics: the conservatives or the supporters of socialism/communism as t6 would have it or, perhaps, the secular-liberals and the religious zealots, as the other half might describe themselves and their opponents.

Whenever one attempts to analyze the motives of nations one must do so from the perspective of that nation and its people and their perceptions of their own vital interests. Thus: no one in China cares a tinker's dam about what a hundred millions Americans think about China. They care about America only with regard to how it might react to China's actions or how it might act towards China in support of its own perceived vital interests. Ditto the European Union, Russia, the Arab League, India and so on.

(Parenthetically: Canada might be an exception. We live so close to the US and our economy is so dependent on (more than just tied to) the US economy that we may need to try and put ourselves (our analytical selves) into America's skin before we take actions of our own. Back in 1947 (then foreign minister) Louis St. Laurent defined the limits of middle (secondary) powers: ” We have, of course, been forced to keep in mind the limitations upon the influence of any secondary power. No society of nations can prosper if it does not have the support of those who hold the major share of the world's military and economic power. There is little point in a country of our stature recommending international action, if those who must carry the major burden of whatever action is taken are not in sympathy.”)

So, by all means, see America through American eyes but remember that t6 has only one pair. The polling I have seen indicates, to me, that America is still fairly evenly divided between people who share or have some sympathy for t6’s view and those who hold or have some sympathy for polar opposite views. There is, I think, a roughly equal group in the middle – one which shifts it vote between Republican and Democrats or, in recent years, sits on its hands because neither the Bush Republicans nor the Clinton Democrats are attractive options.

For myself, I continue to describe the ”mix of Jeffersonianism and Hamiltonianism afoot in America” as  ”a kind of greedy, grubby populism”. My own, personal, shorthand descriptor is ”Lou Dobb’s America” – not because Mr. Dobbs is the best or worst of its advocates but because he has made his journalistic self part of the story and has, effectively, used the power of TV to propagate his protectionist, isolationist message. But, Lou Dobb’s America is not the American majority; it may not even be the largest of the sundry American minorities. Remember that 59 million Americans voted for John Kerry in 2004 (62 million voted for Bush – that's a 3% difference) and, in 2006, in the midterm elections, 42 million Americans voted Democrat against only 35.7 million who voted Republican. America does not have one voice; it is a chorus.


 
Very well said Edward !!

America does not have one voice; it is a chorus.

But I think the word cacophony may be more apt.  ;D
 
Some more about "Conservatism" by Jerry Pournelle

http://www.jerrypournelle.com/view/view484.html

Tuesday, September 18, 2007 

I have done both the mailbag and the column and they await formatting and posting by the managing editor.

The Gods of the Copybook Headings

It is probably time to remind you of The Gods of the Copybook Headings, and The Old Issue. These are both important to keep in mind when considering today's headlines.

I bring this up because I am in a small debate in another conference on just what a Conservative is. If you take a poll on the subject you will get one answer, because the neo-cons have stolen our label but left behind most of our principles. No real Conservative could possibly have endorsed the crazy spending spree of the Bush Administration. I will leave endorsement of the War for another time; suffice it to say that Buckley endorsed the invasion of Iraq, although doing so violated nearly every Conservative principle.

And that, I would say, is key to defining Conservatism and Conservatives. Conservatives, the real thing, have principles and insist that those who govern in their name do so from those principles; not from expediency, not in response to the whims of the moment and temporary majorities, but from real principles.

That almost inevitably condemns Conservatives to an advisory rather than a governing role, particularly in a nation in transition from Republic to Democracy (which will inevitably lead to Imperialism). Conservatives will insist that not all things are possible, that not all government actions will do good, that "Big Government Conservatism" is a contradiction in terms, and that foreign policy ought to serve our national interests, not send out our blood and treasure to Do Good in Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East.

When Buckley founded National Review he said the purpose was to stand in the way of history and shout "Stop!". For a long while NR did that -- and by doing it, kept the debate alive, and made it possible to slow some of the headlong rush to disaster. But note that National Review couldn't stop The Great Society, which finally did in the black American family (slavery couldn't do that; Reconstruction couldn't; Jim Crow and legal segregation couldn't destroy the black family). And eventually National Review ran the articles by the egregious Frum denouncing as no longer conservative anyone who opposed the Iraq invasion.

It's an important debate: should the neo-cons, most of them with Trotskyite origins and residual beliefs in the power of big government do Do Good, be entitled to the honorable designation of Conservative?  Real conservatism became a movement in America when Russell Kirk put together the philosophical foundations, a set of self-consistent principles derived from both Edmund Burke and the American Framers of the Constitution. Conservative scholars read Kirk and Burke, but also The Federalist Papers, and George Washington's early speeches, the letters of John Adams. We don't expect all conservative followers to read this stuff; but we do expect our leaders to be familiar with our origins.

At least I think I can make that case. I do not see how an administration that spent money like drunken sailors, engineered entangling alliances, and got us involved in the territorial disputes of Europe and the Middle East can be said to have paid much attention to the principles of American Conservatism.

So let me repeat:

It is probably time to remind you of The Gods of the Copybook Headings, and The Old Issue. These are both important to keep in mind when considering today's headlines.

You may hear the poem read to you at http://www.olimu.com/Readings/GodsOfTheCopybookHeadings.htm  The reading is excellent; the commentary is typical modern academia. No matter. The poem is what counts.
[\quote]
 
Just four days before President McKinley was assasinated Vice President Teddy Roosevelt gave a speech about his vision for America past and the future. The Speech on Americanism at Minneapolis Minnesota is stunning in what it reveals about the cultural differences between today and that time and the course of the USA in the world as envisioned by the man who would be president just two months later.

http://jonesmansion.com/history/speechon.htm

While you are refering to the four horesmen, you might have missed a fifth... Teddy had some interesting views.

 
Some things in the article struck me as odd.  Calling New Orleans the most important battle between Trafalgar and Stalingrad is a bit of a stretch in my view.  It does have a heck of song though.  It was strange to see a wizard of the Klan quoted, but that may be my Ontario sensitivities kicking in.  The parallels between frontier America and inner-city gangs were also, perhaps, a bit of a reach.  While the US was certainly able to level cities from the air they were not alone in that capacity.  In addition, other nations tried to level whole cities from the air.

Talk of 19th century Jacksonian freedom and equal rights and how that squared with slavery and racism gets "book laws don't count for much in the teeth of popular feelings."  There is the interesting line that credits Jacksonians for the civil rights movement.  Perhaps that can be established, but I found the next line very interesting "they (the civil rights movement) scrupulously avoided the violent tactics that would have triggered an unstoppable Jacksonian response."  Zoiks.  His mention of "unpopular minorities" would raise eyebrows in those who worry about the tyranny of the majority.  The latter concept gets rough treatment at the hands of the Jacksonians in the essay. 

These Jacksonians sound pretty tough.  I bet they could beat the 300!  The Jacksonians probably invented the Internet as well.

Still, I can't argue with the foreign policy view.  I don't think that much useful political thought regarding international politics has been written since Leviathan.  Foreign aid to make us feel good drives me crazy.  Wars should be principled but they should also aim to meet some vital national interest.
 
I agree that national interest needs to drive foreign policy. In the 20th century to date US national interest seems to be involved with defeating ideologies that threaten the freedom of the US and its trading partners. The US can defend its territory but an island of freedom/democracy in a sea of totalitarianism and I dont think the country to survive that scenario.
 
T2B : Please define 'National Interest' for me. When I look at Japan, the biggest giver of foreign aid on the planet, I see this aid as the biggest tool in the Japanese foreign policy toolbox. This money isn't given away only on the basis of making people feel good, and not even on the basis of spreading liberal (free trade, democracy, freedom, ...) values troughout the world but to open up foreign markets to the giver's products.

As I recall, Hobbes doesn't say much about foreign relations in Leviathan. Even his theoretical anarchy can't be directly translated on the International System (for example, one of the basis of his anarchy is that every human being can kill every other human being regardless of his strength. If you applied that directly to international relations, the component of Power wouldn't be of any interest as Luxembourg could "kill" the US...)

Just some random thoughts...
 
nil,

At the risk of giving a self-referencing definition, national interest would relate to an aspect of vital importance to the nation.  A clear example would be security.  Another could be trade or a vital natural resource.

In the case of Japan they have certain restrictions on their activities abroad.  As such, one would not be surprised to see foreign aid as their primary foreign policy instrument.  I don't see the Japanese example as contrary to my opinion if they are using foreign aid as a genuine foreign policy tool.  Similarly, for Canada to send aid to Afghanistan serves a vital national interest.  Beyond that, in my opinion, it gets weaker.  At the risk of quoting myself, I wrote "Foreign aid to make us feel good drives me crazy."   I didn't say that "Foreign aid drives me crazy."  You could sub-in "Foreign interventions to make us feel good drive me crazy" as well.  When a national interest is not a stake things tend to come apart when problems arise.  If it is an operation in the national interest we can, on the other hand, stick it out through problems.

Turning to Hobbes and Leviathan, his description of the state of affairs without a higher authority seems to translate into foreign affairs (nasty, brutish and short).  He was making a construct to get to his point about a nation and the coming together of self-interested individuals who submit themselves to a higher authority to prevent destructive anarchy, but I see the first part of the model as valid for the international field.  In the international field I don't think that the second part has ever happened (coming together under a common authority).  We have trappings in international bodies and international courts, but time and time again we see that in the end nations will do what nations think they must do.  If they submit it is to another nation or a coalition of nations.  I don't see the underlying consensus coming together to have a real world authority.  I am not comfortable with the thought of some guy in Europe, Africa or Asia passing laws that regulate my life here.  I'm OK with my fellow Canadians doing that because we have a baseline of culture, history and experience. 

I chuckle when I read of people talking about "illegal wars" or "international law."  I see the international stage as being in Hobbes' description of the "natural order."  Nations cannot look to a real higher authority to come and sort their problems out.  Perhaps I was hasty to omit one other thinker after Hobbes who might apply.  Tennyson's "Red in tooth and claw" from 1842 seems to work sometimes as well.  When push comes to shove you can wave your model UN charter around, but it will come down to what you are prepared to do and what your friends are prepared to do to help you. 

The idea of anarchy does, in my view, translate to international affairs.  The ability of Luxembourg or the Duchy of Grand Fenwick to "kill" the United States as compared to the individual people in Hobbes' natural state is a distinction but I don't think that matters all that much.  Nations in the world live as sovereign equals and they cannot look to a real higher authority to sort things out.  Some have tried to erode national sovereignty for a variety of reasons but recent events would indicate that the concept is still alive. 

The power of a nation is limited, and we don't see general war an anarchy.  They have to come together and work in self-interested cooperation.  The various states do regulate their behaviour in relation to each other, but in the end they have to look to their own means.  As national power is finite, it should be expended in pursuit of a national interest and not just to feel good.  Which brings us back to the beginning.

Cheers
 
    T2B, the higher power is in part a normative one. You say the international system is inherently anarchic and Hobbesian, you then say that there is no higher power and authority which nation-states bend too within that anarchic system. In practice one sees all sorts of cooperation, negotiation and deal making, far more than war making, without any higher authority. Not only that, but nations willingly and without compulsion impose limits on their own behavior, whether it be agreements like NAFTA or WTO protocols or banning land mines use.  Just because there is no ultimate authority does not mean the system is without structure. There are huge amounts of structure internationally, it is true some may not function at times and may buckle and fail under certain pressures, but that does not mean that they are not there. Also, the root of all of Hobbes' arguments are pinned on his analysis of the nature of mankind; man has a 'Hobbesian' streak in him, but his fundamental analysis of human nature has been pretty much abandoned by most for good reason.

P.S. There have been a number of developments on international relations since Leviathan, some worth reading even, and some, as you say, not so much.
 
The landmine ban is a classic example of doing something to feel good.  They are banned, but they are still used.  Other weapons have been banned as well and not used in any great way, but that use has been restricted, I would argue, out of fear of reprisal in kind and not the punishment that would come from violating the ban.

I would argue that what you call normative higher power is only those limits and compromises that countries will accept or are willing and able to make other accept.  How do those structures hold up when push comes to shove?  To whom did the Tutsi's in Rwanda turn for salvation?  A neighbour in society can utlimately count on the law coming in to resolve a conflict with his neighbour.  In the world there are no police but rather your own means and allies/coalitions that may or may not intervene.  I would argue that they should intervene when it matters to them out of national interest (self-interest).  The results might get dressed up in law after the fact but that doesn't change anything. 

My schooling is now fifteen years back in the mists of time, but I seem to recall that Machiavelli and Hobbes resonated with me.  The rest of the stuff struck me as wishful thinking or pretty little sand castles (hmm Locke was alright).  I trust mankind to do what mankind thinks he must do and what he thinks he can get away with.  Morality does, of course, moderate behaviour, but even that can give way in good men.  My International Conflict Management courses were what really cemented it for me.  They didn't like it when my first question was "What ever happened to winning a conflict?" .

Hey, I think that the UN is a great idea.  Having a place where the international community can talk and discourse is important.  I just wouldn't want to count on it to protect my family. 
 
I'm just obsessed with Hobbes right now, particularly regarding the arguments based on his work to justify the realist theory in international relations (University can drive you nuts sometimes). I have no problem with your liking of the classical realist theory (it is after all the most simple, elegant and durable theory out there). It's because I like the Hobbesian state of nature so much and some of it's philosophical consequences that I tend to react when I read about Hobbes.

The national interest concept is one of the most contested concept out there tough. (here's my original take on this debate...) If you think of it in an Hobbesian way, there is a 'supreme bad' or summum malum for the individual which is it's own death and no 'supreme good' or summum bonum universally recognized. Of course you could say happiness would be the supreme good of man, but happiness cannot be defined because everyone gets happy for different reasons. In fact, since the death is man absolute fear, it also becomes his absolute motivation in life, such absolutes leave no room for any summum bonum. In the same regard, if the 'death' of a State is its summum malum, its summum bonum would be the national interest which like happiness cannot be defined precisely because it changes in time and from state to state etc. Was it it in the national interest of the US to go fight in Vietnam, some say yes, some say no... Did they send their troops there thinking it would help the survival of the US? Most probably.

As for feel good aid, I'm with you on this. At least half of the planet needs to be helped in some ways, might as well give to those parts of the world that  both needs it and will reward us with advantages. Pure rationality.

I hope Its not too confused, I've been losing my English skills lately...
 
I would say that generally man avoids the worst outcome as he perceives it, and I think that this is what Hobbes was driving at (as were the Game Theory folks four hundred years later).  People arm themselves and barricade the door, or they form tribes/societies/nations to avoid getting killed out of hand by others.  This means giving up some opportunities/freedoms by submitting to authority and this gets to the social contract bit.

In a national sense, perhaps nations seek to avoid the worst outcome as well.  I see many wars as arising out of the fear of something happening.  It is a last resort, since the outcome is not certain, but it is seen as a chance to stave off an even worse situation or at least have a say.  Japan knew she was hooped without natural resources and she felt blocked.  The US didn't want Japan to get those natural resources.  Japan felt that she had to act, and the US knew that they had to react in turn to prevent Japan getting too powerful.  Thus, national interest is seen in a slightly negative way, the prevention of something happening. 

What sticks with me regarding Hobbes (even though he didn't go there) is the distinction between national politics and international politics using his writings.  Hobbes was, I believe, mostly writing about the English Civil War.  Nevertheless, I think that his description of man in the state of nature can translate into international politics, while his prescription of Leviathan to create peace and harmony is not possible for the international stage (I think he went a little far in how strong that authority should be, but look at his times).  The authority that regulates internal politics is absent outside of a nation.  Personnally, I divide my views on life along internal and external lines.  Within Canada I have a rather warm and fuzzy view of matters.  Outside, however, I see a more dangerous place where we need to look our own arms to protect us and try to have a few good friends that will stick with us.






 
Reproduced below, from today’s Globe and Mail, under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act, is an opinion piece by three distinguished Canadian academics with excellent credentials in the foreign policy field: (Milnet.ca member) Jack Granatstein, Denis Stairs and Gordon Smith.

Secret strategy: Get it right with America

J.L. GRANATSTEIN and DENIS STAIRS AND GORDON SMITH

From Monday's Globe and Mail
September 30, 2007 at 9:59 PM EDT

Canada's future strategic environment is a threatening one. We live in a dangerous world of terrorism, climate change and natural disasters, and nations losing – and gaining – power. Are we ready? Most critically, how can Canada deal with the United States?

Looking ahead two decades, there are two possible and incompatible ways in which the U.S. might develop. We have been through a period of American unilateralism, tempered slightly with “coalitions of the willing.” These coalitions are as much a matter of convenience as necessity. The Bush administration has not been interested in strengthening the international order, if by that we mean international institutions and international law. Indeed, it has weakened both.

The U.S. feels threatened, and is threatened, by terrorism, above all of the al-Qaeda, jihadist kind. We condemn those who kill indiscriminately to advance sectarian visions, but we recognize that there is also a political impetus in the U.S. (and other countries, too) to identifying an enemy with whom one is “at war.” The Cold War is over, but having an enemy is a political convenience, and the U.S. seems to find it difficult – as the history of its relations with China, Cuba and Vietnam illustrate – to let go of old animosities. If the U.S. is unable to come to terms with political Islam, or if the Islamists are unwilling to moderate their unrelenting hostility to the United States and the West, we are surely faced with a period of prolonged conflict.

This is puzzling on one level, because it is clear that successful nations such as the U.S. and Canada – and failed states, too – benefit from international stability. Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Haiti and Afghanistan could greatly improve their peoples' lots with stability. For its part, the industrialized world, especially the U.S., has much to lose from uncertainty, instability and conflict. Moreover, the U.S. led the world in the creation of international regimes, particularly in the postwar 1940s. The winner of next year's presidential election will need to consider whether the U.S. should return to leading the advance of liberal internationalism.

There are signs pointing in both directions. Recent reports and books by Joseph Nye, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger and Strobe Talbott all delineate the need for the U.S. to work with the international community to a much larger extent. That community, including Canada, also has a vital interest in keeping the Americans involved. As former Liberal defence minister David Pratt said at the University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, “Like the rest of our NATO allies, Canada looks to the United States for leadership on strategic issues. When that leadership is absent, Canada's strategic objectives suffer. Whether we like it or not, on a geostrategic level, we are joined at the hip with the Americans. We succeed when the Americans succeed, and attempting to decouple ourselves from this equation is an absolute and utter waste of time.” Mr. Pratt is surely correct.

But there are also contrary indications pointing the United States away from liberal internationalism. U.S. exceptionalism is strong, and both the Republicans and Democrats use exceptionalist rhetoric to justify their positions on foreign policy. The rise of the Christian right in the U.S. brings to a substantial portion of the American population (perhaps a third) the conviction that God and U.S. foreign policy are inseparable. For many, therefore, the U.S. has a duty to advance its God-given values – sometimes truly universal values, sometimes just better – in the world.

It is not a big jump from there to unilateralism or isolationism. Even among American liberal internationalists, there is a tendency to think of multilateral institutions as vehicles for advancing what are really unilateral interests. This tendency is not confined to the U.S., but the American version of it leads more seamlessly to the notion that the good multilateral institutions are the ones the Americans can dominate, and the bad are the ones in which they have to compromise.

For Canadians, this situation will pose serious problems. We do not simply want to be a minor regional power. We need to work with the United Nations, ideally a much-reformed world organization, and other multilateral institutions such as NATO. But preserving a fundamentally amicable relationship with the Americans must be our highest priority. It won't be easy dealing with a weaker, more anxious America, but our future security and prosperity will depend on getting this relationship right.

J.L. Granatstein is a Toronto-based historian, Denis Stairs is professor emeritus of political science at Dalhousie University, and Gordon S. Smith, a former diplomat, is executive director of the University of Victoria's Centre for Global Studies.

Exceptionalism has been a key component of America’s mythology since 1776. It is rooted in the idea that America is, inherently, good, or, at the very least, better than other nations in the word. This idea is, of course, not unique to America – the 19th and 20th century Germans, for example, believed in ”Gott mit uns”, the French retain a wholly unfounded belief in ”la gloire” and Britain’s 19th century ”jingoism” is nearly unparalleled in world history as an example of national aggressiveness. But American exceptionalism is so powerful a belief that Granatstein, Stairs and Smith do well to single it out.

I do not believe in ”Gott mit uns”. Gott (or any number and variety of gods) has not, does not and will not guide or save nations and empires.

Here is the key, I think:

”We do not simply want to be a minor regional power. We need to work with the United Nations, ideally a much-reformed world organization, and other multilateral institutions such as NATO. But preserving a fundamentally amicable relationship with the Americans must be our highest priority. It won't be easy dealing with a weaker, more anxious America, but our future security and prosperity will depend on getting this relationship right.”

There are two ideas here:

1. Our goal to be a leading middle power (implied by the authors) requires us to work in a US supported (ideally US led) multinational system – one which, as the authors correctly assert, the current Bush administration has worked very hard to weaken.

2. Our great reliance on the US means we need to worry about the inevitable (albeit possibly only relative) weakening of America – as China, especially, and India strengthen.

How will America deal with the rise of China?

I continue to insist that China is not and ought not to become our (or America’s) enemy. It may not be a friend, much less a trusted ally but it need not be cast as an enemy. We don’t need any more enemies – not even the Pentagon’s big war faction (as described by Thomas P Barnett in ”The Pentagon’s New Map” (New York, 2004)) needs China as an enemy. Militant, medieval Islamists ought to provide all the enmity we need for a long time. We need to enlist China in the “war against barbarism” – and they area already cooperating, albeit reluctantly, because of Islamic separatists in Xinziang province and in bordering states.

In any event: more exceptionalist grist from Mead’s mill. See: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85504/walter-russell-mead/god-s-country.html




 
Exceptionalism looks to me like another form of nationalism.  We all think we are special.

I would argue that the United States have been isolationist for much of their history, if you confine their sphere of influence to North and South America.  The oceans have offered them a buffer and the plentiful resources of the Americas meant that they didn't need to go and acquire colonial possessions.  There have been expansionist activities as well, but again those have generally been confined to the Americas.  The Phillippines and other former Spanish possession in the Pacific are notable exceptions, but then again they arose out of the same war that took Cuba out of Spain's sphere and into US influence.

I would venture that there has been tension between those Americans who think that the US should look to itself and those who want the US to get involved in the world.  I think that the former generally dominate, although they can certainly come out swinging in international affairs if they feel US interests are threatened. 

Looking wider, I believe that wars are the results of imbalance and uncertainty in power.  As new powers emerge conflicts arise.  The big wars of the last century came out of the emergence of a unified Germany into the European stage combined with the decline of the Hapsburgs and Ottomans.  (France, Britain and Russia having already hammered out their relative places vis-a-vis each other through previous wars).  The Russo-Japanese War and the Pacific aspect of the Second World War came from the emergence of Japan on the international scene after the Meiji Restoration ended Japanese isolationalism.  The brushfire wars of the later half of the 20th century came out of the retreat of colonial powers and the emergence of local nations.  Once enough fighting has happened the parties accept the new power arrangements and you have relative calm until the next upheaval.

As China emerges we may well see conflict.  Whether that conflict breaks out into open war is debatable.  I think that they will react quite aggressively to perceived threats to their own local sphere of interest but that they are not necessarily looking to build an empire.  How Russia, India, Pakistan, Japan, Korea and Vietnam and others to include folks on the second row to include Australia, the US and Singapore react to this emergence of power will drive, in my view, what happens.  The reaction of the US, in my view, will be driven not by different strains of protestantism but rather by pragmatic assessments of how US interests will be affected.
 
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