Infantry Tactics

[KevinB]

WRT Shooting the moon - I was talking on another thread about the predicaments in which Biden and Putin find themselves because they pitched grandiose plans and now have to try and salvage some kind of win from their failure to achieve a clear endstate. That is where the salesmanship issue arose.

You using the same analogy in this context confused me. I agree in general that when you start bargaining you should seize as much bargaining room as possible by aiming high.

Gotcha - I had missed that and was totally confused here with that.

But back to the issue of tactics.

WRT 4 PBIs wandering the universe seeking direction, we are in full agreement.

How about keeping them in military school a little longer, putting them under a seasoned Sergeant as part of a group of similar dispersed teams under command and control of a Lieutenant and a useful Warrant Officer.

Or follow D&B's experience.

Keeping in mind the British Cpl is the basic equivalent of the CAF Sgt or US Army SSGT.
I as you know am a huge fan of dispersed operations - and small teams.
But I also know what happens when a Layback Patrol under command of the Pathfinder Warrant goes sideways when the WO gets pulled out and the 6 PTE's he was mentoring end up alone to make their own 'plan' (caveat three of us had been M/Cpl's in the Reserves before becoming PPLCI - and we had all gone through PPLCI BSL)
*In my defense I thought it was a fantastic plan at the time. In hindsight it was a RFBI and while we got great training value out of it - we effectively ruined the Res Ex we where supporting.
I have also seen worse lost wanderings, and understand the need for a depth of training and experience in dispersed small unit operations.

I have nothing against a 4-6 man brick as a building block - in fact I think 6 is just about ideal - as it lets you put 6 GIB that are fairly autonomous as to transport method - most SOF Det's went from 4-6 as it allows longer continuous operations when needs - as well as while you can control a room with 4, it doesn't allow for any security front/rear or depth in case of PUC's or Injuries.

6 can also 3x2 or 2x3 in vehicles by themselves if need be.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Gotcha - I had missed that and was totally confused here with that.



Keeping in mind the British Cpl is the basic equivalent of the CAF Sgt or US Army SSGT.
I as you know am a huge fan of dispersed operations - and small teams.
But I also know what happens when a Layback Patrol under command of the Pathfinder Warrant goes sideways when the WO gets pulled out and the 6 PTE's he was mentoring end up alone to make their own 'plan' (caveat three of us had been M/Cpl's in the Reserves before becoming PPLCI - and we had all gone through PPLCI BSL)
*In my defense I thought it was a fantastic plan at the time. In hindsight it was a RFBI and while we got great training value out of it - we effectively ruined the Res Ex we where supporting.
I have also seen worse lost wanderings, and understand the need for a depth of training and experience in dispersed small unit operations.

I have nothing against a 4-6 man brick as a building block - in fact I think 6 is just about ideal - as it lets you put 6 GIB that are fairly autonomous as to transport method - most SOF Det's went from 4-6 as it allows longer continuous operations when needs - as well as while you can control a room with 4, it doesn't allow for any security front/rear or depth in case of PUC's or Injuries.

6 can also 3x2 or 2x3 in vehicles by themselves if need be.

Within our standard 12 man 'Multiple' we often split into 2 x 6 man teams.

Especially when you're carrying about 400lbs of ECM on your backs between you

 

[Kirkhill]

Fairly common place review ....

Soldier modernisation: lessons in lethality - Army Technology

Any new weapon systems that an army wants will add to the loads that its troops are already carrying on the battlefield.

www.army-technology.com

Except for this

New systems means more training​

But it is not just the weight of new equipment that is a factor. Ben Barry, senior land fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies told Army Technology: “In theory you can give a [tactical] drone to every soldier, but that gives every soldier something else to do and something else to be trained in – he’s got to be an expert.”

Barry explained that drone operators need to how and when to deploy drones. For example, they need to know if other aircraft are in the area and if they are friendly or not, that drones should not be used in the same airspace when firing mortars, or when right time and place to use a drone is considering GPS jamming. “Using a drone from a mile away also means being able to relate the drone to the ground, learning how to use it requires training and expertise,” he added.

The Ukrainians might disagree.

 

[KevinB]

Fairly common place review ....

Soldier modernisation: lessons in lethality - Army Technology

Any new weapon systems that an army wants will add to the loads that its troops are already carrying on the battlefield.

www.army-technology.com

Except for this



The Ukrainians might disagree.

They had had a lot of issues that don’t make the news with drones and Blue on Blue.
He’s not wrong

 

[Kirkhill]

They had had a lot of issues that don’t make the news with drones and Blue on Blue.
He’s not wrong

Sorry, but I am suspicious of guilds.

Just finished reading a GAO report from 1992 about Bradleys and Abrams. Americans klled a lot more of their own vehicles than the Iraqis did.

Guilds do not contribute to innovation.

 

[KevinB]

Sorry, but I am suspicious of guilds.

Just finished reading a GAO report from 1992 about Bradleys and Abrams. Americans klled a lot more of their own vehicles than the Iraqis did.

Guilds do not contribute to innovation.

You just highlighted why training is important

 

[OldSolduer]

You just highlighted why training is important

Especially AFV and AC recognition

 

[Kirkhill]

You just highlighted why training is important

Training is doing the same old thing in the same old way.....

 

[KevinB]

Training is doing the same old thing in the same old way.....

No it isn’t.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Speaking of the infantry fight, hand grenades seem to be heavily used. I suspect the issue of both thrown and propelled grenade usage is much higher than envisioned by Western Armies.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Speaking of the infantry fight, hand grenades seem to be heavily used. I suspect the issue of both thrown and propelled grenade usage is much higher than envisioned by Western Armies.

Based on the (largely Infantry led) infiltration tactics being used by the Russians, I can see a need for more Machine Gun/ AGL equipped direct fire platoons too.

Or Corps

Canadian Machine Gun Corps - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Seems like water/snow fed guns have comeback as well, I wonder if any of them remember how to do indirect fire with a MG?

 

[Kirkhill]

No it isn’t.

It isn't? Or it shouldn't be?

 

[Kirkhill]

Based on the (largely Infantry led) infiltration tactics being used by the Russians, I can see a need for more Machine Gun/ AGL equipped direct fire platoons too.

Or Corps

Canadian Machine Gun Corps - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

To recapitulate

2x C16 per battalion section or
8 4x C16 per battalion platoon or
24 16x C16 per brigade company with a mortar platoon in heavy support?

Machine Gun Company (Great War)

At the beginning of the Great War, machines guns were held within the sections of the infantry battalions. As the war progressed, machine guns were often being ‘brigaded’ under the comm…

vickersmg.blog

Machine Gun Battalions

Battalions based around the machine gun were established as part of the mobilisation of the British Army in the mid to late 1930s. They were formed under the same principles as the Brigade Machine …

vickersmg.blog

 

[KevinB]

It isn't? Or it shouldn't be?

I don’t call it training if it isn’t

Everything should be evolutionary, building on previous lessons.

If it isn’t, your wasting time and money, and eventually lives.

 

[KevinB]

To recapitulate

2x C16 per battalion section or
8 4x C16 per battalion platoon or
24 16x C16 per brigade company with a mortar platoon in heavy support?

Machine Gun Company (Great War)

At the beginning of the Great War, machines guns were held within the sections of the infantry battalions. As the war progressed, machine guns were often being ‘brigaded’ under the comm…

vickersmg.blog

Machine Gun Battalions

Battalions based around the machine gun were established as part of the mobilisation of the British Army in the mid to late 1930s. They were formed under the same principles as the Brigade Machine …

vickersmg.blog

I’d argue it really depends on the theatre, and even interthreater requirements.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, a Mk19 on a GMV was a great support weapon for localized raids. Against larger forces, you needed more firepower.

Certain areas of Ukraine have shown that the individual or ‘section’ AGL can be effective, against more isolated enemies, but just the same as other conflicts when enemies are in mass or have overlapping fields of fire, the individual/section isn’t able to delivery the weight of fire needed on multiple positions.

The issue with AGL’s is they aren’t very man portable, and the ammo isn’t either.
So they need mobility and logistics systems regardless of deployment method.

The AGL isn’t going to add a ton to a LAV Coy in the attack, as they can’t be mounted effectively on the LAV (unless it’s a RWS system), but they are extremely effective for convoy security (another reason why they have nothing in common with the 60mm Mortar), as well as static defense.

I don’t think they are just an Infantry weapon and have just as much purpose in the Service Bn on Logistics Vehicles, and on other units vehicles.

 

[NavyShooter]

This is a 'combat calculus' test I sent out to our Junior Officers to consider a while back:

A Coy is setting up two C-6 MG’s in gun pits in the SF role - they are to be fired between 0800-1800 hrs (dawn to dusk) in the indirect fire mode from defilade to interdict a cross-road area. With two guns, one or the other will be firing at all times at the 'normal rate' (110 rds per minute) over that 10 hour period, consider the following questions:

1. Assuming the guns arrive with 2200 rounds each (10x boxes of 220) how long will they be able to fire for before they require re-supply?
2. How much ammunition will this require over the span of the required interdictory fire period?
3. The nearest ammunition supply drop point that can be reached with a MILCOT is 2 KM from the firing pits. How many MILCOT loads will be required to sustain this fire mission?
4. B Coy has been given the task of supplying ammunition transport to supply the guns. A portion of the 2km direct-path to the guns in a valley is visible to the enemy, so the actual safe route is 3km long. How long will it take an average soldier with a ruck to get to the gun positions to drop off a load of ammunition and return to the drop point?
5. Each soldier in B Coy is capable of carrying 3 cans of ammunition in their ruck-sack. How much ammunition will an 8 person section be able to deliver to the guns?
6. How many minutes of fire are the guns able to deliver per section of troops that arrive with ammunition?
7. Command has directed that the guns must retain at least 10 minutes worth of ammunition on-hand at all times; how soon after the guns move to their positions must the first B Coy section arrive with the first load of ammunition?
8. What is the minimum number of troops required to supply these 2 gun positions with the necessary ammunition for a 10 hour period?
9. B Coy’s current manning is 38 personnel, is this task within the capability of B Coy, or must additional personnel be requested?

Given following additional details:

7.62mm Ball Linked:
Bx 220 rds 8.1 Kg
Pallet (138 bx 30360 rds) 1155 kg

MILCOT Cargo capacity:
1600 kg

It is assumed that A Coy has enough guns/barrels/etc to sustain the two gun positions. The mission for B Coy is solely related to supplying the necessary ammunition to the guns.

This is the sort of thing that I get JO's to think about now and then.

I'm also the guy who got approval to fly drones over a training area in November.

There's 'vain repetition' and there's training.

I do my best to make training interesting.

 

[daftandbarmy]

This is a 'combat calculus' test I sent out to our Junior Officers to consider a while back:


This is the sort of thing that I get JO's to think about now and then.

The correct answer, of course, is:

"2IC, make sure there's enough ammo for the guns. I'll be taking out a fighting patrol .... "

 

[markppcli]

They had had a lot of issues that don’t make the news with drones and Blue on Blue.
He’s not wrong

Again the assumption the because Ukraine has done something that is how it ought to be done rears it’s ugly head. What is done in extremis shouldn’t be how it’s planned for.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Again the assumption the because Ukraine has done something that is how it ought to be done rears it’s ugly head. What is done in extremis shouldn’t be how it’s planned for.

The reality is we are pretty shitty at planning for anything.

Primary lesson of Afghanistan - No one predicted that we be engaged in a intense conflict in Central Asia for a decade and taking causalities during it. Had you announced this prediction in 2000, you be laughed out of the room by the "Experts".

Primary lesson of Ukraine - Many of the "Experts" claimed that large scale peer to peer conflicts where a thing of the past and would not take place again.

Primary lesson from the above - The "Experts" are generally wrong more often than right, you don't get to pick the wars we learn from or the ones you are thrust into. Canada is likley to be an expeditionary army for at least the rest of this century and faces the possibility of being engaged anywhere in the world, at any level of engagement, from humanitarian to peer to peer operations, so prepare, plan, train and equip for all of them.