Infantry of Tomorrow

[a_majoor]

Lots of good points so far.

I am not wedded to the idea of 3X3X3 sections, but am pointing out some simple alternatives. Adding three more riflemen to a platoon is much easier than, say, advocating a 12 man section. The arguments for a modular structure built around 4 man "bricks" are also persuasive: we might be in for a mud wrestling match between advocates of a British style system based on "4" and a Marine system based on "3" man teams. Since each force has had operational experience using these structures, there are lots of lessons learned to explore.

Sometimes, the operational situation unfolds in a manner that demands "physical" battle on the tactical level.  For some reason, I don't think Marines could bypass enemy strongpoints in Fallujah to "drive on to their center of gravity".  I would venture that the insurgents barricaded up in a mosque or a school was the "center of gravity".

Attacking the enemy morale is an important aspect of war, I hope I didn't come off sounding like that should be the only aspect, when all else fails, we still need to get in there and force the enemy out at the point of a bayonet. However, we have concentrated exclusively on the direct assault, which is costly in logistics, manpower and time, and has the potential to hand the enemy propaganda victories (like Peter Arnot's infamous [and never confirmed] allegation that an American officer told him "We had to destroy the villiage in order to save it").

Finding the enemy center of gravity is a higher level task than the section or platoon in battle, and I would suggest the evidence so far about Fallujia suggests the Americans did a great job in the set-up for the battle. The Jihadi leaders fled through the loose cordon during the build-up phase, leaving the fighters uncoordinated and possibly demoralized before the first Marines entered the city. Parallel actions in the surrounding area further disrupted the Jihadis by killing or capturing them before they could establish new cells outside of Fallujia. Section and Platoon tactics in that case involved mopping up local strong points rather than a grinding "Stalingrad" or "Ortona" type battle.

We also need to get a bit father out of the box. Maybe the level of organization should be the platoon or even company, like some of the examples Infanteer has raised. That would bring up a lot of interesting changes in training, TO&E, tactics and so on. Infanteer has raised a crucial question: how do we organize to transition seamlessly between tasks in a "three block war" scenario?

 

[KevinB]

Okay maybe I did not ellaborate very clearly.  I don't consider the Wainwright/Sufield section and Platoon attack likely to occur in the near future...

Section and Pl attacks in build up ares - I do - however gaining lodgement and operating in built up area the 4 man team is a more flexible building block than a 8 or ten man section.  The idea is with the four members one can be a specialist - breacher,DM,LMG,cooms,medic etc.  I fail to see why it requires more leadership trg  - we used to have no hook private runing section attacks (live) during the RV days.  I dont like the sepaerate leader idea as it make us inflexible in that set piece.

I actually prefer a 12man section for Light Inf ops (adding a DM, C6team and a medic).

As for the Cav issue - I dotn see hwy a 011 crew cannot be a team with a 031 dismount section - but it make it more flexible to be able to conduct different type of missions that the curent set-up - it takes away from the inf system to expectthem to specialize in both light in vehicle operations 9crewing a LAV is a full time job and it will degrade your light skills accordingly)

 

[a_majoor]

I don't consider the Wainwright/Sufield section and Platoon attack likely to occur in the near future...

A section chases an enemy out of a building. The bad guy runs across the open field/parking lot in the back where some of his buddies are waiting...Even in an urban environment there will be some areas where traditional fire and movement might be appropriate. I can walk through areas of London where you abruptly transition from built up areas to vacant lots, green space or large parking areas, and I think most cities and towns have similar conditions

Section and Pl attacks in build up ares - I do - however gaining lodgement and operating in built up area the 4 man team is a more flexible building block than a 8 or ten man section. The idea is with the four members one can be a specialist - breacher,DM,LMG,cooms,medic etc. I fail to see why it requires more leadership trg - we used to have no hook private runing section attacks (live) during the RV days. I dont like the sepaerate leader idea as it make us inflexible in that set piece.

 

The consideration here is there is a need for more leaders, since each brick needs to be able to operate effectively on its own. Some possible ppermutationswould be 4 leader (team leader and 2I/C per brick); 3 leaders (3 X 3 man teams, 1 per team); 4 leaders (3 X 3 man teams, Section commander + one leader/team) and so on.

I actually prefer a 12man section for Light Inf ops (adding a DM, C6team and a medic).

Would this be a platoon with two large sections, or a 40+ man platoon with 3 large sections and the HQ section?

As for the Cav issue - I dotn see hwy a 011 crew cannot be a team with a 031 dismount section - but it make it more flexible to be able to conduct different type of missions that the curent set-up - it takes away from the inf system to expectthem to specialize in both light in vehicle operations 9crewing a LAV is a full time job and it will degrade your light skills accordingly)

The arguments go both ways. I favor having the crews being part of the same team "cap badge" wise, perhaps just having a different career progression than the dismounts, but that is more of a preference for morale and esprit de corps reasons than anything else.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Thank you guys...am learning a lot here. I have a question though:

Would issuing a 7.62 mm version of the C7 as a DMR help or hinder a section?

 

[foerestedwarrior]

The vast knowlege on this site is amazing, please continue.

 

[KevinB]

Ex-Dragoon - help it considerably.

The MRS does/will have a suppressor as well so the section and platton will be able to remove enemy with a great deal more stealth (not perfectly silent but at least shooters postion will be concealed).



a_majoor, your missing my point totally - the curent training done by the vast majority of the CF is antiquated.  I got exposed to some 'other assets" methods for 'trench' clearing and it was 110% more efficient and focused on the preservation of manpower.  I woudl not focus on the platoon at all - other than a collection of 10 bricks and one brick lead by a Lt/Capt...  I dont feel constrained by creating a section at all - just that for some operations the attachement of three bricks into a unit could be done.  A Pte can be a 2i/c you dont need the (woefully inadequate) PLQ system of todays forces to make you a leader - as I said before I saw no hook Pte's doing life fire section attacks and leading patrols during RV92 - the key was they had time in the field (3 months during RV) to learn their job skills and that of the men above...

If you keep the same capbadge and split the career progression you will get greater resentment IMHO - I don't think much of the 031's that want to live out of a LAV I think they are just wannabe tracktoads...
LAV Inf - half assing it since 1990 - cant run the LAV, and cant be Light Inf...

 

[a_majoor]

a_majoor, your missing my point totally - the current training done by the vast majority of the CF is antiquated.

Actually, I am in total agreement, having been a purveyor of training since about 1988. The erosion of training standards is a cause of great concern, but is probably best handled in another thread or forum. What I was trying to get at was the dispersion of smaller and smaller sub-sub-sub units (sections, bricks, squads or whatever) will require more leaders. I have also seen Pte's doing great jobs in leadership roles, and maybe all we need is some sort of OJT/"Selection" process to find and build leadership potential prior to putting a guy on course. My own mental model would be something like "outward bound" or the "Eco-challenge" race where small teams have to overcome obstacles together...

I got exposed to some 'other assets" methods for 'trench' clearing and it was 110% more efficient and focused on the preservation of manpower. I would not focus on the platoon at all - other than a collection of 10 bricks and one brick lead by a Lt/Capt... I don't feel constrained by creating a section at all - just that for some operations the attachment of three bricks into a unit could be done.

I am having a bit of difficulty visualizing this. Are there intermediate leadership positions (Sgt, WO) in this model? Are some bricks designated, armed and equipped as "support", "assault", "patrol" and so on? To my overactive imagination, this looks a bit like a Special Forces type of organization, with each brick containing specialists who are also cross trained (Patrol leader, Medic, Linguist, Communications)

If you keep the same capbadge and split the career progression you will get greater resentment IMHO - I don't think much of the 031's that want to live out of a LAV I think they are just wannabe tracktoads... LAV Inf - half assing it since 1990 - cant run the LAV, and cant be Light Inf...

The two schools of thought are the "Australian" model, which uses the Armoured Corps as a sort of taxi service, and the Marine model, where everyone in the LAV company is a Marine regardless of their actual employment. Any readers have actual experience in either force and can comment on the pros and cons?

 

[KevinB]

Not over active imagination at all  ;D

I agree it need a seperate thread to delv into training issues - I just was wonder though why a 4 man team needed a leadership 'backup" and the threeman did not?

Just egging you on...

 

[Kirkhill]

The combatants of World War I learned a number of lessons as they attempted to resolve how to increase dispersion in the face of increased firepower, while still maintaining some type of control over their squads and platoons. By increasing the training standards of the individual soldier they hoped to enable themselves to decentralize command and increase dispersion.2 Better trained soldiers could operate more effectively without direct supervision

One end of the spectrum of dispersion is a massed armed force in physical contact, slow to move, and under the direct observation and control of its senior leader. The opposite end of the spectrum is a force of individual skirmishers moving quickly and guided only by a general intent

I think that this is what KevinB is getting at.  That when dedicated troops (especially volunteers) have been given adequate training in the past then they are able to function well in dispersed formations and as individuals.  This has guided the Experimental Rifle Corps of 1805, various Rangers, Hussars, Jaegers, Commandos and Paras - some might describe these folks as common soldiers with extraordinarily big egos - but the fact is that their attitudes contributed to their professionalism and dedication to their tasks and training.

As cited by CWO3 Eby it also guided the German Stosstruppen and as others have alluded to it guided Currie's Corps.  Dispersion, training, knowledge of and dedication to the Commander's Intent has often resulted in significant battlefield success.  Too often in the past bodies have been grouped together not with the intent of concentrating firepower but instead to absorb casualties, maintain momentum and get enough people into the field so that the enemy is confronted with too rich a target environment and that the one individual necessary to complete the task will get through.  This is the theory behind Napoleon's columns and the Communist human wave assaults.

In World War I, we often talk of how well trained the Canadians were, but at what level did the training occur?  When you look at the casualty lists, for example the 10th Bn CEF, I think you will find that the Bn was reconstituted something like 6 or 7 times between April 22 1915 at its baptism by fire in St Juliens Woods and Nov 11 1918 in Mons or a period of 3 1/2 years or 40 months.  That effectively means that after every major "push" the battalion was reconstituted from the ground up around a cadre of survivors and those LOB.  The rest of the troops were trained on the ground within about six months to be able to operate as part of an "independent" small unit (section or platoon) under the command of a newly jumped up Sergeant or a "green" Lieutenant.  The flooding or swarming tactics that the Germans used in March 1918 were used by Currie in April 1917.

In further support of well trained troops operating in "multiples" as part of a swarm - the US Navy participated in a Millenium Joint Ex - they discovered that the greatest threat to their Capital Fleet operating in support of Shore operations was a mob - or swarm - of dedicated Jihadis in rubber dinghies with bombs on board - that has driven their push to a new class of cheap, lightly armed, manoeuverable Corvette for inshore work.

And finally - to highlight the impact one multiple can have on the battlefield - some months back it was reported in the British press that a Corporal in command of a "brick" of 4 young troops, supported by 2 or 3 Warrior fighting vehicles cleaned out an entrenched position of some 50 plus Jihadis.  He fixed bayonets, assaulted across 200 yards of open ground with covering fire from the Warriors, jumped into one end of the ditch and started killing.  He and his "brick" emerged from the other end of the ditch intact with 35 dead insurgents behind them and the rest running across the open desert.  The troops served with a well trained, conventional infantry regiment (Princess of Wales Royal Regiment).  These are not considered "elite" forces.  They are just dammed good soldiers.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

The two schools of thought are the "Australian" model, which uses the Armoured Corps as a sort of taxi service, and the Marine model, where everyone in the LAV company is a Marine regardless of their actual employment. Any readers have actual experience in either force and can comment on the pros and cons?

I have experience with the LAR/LAV company model as I serve in a Marine LAR company.

The closest translation of this would be to imagine that if in Canada you took a regiment such as the Royal Canadian Dragoons.  Everyone within that regiment regardless of whether they were a clerk, mechanic, supply tech, armoured crewman, etc. would all wear the RCD capbadge and all be Dragoons.

To expand upon this, if you were to add the TOWs (as part of the combat arms restructure) that were previously RCR soldiers, they would now trade in their green berets with RCR capbadges for black ones with the RCD Springbok and would be remustered into the the RCDs as Dragoons.

On the pro side:  
-Everyone views themselves as a team player, playing to the same standard.  This goes along way when sh*t hits the fan and to your left is Joe Mechanic, but you've got no qualms because you know that he can shoot, is fit, etc.
-You lose a lot of petty squabbling that I used to find present in the CFs between the different combat arms and support trades.  I don't think this ever elevated to the pont where it prevented anyone from getting the job done, but it adds alot of cohesion when everyone can identify with a single unit as their 'family', rather than a plug&play system that although people are members of a regiment, they rarely ever serve as an entirety with that regiment and are more often part of a 'task-force' environment.

On the con side:
-career progression does become problematic for those in trades that are not 'centre of focus' for the regiment, ie.  If the RCDs were to adopt the RCRs TOWs, those that are in TOWs may get stuck in a backwater platoon and cannot transition into other roles as necessary for career progression opportunities.  All military promotion scales are pyrmadical in form, but by isolating these pyramids into smaller ones, you really limit the 'gene pool' so to speak.
-Within these 'bastard children' support trade soldiers that are adopted by the regiment, they will get posted in and out and may not take up a true association with the regiment they are part of.  This I don't think is that much of a problem, as an average posting of 3 years would allow these people to form some good associations and if the regiment does its job properly and makes these soldiers truly feel like a welcome part of the family, this should be limited greatly.

Something to also note on the Con side, particularly here in the Marine Corps is that at the senior NCO and officer level you often lose alot of technical and tactical proficiency because leadership positions are open for anybody within the infantry field (as LAR is an infantry unit), regardless of whether they've got LAV experience.  There is a LAV Leader's Course, which is a rough equivalancy of a Canadian Crew Commander's course, but that's about it for formal career progression training for the LAV Leadership community

I've thought about this alot and I don't think that there is one right answer.  
On the one hand you could go with the Marine model and do another 'reunification' and have all soldiers wear the Canadian Army capbadge and go to a system of numbered units based on functional roles.  Ie. 1st Canadian Infantry Battalion, 3rd Canadian Light Armored Reconnaisance Battalion, etc.
On the other end of the spectrum you could go to a regimental system such as the US Army in that although regiments exist, individuals are posted in and out of them with great regularity.  Little association is given to the regiment as the home
And on a completely different hand (I'm beginning to look a bit like Shiva here with these multiple hands...) you've got the British model which maintains a soldier with their regiment as much as possible (save the support trades which take great pride in themselves, ie. REME).

 

[Infanteer]

A few different subjects here, so I'll see what I can address:

WHO's DRIVING?:

The way I see it, there are three possible approaches to solving combined arms cooperation and career structures of both the Infantry Officer and the Infantry Soldier.

Since I A Majoor gets to be king of the Armour thread, I'll usurp the throne here.   In my ideal system the Regiment would be tied to the Brigade level - all units within the Brigade would belong to the same regiment, irregardless of trade.   Formation of units and sub-units would not depend on which trade a guy was in (Infantry go into the Infantry Battalion, Arty goes into the Arty Regiment, Strats go here, etc, etc) but rather by operational requirement.  An Infantry Battalion could contain Arty (mortarmen), Engineers (Pioneer), Crewmen (LAV driver), and Infantry (Dismounts).  If the battalion is becoming the main Unit of Action (where the main level of Combined Arms exists) then it would be possible for a commander from any branch to command the battalion.

http://army.ca/forums/threads/19094.0.html

We've approached a few ways of leading up to this (a single branch - the combined arms).

That being said, we can choose three ways to roll our infantry:

1)   The "multi-tasked" approach.   I would hold this similar to the approach of the USMC.   A Marine Infantryman could find himself a mech trooper attacking from a Amphibious Tractor or a light infantry soldier fighting a battle in the Mountains of Afghanistan.   When Marines need their mech support, an independent LVP7 unit transports them (is this correct Matt?)

2)   The "rotating-task" approach.   This would be the approach the British Infantry takes.   There a set of tasks that the Infantry can be expected to undertake, and each battalion rotates through different tasks for a set period of time.   For say, 3 years, the battalion may focus on Jungle Warfare, while in the next three years it becomes an Armoured Infantry battalion that fights from Warriors.

3)   The "specialized-task" approach.   The US Army is a good example of this approach.   Different Infantry TO&E are created for different specializations.   In the US, there are Light Infantry Battalions (10th Mtn Div), Ranger Battalions (75th Ranger Reg), Parachute Battalions (82 Abn), Air-Assault Battalions (101st Airborne), and Mech Battalions (1st Infantry Division).

Canada's Infantry takes a little bit from both 1 and 3 (and 2 to an extent in the Light Battalions).   We have both delineated the Infantry between Mech (1st and 2nd Btns) and Light (3rd Btns) roles.   However, these battalions are all expected to be capable of jumping out of their roles if the operation requires it (2 PPCLI, a mech unit, acting as light infantry in Afghanistan; 3 PPCLI, light infantry, doing patrols in Cougers in Bosnia).

As for the ideal solution, I'm not to sure yet.   What do you guys feel?   Here is one possibility I have been playing with for a while:

A)   Split the Infantry formally between Light and Mech disciplines.   Each branch will be served by a separate career structure.   Perhaps the mech side can be merged with the Armoured side, creating the "Cavalry" MOC.   There are Cavalry Crewman (the drivers and gunners) and Cavalry Scouts (the dismounts).   The branch would be served by a common "Maneuver Officer" who focused on a combined Armour/Infantry Phase IV course.   A good discussion of it is here:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/17788.0.html

Meanwhile the "Infantry" branch would be formed out of the Light Battalions.   It would focus on Light Infantry Tactics and would focus on mid/low density conflicts where intimate support from mechanized/armoured assets could not be expected.   The branch would have an "Infantry Soldier" MOC and be served by the "Infantry Officer".   Seeing how this branch would lose the "mech turf" it would move to the SOC support role.   All infantry soldiers would be jump qualified and work intimately with Air Assault techniques (whirly-birds).

Whatever the solution, I think that the Infantry should get out of the driving/turret manning/crew commander business.   In my ideal "all arms regiment", even if we keep a "multi-tasked" approach for our Infantry, the Regimental Commander of the Brigade can send in crewmen with their LAV's to give the Infantry a lift if they need it.

Anyways, a little rambling on that subject to stir the pot.

THE INFANTRY BUILDING BLOCK

I'm starting to figure that section size isn't really an important issue.   We can peg an arbitrary number (Divide the platoon into 3 even parts) for administrative purposes but tactically, let the platoon commander organize the "blocks" as he feels.

A Platoon would consist of a couple "blocks" of support weapons (Carl G, C-6) as well as a HQ Block (Pltn Commander, Platoon NCO, signaller, Designated Marksman).   The rest are "Infantry Blocks" which the Platoon Commander uses tactically as he sees fit.   If he wants a good amount of fire support, he can (like the Marine Gazette Article) form a block of C-9 gunners to really suppress a target while one Sergeant leads an "Assault Section" formed of four Rifleman blocks.   Each block is commanded by a Corporal who is given a "Basic Infantry Leadership Course".   After a Corporal gains some experience in leading a block, he can take and "Advanced Infantry Leadership Course" to get promoted to Sergeant and in command of a group of blocks.

So, here is a theoretical Platoon organization:

1 x HQ Block - 5 pers: Platoon Commander (Lt.), Platoon NCO (WO), Platoon Signaller (Private), Platoon Designated Marksman / Driver (Private), Platoon Medic (Private)

1 x Command Block - This block contains 3 Sergeants who can be sent to command a Section of blocks grouped together

2 x Support Blocks - Each consists of 4 soldiers (1 x Corporal - 3 x Privates) who are trained to use act as either an 84 teams or a C-6 teams.  

6 x Assault Blocks - Each consists of 4 soldiers: 1 x Block Commander (Corporal), 2 x Riflemen (Privates), 1 x Grenadier (Private)

3 x LMG Blocks - Each contains 3 soldiers: 1 x Block Commander (Corporal), 2 x Light Machine Gunners with C-9.

Administratively, a more conventional approach is taken.

3 x sections of 12 soldiers (1 Sergeant, 1x LMG block, 2x Assault Block)
1 x HQ section of 13 soldiers (1 x Pltn Cmdr, 1 x Pltn NCO, Medic, Sig, DM, 2 x Support Blocks)

The "Modular Infantry Platoon Mk 1" will have 49 pers total.

Now, I know this idea is waayyy outside of the box, but I think it is a good "thought experiment".

Questions:

1)   Is this platoon formation getting too big?   49 pers can be a big platoon.

2)   Will this sort of doctrine lend itself to tactical instruction?   Will it be easily teachable and executable, or is it loading up a Platoon Commanders plate too much?

3)   How will the "Modular Infantry Platoon Mk1" fit into the Infantry Company?   Should doctrine include the ability of a company commander to take blocks from his platoons as he needs them?

4)   How flexible can a Platoon Commander and/or a Section (group of blocks) Commander be with the blocks?   Can he break blocks up if he wants to, or exchange pers in a block if neccessary?   Or should a block be left intact if possible.

Anyways, I'll stop for now.   These are just two ideas I've had rolling around in my head since this thread began.

Comments, Thoughts.

Infanteer.

 

[enfield]

Lots of detail Infanteer.
A comment on how many maneuvere elements you have in your model. I've always seen command and control as being built on a series of 3 or 4 maneuvere groups - 3 platoons in a company, 3 sections + weps det in a platoon,4 fireteams in a section, etc. This ratio, as I understood it, is used because the most elements any commander can properly control in a battle is 3-4. Anymore, and they get confused, and this seems reasonable.
Your model seems unwieldy. Giving the Platoon Commander enough specialized elements to be tailored to a situation is good, but if we go to far down that road, we can up with too much detail. I'm not sure we need to build so much flexibility into the system - on the ground, the system will adapt if it needs too.

One of the currents of Infantry warfare since 1914 has been the drift of heavier and more powerful weapons lower and lower down the chain, giving more firepower to individual soldiers and sections rather than keeping it up high. But here, I see a debate in tactics about 'Support' and 'Assault' elements in a section or platoon. Do we want to push heavier weapons (C6s, C9's, 203s) up higher, out of the sections to make them lighter and give the platoon a more directed punch? Or do we want to see all the firepower assets pushed down low? Do the lighter/smaller versions of some of our weapons justify pushing them down lower - para-Minimi's, para-Carl G's, etc.

For the LAV experts here - What are the implications of making the LAV crews Armoured? How intermeshed do the LAV crews and their dismounts be? Do they need to be based in the same building in garrison? Do they need to live together, or know each other?
Following one the British model Infanteer mentioned, can we have Armored keep and maintain the LAVs, and the maneuvere skills that go with them, while Infantry Battalions shuffle every few years between Mech and Light?
If we do seperate LAV crews and dismounts, can we re-org the Mechanized formation, integrating it more closely with Coyotes, MGS, and other Mech/Armour assets?

 

[Infanteer]

Lots of detail Infanteer.
A comment on how many maneuvere elements you have in your model. I've always seen command and control as being built on a series of 3 or 4 maneuvere groups - 3 platoons in a company, 3 sections + weps det in a platoon,4 fireteams in a section, etc. This ratio, as I understood it, is used because the most elements any commander can properly control in a battle is 3-4. Anymore, and they get confused, and this seems reasonable.
Your model seems unwieldy. Giving the Platoon Commander enough specialized elements to be tailored to a situation is good, but if we go to far down that road, we can up with too much detail. I'm not sure we need to build so much flexibility into the system - on the ground, the system will adapt if it needs too.

I think you're right on this one - I've always seen the 3+1 model of building units as the one that makes the most sense.  It would probably be easier from a doctrinal point of view to keep sections in a "hard" TO&E while trying to push the notion of flexibility onto aspiring platoon and section commanders.

Which brings us full circle back to two questions we're "stuck" on:

1)  What would be the ideal arrangement of the section

2)  We aren't going above the section level too much.  Do we have to hammer it down first before addressing the platoon, company and battalion?  Does anyone have any ideas of the Infantry sub-units and units of the future?

 

[Kirkhill]

Here's another thought:

Basic Principles -   Hold organization stable but cross-train troops and supply Coy/Platoon with an arsenal of weapons that the Command Structure can tailor to task
                     - Company is an autonomous Plug'n'play element.

Organization

Close Combat Elements - 6 Multiples of 4 infanteers, organized into 3 Sections, each with a Senior Multiple commanded by a Sergeant and Junior Multiple commanded by a Corporal

Support Elements - 2 Multiples of 4 Infanteers, organized into 1 Section, with a Senior and Junior Multiple commanded as in the Close Combat Elements

Command Element - 1 Multiple of 4 Infanteers consisting of PL, P2i/c, 2x Dr/Sigs


Tasks

Close Terrain - Close Combat Elements equipped to fight at ranges less than 200m, Support Elements equipped to supply Fire Support out to 800m, Command Element equipped for Self-Defense

Open Terrain - Close Combat Elements equipped to fight at ranges out to 800m, Support Elements equipped to supply DF Support out to 1800m (C6 SF) and AT Support out to 600m, Support reinforced from Coy with 2000m AT capability,   Command Element equipped for Self-Defense.


Arsenal

Personal Weapon - C7/C8
Support Weapons - Close Combat - C7-HB (with AP rounds?), C9, M203 or Equivalent, M72
Support Weapons - Fire Support - AR-10, C6 (With SF Kit), CG-84, Eryx, 60mm Mortar (Handheld)
Sighting Systems - Suitable to Task

Training -
Close Combat Elements trained on all 5.56 systems, M203 and M72 as well as senior soldiers trained on CG-84
Support Elements trained on all Platoon Weapons
Command Elements trained on all Platoon Weapons (Dr/Sigs primarily responsible for 60mm Mortars)

Company Support
Company holds 2-8 Multiples (depending on manning restrictions) (either a Section or possibly even a 4th Platoon) primarily tasked for Fire Support out to 1800-2000m.   Secondary role as Close Combat Elements
Arsenal to include: C6-SF, HMG, AMRs, ALAWS, 60mm Mortars with Base-Plates.

This all assumes a dismounted, light role.

There would be 3 different ways the Company could integrate the Mounted role.

1 - Light Vehicles (Unarmoured for Administrative Moves) - Platoon Support Elements would field Four Dr/Gunner pairs to man 4 Pl vehicles -   CCE and CE would be ride alongs in the Back.
1A - Light Vehicles (Light Armour applied locally for urban patrols) - Pl Support Elements Supply Dr/Gunner pairs - CCEs supply dismount Multiples (1 Multiple for two vehicles, one vehicle or even 2 Multiples per vehicle depending on operational need).

2 Light Armoured Vehicles - Attached Light Armour supplies Vehicle with Crew and Infantry piles into the back in Multiples depending on Mission

Some examples

For longer patrols 2 Vehicles may only carry one Multiple between them to supply a dismounted scouting capability

To supply a reasonable weight of dismounted capability for an independently tasked Troop or for local urban patrols then each vehicle will carry a full Multiple.   Troops could even be larger than   4 Vehicles (Perhaps we could consider 6-8 Car Troops augmentable with TUAs and/or MGSs for independent action.

As part of an Urban Quick Reaction Force, where troops will not be living in their vehicles and need only carry fighting order then perhaps each vehicle could carry two Multiples so as to safely carry an IS equipped force of useful size to the site of any urban crisis.

3.   The Light Armoured Force could/should have dedicated "Dragoons" that are permanently part of the LAV crew (one Multiple per vehicle) that could be attached to an Infantry force.

My preference is for a combination of 1/1A and 3   with the added capability of being able to throw additional Infanteers into the back for QRFs.   (There is a famous painting of the Scots Greys going into the Charge somewhere with a bunch of characters in skirts hanging from their stirrups (I think it was the Gordons but memory fades with age) an earlier example of the ad Hoc type of co-operation I am talking about).

Anyway my two cents worth......

Cheers.

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1210/p01s03-woiq.htm

This is a tale from the Christian Science Monitor about some of  Matt Fisher's buddies in Fallujah.  A USMC Light Armoured Company operating in an urban environment - scouts tasked as a Quick Reaction Force.

I note, just to be difficult, that despite all those talking about the need for "Heavy" armour there seems to be an awful lot of "Light" armoured LAVs, Strykers and even AAV7s (Amphibious Armoured Vehicles) being effectively employed in urban environments in combat support and service support roles.

 

[a_majoor]

I think Kirkhill has a well thought out layout, which has the flexibility to perform lots of tasks (mix & match multiples), without being too unweildy or large.

Without going into too much depth for now, I mught suggest the support multiples be armed with Javelin or Gill/Spike, not only to deal with armoured targets, but also to integrate a day/night/thermal sight system into the platoon for enhanced situational awareness. Some of the other weaponry being touted is probably more "nice to have", if I was to add one "new" weapon to the platoon I would go fro a C-7 with the HBAR and a better sight as the platoon marksman's weapon to avoid interoperability issues.

I also like the way Kirkhill has handled the mobility issue, but will read this and Infanteer's (the Pretender!) again in more detail over the weekend.

 

[KevinB]

Infanteer, You keeping the leaders out of the blocks TSK TSK...

In the world according to Kevin  :

Platoon - 10 blocks (48 pers)

#1  Lt/Capt, Sig, Rifleman, Grenadier   (these two Pte postions can drive)
#2  M/Cpl, Weapon Op, Rifleman, Grenadier
#3  Cpl, Weapon Op, Rifleman, LMG
#4 Sgt, Sig, Rifleman, Grenadier
#5 M/Cpl, Medic, Rifleman, LMG
#6 Cpl, Weapon Op, Rifleman, LMG
#7 Sgt, Sig, Rifleman, Grenadier
#8 MCpl, Weapon Op, Rifleman, LMG
#9 Cpl, Weapon Op, Rifleman, Grenadier
#10  WO, Medic, Rifleman, LMG

Coy orbat to follow

This gives 3 12man sections possible if nec and a 4 man Admin unit for the WO - I tuly despise removing leaders from elements.  In situtations were I have seen it doing CQB training and excersises The "leader" sends his sheep off to be killed while residing safetly behind...  Furthermore the way CQB breaks down the best method is to have dispersed leadership inbedded into th boots on the ground.

The weapon Op positions can be C6, Mortar (60mm) CarlG, MRS/DM, or Method of Entry specialist.
Primary armament would be the C8SFW with the team leader also getting a M203.

*Medic - more of a Inf TCCC/US Ranger Medic (not as detailed work as a 18D) type as the majority of CF medics seem to be adverse to using a personal weapon.



More after work...

 

[Kirkhill]

One other support weapon I would add to the Close Quarters Elements arsenal would be this one

http://www.worldsecurity-index.com/details.php?id=169

The Multi-shot 40mm grenade launcher.  That plus 2 C9s and a Multiple commander to coordinate support could be a useful element in some Close Quarters Actions I would think


By the way Kevin, I  like the extra bodies and giving the PL and the 2ic their own Multiples (2ic to control support I assume) and the Medic trained riflemen seems to me a nice touch.

 

[Infanteer]

Infanteer, You keeping the leaders out of the blocks TSK TSK...

I was running my proposal off the way the US does things with a section commander independent of the fire-teams.   Each block would be led by a Corporal who had some sort of "Junior Infantry Leadership Course".

Of course this notion is one for debate as well.

----

Since we seem to be getting into FIBUA/MOUT scenarios (which may distract us too much) I thought it would be nice to put this link up from SOCNET:

http://www.socnetcentral.com/vb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=917&highlight=Urban+Combat

Follow the thread if you have the time - its one of the finest I've ever read on SOCNET.   Tracy, a retired US Special Forces Warrant Officer, gives excellent insights into his experience in fighting in an urban setting (he's BTDT).

Here is an excerpt of his idea of platoon organization for city-fighting:

------------

Got quite a conversation going on with the equipment for Urban Warfare, so I'll try to elaborate:

1. Urban Warfare is three dimensional; we have to look UP and DOWN as well as all around. While we clear, we need 'angels' looking over us to watch our backs.

2. Urban Warfare is more like a continuous series of raids on prepared positions (buildings) than a movement-to-contact in a rural environment. Time is always lacking, so we can't prepare for raids the way we used to: plan one at a time and rehearse one at a time.

3. Urban Warfare is manpower intensive: a small three-story building that's 20m long and 20m wide can suck in an entire platoon for clearing. We haven't got the manpower.

4. Our intelligence system is not configured for Urban Warfare. Some new technology designed for Urban Warfare would really be nice; failing that, we have to fall back on providing our own intelligence as we go through the area.

Here's "Tracy's Theories and Rambling?s on Urban Warfare":

1. Make DAMN sure you have to go in to an Urban Area and clear it; it should be the LAST OPTION, not the first.

2. Task Organize and train for Urban Warfare: Split the force into two equal elements: Recon/Security and HQ/Assault. Always commit 50% (or more) of your force to R/S; believe me, you?ll need it.

3. The R/S Element has the MGs, AT Launchers, Snipers, Tanks, Mortars, etc. H/A has the Infantry, APCs, Breaching Equipment.

4. As goes the Recon, so goes the Assault. If your Recon Element screws up, the Assault Element will die; and the survivors will want to get even. Recon will find the ways to get in; and provide the cover needed for the Assault Teams to get into position. One of the most vulnerable times for the Assault Element is the Breach into the building. All buildings have a natural kill zone all the way around it?s perimeter, and the Assault has to go through that kill zone to get in and do their job.

5. The R/S element also prevents reinforcement AND escape. In general terms, the Urban Force moves like an inch-worm: R/S moves up, H/A catches up. First, R/S performs reconnaissance tasks; Second, they establish a cordon around the site; Third, they cover the approach of the H/A element; Fourth, the R/S element makes sure no one interferes with the H/A element while they?re working. During the assault, the R/S element will have to detach a sub-element to begin the reconnaissance of the next building; and start the process all over again. Communication with Higher and Adjacent Units is the R/S responsibility.

6. The R/S element should have more experienced urban fighters than the H/A. The reason is two-fold: First, they will have a better idea of what to look for. Second, they may have to go in and recover the H/A element if things go really bad.

7. The H/A element is the one that makes direct physical contact with enemy. They have fewer tasks to perform; but have a greater opportunity to die. They follow the R/S element into the area. When they?re moving, they also act as the mule train and bring the additional supplies: The supplies taken are: ?35MM?; Class 3 (Fuel), Class 5 (Ammo) Medical and Maintenance. This is also called the Combat Trains. H/A also provides and controls communications inside the Urban Warfare Unit, controls the overall operation and uses the R/S Element to relay information outside the unit.

8. The H/A element starts their work by dropping off the Combat Trains in a secure area marked by the R/S element. Then they begin their pre-combat checks and receive the intelligence from R/S. Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) will be critical for successful Urban Operations. Because there are so many buildings to clear in so little time, SOPs will help speed up and smooth out the process. Urban Fighters will not have the luxury of planning and rehearsing separate operations for every building.

9. Once they get all the information possible from R/S, the H/A will do their own leaders? reconnaissance to fill in any gaps and visualize the area. Oral operations orders are next, followed by movement to the Last Covered and Concealed Position (LCC). On the Go Signal, the H/A begins their Approach and Breach. R/S will have the heavy stuff with them, so it stands to reason that they can blow a breach for the H/A every once in a while. After the breach, the H/A enters and begins clearing the building. The HQ sub-element will position themselves where they can best control the operation. During the clearing, the HQ sub-element will call forward a small piece of the R/S to begin looking over the next building and provide a little extra security. Once the building is secured, H/A sends back for the Combat Train and brings the R/S element up to consolidate their position.

10. Then the fun starts all over again?

Organizational Ramblings:

Let?s look at an Infantry Platoon as an Urban Warfare Unit. Remember, this is my fantasy!

First, here?s the personnel to work with:
Platoon Leader
Platoon Sergeant
2 x Radio Operators
3 x Rifle Squads ( 1 Squad Leader, 2 x Fire Teams of 3 personnel each team (Rifle-Grenadier-SAW) )
1 x Weapons Squad (1 Squad Leader, 2 x two-man MG Teams, 1 x two-man AT team)
Attachments: 1 x Medic, 2 x Marksmen/Snipers, 1 x Forward Observer, 1 x Truck Driver (maybe!)

37 personnel total.

Extra Equipment:
3 x One-Meter-Wide Ladders; 4-5m long.
6 x 40m Abseiling Ropes.
3 x Grappling Hooks.
Flashlight per man for attachment to the rifle.
Knee and Elbow Pads for everyone.
Breaching Charges.
Sledge Hammers and Pry Bars.
Construction Material (plywood, poles, hammers, saws, nails, lashings, etc.)
Extra Hand Grenades (one per room to clear).
Extra Light AT Weapons (one per man).
Extra Explosive Demolition Material.
1 x Truck of some sort.


TASK ORGANIZATION FOR URBAN WARFARE:

Headquarters and Assault Element

HQ Sub-Element:
Platoon Leader
Radio Operator
Medic
Truck Driver

1st Assault Squad
Squad Leader
4 x Riflemen
1 x Grenadier
1 x SAW Gunner

2d Assault Squad
Squad Leader
4 x Riflemen
1 x Grenadier
1 x SAW Gunner

18 Personnel total in H/A


Reconnaissance and Security Element

R/S HQ and Commo Team:
Platoon Sergeant
Radio Operator
Forward Observer

1st R/S Squad:
Squad Leader
1 x Sniper
2 x Grenadiers
2 x SAW Gunners
1 x MG Gunner
1 x AT Gunner

2d R/S Squad:
Squad Leader
1 x Sniper
2 x Grenadiers
2 x SAW Gunners
1 x MG Gunner
1 x AT Gunner

19 personnel total in R/S

The biggest changes you can see are the two assault squads each exchanged a Grenadier and SAW gunner for two riflemen (the extra rifles came from the other rifle squad and the assistants to the Machine Gunners). Grenade Launchers have limited applicability inside a building because they have a minimum arming distance of about 14 meters. SAWs are not the preferred weapons of choice in room clearing. But a SAW can cover dangerous areas like hallways and stairwells.

Each Assault Squad clears one room at a time while providing its own local security.

The remaining rifle squad and weapons squad were split evenly to provide a recon and security capability. Actually, under the right conditions, one of those R/S squads could stop an enemy platoon dead in its tracks. Remember R/S has to prevent reinforcement also.

Now, If an Infantry Squad ( 9 personnel) is the Basic Urban Warfare Unit, I'd split it into a Light Fire Team of all rifles; and a Heavy Fire Team of Grenadiers and SAWs. I'd breach with the Heavy Team and roll the Light Team into the building.

Instead of keeping the Heavy on cordon security; I'd have the Heavy Team follow the Light Team as roving security inside the building. That way the Squad Leader isn't splitting his meager force. The Heavy Team can take point on the clearing when there's extra resistance.

 

[KevinB]

Ah Infanteer I understand now...

Unfortunately I think we have to get the fight in the cities mentality in our heads and leanr it and live it.   No one will sit dug in in an open plain and wait for us (can we agree on this?)
  Once we agree on this what areas that are left are what we consider complex terrain - Mountains, Forests and Urban areas...
These days even forests are not great to hide you Brigade in as it simply does not hide you like it did pre Space age.

So we are left digging folks out of mountain caves and cities.   Neither of which are particularly pleasant places to fight.

Noit wanting to disagree with "Tracy" but he was constraining himself to a US Inf Pl org.   If we start opening up our scope I think it is possible tailor the entity to a little bit better than that.


-----

Next Kevin's World Coy orbat...

I'd keep it into the same four man bricks.
OC - Sig - Driver - Rifleman (close protection)

2i/c same three others as OC

CSM - medic- driver- LMG

CQ - medic - driver - Grenadier

Sigs - 3 REAL Sigs - LMG

AMB - 3 medics - LMG (I like the idea of integral medicine as low down as we can go - ideally we coudl have a SF tpye medic with field surgical skils at this level)

I would hold the majority of weapons at the CQ and pool it - so a element could draw what it needs prior to an op - yet if no heavy's we needed (a low threat NEO task...) the weapon woudl be avail but the main force not encumbered.

Basically adding 24 pers for Coy HQ...
  4 "Platoon elements" per coy

Weapons held at Coy level
AR10T/SR-25 MRS   x 12
Mk19/GMG x4
Mk3 Karl Gustav x8
60mm Mortar - w/ C2 sight and baseplates x4
C6 GPMG x8
US Javelin x4

I am not a fan of the multishot GL's - as two versions I have seen have been dismal performers - I woudl however look at addtion FN shoot thru rifle grenades that can be quickly added to weapons - making the brick able to volley grneades if nec...


Now why the four platoons?

Well I like the idea of having the potential to split the Coy under the Coy commander and 2/ic - especially if doing Airmobile or Airborne Operations.   One "Troop" could secure the airhead while the other drove onto the objective.
In fact my original idea was two go with 2 platoons formed into a "Troop" but I figured there would be to much associate admin.

Of course I now have a 184man coy...