Infantry of Tomorrow

[Kirkhill]

Kevin

You are only 2 over a Bog Standard USMC Company.   They seem to handle it from Command and Control.

The only real questions with such a structure are:   how many would companies you deploy in both a KFOR and a PRT type mission?   how many would we need to maintain two KFORs indefinitely (say at least 3 coys at home for every coy deployed, 4 would be better?   how many officers billets are going to be left? and the big one how many can the tax-payer afford?

Cheers, Chris.

Could you still have an effective organization if you restricted yourself to 3 platoons and took the coy down to 146 All Ranks?

 

[enfield]

Kevin;
I notice in the Platoon you dispersed the heavy weapons across all the bricks and sections. Why? Does having them seperated like that make them more effective, and the platoon more versatile?
I see it as giving the platoon cmdr less effective control over his heavy weapons, since they're scattered around the battle field - usually the heavy weapons are near the LT, within his or the 2i/c's direct control, and the C6 is in his 'back pocket'. Are you trying to make each section/brick more independent and powerful? I do like the interchangable "weapons op" position, specialized to mission.

In the Coy Orbat you've done the opposite and centralized a massive weapons detachment - which I like, at that level.
Pooling the heavy weps at Coy level, and leaving the the assault force encumbered, is an excellent idea. But do we really need 12 Direct Marksman? I think they're an asset definitely lacking from the orbat now... but 12 seems like overkill.

How would you modiffy this, at all, for Mech?

 

[Infanteer]

I too am a fan of moving the 60mm mortar to the company level and having a dedicated mortar section for the company commander to call upon.   I can remember that in every company attack I did, this is what was done - may as well make it official.

As for support functions at the battalion level, I like some of the stuff I've seen coming out of the Light Infantry ideas in the CF.

For a LAV-less infantry battalion, the proposal I have in my hand lays out the support assets to be:

- A Combat Support Company consisting of a Recce Platoon, a Signals Platoon, and a Direct Fire Support Platoon.
- Engineer and Mortar assets would be attached from Arty or Engr as needed.

If I had it my way as the usurper, the LAV-less Infantry Battalion would have:

Combat Support Company:
- Signals Platoon

- Recce Platoon (With Sniper Section)

- Mortar Platoon (whether they are gunners or grunts, I don't care - it's the fact that the 81mm tubes are organic that is important)

- Pioneer Platoon (same as Mortars, what would the Pioneer platoon for a Light Battalion consist off - my guess is Assault Troops (flamethrowers, mines, explosives, etc, etc)

- And finally, the Direct Fire Support Platoon:   I've been reading some good stories about successful Marine Corps use of the same concept - they term it the Combined Anti-Armour Team (CAAT).   The Light Infantry Doctrine Paper I have lays out DFS platoon as follows:

- 10 x LUVW (the example uses the HMMVW, but perhaps a the Mercedes will work as well?)
- Four 8 man sections broken down into 4 man dets (1 car/det)
- One HQ Det containing DFS Platoon Commander, Driver, Signaller, Medic
- One Stores Det (in HMMVW or LSVW   ) containing DFS Platoon NCO and Storesman.

Each car is capable of dismounted/mounted capabilities with the following layouts:
- MG: M2 .50 cal ideally (C6 is also suitable, however, each car should have 1 or 2 GPMGs)
- Anti Armour: TOW?   If not, Javelin?
- Anti Aircraft: A shortrange Anti-Aircraft missile for point defence of light battalion.
- AGL: M-19 seems to be the logical choice.

This layout gives a Light Infantry Battalion a reasonable amount of firepower that is man portable if necessary, easily inserted into tricky places and yet mobile.

----

As for a Mech Infantry Battalion, the fact that the carriers are integral seems to indicate that support assets can be pushed farther down the chain (this is what the Americans have done with their "Stryker Brigade Group" Doctrine.   For example, at the company level you can have 120mm mortars in carriers (the new AMOS turret seems to be ideal).

This brings me to an important question of this discussion: Should Mech TO&E be different then Light Infantry TO&E?  If so, does this mean that tactical doctrine for the two is going to be different.  My current thought is "yes" because the inclusion of the Zulu callsigns (whether piloted by crewman or infantry guys) means a big difference in a whole gamut of factors (footprint, capability, area of "control", firepower, etc, etc).

 

[Kirkhill]

Four 8 man sections broken down into 4 man dets (1 car/det)

Infanteer, I think you will find the USMC only employs two men per car in their CAAT, driver and gunner.

At least as I understand the numbers in Death Ground.

 

[Infanteer]

Four 8 man sections broken down into 4 man dets (1 car/det)

Infanteer, I think you will find the USMC only employs two men per car in their CAAT, driver and gunner.

At least as I understand the numbers in Death Ground.

Probably, but my reference to the Marine CAAT's was the utility of light-vehicles mounted with heavy weapons systems as infantry support (I guess we can call them "technicals"?).

The 4man/car layout that I lifted from the Light Infantry paper would be arranged as so:

-Driver
-Det Commander
-Gunner
-Ammo-guy/assistant gunner

I figure the utility of a four-man team in a car is that if they are required to dismount with the weapon system, the team has the available manpower to handle both the weapon and sufficient ammo.

 

[Kirkhill]

Point taken.

Alternate position - 2 man veh in 2 veh tms with room to carry a 4 man dismount between them (maybe more depending on vehicle size)

Just a thought.

 

[Infanteer]

Point taken.

Alternate position - 2 man veh in 2 veh tms with room to carry a 4 man dismount between them (maybe more depending on vehicle size)

Just a thought.

Either way you cut it, it's still an 8 man section support team.  I guess the idea of the guys who wrote it out was to have a TO&E that fit either dimounted or mounted DFS roles.

 

[a_majoor]

Late to the party again, but I believe there is a move afoot to test a four platoon Coy at SG 05, with the current thinking being 3 dismounted platoons (as per) and a DF platoon kitted out with all the heavy weapons. This is just conceptual, so I am tossing it into the forum with a 30 second delay action fuse to see the results!

Circling back to the beginning, if the section is organized with the ability to operate as an independent entity for short periods of time, then the role and organization of the platoon also changes. The idea of the C-6 in the Pl commander's hip pocket might be moot, or irrelevant depending on the organizational model. In the first post, I used a variation of the Rwandan People's Front (RPF) section attack, which was designed to conserve resources and primarily disrupt the enemy morale. My guess was the platoon organized in this fashion would move in a column or "stack", with the platoon commander trailing behind the lead section and updating the trail sections of where to exploit the gaps the lead section was creating. The platoon 2I/C could bring up the "extra" heavy weapons to deal with a particularly hard point, and drop off "section packs" of resupply to the consolodating sections as the platoon moved past.

At company level, you might have the coy advancing "two up", with a reserve platoon to snake in behind whichever platoon is moving up the fastest. These principles would apply to all Light Infantry (LIB, airborn, airmobile or Reserve regiments). Mechanized Infantry would behave in almost the same way, with the vehicles serving as the "support group" (HMG, AGL or 25mm chain guns will really thicken up the support fire), and the platoon commander able to call organic DF and IF assets at short notice.

On the issue of "nice to have" kit, I would vote for a shoot through rifle grenade over a revolver type grenade launcher. If you want that much firepower, get an AGL. I would also like to see a "universal" grenade, i.e you can throw it like a "potato masher" or slip it over the muzzel of the rifle. This is a lot easier than having several natures of grenades.

One observation about the "brick" or "multiple" structure, it has a "back to the future" feel. WWI platoons were built around the Lewis gunner and his ammunition carriers, backed with some rifle grenadiers and a bunch of riflemen to protect the firepower on the move, and do the actual assault after the Lewis gun and the grenadiers suppressed the target. Substitue support bricks for lewis gun....

 

[Infanteer]

Late to the party again, but I believe there is a move afoot to test a four platoon Coy at SG 05, with the current thinking being 3 dismounted platoons (as per) and a DF platoon kitted out with all the heavy weapons. This is just conceptual, so I am tossing it into the forum with a 30 second delay action fuse to see the results!

That would be along the lines of the 3+1 rule.  A company has 3 Maneuver Platoons and a Support Platoon.

Circling back to the beginning, if the section is organized with the ability to operate as an independent entity for short periods of time, then the role and organization of the platoon also changes. The idea of the C-6 in the Pl commander's hip pocket might be moot, or irrelevant depending on the organizational model. In the first post, I used a variation of the Rwandan People's Front (RPF) section attack, which was designed to conserve resources and primarily disrupt the enemy morale. My guess was the platoon organized in this fashion would move in a column or "stack", with the platoon commander trailing behind the lead section and updating the trail sections of where to exploit the gaps the lead section was creating. The platoon 2I/C could bring up the "extra" heavy weapons to deal with a particularly hard point, and drop off "section packs" of resupply to the consolodating sections as the platoon moved past.

At company level, you might have the coy advancing "two up", with a reserve platoon to snake in behind whichever platoon is moving up the fastest. These principles would apply to all Light Infantry (LIB, airborn, airmobile or Reserve regiments). Mechanized Infantry would behave in almost the same way, with the vehicles serving as the "support group" (HMG, AGL or 25mm chain guns will really thicken up the support fire), and the platoon commander able to call organic DF and IF assets at short notice.

Why not carry your platoon level principle onto the company?  I'd argue that the lethality of modern firepower allows us to be even more conservative with commitment.  Have a Coy split Penetration/Suppression Roles between one of its platoons (plus it's organic support) and let the other two platoons become the Exploitation element, ready to slip by the action and exploit the breakthrough.

If needed, an additional platoon can "roll off" to aid with reducing the objective (leading to a three-way assault that you alluded to earlier) - or the commander can just picket the surface to allow more of the battalion commander's forces to move through the gap.  Either way, committing as few of your resources to the initial firefight should be the goal; it leaves more for you to play around with as the situation develops.

On the issue of "nice to have" kit, I would vote for a shoot through rifle grenade over a revolver type grenade launcher. If you want that much firepower, get an AGL. I would also like to see a "universal" grenade, i.e you can throw it like a "potato masher" or slip it over the muzzel of the rifle. This is a lot easier than having several natures of grenades.

I think that there should be a healthy mix of offensive and defensive grenades.  Chucking fragmentation grenades (defensive grenades) around on an assault when everybody is moving may tend to induce caution for safeties sake.  Offensive grenades can lead to much more fluid assaults in both training and battle.

One observation about the "brick" or "multiple" structure, it has a "back to the future" feel. WWI platoons were built around the Lewis gunner and his ammunition carriers, backed with some rifle grenadiers and a bunch of riflemen to protect the firepower on the move, and do the actual assault after the Lewis gun and the grenadiers suppressed the target. Substitute support bricks for lewis gun....

Perhaps this shows the level of ossification that has crept into our Army.  As Michael O'Leary pointed out in his article (the one used in the beginning of the "Thinking About the Section Attack" thread), we've slowly done away with the notion of the section as a divisible unit.

 

[KevinB]

Kevin;
I notice in the Platoon you dispersed the heavy weapons across all the bricks and sections. Why? Does having them seperated like that make them more effective, and the platoon more versatile?
I see it as giving the platoon cmdr less effective control over his heavy weapons, since they're scattered around the battle field - usually the heavy weapons are near the LT, within his or the 2i/c's direct control, and the C6 is in his 'back pocket'. Are you trying to make each section/brick more independent and powerful? I do like the interchangable "weapons op" position, specialized to mission.

In the Coy Orbat you've done the opposite and centralized a massive weapons detachment - which I like, at that level.
Pooling the heavy weps at Coy level, and leaving the the assault force encumbered, is an excellent idea. But do we really need 12 Direct Marksman? I think they're an asset definitely lacking from the orbat now... but 12 seems like overkill.

How would you modiffy this, at all, for Mech?

Whoops I was not clear enough
What I did was simply make the CQ responsible for all the "support" weapons.  In mech units the support weapons are divied up to the different sectiosn anyway - so the command LAV getting hit does not strip the Karl G etc...
Currently we have a tenedancy to allocate the mortar to the PL but we then steal them back for coy level ops (especially now w/o BN 81's)  The idea was the the CQ deploy with the items and have them available for the PL's to pull for missions when nec. -- and if the OC has the need simply to pull elements from the PL's into a Coy Wpn Det.




The DM gun (7.62) IS going to be a section weapon in the CF (reg force - there is ZERO plan to buy ANY for the reserves - like the C7CT, .338LM MRSWS and LRSWS... - OUR total farce at work again...)
There are many opportunites for the DM to be used.  Having been part of a QRF team in Afghan and involved in items like NEO contingency and Embassy "issues" with a detached PL (which is more and more common these days) I could easily employ 4 DM's for a PL (and I feel they should ideally be able to be grouped in pairs as well).  I'd love to offer a few "hypothtical scenarios" but I think Gunner and others might slap my pee pee for OPSEC breaches 

As a prevous Wpn Det Commander - and section comd and 2I/C - the Pl commander (the majority of the young ones) will not react properly when confronted with a "hasty attack" scenario - the majority will want to plan and detail and co-ord their forces - instead of either - withdrawing out of SA range (or outranking them with PL weapons - if possible), or consulting with higher and getting Arty or FA assets and possibly high INF assets to deal with the threat.  -- In the advent of minor opposition - then simple fix and destroy the elaborate orders makes your Hasty attack into a deliberate and my firm beleive if you need told hold anything more than a quick radio frag then go into a delib and use higher asstes.

Secondly the end state always seems to be a section attack or pl atk - if in doubt stay in the "box"  Now no matter how many time the DHTC cadre would explain to the Pl or COy that you want to enter a structure as quickly as possible and via multiple points - what happens?  Well sure enough the Lt or whatever decided screw it I can't control a mutlifaceted entrance and goes with one entry point and what happens the EN comes over and wipes out the PL...
Our officer centric army is facinated with control - as much as you hear about how flexible we are it is ALL BS - a good example that mnay here can rationalize with is the BC Fire's - as part of B Coy 1VP we deployed as the Vanguard to the 1st Fire (Barrier) and we sent out on PL sized tasks - heaven forbid we break down under the SME's (the Fire people...)  This was highlighted at the 2nd round - Kelowna where we went into structural fires the first night and my platoon got seperated (we rode on firetrucks for most of the night) Half the PL was plsit on one side without trnasport - so we simply hitched a ride - the system worked marvolously for we were workign 1 on one with the KFD firefighters and simply did as instrcted by the SME's - of course the ARMY could not fathom this concept for what were the SrSrNCO's (ie MWO's and above) and Officers to do? SO we proved our inflexibility again and the next day were all constitiuted back together under the dreaded chain of command and sent out to do meanial mop up jobs - for together with no SME's aroudn we were more of hinderance to real firefighting operations...

While my rant might not have been 100% in correlation to the topic at hand I was trying to demonstrate the demorlaisingly uphill battel that it will be in order for the Land Force to look outside the "box" as it where in order to tailor the force to the new missions at hand.

 

[Infanteer]

Good stuff.

As a prevous Wpn Det Commander - and section comd and 2I/C - the Pl commander (the majority of the young ones) will not react properly when confronted with a "hasty attack" scenario - the majority will want to plan and detail and co-ord their forces - instead of either - withdrawing out of SA range (or outranking them with PL weapons - if possible), or consulting with higher and getting Arty or FA assets and possibly high INF assets to deal with the threat. -- In the advent of minor opposition - then simple fix and destroy the elaborate orders makes your Hasty attack into a deliberate and my firm beleive if you need told hold anything more than a quick radio frag then go into a delib and use higher asstes.

Although this may be a doctrinal issue as opposed to a strictly infantry one, I agree with you.   I remember "hasty attacks" where the entire command group got togeather and the whole "school-book" process was laid out.   It seems to me that a chance "bump-and-grind" for a platoon should consist of a few spoken words, some hand signals, and away you go.

Interesting enough, the Germans (yes, I know, it's the Germans again) weren't too keen on written orders.   General Hermann von Balck would issue every order verbally - if it had to be written down then it was too complicated.

Remember, a plan is only a basis for change.

Secondly the end state always seems to be a section attack or pl atk - if in doubt stay in the "box" Now no matter how many time the DHTC cadre would explain to the Pl or COy that you want to enter a structure as quickly as possible and via multiple points - what happens? Well sure enough the Lt or whatever decided screw it I can't control a mutlifaceted entrance and goes with one entry point and what happens the EN comes over and wipes out the PL...

Our officer centric army is facinated with control - as much as you hear about how flexible we are it is ALL BS - a good example that mnay here can rationalize with is the BC Fire's - as part of B Coy 1VP we deployed as the Vanguard to the 1st Fire (Barrier) and we sent out on PL sized tasks - heaven forbid we break down under the SME's (the Fire people...) This was highlighted at the 2nd round - Kelowna where we went into structural fires the first night and my platoon got seperated (we rode on firetrucks for most of the night) Half the PL was plsit on one side without trnasport - so we simply hitched a ride - the system worked marvolously for we were workign 1 on one with the KFD firefighters and simply did as instrcted by the SME's - of course the ARMY could not fathom this concept for what were the SrSrNCO's (ie MWO's and above) and Officers to do? SO we proved our inflexibility again and the next day were all constitiuted back together under the dreaded chain of command and sent out to do meanial mop up jobs - for together with no SME's aroudn we were more of hinderance to real firefighting operations...

Interesting point.   Two thoughts:

1)   Since this thread seems to be indicating that the section/platoon will become a much bigger player in battles, then perhaps it is necessary to start ramming alot of capabilities and decision making further and further down the chain.

2)   Is it necessary to have every Platoon commanded by an Officer?   Would there be any value or advantage to having NCO's command a platoon or two, within the company.   It might be advantageous to get the most we can out of our Sr NCO's. (The Germans did this, I remember the hearing that the Canadians tried it, but it didn't quite work out)

 

[KevinB]

I agree 100% on verbal orders for hasty's - pref via radio so the "comand cell" does not need to break out lunch and discuss it together and adopt group think...

I always thought ALL ranks should start out on the same career stream - then break them into command and staff positions at Sgt say...

This would have a two fold advantage get rid of some of the "book smart only" officers and get rid of some of the dumb as a post troops (I hope at least) [not to worried about offending them here most can't spell computer let alone turn one on  ]

 

[a_majoor]

Ideal section attack orders:

"2I/C, cover that position. You and You, follow me!"

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Four 8 man sections broken down into 4 man dets (1 car/det)

Infanteer, I think you will find the USMC only employs two men per car in their CAAT, driver and gunner.

At least as I understand the numbers in Death Ground.

Actually the crew of a CAAT vehicle is normally 3; Driver, Vehicle Commander and Gunner.

Interesting thing about CAAT teams is that normally you have 3 sections of 6 vehicles (3 x. 50 cal/Mk19 and 3 x TOW) per section (each section commanded by a Staff Sergeant) to form a CAAT platoon (18 vehicles total), which is commanded by a 1st Lt.

On the Canadian side this is roughly equivalent to a "mud" recce. squadron which would be commanded by a Major.

 

[Kirkhill]

Quote from: Kirkhill on Yesterday at 16:43:35
Four 8 man sections broken down into 4 man dets (1 car/det)

Infanteer, I think you will find the USMC only employs two men per car in their CAAT, driver and gunner.

At least as I understand the numbers in Death Ground.


Actually the crew of a CAAT vehicle is normally 3; Driver, Vehicle Commander and Gunner.

Interesting thing about CAAT teams is that normally you have 3 sections of 6 vehicles (3 x. 50 cal/Mk19 and 3 x TOW) per section (each section commanded by a Staff Sergeant) to form a CAAT platoon (18 vehicles total), which is commanded by a 1st Lt.

On the Canadian side this is roughly equivalent to a "mud" recce. squadron which would be commanded by a Major.

Thanks for setting me straight on that Matt. 


Quick question for you. Can the platoon vehicles carry additional bodies on patrol? Do they ever operate that way? If so how many can you cram in?

Interesting about the rank structure. Offers some interesting insights to span of control issues as are being discussed on the Canadian Cavalry thread on this board. A "Squadron" made up of three, or even two of your USMC style Platoons (Troops) in addition to an 8 Car Coyote troop, and an Assault Troop with LAVs and MGSs might make an interesting mix.  Could offer a Major a real challenge.

I know.... Off topic and on tangent.

Who was suggesting a Combined Arms category in the Field?  George and McG?  I'm for it.

Cheers.

 

[a_majoor]

Span of command: A Marine LAV coy is a combined arms unit with mounted Infantry, DF (LAV_TOW) and IF (81 mm mortar) all integral to the unit, and under command of a Major, with a Captain 2I/C and 5 LT's commanding the individual platoons. (I may have missed someone). The ideal command and control relationship should be horizontal, fast and have low latency. Higher should be able to "look in" but not try to fight the tactical battle.

The impression I am getting is the Mech force should be very different from the light force, or am I misinterpreting Kirkhill's posts? A series of "technicals" with a small number of Dragoons able to dismount and do local clearing, close security tasks etc. would have utility in a low threat environment, but is it scaleable for medium/high threat environments?

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Kirkhill,

You easily put another 2 troops into a CAAT vehicle as you've still got 2 unoccupied seats in the HMMWV in the back as the gunner is standing.

Interestingly, the 22nd MEU that has just returned from ops. in Afghanistan where they were acting pretty much as the recce. element for the Battalion Landing Team's operations, conducting such things as route recce., convoy escort and cordon and search operations.  The CAAT platoon been reinforced with a rifle squad per CAAT section bringing the CAAT section to have 8 vehicles and 31 Marines per section.  The squad was mounted in 2 "highback"/cargo carrier HMMWVs with an expedient M240/C6-M249/C9 pintle mount above the cab.

This is roughly equivalent to having an Assault Troop integrated amongst the Recce. Troops within a squadron, or in today's "plug & play" Army, having an infantry section attached to each Recce. troop.

If it weren't such a PY issue, the recce. elements would benefit greatly from having 5 pers. per vehicle (3 crewmembers plus 2 dismounts) in addition to a 3 section Assault/Support Troop

Sorry, didn't mean to hijack this thread as I'm turning this into a recce. conversation rather than line infantry.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Span of command: A Marine LAV coy is a combined arms unit with mounted Infantry, DF (LAV_TOW) and IF (81 mm mortar) all integral to the unit, and under command of a Major, with a Captain 2I/C and 5 LT's commanding the individual platoons. (I may have missed someone). The ideal command and control relationship should be horizontal, fast and have low latency. Higher should be able to "look in" but not try to fight the tactical battle.

A_Majoor,  

Actually that model is really only applicable to Reserve Marine LAR units.   Active Duty the Coy. commander is a Captain and the XO (2ic) is a 1st Lt.   The platoon commanders are either 1st or 2nd Lt.s

On the reserve side it is more as you described, being that 99% of US Marine reserve officers served on active duty for 5 years before transferring to the reserve.   Their average rank upon transfer is 1st Lt. or Captain.   It's pretty common to have platoon commanders as Captains and your company commander as a Major.   In my case I had a platoon commander that was a Captain and on active duty had served as a company XO with 1st LAR prior to his transfer to the reserves.   Our XO billet was already filled when he transferred so he was given the position of a platoon commander.

For the most part the Marine Corps gives alot of responsibility to its NCOs and junior officers as evidenced in the case of the CAAT platoon from 22nd MEU which I've already discussed.   You've got SSgt.'s commanding sections of 8 vehicles/31 Marines per and a 1st Lt. commanding 24 vehicles/93 Marines total for the reinforced platoon.

 

[ArmyRick]

IMO, here is how I would organize the platoon

The Army Rick platoon is 28 strong (40 if we splice in a LAVIII section of 4 vehicles with 3 each, the LAV SGT will now command the LAV crews all the time or we can hand over the LAVs to the armour)

PL HQ (4)
-LT and a signaler
-WO and a signaler
Support Section (8)
-SGT (Comd, C6 Controller)
-MCPL (2IC, ALAWS Controller)
-2 x C6 Crews (2 pers each)
-ALAWS Crew (2 pers)
2 x 8 man Asault sections (as they are organized today)

-The sections can be broken down into 2 x 4 man bricks (as we do commonly for patrols) and this gives the PL comd 4 x 4 man bricks to command on the assault w/sig acting as his fire team partner

-The PL 2IC w/sig will command fire base (a heavy one as yoo note) and their is no section to leave with fire base elements

I can see a wee bit of a problem when advancing to contact on foot (the lead section traditionally forming the fire base with wpns det) however we can try a fire base releif or a very large fire base (oodles of suppresion) and a small assault element.

For mounting in the LAVs I would break the 4 assault groups (the half sections for those of you not aware of CF Infantry doctrine) and place one in each vehicle and then divide the support weapons and the HQ element evenly as possible but keeping crews together for support weapons and sigs w/their leaders.

When dismounting on the objective or in Urban Ops, a 4 man assault group launching right into battle is very important.

I would also like to see more FIBUA (or OBUA) mod included in the Infantry PLQ these days (lets face it, we are more than likely going to fight in town than some open plain)

What do you guys think ? (Yeah, ok, I have been drinking while typing but that shouldn't change your opinion too much? Now if the damn key board would just sit still...)

 

[SHARP WO]

Army Rick,

You have a nice concept, but I would see something more like this.

Pl Comd, Sig and Runner.
Pl 2i/c & Signaller.
Wpns det Comd and 2i/c.
C-6 crew x3(Far too often we have used the Det Comd or Det 2i/c as the Gun controller)
C-6 crew x3
84mm crew x3(the third man for carrying extra ammo)

8 man Infantry Section x3

Total 40 men for dismounted ops.

During A to C you need the extra gun for overwatch and it gives more protection to the lead Section.

SHARP WO (Dan Ruiter)