Future Armour

[a_majoor]

Reviving this thread on a different tangent. One of the most vexing problems for military planners is logistics, and armoured vehicles consume vast quantities of fuel, in addition to the maintenance requirements, associated support like tank transporters for long road moves (in the case of tracked vehicles) and so on.

In the "A Scary Strategic Problem: No Oil" http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/37017.0.html, several suggestions are raised about increasing fuel efficiency, along with alternative fuels and powerplants. Certainly if a four passenger automobile that can achieve 100 mpg is within the current state of the engineering art, what is possible with armoured vehicles? Giant machines like the M-1 guzzle fuel at a rate of gallons per mile, and IFV's like the M-2, Warrior or PUMA are probably not much better. Wheeled vehicles like the LAV can do better, but still consume more fuel than a comparably sized truck, for example.

In general, a smaller, lighter machine will outperform a larger, heavier one. This also provides other benefits outside the fuel and logistical slice arguments, such as being more air portable, presumably fitting into more places and having a smaller signature for enemy soldiers and weapons to track.

Here are some off the cuff suggestions to start:

Preferential armouring. Place the crew in a "pod" inside the vehicle with max armour protection, and surrounded by secondary systems so a shot has to travel through them before striking the armoured pod. The Merkava incorporates this idea to some extent, since a frontal strike has to penetrate the engine compartment before entering the hull.

Suspension. A four wheeled vehicle is lighter than an eight wheeled vehicle. Eliminating a lot of weight can reduce ground pressure to the extent that four wheels will suffice. In four or multi wheel configurations, simplify the suspension further by eliminating steered wheels and incorporate "skid" steering like on a "bobcat" or "Argo" ATV

Powerplant: Diesel electric hybrid drives are current state of the art. In the near future, Solid Oxide Fuel Cells should be able to use liquid hydrocarbon fuels directly (current examples can run on straight natural gas). Fuel cells convert the chemical energy of the fuel directly into electricity, so the efficiency is far higher than using an IC engine.

The floor is open to ideas

 

[mainerjohnthomas]

I favour losing the conventional turret for a design similar to the Swedish S tank, only with a free moving (not hull integral) gun system.  The gunner's station is inside the hull, freeing up the mass of armour from the turret volume that will no longer be required, and dropping the profile of the tank accordingly.  The reduced mass will make the tank lighter, for similar overall protection.
    I look at the advances in hybrid vehicles (a transitional technology) and fuel cells as offering real hope to heavy armour for growing a much longer reach.  With increased fuel economy both from the higher efficiency fuel systems, and the loss of mass of the manless unarmoured turret, the tanks of tomorrow could have both higher speed, and much higher strategic mobility than the fuel guzzling monsters of today that manage to make the Centurion look like a moderate drinker  :blotto:.
  Through tube missile systems, NLOS systems able to take targeting information from the light armoured scouting forces, or even infantry for long range precision work, or from AD sensor platforms for tube launched SAMs (does such an animal exist yet? ) allow the tank to dominate the long range envelope long before entering the range of its 120mm calling card.
  The tank provides the punch, but the data comes from Coyotes/drones/infantry spotters.  The tank is like the sting on the scorpion; it may provide the kill, but the prey is found and caught by the eyes and pincers.

 

[George Wallace]

I favour losing the conventional turret for a design similar to the Swedish S tank, only with a free moving (not hull integral) gun system.  The gunner's station is inside the hull, freeing up the mass of armour from the turret volume that will no longer be required, and dropping the profile of the tank accordingly.  The reduced mass will make the tank lighter, for similar overall protection.

What you are desiring is not a Tank then, but an Assault Gun or a Tank Destroyer.  What you have in the S-Tank is a 'tank' that has minimal traverse in its main gun and less SA for the remaining crewmembers.  In a battle, a turretless tank would be exposing its vulnerable sides to the enemy as it turns to engage targets.  A turreted tank can keep most of its protective armour in its hull facing the enemy, as its turret traverses through the enemy.  A turret can often turn quicker than the vehicle.  When engaging targets on the move the Stabilization system will keep the gun in a turret on the target.  This is impossible in a turretless tank.  A moving target is harder to hit than a stationary target.  A turretless tank would have to stop to engage in most instances, thereby making it a stationary target and easy target for the enemy.

 

[mainerjohnthomas]

I knew I was going to mislead people with the S tank comparison, mea culpa.  I don't advocate removing the turret, but removing the people from the turret.  The turret would consist simply of the main gun/coax/targeting sensors with the gunner remaining in the hull.  The turret would be much smaller, require little armour, and actually traverse faster due to the decreased mass of the turret. The only thing the Russians got right was the invention of the autoloader, and reduction in armour/turret volume taking the loadar out of the turret; being Russians they made the rest of the tank a POS deathtrap staffed by midgets, but the theory was a step in the right direction.

 

[George Wallace]

Removing the crew from the turret, also removes much of their situation awareness.  SA can not be achieved with sensors to the same extent that it can with the senses that a man has.  I put to you an example that you may more readily understand.......Take your car and spray-paint all the windows black so that you cannot see daylight through them.  Now mount a camera on the front of your car, and cameras everywhere else that you please, along with a monitor in front of your steering wheel.  Now drive your car in Rush Hour traffic.  Your SA is greatly reduced, and you will probably have had your first accident backing out of your driveway.....let alone make it out onto the highway. 

Crews need to be able to stick their heads out of the hatch from time to time.  They can not do this stuck down inside of a hull operating a remote turret.

 

[rmacqueen]

I have been working on an article that tackles the idea of the CF in the new millennium.  As part of this I have given a lot of thought as to possible configurations of future armour.  The conclusion I have reached is...I don't know.  It is a vexing problem with timelines and ever changing tactical and strategic situations affecting it.  For instance, when we consider how long it takes to take a tank from concept to production and consider how our commitments have changed in the last couple of decades you can see the problem.  At the same time the old adage that "everything old is new again" seems to apply as evidenced by the Leo's in Afghanistan.

You also have 2 diametrically opposed uses for the tank in the modern world.  First, as an MBT, we see the need for mobility, armour, firepower and the ability to hide.  But, at the same time, when deployed like it is in Afghanistan, we are partially using it as a projection of power, a psychological tool and a political tool, and in such a role the tank needs to been seen, capable of going everywhere from mountain to village and forced to move slowlythrough streets crowded by non-combatants.

So where do we go from here?  If we were to base our ideas of future armour based on past experience then we are back to phasing out the MBT but, as Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, there is still a role for the MBT.  The problem is, will the next conflict favour a tank or would a tank be a liability.

Of course, there are also emerging technologies that can drastically affect the development of future armour as well.  Zero point energy, which is currently being worked on, would eliminate the need for any fuel (basically, it takes it energy from the very molecules that surround us).  Also, new types of armour are being developed, as are weapons.  Remember when reactive armour was state of the art?  In the timeline of procurement projects that wasn't that long ago.  Such developments opens the possibility of a tank with a more artillery type gun on it that is capable of firing "smart" munitions.  Heck, given the advancement of technology one could even envision a separate system designed to fire nothing but smart munitions and is separate from a turreted gun.  How about "pods" on the sides, a la' Roland?

So, what is my point?  It is a confusing mix of possibilities that better minds than mine are working on.

My 2 cents (probably over-charging)

 

[Spring_bok]

Crews need to be able to stick their heads out of the hatch from time to time.  They can not do this stuck down inside of a hull operating a remote turret.

One of the reasons that the MGS plan dies is because the position of the gun restricted the commanders view throughout the whole left side.  This is interesting because the reports from oversees are telling us that commanders have to be up looking around more than ever because engagements are so much closer than we usually train for.  What does this mean for RWS?  Especially when they put RWS on the LAV3 hulls, how much close in SA will be ccompromised  Just my thoughts.

 

[Kirkhill]

Here is one of the first vehicles to be equipped with a "Remotely Operate Weapons System". The Marder.

It has a turret right enough but with the guns and sensors mounted above and behind the commander and gunner.  It also, originally, had a 7.62 mounted on its after deck that was fired from inside the vehicle, independently of the main armament.

 

[George Wallace]

Here is one of the first vehicles to be equipped with a "Remotely Operate Weapons System". The Marder.

And as it was upgraded, you will note that they did away with the remotely operated 7.62 GPMG in the Rear.  There are reasons for that.

 

[Kirkhill]

And as it was upgraded, you will note that they did away with the remotely operated 7.62 GPMG in the Rear.  There are reasons for that.

You are right George.  I was also referring to the Overhead mounted 20mm with the Coax 7.62 as effectively an RWS mount as the gunner and CC were forward of the trunnions, the breaches and ammunition storage were mounted externally and the weapons were solenoid operated.

I know that the mount leaves a big blind spot for the CC.  I just point out that as similar system as has been suggested has been previously fielded.  I know the Marder has not seen a shot in anger but when it was introduced, right after Horatio held the bridge, we all thought it was the catsass.

 

[a_majoor]

Much of what is being spoken of here has been explored in Armor Magazine, including attempting to forcast the effects of long range munitions and the shape of tanks to come. The index is not interactive, so you will have to look the long way: http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/ArmorMag/webindex.xls

One idea which is in there was a hybrid design: picture an "S" tank with the gun mounted in a cleft in the upper hull. When advancing or otherwise not in use, the gun is retracted, but is extended to traverse and fire. "From the External gun to the Hybrid tank" http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/ArmorMag/nd96/6fletch96.pdf

No solution is 100%, we can think of flaws in this and every design or concept dating back to the first tanks in WW I. The trick is to try to minimise the technical flaws and find TTPs and organizational models which emphasis the strength and mask the weakness of our systems.

 

[mainerjohnthomas]

Much of what is being spoken of here has been explored in Armor Magazine, including attempting to forcast the effects of long range munitions and the shape of tanks to come. The index is not interactive, so you will have to look the long way: http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/ArmorMag/webindex.xls

One idea which is in there was a hybrid design: picture an "S" tank with the gun mounted in a cleft in the upper hull. When advancing or otherwise not in use, the gun is retracted, but is extended to traverse and fire. "From the External gun to the Hybrid tank" http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/ArmorMag/nd96/6fletch96.pdf

No solution is 100%, we can think of flaws in this and every design or concept dating back to the first tanks in WW I. The trick is to try to minimise the technical flaws and find TTPs and organizational models which emphasis the strength and mask the weakness of our systems.

    It seems that better minds than mine have both been thinking along the lines I suggested, but reading more deeply on the subject as well.  Thanks again a_majoor for finding what I was stumbling towards.  One point to consider though, SA is important, but how many of our Afghanistan casualties have happened because our guys were partially  outside the armour when their LAV got hit?  At some point, sensors other than the MKI eyeball are going to have to be the source of tanker's SA, while infantry and light armour are going to be primarily human senses with mechanical augmentations.  Thats one reason for tanks to maintain mixed formations.

 

[peaches]

I am an Airforce guy trying to learn more so bare with me please.  Could I ask a question here?  Why is the issue of MBT so spun up in this military. 

I believe in simplisity, that's what ultimatly wins wars.  The combined arms team has existed since WW1.  Tanks, infantry & arty with healthy doses of air wins the land battle.  In a country like Canada (the second largest in the world, & one of the richest) why can we not have modern MBTs.  This should be an easy decision. I realize that the "Cold War" is over, but no modern army has disbanded their tank forces, reduced yes, scrapped no.  Why are we running head long to scrap tanks.  We have 3 CMBG here in Canada, only 3, it seems to me that they should be properly equiped.  Why not create 1 Heavy Brigade, Tanks, Tracked IFV, SP M109A6's, a battery of MLRS, ADATS AD.  Could we not create 2 medium force brigades along the lines of the US Army SBCT.  Even go father and create a light brigade group by consolidating the three light battalions.  Perhaps the three light battalions could be our CSOR. 

The subject of logistics, we can move tanks anywhere on Earth if we want too.  The Ukrains & USAF help move our LEOs to A-Stan, we are getting 4 C17s, and we are getting new transport ships.   

We don't need an armoured division, we don't need thousand of tanks, but why can we not have 1 brigade, a real combined arm armoured brigade like the US Army, or British Army.  Just asking questions?

 

[George Wallace]

    ........  One point to consider though, SA is important, but how many of our Afghanistan casualties have happened because our guys were partially  outside the armour when their LAV got hit?  At some point, sensors other than the MKI eyeball are going to have to be the source of tanker's SA, while infantry and light armour are going to be primarily human senses with mechanical augmentations.  Thats one reason for tanks to maintain mixed formations.

Unfortunately, as a Crew Commander you will have to take some chances.  (Being a bit morbid now)  A CC must be knowledgeable of the fact that (s)he may have to sacrifice themself's in order to save their crew and equipment.  A tank, or any AFV, is very hard to fight while all buttoned up, and may become even more than a liability that it should.  They don't call us "Coffin Jockey's" for nothing, and a Tank is more likely to become a coffin if SA is lost or degraded.

It is much the same for Armour Recce, who know that their life expectancy in Battle averages approx 7 seconds.  90+% are not even expected to survive crossing the Start Line. 

Them's the hazards of the Trade.

 

[a_majoor]

One point to consider though, SA is important, but how many of our Afghanistan casualties have happened because our guys were partially  outside the armour when their LAV got hit?  At some point, sensors other than the MKI eyeball are going to have to be the source of tanker's SA, while infantry and light armour are going to be primarily human senses with mechanical augmentations.  Thats one reason for tanks to maintain mixed formations.

The IDF is still very big on crew commanders having their heads out of the hatch, despite fielding very sophisticated tanks and AFV's with a lot of high tech bells and whistles. The Urdan cupola has a hatch which (for want of a better description) can be raised and locked in plce like an armoured umbrella over the crew commander's head. Of course a well aimed shot can still get him, and various random hazzards could kill an exposed crew commander as well, but something like this is hardly high tech.

As a BTW, Israeli tanks can be fitted with miniature receivers to display live feeds from TUAV's flying a bound ahead, and the Merkava's are fitted with a sophisticated fire control system which can alert the crew to changes in the field of view that might indicate targets and prioritise the aiming for the gunner, so they "could" be techno weenies and stay buttoned up at all times, but don't.

 

[Kalatzi]

It is much the same for Armour Recce, who know that their life expectancy in Battle averages approx 7 seconds.  90+% are not even expected to survive crossing the Start Line. 

Them's the hazards of the Trade.

No Disrespect, I've heard of very high projected casualty rates for all arms in high intensity combat ala NW Europe
but those numbers seem just an itsi-bit high, dont you think?

 

[rmacqueen]

No Disrespect, I've heard of very high projected casualty rates for all arms in high intensity combat ala NW Europe
but those numbers seem just an itsi-bit high, dont you think?

You can probably correct this for me George (been out of the game awhile) but IIRC the stats we were given were for an estimated 80% mortality rate for armour in the first 24hrs if war had broken out in Europe.  That is for tanks in general and recce is even more dangerous.

 

[George Wallace]

Don't really recall seeing it written in stone, but the Recce figures were what we were basically told over and over again.  4 CMBG didn't really have a large or long survival rate in all predictions, should the balloon have gone up.  The majority of Recce would be gone in the first contact.  The Tanks weren't going to survive more than one or two engagements.  As Corps Reserve, 4 CMBG would have been racing to fill holes punched into the Corps Lines as soon as First Contact was made, and soon stretched to its' breaking point.  Predictions had the Spetsnaz dropping into France to take out all the Nuclear facilities, before we could even roll out of the Margs; so we would already have begun fighting with the Enemy in our Rear. 

 

[ArmyRick]

Well those were realistic scenarios for the cold war, thank the powers that be it never did happen. Now what about rates of survival in Afghanistan (I seem to think they are a tad bit higher than 6%). Thoughts? questions?

I remember learning about how german armour recce was heavy on the armour side (Didn't they actually put MBT in their armour recce, George?). I wonder if such a heavy Armour Recce force could be used in the more open areas of Afghanistan (I don't remember the actual term but its like zone surveillance or zone recce? Again George, you could probably throw in an educated answer?

 

[George Wallace]

Don't forget that the Canadian philosophy for Recce is more "Sneak 'N Peek", as is the British, as opposed to the German Philosophy of "Fighting for Information".  They have an excellent Recce vehicle in the Luchs, which in my opinion is the only large vehicle of this type that is good for Recce.  It is very silent, especially after they sorted out the problem with their brakes (Those who know, remember that their brakes sounded just like those on the LSVW.  They solved that problem - so why can't we with the LS?), has good firepower and can, with its' two drivers, drive as fast and safely in Reverse as it can in Forward (bigger and better than the Ferret ;D).

When the Leo 2 came out, the Germans cascaded their Leo 1's down from the Tank Bns to the Recce Bns.  This made sense with the type of tactics that they were used to using. 

If we were in the same boat, it would not work, but we could have looked at cascading them down to Reserse MTC's and do conversion courses for the Cougar Regiments.  We missed that chance on several occasion's.