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Future CH146 Deployments

I_am_John_Galt said:
Coulda, shoulda, woulda ... wasn't it the Army that killed ERSTA?

"We have Coyote, so..."

Yet every single senior Army commander that has seen the demonstration system mounted on a CH146 has said "I want that". LFCA investigated the possibility of purchasing one or two a few years ago, but it wasn't permitted.

War tends to re-focus people on what's really important, and Sperwer, for all of its shortcomings, has demonstrated a part of what we can do with a manned and armed helicopter.
 
STONEY said:
I know that they maybe different models but i noticed that the PAKS are getting 25 Bell 412's .

It depends upon what they plan to use them for. The RAF has a few for training purposes, for example.

STONEY said:
Why when we got the CH146 didn't we get a better power package , wasn't it touted at the time
as being a lot better than the A/C it was replacing.  I realize that DND really didn't want the A/C in the firstplace as it was a political decision ,but doesn't anyone at NDHQ have the balls to speak up every once in a while.  If we had to accept it couldn't they have tried for a better package.

There were a number of factors: the Twin Hueys were not in great shape, money (but not enough to buy a reasonable number of Black Hawks) suddenly became available and there was some haste to push this through before it disappeared, a PC defence minister in whose riding these things were made doubled the number in order to get re-elected (he wasn't), Oka/Akwesasne and peacekeeping were major influences at the time, and it looked like a Twin Huey. Nobody realized that looks and reality (like materials used in construction in certain areas, and several key systems) were not necessarily the same thing. Commonly-heard buzz-phrases were "it's a commercial purchase, so it will work" and "it's just like a Twin Huey, so no user trial is required".
 
Zoomie said:
Unfortunately it is not the CF that chooses what it wants to fly, drive or float - it is the Government.  If the Army owned its own aviation wing - it would still be flying the Kiowa's and not have enough money for fuel. 

There is no basis in fact for that claim. Funding would be expected to be equal, regardless of service-of-ownership - and that, too, is purely a Government decision.

Up until not too long ago, all Tac Hel equipment and O&M was paid for out of the Army budget. The problem with that was the perception of some commanders that they were paying for toys for the a** f**ce - they did not feel like the owners. With Tac Hel officers spread throughout the Army chain-of-command, if the relationship reverted to its original natural and rightful one, we would be on par with any other Arm/Branch/Corps wearing green.

To see what COULD be, albeit on a smaller scale, just look south.

Zoomie said:
The real benefit to having one branch of the CF own all the aviation assets is the reallocation of YFR (Yearly Flying Rate) - if one fleet under-flies its allocated hours, they can be shared with another fleet.  This happens with the Buffalo all the time - we had back our unused hours and they get allocated to the Hercs, Grifs, etc.  This is all done internally within the Division.  If the Army had its own fleet, they would have to decide whether or not to fuel MBTs or Helo's - who do you think would win in that fight

So the a** f**ce can switch money between budgets but the Army cannot? Does it have better fin people? This herring is not just red, it's got a thousand-watt bulb jammed up its backside.
 
Rick Ruter said:
With the Threat level at the time, it would have needed armoured seats and floors which means no cargo capacity worth talking about. Now Kandahar is at a lower elevation so it may be possible to operate but then I'm not doing staff checks anymore.

We're going without armour (possibly the front seats, but no definite word yet) and not carrying cargo or troops, which makes a big difference.
 
Loachman said:
if the relationship reverted to its original natural and rightful one, we would be on par with any other Arm/Branch/Corps wearing green.

Keep dreaming...

So the a** f**ce can switch money between budgets but the Army cannot? Does it have better fin people? This herring is not just red, it's got a thousand-watt bulb jammed up its backside.

You obviously didn't read the post - just jumped in all full of piss/vinegar and started venting.  The Air Force (see, that isn't too hard to spell) has a fuel budget that is massive compared to the complete operating budget that the CLS enjoys.  Granted that a portion of this budget would be transferred over - let's say 30% - that is all they would get.  Meanwhile, the rest of the flying team gets to split up the remaining 70% and transfer them among their fleets at will.  If one year the Hercs overfly themselves - the MPA or SAR community could throw them a couple of thousand hours (this happens routinely).  If an Army Aviation unit were to over-fly, where among their 30% would they get more YFR?  How does Diesel fuel compare to Jet-A?  I highly doubt the CAS would be so willing to transfer his valuable YFR to the CLS.  Albeit highly simplified, this was/is my point.

It's obvious from the tone of your posts that you are all for this pipe-dream - I'd think that after 20+ years wearing blue you would just accept the inevitable and move on.  Per Ardua Ad Astra
 
Zoomie said:
Keep dreaming...

Hope springs eternal - yet I am under no illusions.

This was in response to your baseless suggestion that the Army could not afford Tac Hel, budget adequately, or shift funds from one area to another, and would not replace unsustainable/obsolete fleets - "If the Army owned its own aviation wing - it would still be flying the Kiowa's and not have enough money for fuel".

There are thirty-five-years of history that refute that. From the inception of Tac Hel forty-four years and twelve days ago, the Army paid for it right up until the CH146 purchase. It bought and subsequently replaced older fleets several times - Cessnas in the Air OP role and Hillers in the recce role with Kiowas, Single Hueys with Twins, and Voyageurs with Chinooks, and supplied them with sufficient fuel. We never had a shortage of YFR for my first fourteen years in Tac Hel, while the Army was paying for it. What you are saying could not/would not be done has been done.

Zoomie said:
You obviously didn't read the post

Oh, yes, I did.

Zoomie said:
just jumped in all full of piss/vinegar and started venting.

No piss, no vinegar, and no venting. You're reading more into my words than was there if you're seeing that.

Zoomie said:
The Air Force (see, that isn't too hard to spell)

I can spell the words, thank-you.

Zoomie said:
has a fuel budget that is massive compared to the complete operating budget that the CLS enjoys.  Granted that a portion of this budget would be transferred over - let's say 30% - that is all they would get.

Our current fuel budget would sufffice. I do not believe that our YFR fluctuates enough to cause difficulties. The Army managed before, when we had more helicopters, and three fleets including Chinooks.

Zoomie said:
Albeit highly simplified, this was/is my point.

And my point was, aside from it being a non-issue, that this is no basis upon which to decide ownership. Your assertion was that "The real benefit to having one branch of the CF own all the aviation assets is the reallocation of YFR". Is that it? Is there no other reason? Operational effectiveness and responsiveness to the very organization for which we exist would trump a budgetary issue, especially a non-existant one, I would think - if logic had anything to do with it.

Zoomie said:
It's obvious from the tone of your posts that you are all for this pipe-dream - I'd think that after 20+ years wearing blue you would just accept the inevitable and move on.  Per Ardua Ad Astra

Most things start out as dreams. Nothing is inevitable, unless nobody does anything, and I am not alone in not accepting anything less than the ideal.

If acceptance of inevitability was of prime human concern, none of us would ever attempt anything, would we?

I get the same line from certain people that I know who blindly repeat that Afghanistan is a "quagmire", that it is lost, that we are losing people for no good reason - our defeat is "inevitable".

George Bernard Shaw once said "The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man."

In some circumstances, I would much rather be unreasonable.

Both the Army as a whole and Tac Hel would be better off if we reverted to the old relationship. Granted, it is not likely to happen, but that is solely due to politics.
 
Duey?

Kujor asti? Chi maikoni?

I know you have opinions on the CH-146 and its ability to fly in Afghanistan. Or did I dream those AB-212s flying over our house in Kabul? And were those UH-1Bs in KAF just a figment of my imagination?

I'm guessing that if those a/c can fly there, so can ours.

MG

 
It depends upon what one is doing with them - and nature and altitude of the LZ/PZ, payload, fuel load, and ambient air temperature are all factors.

Helicopters do not work well in thin air, ie high altitudes and high temperatures.

It takes more power to hover than it does to fly forward. It takes even more power to hover out of ground effect. If one has a large, flat, open area free of obstacles, like an airfield, one can accelerate through translational lift while remaining in ground effect and then climb to altitude. If one is attempting to take off from or land on rough ground surrounded by hills and other obstacles, one must climb vertically to the point where one clears the obstacles before moving forward, and such a climb takes a lot of power. Departing from confined areas in Canada during the summer often requires a bit of care.

Obviously, the greater the payload and fuel load, the more power is required. Typically, we will go with reduced fuel loads if we are carrying a full load of troops, especially if they are carrying rucksacks, and/or reduce the number of troops from eight to six. This works well in training areas, where range is not a factor, although moves conducted with multiple lifts can be a challenge. We don't normally lift troops carrying the same weight of gear as guys are lugging around in Afghanistan, either. We also do not normally install door guns or armoured crew seats, which add weight.

You wouldn't want to be hopping onto one of these with five other guys in an area infested with Taliban, as the departure is going to be painfully slow.

Also, with six in theatre (and sustaining even that modest number over several rotos is going to be another big drain on our little grossly-undermanned community), one can assume that about four will be serviceable and available at any one time. We could, then, lift sixteen to twenty-four guys in one go, depending upon distance etcetera. Is that useful (presuming it's even doable, depending upon the PZ/LZ, ambient air temperature, etcetera)?

The recce/escort role is a little different. We would likely carry one extra crewman, but no other passengers, and the ball, guns, and ammo, but no cargo. Departure would be from a nice runway, and that should be the only point of landing as well. The performance limitations of the machine would not be so significant.
 
Loach,

the Griffon twin-pack is de-rated in terms of power.  The actual limiting factor on the Griffon is the mast and the amount of torque that it can take.  Yes, altitude and heat have a great effect on turbines.

Got to go, time is running out...
 
Scoobs said:
Loach,

the Griffon twin-pack is de-rated in terms of power.  The actual limiting factor on the Griffon is the mast and the amount of torque that it can take.  Yes, altitude and heat have a great effect on turbines.

Got to go, time is running out...

I'm going to guess hes well aware of that
 
Military planned for bigger Afghan deployment

MURRAY BREWSTER -- Canadian Press

January 6, 2008 at 2:20 PM EST

OTTAWA — The Canadian military initially planned for a much wider involvement in the Afghan war than what it delivered in Kandahar, newly released documents show.

As a battle group of 2,200 soldiers was preparing to face the Taliban two years ago, the air force drew up plans in late 2005 to deploy eight CH-146 Griffon helicopters, specially modified as attack aircraft, and a fleet of CF-18 fighter-bombers.

The proposals were eventually set aside, despite NATO's plea for more aircraft, specifically transport and attack helicopters.

The Griffons and jetfighters were intended to give Canada's troops their own hard-hitting air power, instead of relying on other allied nations, such as the United States and Britain.

Canada eventually chose to send C-130 Hercules transports, which drop supplies to far-flung desert bases.

The country's top military commander said he asked the air force to draw up the contingency plans, but ultimately decided against recommending the deployment of the fighters and helicopters.

“The air force believes in this mission,” Gen. Rick Hillier, chief of defence staff, said in a recent interview with The Canadian Press.

“They're already playing a huge part, as you know. And you have a variety of communities within the air force who are keen as all get out to participate in the mission.”

Extensive preparations were made with the air force arranging a service-support contract for the CF-18s and a demonstration trial where a weapon system was installed on one of the utility helicopters.

At the same time as the army was deciding on a squadron of old Leopard C2 battle tanks to counter the surge in Taliban violence in the fall of 2006, the air force pulled together a timetable that would have seen armed Griffons on station for a year at Kandahar Airfield, beginning in February 2007.

But Gen. Hillier rejected the air force plan, saying NATO already has enough fighter-bombers and attack helicopters based in Kandahar and the CH-146 was not the kind of chopper Canada most needed.

“The Griffon community was ready to go,” he said. “It's just that when we do our assessment, the real need that we have there right now is troop lift, heavy loads of people. Unfortunately, the Griffon just can't do that in that environment.”

At an informal meeting of NATO defence ministers last fall in Noordwick, Holland, the shortage of helicopters was among the biggest issues. With members either unable to reluctant to deploy their aircraft, the alliance approved a scheme to rent civilian choppers for hauling cargo in Afghanistan. It also began exploring the possibility of paying former Warsaw Pact members to take their helicopters out of mothballs.

As the military variant of the civilian Bell 412, the Griffon has the capacity to carry 12 soldiers in full combat gear, or six stretchers. The Conservative government intends to buy 16 CH-47 Chinook helicopters, which carry up to 30 soldiers, but deliveries aren't scheduled until at least 2011.

Critics have been pressuring the Defence Department to send the Griffons, in part to get Canadian soldiers off Kandahar's bomb-strewn highways.

But Gen. Hillier flatly rejected the argument, saying the CH-146 wasn't suited to operate at high elevations and in 55C degree heat.

But internal air force documents suggest that to cope with the altitude and climate extremes, the takeoff weight could be lowered by roughly 453 kilograms.

Gen. Hillier also indicated he wasn't satisfied the helicopter could function well in an attack role, citing the level of complexity and precision needed to deliver guided missiles on target.


The use of air power in Afghanistan has become a politically sensitive subject as the number of civilian casualties from wayward missile and bomb strikes rose substantially throughout 2007.

Employing the air force to a greater extent would have required a substantial increase in size of Canada's commitment as well as more money. Aside from pilots, each aircraft comes with a small army of maintainers.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080106.wafghancraft0106/BNStory/Front

Were these deployments ever considered part of the Vanguard, or were they going to be separate from those resources already on standby?

Bandit

 
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