Generals, Generalship and History; split from Re: The Somme

[jimmy742]

A Haig apologist I see. I understand it's become fashionable lately.

Allow me to relate what my grandfather ( He was at the Somme, Arras etc...) said to me once in one of the very few times he discussed the war. "We were getting killed by the stupidity of our own senior officers and it was just a matter of time before your turn came up."

He served in the Vandoos so his opinion may have been slightly clouded.


(Edited by Moderator to insert new title)

 

[Michael Dorosh]

A Haig apologist I see. I understand it's become fashionable lately.

I don't think Haig had much to apologize for, frankly. All the generals were stupid in the sense that they were working in conditions which hadn't existed before. That they were weren't wizards or magicians should not have been a surprise; tragically, their learning curve involved the loss of millions of lives. Blame the politicians and even society as a whole for cheering the start of the war and enthusiastically sending young men like your grandfather off to fight in it. I don't know if Haig was smart or stupid, I do know he wasn't a criminal. And that a fair number of those generals the soldiers thought so little of were killed in action, trying to do the best job they could under appalling conditions. Glad I wasn't alive then.

 

[xavier]

Hi all:

I read somewhere that the generals who led their men faced the most rapid change in history. It's too bad I can't remember where. In a space of 30 years, militaries had completely changed. A soldier from 1914 had more in common with his 1855 counterpart than with a 1916-18 soldier.  The authour was pointing out that it's real easy for us to criticize from hindsight and that the changes were so profound that no general let alone society had time to properly assimilate those revolutionary transformations.
I'm one of those that's deeply critical of Haig. After the first week, he should've called it off  when he received the preliminary casualty list. Then called together his subordinates and 'brainstorm'  an alternative approach in order not to squander their men(or more precisely reevaluate everything from logistics to strategy)

Interestingly the French are celebrating the 90th of Verdun as well. What another bloodbath that was.

P.S. Osprey has created a mini website about the Somme in prepartion for its forthcoming booklet on the battle. For an amateur like myself, it's very helpful to learn more about the realities of what Haig and his subordinates faced as well as the battle itself

xavier

 

[Red 6]

It's tough to accurately put ourselves into the mindset of World War I commanders. On the one hand, you can't help but ask how anyone could've coped with all the advances in warfare that took place in the decades leading up to the 1st World War. But, it wasn't the first industrial age war. It's my understanding that the European armies didn't give full weight to the lessons of the Civil War. I'm not sure I could come up with an alternative to what amounted to a slaughter on the Western Front. But, you can't help but be appalled at the death toll. That the German Army was able to roll up the allied front in the Spring 1918 offensive after almost four years of combat doesn't say a lot for the strategic level of leadership on the allied side.

As an amateur historian focused ont he Pacific World War II theater, I've been involved in dialogues and debates whether this or that island campaign was necessary in the big picture. Peleliu is the camapign that comes to mind, as well as Iwo Jima. One of my buddies has written, "If we had looked at every Pacific campaign with the critical eye of posterity knowing what sort of casaulties were in store, we probably would've stayed in Hawaii. That's what some people think anyway."

 

[Michael Dorosh]

It's tough to accurately put ourselves into the mindset of World War I commanders.

Especially if your entire historical knowledge comes from 32 page pamplets published by Osprey...

 

[jimmy742]

I don't think Haig had much to apologize for, frankly. All the generals were stupid in the sense that they were working in conditions which hadn't existed before. That they were weren't wizards or magicians should not have been a surprise; tragically, their learning curve involved the loss of millions of lives. Blame the politicians and even society as a whole for cheering the start of the war and enthusiastically sending young men like your grandfather off to fight in it. I don't know if Haig was smart or stupid, I do know he wasn't a criminal. And that a fair number of those generals the soldiers thought so little of were killed in action, trying to do the best job they could under appalling conditions. Glad I wasn't alive then.

Thank you for your reply. I do agree with you to a point. As an aside, he never spoke English again after 1918 and refused to leave Quebec for the rest of his years.

Perhaps one of the issues was the mind set of the British officer class who regarded the British or Commonwealth enlisted man as little more than part of "the herd". Haig was a Cavalry officer of the "truest and bluest" type and I suspect the plight of the men under his command mattered very little to him. I think Stalin's famous quote regarding statistics applies here.  I'm not sure if there are any recorded instances of whole bataillons or regiments bleeting like sheep while marching to the trenches like the French did at Verdun but I wouldn't be surprised.

There is a close parallel between the attitudes that prevailed among General officers at Verdun prior to Petain taking charge and how Haig and his subordinates behaved during the Somme, imo. The French learned after Chemin des Dames and Verdun, Haig gave us Passchendaele.

 

[Scott]

Mike,

This:

Fair enough; how would you, personally, have relieved the pressure on Verdun, then?

and this:

Especially if your entire historical knowledge comes from 32 page pamplets published by Osprey...

Sure seem to contradict this:

Is the point of the forum to come on board and boast about one's achievements and belittle others for their lack of knowledge, or to learn about things?

I tend to do both. Guess what I was just doing?  Thanks to you and GAP for the info.

So quick to jump on certain Staff members when they slip yet you don't seem to want to follow the same rules.

What was that old saying about people in glass houses and stones?

Maybe I misread what you said, if so I wish you'd clarify.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Xavier posted a pretty strong position on Haig while at the same time ignoring that more recent research has been done on him - to wit

I read somewhere that the generals who led their men faced the most rapid change in history. It's too bad I can't remember where.

and later

I'm one of those that's deeply critical of Haig. After the first week, he should've called it off  when he received the preliminary casualty list. Then called together his subordinates and 'brainstorm'  an alternative approach in order not to squander their men(or more precisely reevaluate everything from logistics to strategy)

  And finally,

Osprey has created a mini website about the Somme in prepartion for its forthcoming booklet on the battle. For an amateur like myself, it's very helpful to learn more about the realities of what Haig and his subordinates faced as well as the battle itself

I found it, and still find it, odd that such a strong opinion could possibly be formed despite using a widely acknowledged poor source (Osprey is a set of primers). If Xavier is keen on learning about the Somme, he would be wise to take up Captain O'Leary on our book recommendation from page one. I only presume Xavier's reading into the matter has been superficial based on past postings about Osprey in other threads, as well as the conclusion he presents here, which is at odds with Corrigan.

Has this clarified my position?  Not to jump on Xavier; he is a keen student and has asked many questions both here and at my own forum. Yet I think in this instance, he has formed an opinion not on what has been discussed here, but on a set of primers of little historical worth - IMO and probably of most scholars. I was perhaps a bit hasty in choosing my words and intended them to be humorous but I see it did not come out that way. Should have added a smiley.

Basically, I'm telling Xavier you won't get th' smarts we gots here by reading 32 page primers, nor will a true understanding of Haig's career be garnered from television specials and the like. As visual entertainment, TV is king, but I wouldn't use a television broadcast in a "serious" discussion of any topic. Still, I've asked a friend to tape the special on the Somme - thanks for the tip on that program Red 6, et al.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Mike,

This:

Quote from: Michael Dorosh on Today at 12:51:16
Fair enough; how would you, personally, have relieved the pressure on Verdun, then?

Incidentally, what was the problem with this?  It's a fair question. Captain O'Leary stated a page ago (or perhaps another WWI thread) how odd it is that those critics of Haig and leaders in the First World War (Lyn MacDonald, et al) generally have no alternate suggestions as to what could have been done differently.

I find that a salient question, don't you?

Anyway, let me know which rule I may have 'slipped up on' as it is quite possible I am misreading you in return. Thanks.

 

[Scott]

I guess it was the way in which I saw it written. Someone comes here, posts once and your question looked as though it was meant to draw fire.

This is the post in question:

This is my first post since joining 10 minutes ago, I have just watch a programme on UK TV in Nottingham showing 'The Royal Newfoundland Regiment' and their heroic advance on the Somme - everyone a hero - led by incompetents.

I believe some gentle herding could have been a bit more effective than the way you posted your question. It seemed belittling to me seeing as the person here admitted that it was his first post and seemed to have gathered his information from a television program, maybe he even formed this opinion from there? The post seemed to be more of an overall, generalized comment. Maybe a comment on the information offered in the program?

Regardless, until, Bill returns to clarify or expand on what he said we are both in the dark. I just did not wish to see a new member leave due to a seemingly short tempered reply. Once again, the line between a troll and a witty reply is razor thin.

Thank you for clarifying on both matters.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Scott - I just noticed the quoted portion - I highlighted the wrong portions - I meant to respond to the cricism of Haig, not the fact he had watched a television show. Good catch on your part -

Bill DD - no, I wasn't trying to belittle your source (though I am sincere in my comments that TV isn't a great medium to draw on), rather, I meant to say that it is well and good to criticize Haig and British generals, but in order to do so, it is probably wise to have some idea of how they could have avoided doing what they did.

Doing nothing on the Somme was not an option. The French mutinies of 1917 several months later are evidence of weakening morale and resolve. The casualties at Verdun point to physical decline of the French Armies. Something HAD to be done by the British. Would be interested on your opinion of what could have been differently. Like I said, I'm glad I wasn't making decisions like that at that time.

I do think Haig would have been wise to let division commanders use more leeway in actual tactics - several divisions took objectives for low cost at the Somme (relatively speaking - even a WW I victory was usually costly in human lives). But I do wonder if part of the problem was not simply the slowness with which information was disseminated - a successful division attack in the sector of one corps might never be absorbed as "lessons learned" on a neighbouring corps for several weeks or even months. Was Haig a victim of that? I don't know enough about him to say, but these are possibilities worth discussing.

Welcome to army.ca , by the way.

 

[xavier]

Michael:
No worries, I'm just the example du jour of a keen but naive student of military history  I admit I should shut up, read more and then modestly articulate a position.
However, my views aren't formed by Osprey. While they're a helpful primer, I do try to try to read more substantial books on the historical eras that interest me. I concede that because I'm not a soldier and have zero combat experience, I don't always understand the significace of why a logistics delay or communications breakdown caused this situation and led to defeat.  Actually I avoid watching TV specials on this or that battle or personality. I find them worse than superficial and rather annoying concentrating on the dramatic rather than explaining the historicla vent or placing the battle/era/personality in context

With respect to Haig, the one major criticism I have (and it's an identical one with Joffre) is how come he stayed so far away from the front? Wouldn't it have been more effective to be some 50 km or so? Thus he would be far enough to see the evolution of the battle's conduct while close enough to issue contemporeanous orders especially since communications broke down as soon as the shelling started?

I'll reread the beginning of the thread and check out Capt O'Leary's post.
Thanks!

xavier
 

 

[mdh]

Captain O'Leary stated a page ago (or perhaps another WWI thread) how odd it is that those critics of Haig and leaders in the First World War (Lyn MacDonald, et al) generally have no alternate suggestions as to what could have been done differently.

Keep in mind that Haig's reputation was first undermined by its participants.  Siegfreid Sassoon's superb "Memoirs of an Infantry Officer" and Robert Graves' equally poignant "Goodbye to all that" created a literary sensation during the inter-war years for their respective frankness and outspokeness about the carnage of WWI. 

There is a Canadian memoir in the same vein - "Generals Die in Bed" by Charles Harrison which I haven't read but whose title presages a direct condemnation of the "chateau generalship" that many felt typified Haig's leadership style.

(It's interesting to note that this view continued to echoe through popular culture with the production of Oh What a Lovely War in the 1960s, and more recenlyt Black Adder Goes Forth.)

This hasn't stopped successive historians from attempting to rehabilitate Haig as a battlefield commander - one of the more (relatively) recent ones being John Terraine's biography of Haig published in 1990 (which I'm trying to track down).

Even the esteemed John Keegan remains agnostic on the subject of alternatives - concluding, IIRC, that revised tactical doctrine would have made little difference in the overall direction of the war.  The only WWI leader who seemed to offer some original strategic thinking was Churchill whose Gallipoli adventure promised, at least initially, the prospect of outflanking the deadlocked western front.

cheers, mdh

 

[xavier]

Mdh:
Churchill? I say this with surprise because Keegan is quite scathing. Keegan assessed that Churchill was a strategic romantic . Implicitly Keegan lashes out at Churchill's Boy's adventures sense of strategy. I've always regarded Churchill's sense of strategy as rather imaginative but he often failed to think through important details like logistics

xavier

 

[mdh]

Churchill? I say this with surprise because Keegan is quite scathing. Keegan assessed that Churchill was a strategic romantic . Implicitly Keegan lashes out at Churchill's Boy's adventures sense of strategy. I've always regarded Churchill's sense of strategy as rather imaginative but he often failed to think through important details like logistics

Xavier

I think you might be overstating Keegan's assessment of Churchill (mind I'm going by what he's written in his history of World War One.) In fact Keegan is far more critical of Haig than Churchill. But the interesting thing about clever revisionist history is the level of cleverness; it rarely changes the analysis and perceptions of the original participants who, more often than not, got it right in the first place.

In any case Haig is tough guy to defend. As Keegan notes he managed to conduct the Somme offensive with an almost casual Edwardian serenity that many interpreted as callousness.  Haig seemed to possess a kind of supercilious piety and aristocratic insularity that later became symbolic for interwar intellectuals - especially those of a leftish persuasion. (Read Vera Brittain's Testament of Youth as a good example). (More demagogic marxists insisted that Haig's attitude was merely consistent with his class assumptions, in that 55,000 casualties were rather unfortunate, but that's what the working class was for.)

However Keegan really doesn't believe that WWI generals could have achieved much more even with inspired leadership. Europeans had invented fantastic technologies of defence, but offensive technology hadn't caught up. It's ironic that Churchill ruined his early political career after the Gallipoli fiasco while Haig managed to hang on after the Somme.

In this sense I think we should give some credit to Churchill for having tried an alternative strategy (which severely damaged his reputation at the time);an alternative never seems to have crossed Haig's mind.

cheers, mdh

 

[ExSarge]

It seems to me the many/most of the innovations in World War I were either at the tactical level, or technical in nature. Tanks, chemical agents, that sort of thing, were introduced and employed, but it seems to me that they didn't alter how missions were carried out at the operational level. The basic way offensives were carried out doesn't seem to have changed much during the course of the war, at least on the allied side.

This is perhaps the start of a new thread. Failure, or perceived failure of the leaders and staffs to adapt to the changing circumstances. I think the case can be made that the lack a systematic staff training prior to the war led to this. Leaders who were trained and spent their carears using 19 century tactics found it hard to adapts to the technical innovation's that required changes. Overly simplistic perhaps but I think it has some merit.

 

[mdh]

Leaders who were trained and spent their carears using 19 century tactics found it hard to adapts to the technical innovation's that required changes. Overly simplistic perhaps but I think it has some merit.

I don't think it's overly simplistic. The armies that went to war in August 1914 were for all intents and purposes 19th century armies. It's easy to forget that the high water mark of Victorianism, the Diamond Jubilee, had only taken place 17 years before. That's fewer years than Expo 86 in BC just as a point of comparison.

Moreover the common military experience of Victorian soldiers was war on the cheap; a hasty expedition here and there against insolent tribesmen. Haig himself (B.1861) was a product of the Victorian ethos and participated in the punitive expedition against Mahdi forces in Sudan (along with Churchill). Rank was almost always commensurate with one's social station, and inspired (or in many cases uninspired) amateurism was practically doctrine in the British Army of the period.

The Boer War (whose protracted course and near systemic incompetence caused a political scandal) overturned some of those assumptions, but not enough to make a difference in 1914.

Again in reference to Keegan, he refers to Haig as a "cavalry" general of the very conventional sort.  WWI was also their high water mark.  As Keegan notes in his introduction to an excellent series of essays called "Churchill's Generals", all of the leading British generals of the 1939-45 war who assumed positions of command and influence were infantry officers. 

cheers, mdh

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Again in reference to Keegan, he refers to Haig as a "cavalry" general of the very conventional sort.  WWI was also their high water mark.  As Keegan notes in his introduction to an excellent series of essays called "Churchill's Generals", all of the leading British generals of the 1939-45 war who assumed positions of command and influence were infantry officers. 

And Canada's tended to be Gunners - Crerar, Simonds, Roberts, Matthews etc....

 

[ExSarge]

And Canada's tended to be Gunners - Crerar, Simonds, Roberts, Matthews etc....

You forgot the best (Gunner that is) of the lot. McNaughton.

Interesting points though. Britian pushed forward, or more to the point, they pushed themselves forward those officers who had seen the horror, carnage and waste of the front line in WWI. Canada promoted the Gunners. The original "scientific" soldiers.

The above is not intended to reflect on the relative merits of either group, only to high light an interesting, well to me anyway, point.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

You forgot the best (Gunner that is) of the lot. McNaughton.

Interesting points though. Britian pushed forward, or more to the point, they pushed themselves forward those officers who had seen the horror, carnage and waste of the front line in WWI. Canada promoted the Gunners. The original "scientific" soldiers.

The above is not intended to reflect on the relative merits of either group, only to high light an interesting, well to me anyway, point.

Well, comparing McNaughton the scientist gunner to, say, the profane and blustering Vokes seems like apples and oranges. Competent, to be sure (though critics of his Moro River campaign would disagree, and I think Granatstein argues convincingly that he was unsuited to command an Armoured Division but did anyway due to a mixup between Foulkes and Vokes), but one of the few infantrymen to gain high command in the war.  Hoffmeister did too, but he was a militiaman and eventually commanded an armoured division (successfully). Keller was another example of a less than adequate commander that came from the infantry.