Government hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

I'll believe it when I see it.

 

[Maxman1]

To be clear I think the 149 could work. But traditionally, we've had medium-heavy helos for maritime and SAR. And those are the driving requirements. Any transport helicopter requirement in a combined scenario will be downstream of that. Not sure where the 149 lines up in the maritime and SAR role. But if it can work, then it could well be the choice. I wouldn't change numbers too much for TH either.

The 149 would be medium tac helo, and the minimum of 100 number comes from the original Griffon fleet. Maritime and SAR would be done by the 101, the latter it already does as the CH-149 Cormorant.

The 101 is big, has three engines instead of a twin pack. The maritime version is listed as carrying 26 troops seated or 38 standing, or four stretchers, and the transport version is listed at 30 troops seated or 45 standing, or 16 stretchers.

 

[FJAG]

“The other thing a lot of people don’t realize is that one of the policy decisions of the (Pierre) Trudeau government, which in hindsight was a big mistake, was to change the primary mission of the Armed Forces from one of defending Canadian sovereignty to being one of a more like an internal security force.”

I don't agree with that statement. The army maintained a primary mission with 4 CMBG as part of NATO in Germany and the the three Canadian combat groups and airborne regiment were aimed towards 1) force generating individual replacements for 4 CMBG and 2) defence of Canada.

There was no change to internal security as the primary mission. One must remember, however, the times. The US had been involved in a number of race riots and had called out the National Guard on a number of occasions (remember the Kent State shootings happened in 1970). There were also numerous anti-Vietnam War protests. Some of that washed over into Canada. Our own issues were with the FLQ which hit a high point of Oct 1970 when we deployed in force to the streets of Montreal and Ottawa and other places. Yes, we did learn riot control, vital point security and civil disorder types of skills, but those were secondary tasks and far from primary. If I was to put a percentage to it then we spent 98% of our time on gunnery training and 2% on internal security matters. It wasn't even close.

I'll blame Trudeau for a lot of things, but that wasn't one of them. I'll go a step further, when Europe put the boots to him about defence matters we did get some healthy upgrades like the Leopard tanks to replace the Centurions and kept us in Germany. His son was too stupid to realize the changing face of the world and the army's role in it. I don't begrudge the air force and the navy their capital programs - they needed them desperately - but politicians continue to have a blind spot as to the value of boots on the grounds.

I doubt we need bespoke units. We need capabilities, with soldiers trained to use them. What I mean is that we don't need soldiers with specialized training for opposed landings under fire unless we are prepared to risk them and prepared to do so on a scale that matters. That leaves capabilities for moving people by air and across beaches mostly unopposed during initial entry. Somewhere between "leg infantry" and "air assault", for example, there is "infantry capable of working with aviation".

Agreed. In the days of Hueys and Voyagers, we trained often with helicopters and, quite frankly at the sub-unit level its pretty easy to teach the fundamental drills and procedures. Planning air mobile missions and the sustainment of them at the unit and above level is different and needs a good understanding of what is within the realm of the possible.

There are a couple of reasons for Canada to have an armoured brigade.

The first is conditional. I'll assume our top-ranked scenarios leading to war all involve NATO. What is the mix of armoured and infantry brigades across NATO? If the alliance is a bit short on armoured formations, a Canadian contribution would be useful. This analysis should also be applied to artillery (shorthand for all things fire support) formations attached to echelons corps and above. Maybe we should also be able to contribute the modern equivalent of an AGRA, no matter how few divisions we have right now.

The analysis has been done - at least when NATO could rely on the US. The thing that was needed was manoeuvre brigades and specifically armoured brigades. Fire support and sustainment had been undervalued and also relied heavily on American combat support and combat service support brigades. In short, all three classes are needed.

The second is absolute. If we don't attempt to maintain the capabilities essential to running at least an armoured brigade, perhaps we ought to get out of the land game entirely. Either-or. The same applies to all the formation and major unit components of a division, really - mechanized brigade, artillery brigade, engineers, CSS, etc.

I agree with the basic premise that if we don't do Europe we don't need a big (or even moderate) mechanized army. We will, however, need a different type of army for the security of Canada's territorial integrity - everything from air transportable assault to air defence to ground based anti-ship capabilities to augment our very limited air and sea resources.

I reiterate that the minimum balance of armour required for an armoured brigade and armoured division are probably* the same: two armoured units in one brigade. That's all. Everything else is about stuff to support the operations and movement (tactical and operational) of an armoured formation. That includes a lot of infantry (preferably two brigades), appropriately equipped.

*based on historical observation, subject to ongoing operational analysis and validation

I'm quite flexible on force structure although my optimum scenario continues to use the existing army as the baseline. I think we ought to be able to comfortably commit a two brigade armoured division to Europe with its equipment forward deployed together with the equivalent of an armoured battle group with a slice of combat and combat service support. The rest is fly over. I can see one RegF brigade in Canada as the core to sustain that and to be the roto 0 flyover force. I see a second, light brigade totally focused on Canada. And I see a third RegF brigade broken up to be the leadership and training cadre for a minimum of four (3 armd/mech, 1 light, fully equipped) 30/70 to 20/80 reserve brigades and 200% of the CS and CSS needed in Europe to a) round out roto 0 with another brigade and CS and CSS; b) be the FG base for all rotos >0; and c) be the core for the growth of the army beyond its pre hostilities size.

On the topic of helicopters. When I see the structure of armoured brigades I see that around half the aviation brigade is made of recce/attack. I wonder if this is a field that should be going to unmanned systems of various sizes. As for lift, I see the value of medium lift for sustainment purposes but do wonder how much utility lift is really needed these days - can we create useful unmanned cargo carriers (a la Amazon concepts)? Medevac? I'm well aware of what aviation did during Afghanistan and the excellence of many of the crews there but will combat in Europe create an environment where much of that capability is subject to severe and rapid losses? IMHO it's far too early to talk about what version of a standard helicopter to use. It's time to rethink the whole aviation paradigm in light of need, risk and new technology.

 

[Maxman1]

Also, C-27 Spartan to replace the Kingfisher.

 

[ytz]

The 149 would be medium tac helo, and the minimum of 100 number comes from the original Griffon fleet.

Even replacing a 100 Griffons:

100 CH146 x 10 pax = 1000 pax total lift demand
53 AW-149 x 19 pax = 1007
39 AW-101 x 26 pax = 1014

And that's just looking at pax lift. If we go into the range-payload diagrams, you'll see the capability gaps of the AW149 and AW101 vs the CH146 widen substantially more.

Maritime and SAR would be done by the 101, the latter it already does as the CH-149 Cormorant.

The 101 is big, has three engines instead of a twin pack. The maritime version is listed as carrying 26 troops seated or 38 standing, or four stretchers, and the transport version is listed at 30 troops seated or 45 standing, or 16 stretchers.

Well aware. And that size is what makes it so useful and why we bought it for SAR and MH roles. Three engines makes them so much more capable on what they can lift (even in an emergency where they lose one). It also comes with a lot more range. And the real kicker: a ramp.

The only reason people think it's too big for Air Assault is because of anchoring bias around how the Americans do things (Blackhawks) and what we have today (Griffons). But I don't think anybody would say the UK is missing something for using these for air assault. They have now moved from the RAF as the main transport helicopter for the army to the RN as the main transport helicopter for the Royal Marines.

If you're wondering, "Well, why would I want to fly in with vehicles?" Cause no near-peer is letting you fly right onto an objective:

Also, C-27 Spartan to replace the Kingfisher.

Only if we're agreeing to get rid of the Hercs and replace them with A400Ms like the Brits did. Otherwise, just buy more stubby Hercs and collect the benefit of commonality.

 

[MilEME09]

Also, C-27 Spartan to replace the Kingfisher.

C27 lost for good reason to the kingfisher

 

[Maxman1]

C27 lost for good reason to the kingfisher

Because Airbus was the right company with the wrong product, and the specifications were lowered until the Kingfisher passed.

 

[MilEME09]

Because Airbus was the right company with the wrong product, and the specifications were lowered until the Kingfisher passed.

more likely the specifications were changed because we keep catching the CAF tailoring requirements to angle towards a clear choice they want, and to make it a fair competition and avoid law suits we had to change the requirements.

 

[ytz]

more likely the specifications were changed because we keep catching the CAF tailoring requirements to angle towards a clear choice they want, and to make it a fair competition and avoid law suits we had to change the requirements.

Due to gridlock the PMO was basically bullied into turning some mandatories into rated. That then allowed the 295 to win on price and industrial benefits. It's unfortunate, having burned a ton of political capital on other sole-source projects (C17, C130, etc), the government of the day didn't want a competition that came down to the Spartan and the Herc. Industry wanted a more competitive process to maximize their leverage for IRBs.

 

[dapaterson]

C17 was ACAN, not sole source.

 

[suffolkowner]

Close. But a real frustration has been how much we've skimped and lost organizational efficiency with the helo fleets.

We have 25 Cyclones right now. Those basically support 12 frigates, 6 AOPS and 12 MCDVs. We should be closer to 1:1 between ships and helicopters. And there needs to be enough to fill the maintenance pipeline and an attrition reserve.

The AOPS and MCDV's dont support Cyclone operations though?
35 was the original MH number i think

 

[ytz]

The AOPS and MCDV's dont support Cyclone operations though?
35 was the original MH number i think

They don't have them onboard. That doesn't mean there's no demand for Maritime Helicopter support to them. The helos should be providing them various forms of support close to Canada. Basically you need to actually force generate detachments for the 15 DDGs and two oilers, and then for some support dets to the rest of the fleet in and around Canadian waters. That's going to be somewhere around 25 frames total. Then add on OTU and some attrition reserve/maintenance pipeline. Probably in the ballpark of 30-35 frames.

 

[ytz]

C17 was ACAN, not sole source.

I say "sole source" colloquially. As far as Canadian industry was concerned, it was almost the same thing. As in more IRBs could not be leveraged.

 

[Kirkhill]

Porcupines for all...

Four Porcupines: Scandinavia, The Baltic, The Centre, The Black Sea.
Manpower light, Tech heavy.
Backed by Long Range Precision Fires
UK and France in Mobile Reserve
UK and France Nuclear Deterrent.

3-5 years to implement
0.5-1.0% of GDP over and above current expenditures.

Russian rearmament anticipated to take 5-7 years. US took 10 years after Vietnam.

Can we add a Canadian Porcupine?

I reckon each porcupine would be based on the equivalent of a Multi-Domain Task Force.

....

If we do this then rather than ditching the American kit, we ensure that we have both American and Non-American (Eurasian) kit. Maybe even some Latin American kit as well.

Porcupine for Putin: How Europe can defend itself against Russia

Europe must move, no matter how things unfold

www.telegraph.co.uk

The Trumpian view of Europe and its relevance to the United States is no longer shrouded in hope and uncertainty. The question is how far America First policies will raise the metaphorical drawbridge over the Atlantic. While everyone wants the US to remain an integral part of Nato, Europe would be wise to act proactively now.

It is possible that the Trump peace plan for Ukraine will come at great cost to Ukraine. Russia may make few concessions to guarantee a lasting settlement. Europe will probably be forced to become the de facto guardian of Ukraine’s future as America cuts its military responsibilities and guarantees, in the belief that American investment in developing Ukraine’s minerals will suffice to deter Russia. The crucial question is – what happens when or if Russia continues its aggression.

What could be the most effective and least costly option?

Based on a multi-dimensional geopolitical and military analysis, our proposed option is a modified form of the so-called “Porcupine Defence” underwritten by a combined and re-tailored British-French nuclear deterrent for Europe as suggested by French President Emmanuel Macron. This strategy exploits Europe’s dramatic advantages in population size, GDP and conventional military forces and faces up to Russia’s a significant lead in theatre nuclear weapons. A Porcupine Defence could be fielded within 3-5 years with an affordable increase of 0.5 to 1 per cent of GDP in defence spending.

The aim of this Porcupine Defence is to guarantee such disruption and damage on any Russian military thrust west as to make aggression too expensive to contemplate. The Ukraine War has showed how Porcupine would work. And Europe surely has the resources and technology for this defence.

Russia has exhausted an overwhelming preponderance of its offensive military power in Ukraine. The US took more than a decade to recover from the post-Vietnam “hollow force”: for Moscow, it would probably take 5-7 years or more to rebuild its army. Europe has time to implement a Porcupine Defence, if it starts now.

Porcupine would be deployed to cover the four most likely axes of advance for any Russian attack: the North Cape and Kola; the Baltics, St Petersburg and Kaliningrad; the south-centre oriented around Poland; and the Turkish straits blocking the Black Sea. The defence would be anchored around a willing coalition of Nato and EU states to include Norway, Sweden and Finland in the north; the Baltics, Denmark, Germany, and Holland; Poland and the Czech Republic in the south centre; and Greece, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria on the Black Sea. The UK and France could provide mobile reserve forces held in depth.

The technologies are well known and based on massive swarms of air, sea and land drones; AI, command, computer, communications, surveillance, targeting, decision-making and control systems; land and sea mines; anti-air, land and sea stand-off weapons; electronics, jamming and counter-jamming systems; reserve low earth orbiter satellites; 3D printing and advanced and additive manufacturing logistics and other related systems. Sufficient long range firepower for follow on forces attack/deep strike will disrupt enemy logistics and decapitate senior leaders.

Porcupine will require skilful and rapid innovation, meaning decentralisation of command and control and major reorganisation and training to ensure its military effectiveness. This will be challenging in the short term but it is achievable and the operational benefits will be huge. The obvious strategic weakness of Porcupine is if the war is not short: the Anglo-French nuclear deterrent covers that contingency.

The USSR and Russia have been and are paranoid about nuclear weapons, the ultimate war winners or losers in their concept and doctrine for war. Along with the threat of nuclear weapons’ use is the will to use them. Interestingly, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s determination to retake the Falklands after Argentina’s 1982 invasion heavily influenced Moscow’s nuclear paranoia. That fear still lingers.

If Russia moved west and did somehow manage to break through the defences, facing an existential danger Britain and France could target Moscow and St Petersburg with dozens of weapons as well as the attacking forces. Beyond a natural reluctance to take such a risk, Russia would understand that any massive retaliation would leave America’s 1550 nuclear warheads along with China’s as controlling the future strategic balance to Russia’s disadvantage, thus further reinforcing deterrence.

Whether or not the current trajectory of Trump’s America First policies forces Europe to reconsider its security and defence, prudence demands that preliminary action be taken to begin planning for this future now. Europe simply cannot wait. And we believe that a Porcupine Defence will best fit European and alliance needs to keep the peace.

---

General The Lord David Richards is a former Chief of Defence Staff – the professional head of the UK armed forces. Dr Harlan Ullman, a noted defence expert, has advised a number of governments and ministries of defence on these issues

 

[GR66]

Porcupines for all...

Four Porcupines: Scandinavia, The Baltic, The Centre, The Black Sea.
Manpower light, Tech heavy.
Backed by Long Range Precision Fires
UK and France in Mobile Reserve
UK and France Nuclear Deterrent.

3-5 years to implement
0.5-1.0% of GDP over and above current expenditures.

Russian rearmament anticipated to take 5-7 years. US took 10 years after Vietnam.

Can we add a Canadian Porcupine?

I reckon each porcupine would be based on the equivalent of a Multi-Domain Task Force.

....

If we do this then rather than ditching the American kit, we ensure that we have both American and Non-American (Eurasian) kit. Maybe even some Latin American kit as well.

Porcupine for Putin: How Europe can defend itself against Russia

Europe must move, no matter how things unfold

www.telegraph.co.uk

The problem I see with France and the UK providing a mobile reserve and nuclear fall-back option if the Russians break through the porcupines is that I don't think the Russians need to break through in order to achieve their strategic goals. I also don't think they need to take on all of the porcupines at the same time.

Securing non-NATO Ukraine would move the front all the way to the Polish/Ukrainian border and the physical defence provided by the Carpathian Mountains. It would also give them a direct land link to pro-Russian Hungary driving a wedge between Northern and Southern NATO countries.

Taking non-NATO Moldova would also push the Russian border Westward and only the small portion of Romania laying East of the Carpathians would need to be taken to reach that physical barrier and put Bucharest under threat of aerial attack. This could possibly be done under the guise of a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine (with Russian military backing). No major breakthrough to be countered...the land in question could possibly even be taken before NATO has much chance to respond.

Taking the Baltic States would greatly shorten Russia's border with NATO and restore direct access to Kaliningrad. Again this could possibly be achieved using Russian-backed "separatist" forces within the Baltic States. Would NATO forces be willing to help the Baltic governments put down civil unrest in their countries? NATO troops shooting at protesting "civilians"?

Finland would be much more difficult for Russia but perhaps if the above scenarios were successful then maybe the Finns could be pressured into resuming neutrality and leaving a NATO which was already shown to be ineffective in protecting other other NATO members. Even if Russia did need to attack Finland it would only have to take the Southern portion in order to greatly reduce its front line, push NATO back from St. Petersburg and secure the Gulf of Finland.

None of these scenarios requires Russia to "break through" Polish, German, French, British, Swedish, Norwegian, etc. forces. triggering a threat of French/UK nuclear response. Ukraine needs to be secured as a Belarussian-style client state and without NATO security guarantees Russia will have time to work on that with both internal and external pressure.

The Southern front can be secured by taking non-NATO Moldova and a small portion of Romania. Can the Baltic States be overthrown by a combination of internal unrest and "little green men"? They are pretty defiant right now but if Russia manages a "win" in Ukraine due to Western weakness they may not have much faith in their NATO alliance members. Same with Finland. They previously held to a neutral stance with Russia due to being so exposed to potential invasion. If faith in NATO is shattered could they decide to return to that policy? Would NATO defend a non-NATO Finland if Russia were to invade?

 

[Czech_pivo]

Can anyone envision a scenario where we get a dozen French Blackswords AND down the road French nucs on them?

 

[Good2Golf]

The Brits do just fine using 101s as a transport helicopter.

Because they have ~60 Chinooks, second largest Hook fleet after the US Army.

The 101 is big mediummy , has three engines instead of a twin pack. The maritime version is listed as carrying 26 troops seated or 38 standing, or four stretchers, and the transport version is listed at 30 troops seated or 45 standing, or 16 stretchers.

It’s only 17t all up and can only put 4.1t on its single hook. Chinook is 26t and puts 10-12t on 1/2/3 hooks.

C17 was ACAN, not sole source.

I say "sole source" colloquially. As far as Canadian industry was concerned, it was almost the same thing. As in more IRBs could not be leveraged.

PSPC vernacular is “single bidder compliant.” C-130J for ACP-T and CH-147F for MHLH were also both “single bidder compliant.”

ACAN (Advance Contract Award Notification) is a step that PSPC uses to notify industry that it intends to proceed with vendor ‘X’ on date ‘Y.’ Other vendors who believe they can meet the mandatory requirements may contest the ACAN. They don’t have to be right…but they can contest…like Leonardo did, when it contested the Chinook ACAN. PSPC asked Leonardo if they could lift an M777?….Leonardo withdrew its contest of the ACAN.

 

[GR66]

Can anyone envision a scenario where we get a dozen French Blackswords AND down the road French nucs on them?

Why would France want to give us nuclear weapons? Also that would require both Canada and France withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty.

 

[Kirkhill]

The problem I see with France and the UK providing a mobile reserve and nuclear fall-back option if the Russians break through the porcupines is that I don't think the Russians need to break through in order to achieve their strategic goals. I also don't think they need to take on all of the porcupines at the same time.

Securing non-NATO Ukraine would move the front all the way to the Polish/Ukrainian border and the physical defence provided by the Carpathian Mountains. It would also give them a direct land link to pro-Russian Hungary driving a wedge between Northern and Southern NATO countries.

Taking non-NATO Moldova would also push the Russian border Westward and only the small portion of Romania laying East of the Carpathians would need to be taken to reach that physical barrier and put Bucharest under threat of aerial attack. This could possibly be done under the guise of a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine (with Russian military backing). No major breakthrough to be countered...the land in question could possibly even be taken before NATO has much chance to respond.

Taking the Baltic States would greatly shorten Russia's border with NATO and restore direct access to Kaliningrad. Again this could possibly be achieved using Russian-backed "separatist" forces within the Baltic States. Would NATO forces be willing to help the Baltic governments put down civil unrest in their countries? NATO troops shooting at protesting "civilians"?

Finland would be much more difficult for Russia but perhaps if the above scenarios were successful then maybe the Finns could be pressured into resuming neutrality and leaving a NATO which was already shown to be ineffective in protecting other other NATO members. Even if Russia did need to attack Finland it would only have to take the Southern portion in order to greatly reduce its front line, push NATO back from St. Petersburg and secure the Gulf of Finland.

None of these scenarios requires Russia to "break through" Polish, German, French, British, Swedish, Norwegian, etc. forces. triggering a threat of French/UK nuclear response. Ukraine needs to be secured as a Belarussian-style client state and without NATO security guarantees Russia will have time to work on that with both internal and external pressure.

The Southern front can be secured by taking non-NATO Moldova and a small portion of Romania. Can the Baltic States be overthrown by a combination of internal unrest and "little green men"? They are pretty defiant right now but if Russia manages a "win" in Ukraine due to Western weakness they may not have much faith in their NATO alliance members. Same with Finland. They previously held to a neutral stance with Russia due to being so exposed to potential invasion. If faith in NATO is shattered could they decide to return to that policy? Would NATO defend a non-NATO Finland if Russia were to invade?

Can they do all of that simultaneously? What happens if they get crowded all along the line? There is no need to push to Moscow. Moscow would get perturbed if they lost the Kola, Kaliningrad and St Petersburg. Concurrent loss of access to Crimea through Euro-Turkic domination of the Black Sea. The job for the Poles, with the Brits and the French, then becomes to hold in the centre - which is what a Schiltron (oops sorry, porcupine) is optimized for.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Why would France want to give us nuclear weapons? Also that would require both Canada and France withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty.

I’m just spit balling here.
I’d say the odds of Poland getting nucs has gone up substantially over the last month.
Same with Taiwan, South Korea and even the Baltics.

 

[ytz]

Can anyone envision a scenario where we get a dozen French Blackswords

Yes.

AND down the road French nucs on them?

No.