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'It's time to consolidate NDHQ' & 'DND to take-over Nortel Campus' (Merged threads)

I'd like to echo devil39's point that staffies at the Twin Towers of Doom (or the associated annexes) do work long hours. They get little credit, and loads of stick from "the field," yet they work harder than officers in the units, from what I've seen.

Those at the "centre" can often lose sight of life at the sharp end, but don't think they are a bunch of lazy sods.

Acorn
 
Thanks for bringing this one back to earth Devil and Acorn.

Although I've been one to comment on perceived organizational irregularities, I've never attempted to dump it on the Staff Officers who get posted to Ottawa.  Sticking the blame on them, referring to "The Gong Show" and "bringing on the clowns", is really unfair and is akin to getting mad at a cop for giving you a speeding ticket; the guy is only trying to do the job assigned to him by his superiors.
 
Infanteer said:
is really unfair and is akin to getting mad at a cop for giving you a speeding ticket; the guy is only trying to do the job assigned to him by his superiors.


that and you were speeding...... ;D
 
The point was that getting mad at the cop will do no good as he doesn't set the speed limit.
 
Where to cut is a good question.

Am I wrong in saying that there are over 100 "general equivelent" working at NDHQ?  That there are actually more civilians than military running departments?  WHY?

Something has to be done about the ever-growing size of the civilian component of NDHQ.

I also think that there is one other place to cut.  For the life of me, I can't figure out why we have our normal chain of command, Minister, to CDS to Army to Area to Unit/Base, plus we have a Divisional HQ in Kingston.  What Division?  Where, exactly, do they fit in to the chain of command?

This really confuses me. ???
 
devil39 said:
There might be places to trim in NDHQ, but the people I deal with on the Land Staff need augmentation, not cuts, to keep up with the volume and complexity of the issues they deal with.

I agree wholeheartedly.  I had the opportunity to deal with the Land Staff over the last two years from the same kind of vantage point as Devil39, and I cannot say enough about the dedication and professionalism displayed by the LS.  I have never subscribed to the theory that the higher headquarters must, by its very nature, be evil/incompetent/lazy etc.  I have learned that they simply see problems (and their solutions) in a different context than the lower headquarters/unit/formation - and that is to be expected in a hierarchical organisation.

I too have never served in NDHQ - and yet I sense its inevitability.  There are many officers and SNCOs that I respect and implicitly trust (based on their soldiering abilities and tactical skills) that have served there - and I do not think it likely that they suddenly became evil/lazy/incompetent on arrival at 101 Colonel By.  Much has been said in many threads about "walking a mile in my shoes" etc etc.  Perhaps the aphorism could just as easily be applied to those that throw stones at NDHQ.
 
Quote from Goober,
Top heavy? Easy fix. Fill out the bottom.


Goober, I usually look forward to your posts with as much dread as certain parts of a yearly physical.
But when your on ......... :o    :salute:
Bruce
 
Lance Wiebe said:
Oh, I also forgot to add, why is there fully manned, but zero funded PMO's?

the Matrix way of tasking perhaps? Just because a project has no funds, doesn't mean there's no reqr for loads of prep staff work.
 
Goober has pretty much pinned it down.  Just because you've been starving and you'd like to gain back a few pounds of muscle doesn't mean you can trade in your liver.  NDHQ looks large only because we've drawn down the deployable forces so far.
 
So, if I'm getting this right; our NDHQ is organizationally "left over" from when we had 100,000 troops and a Brigade in Europe?
 
Which would make sense. The number of admin channels would not change with the decrease in troops, just the amount of work required for each channel. And I'm pretty sure that decrease in work has been supplemented by all the new PC kife that has come down the pipe since then.
 
Lance Wiebe said:
For the life of me, I can't figure out why we have our normal chain of command, Minister, to CDS to Army to Area to Unit/Base, plus we have a Divisional HQ in Kingston. What Division? Where, exactly, do they fit in to the chain of command?
We do not have a Div HQ.  There is a Joint HQ in Kingston which contributes to every overseas deployment we have going.  Within the CFJOG there are other formations and units (just like any other CF higher formation) that are outside the three enviroments.
 
Infanteer said:
So, if I'm getting this right; our NDHQ is organizationally "left over" from when we had 100,000 troops and a Brigade in Europe?

In a purely numerical sense, that is probably true.  I think however that you will find that there have been a number of changes in the way in which NDHQ is organised since those heady days.  To start, FMC is gone, and folded into the greater maw in 101.  The J Staff has been established etc etc.  PMOs have grown like weeds, and we have had a massive increase in the number of Sigs types (IIRC Signals Officers are now the largest single officer classification in the military).  With deeper analysis, I propose that what we would find is that an Industrial Age HQ of 100,000 to 120,000 was the same size as an Information Age HQ of 60,000.
 
OK, thanks McG.

But I still have the "why". 

We have several layers of HQ now.  Do we still need another one in Kingston?  You say they contribute to every mission.  Does that mean we have unemployed staff officers sitting around waiting deployment?

I guess what I am really asking, is this a luxury we can afford?
 
Suggest you see this book

Failure in High Command, by LCol (Ret) Jack English - 1991 ISBN 0-919614-60-4 which lays out the need for a peacetime HQ and what it does.

What it does is fight for the survival of the forces when their is no war.

In addition to this is works with other government departments among them being PWGSC to buy the kit and services the military needs.

Unfortunately this may be hidden or invisible from most soldiers who wear combats in the regular or reserve armed forces in Canada.

Two other points for you

I have read (can't remember the exact source) that if DND is compared to the UK Armed Forces it appears that DND is funded at 25% of the comparable level that the Brits are. This alone leads to a better understanding of why progress seems so slow in the military in Canada. there truly isn't much money compared to other departments --- you should see a paper I wrote a short while ago here Canadian US Relations (1900 â “ 2003) http://www.donlowconcrete.com/USA/ and this page http://www.donlowconcrete.com/USA/consensus.htm

What it means in a nutshell is

DND gets no votes for the government - they think they can keep under funding it and get away with it - and they will not be called to account - just look at the sponsorship scandal, the Jane Stewart Scandal, the SeaKing Scandal.

Does anyone care? I really think they don't - In the paper I show above I found a quote from the Conference Board of Canada which said - Canadians do not feel threatened and as long as this is FACT they will not prepare in a meaningful way.

But we'll have a warm and fuzzy from a new re-developed DND space at Downsview and many other boon doggles.

You see? They even bought off the RCMI which is why heads will never roll.

Where to start? DND has a plan which is un funded - means a major expansion of the reserves

Send me your ideas on what to fix as I am writing another paper and if nothing else we can put them on line and then bombard all MPs to say that they have a heck of a mess on their hands.

But why re-write history? DND knows the solution which is laid out here at the 2003   Final Report of the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/mmcc/final_report_e.asp

an extract - On 3 April 2003 the Minister of National Defence (MND), the Honourable John McCallum, announced the start of Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) Phase II as per the Government Policy Statement of 6 October 2000.[21] LFRR Phase II will provide funding for an immediate increase of 750 Army Reservists in fiscal year 2003/2004 and another 750 in 2004/2005. The overall goal, within constraints on resources, remains to increase the Army Reserve (Militia) to 18,500, and additional monies will be set aside to address the equipment needs associated with the new capabilities of the Army Reserve. On 13 May 2003 the Minister re-emphasized that "LFRR is a critical project, and I am determined that Phase 2 will preserve the Army Reserve as a national institution and transform its operational potential to meet Canada's needs in the 21st Century."[22] After assuring the Monitoring Committee on 9 June that he did not wish Progress Report II to gather dust on some shelf, the Minister issued a tasking order to the Department in the full realization that a corporate DND/CF response was required."

althought these are high sounding words - if you scan this board for links to a post I made in MArch April of this year you'll see this link on the HOmeland Defence COnference in Mar 2004 http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/reserves2004/index.htm and then click the publications link - IF YOU DO NOTHING ELSE READ JACK ENGLISH'S PAPER ON WHERE THE REGULAR AND RESERVE ARMY FIT INSIDE DND - http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/reserves2004/publications/english.doc

Next steps --- draft a letter to Minister of National Defence - ask them - how much of the reports recommendatiosn have been implemented, and when the remainder will be funded and delivered. You can send this as a private citizen (barrack room lawyers need not reply to this)

Send me a message if you can't read any of the links above and I will email you privately

OK - all you ruck sack luggers - get going!    :D - you have your reading assignments.

 
Logau ... I don't know if it is just my browser, but some of the font in your posts appears unusually large.
 
Got this from a Patricia in DLR-5 today, its from the UK, but it can be applied to us too  ;)

STAFF GUIDANCE ON DEFENCE RESTRUCTURING


1. This guidance is being issued to remedy a perceived difficulty experienced by Staff at all levels in understanding the rationale behind recent Defence  re-structuring.  In particular many Staff Officers seem not to understand how reducing the numbers of aircraft, ships, tanks, artillery and soldiers results in a more flexible, robust and effective fighting force.

2. In particular it seems that much of the confusion stems from a systemic misunderstanding of the correct use of military terminology.  A list of common terms and actual meanings follows. 

3. In addition there follows an explanation of the key assumptions embedded within the Defence Review.  All Staff Officers are encouraged to seek clarification through their Chain of Command if they still have any questions.

4. Staff Terminology used in the new Defence Plan;

Term MOD meaning

Flexible- a. Smaller
b. Unable to operate unless under US protection

Robust- a. Smaller
b. Lacking reserves or regeneration capability

Networked- Smaller, but still unable to talk to each other

Capable- Smaller

Agile- Really, really small

Deployability- Method of making the Forces, primarily the Army, able to send higher percentages of their manpower to a distant location.  This is achieved by reducing the overall numbers involved, i.e. â Å“In future the Army will be able to send 50% of it's manpower to Africa in the back of a Cessna, thus achieving greater deployabilityâ ?.

Reach- The distance the American's are willing to fly us

Efficient- Much, much smaller

Streamlined- Just unbelievably small

Just in time- For the funeral.

Integrated- Process by which all three services get to brief against each other in public leaks, attempting to justify and defend their own budget against cuts, thereby doing the Treasury's work for them. Taken to extremes by the Army in which Corps and Regiments fight each other, and perfected within the Infantry.

Technically ambitious- a. Slang, as in â Å“He was being a bit technically ambitious when he tried to drive that car through the wallâ ?  (cf, â Å“To propose a Bowmanâ ?)

b. Description of the far future

Reserves- Integral part of current Operational Manning.

Rationalisation- a. Cuts

b. Psychological term, meaning to use complicated arguments to avoid facing unpalatable truths,  i.e. , â Å“we don't need to pay for both expensive servicemen and equipment, because we will be networked, agile,  and technically ambitiousâ ? .

Rapid- Used in a comparative sense, as in â Å“The rapid erosion of the Himalayan Mountains...â ?

Modernisation- Cuts

Radical- Deep Cuts

Transformation- Really Deep Cuts

Sustainable- Assuming zero casualties, no leave and no emergencies.

Sentences such as  â Å“these proposals capture our aim for a speedy deployable, agile, joint and integrated, technically ambitious defence capabilityâ ? will make more logical sense to the experienced Staff Officer once the above definitions are applied.

4. It will also help if Staff Officer's bear in mind the following Planning Principles.  Point C will be of particular relevance in explaining the rationale behind restructuring to Junior Staff.

a. Use of Special Forces.  No one in the general Public has a clue how many there are, so they can be announced as deploying to every country in the world.

b.    Aggressive use of terminology can compensate for lack of actual forces.  For example in the past effective deterrence of a reasonably capable Maritime threat would require the despatch of a task force, consisting of destroyers, frigates, submarines and possibly even a carrier.  In the future this task will still be achieved by a task force; but task-force will be the new description for a mine-sweeper.

c. The new Defence Plan was not resource driven.  A comprehensive strategic estimate was conducted, from first principles, identifying the current and potential threats to the UK and it's interests, allowing a reserve for the unexpected, and also allowing for recurrent non-warfighting tasks such as Fire Strike cover and Foot and Mouth disease.  Against the tasks identified an ideal manpower establishment and Task Org was then identified.  By an amazing coincidence it happened to fit almost exactly within current Treasury MOD expenditure plans, and even allow the MOD to carry half the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan.

d. Much of the current crisis in Defence Spending can be directly traced to the high costs of legacy equipments.  These were ordered at a time of ignorance in the past when Planners naively seemed to believe that the threat they identified as imminent would remain the same for the 20-30 year service life of the equipment they were ordering.  The assumption in the 1980's and 90's that tanks, artillery, and aircraft would be needed in the future was ridiculous, as none of these equipments have been used by the British Armed forces to any degree since the Falklands war.
However, current planners possess better foresight and are able to predict future threats for at least the next 40 years.  We are therefore able to be certain that Britain is unlikely to need any tanks, aircraft, submarines etc. past about 2015.

e. Britain no longer needs a significant anti-submarine capability.  No other nation possesses submarines in any numbers, submarine technology is unlikely to advance at all over the next few 30 years, and should anti-submarine technology or skills be required at any point in the future they can be reconstituted overnight from the reserves.  (Once the reserves have been reconstituted).  In any case by 2020 the UK will be fully integrated into mainland Europe, and will therefore no longer have a coastline to defend or be reliant upon sea-supply. 

f. Similar arguments apply to air defence.

g. The Regimental System.  In the past the Regimental System has been seen as the corner-stone of British Military success, creating a system in which the individual is made to feel part of a greater family, often stretching back hundreds of years, in which he is nurtured and developed, and to which he feels such great loyalty that he is inspired to sacrifice himself if need be for his Regimental comrades.  However, the British youth of today are so naturally self-sacrificing and community spirited that additional incentives are now unnecessary, and in any case the threat to soldiers on the ground has been assumed away.  There is therefore no further need for a system whose main purpose is to generate fighting spirit, and it can be safely emasculated to achieve administrative efficiency (see â Å“Efficientâ ? above).

h. High divorce rates within the Services will solve manpower crises, by ensuring all service personnel will be happy to conduct back-to-back tours forever, as no one will have any families or friends to miss.

i. Savings will be ploughed into the purchase of large numbers of hats.  This will be essential as in future everyone will be at least treble or quadruple hatted.  Wars will be fought in rotation on a strict â Å“first come, first servedâ ? basis.

k. Future savings will be made by abolishing all training for the Chiefs of Staff.  After all they haven't proven remotely as effective at manoeuvre warfare, disruption, dislocation or divide-and-rule as the Treasury.

l. Successive efficiency measures can be made to reinforce each other.  For example, each time troop numbers are cut, a unit can then be tasked to conduct the same jobs as before. Provided there are no actual massacres of Friendly Forces, the new troop numbers can be seen to have been fully as effective as the previous numbers, and so can form a baseline for achieving efficiency cuts to new troop numbers.  Savings can then be invested in new equipment, in the same way that British Airways fires half its pilots every time it needs to buy a new plane.  The ultimate aim is to have one man, but equipped like Dr Octopus.  He will sleep with one eye open at all times to replicate full manning.

m. Key Assumptions:  Current levels of operations are an aberration, will never be repeated, and should form no guide to current manning requirements, let alone future ones.  Gerry Adams has embraced peace, there is no more requirement for crowd control in Northern Ireland, the FBU have forsworn strikes along with all other key public workers, Osama Bin Laden is about to hand himself in and the Easter Bunny will be providing Area Air Defence for London.

5. More detailed guidance can be found in JSP 4708- â Å“Magic Mushrooms, their consumption, effects and results in the MODâ ? and Minister Hoon's Autobiography â Å“What Colour is the Sky in My World?â ?


{CHOtS SIGNED}

I M Promoted
SO2 Spin
Ministry of Truth
Orwell Bldg
MOD 1984


 
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