Leo 2A6M CAN - are they in service?

[vonGarvin]

There goes your redundancy in a combat team. 4 Tps of 4 tanks allows for integral redundancy and allows for rollers and plows to be used during the attack while still having 50% of the troops guns effective.

Your way would only have one tank out of three being actually used during the assault phase. Not to be insulting, but in a conventional context, LAVs would be safely tucked away behind the LD and useless against a peer foe during that phase. Even during the intimate support phase, they'd be tucked away behind us. Two guns firing from two troops not effective fire IMHO. Three tanks plus a BC in the fire base is barely enough rounds on target as well.

Not only that, but as soon as we hit 50%, we're combat ineffective and that requires a re-jig of a Sqn, taking up valuable time on the A to C.

There is a reason why the numbers are the way they are. Afghanistan was not the way tanks are supposed to be used.

Regards

^^
:tank2:


The tanker said what I was thinking

And on behalf of the Infantry Branch (Corps?) I don't find it insulting at all to be tucked away behind tanks. 

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

As a complete aside, the tank troops in Normandy had one Firefly per Troop at the time of the landings. This went up to two Fireflies per Troop as they prepared to go up the channel coast in the fall (late Aug/early Sep).

The early employment of Firelies saw them employed by a variety of positions including officers at Sqn level, but after the initial beachhead battles it was generally agreed that the Tp Leaders and other officers had other tasks and it was felt that the Tp Sgts were the best ones to have the Fireflies. Still, reading through Regtl accounts we see a variety of employment methods.

Looking at Sqn structure, we have a very big tank squadron. It does give lots of flexibility and depth. Now, if only we could resist the urge to attach out all the tank troops to infantry companies...

 

[Infanteer]

There goes your redundancy in a combat team. 4 Tps of 4 tanks allows for integral redundancy and allows for rollers and plows to be used during the attack while still having 50% of the troops guns effective.

And....that flexibility is lost as soon as the HLTA plan kicks in....Not to mention combat losses

Ack, there are trade-offs - I wish we could all have redundancy but we simply don't.  The 19 tank squadron is pretty unique to us (probably due to our breaching doctrine) but other combinations would work.  My above pitch wasn't "Afghanistan" but came from discussions with Armoured Officers with experience in tanks and a perspective on their Corps structure.  The sole purpose of a square combat team isn't to simply plow into a complex obstacle belt and I think, as a Bde Comd, the ability to field four square combat teams vice three in a potential warfighting scenario would far outweigh the loss of a troop in each squadron.

Anyways, this is starting to smell of a tread split.

Looking at Sqn structure, we have a very big tank squadron. It does give lots of flexibility and depth. Now, if only we could resist the urge to attach out all the tank troops to infantry companies...

Yes, and smaller Sqns could help in that there is less to parcel out.  What we really need is AT assets so we avoid using tanks as static anti-armour systems and employ them in countermoves...but you and I know this  .  Rumour is that 19 LAV-TOW are still sitting in Montreal....

 

[George Wallace]

We should also consider smaller squadrons with less tanks - some Armoured Officers have told me interesting ideas for 15 tank Squadrons of 3 Tps of 4 or 4 Tps of 3 - this gives the BG and Bde Comds (and the Army) more flexibility.

I find it insulting for the most part when non-Armour folk start discussing the intricacies of Armour tactics, doctrine and formations.

Would your proposal also be relevant to the reorg and effectiveness of an Mech Infantry platoon being reduced from four LAV to three?  This would provide more platoons for the Coy Comd to play with and more flexibility, would it not?  As an Armour guy, I would think not.  It would give me, the Armour guy, less Infantry support when needed.  With battle casualties, it makes both the Infantry and the Armour sub-unit ineffective all that much sooner.

 

[George Wallace]

......  My above pitch wasn't "Afghanistan" but came from discussions with Armoured Officers with experience in tanks and a perspective on their Corps structure.  ....

I would take that with a grain of salt as well.  Even among Armour officers, there are quite a few 'dummies', damning as that may sound.  Many have no actual time on tanks (TI), so that Black Beret should not be used as a qualifier for any form of expertise.  One or two years as a Tank Troop Leader is not much time.  I would not qualify a Coyote Troop Leader as a Tank expert, nor the Troop Leader who has spent all his time in Recce (prior to the introduction of the Coyote). 

 

[vonGarvin]

I would take that with a grain of salt as well.  Even among Armour officers, there are quite a few 'dummies', damning as that may sound.

I thought we had all the dummies ;D


DUCIMUS! 

 

[Infanteer]

I find it insulting for the most part when non-Armour folk start discussing the intricacies of Armour tactics, doctrine and formations.

Would your proposal also be relevant to the reorg and effectiveness of an Mech Infantry platoon being reduced from four LAV to three?  This would provide more platoons for the Coy Comd to play with and more flexibility, would it not?  As an Armour guy, I would think not.  It would give me, the Armour guy, less Infantry support when needed.  With battle casualties, it makes both the Infantry and the Armour sub-unit ineffective all that much sooner.

If you choose to be offended by professional debate and discussion, then feel free to shove off.  Getting beyond the bubble of one's MOSID and discussing all aspects of the fight is part of the profession.

If you have a proposal for infantry organization, feel free to pitch it; I'll look at the argument instead of your capbadge.

I would take that with a grain of salt as well.  Even among Armour officers, there are quite a few 'dummies', damning as that may sound.  Many have no actual time on tanks (TI), so that Black Beret should not be used as a qualifier for any form of expertise.  One or two years as a Tank Troop Leader is not much time.  I would not qualify a Coyote Troop Leader as a Tank expert, nor the Troop Leader who has spent all his time in Recce (prior to the introduction of the Coyote).

Nice assumptions, but incorrect.

 

[McG]

I find it insulting for the most part when non-Armour folk start discussing the intricacies of Armour tactics, doctrine and formations.

No capbadge works in isolation of any others.  The argument that only my capbadge or beret colour can discuss my concerns is a false argument and comes across as protectionist (particularly when you resort to poisoning the well in conversation with another manoeuvre officer).
If a proposal or idea lacks merit, then an actual SME will be able to deconstruct that proposal or idea through fact based arguments.

Where most (all?) of our allies have smaller squadron/company structures for their tanks, the concept appears viable.  The HLTA problem can be solved by various means including back-fill TAVs or not doing HLTA. 

... I think, as a Bde Comd, the ability to field four square combat teams vice three in a potential warfighting scenario would far outweigh the loss of a troop in each squadron.

But to the BG Comd and Sqn Comd this would reduce flexibility to task tailor as the Sqn could no longer fight in two relatively equal halves.  Maybe the big squadron is a requirement of a small army most likely to deploy below the Bde Gp level.

What we really need is AT assets so we avoid using tanks as static anti-armour systems and employ them in countermoves... 

Rifle Coy LAVs should also have been fielded with the capacity for one or two ready-to-fire long range AT missiles.  But it is probably too late for that idea, and it already has its own thread: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/77588.0/all.html

 

[Kirkhill]

Where most (all?) of our allies have smaller squadron/company structures for their tanks, the concept appears viable.  ...

But to the BG Comd and Sqn Comd this would reduce flexibility to task tailor as the Sqn could no longer fight in two relatively equal halves.  Maybe the big squadron is a requirement of a small army most likely to deploy below the Bde Gp level.

So we don't actually have 3 Large Squadrons of 19 .... we actually have 6 small squadrons of 9?

Curiously that is the number of tanks in an old, cold US Cavalry Troop - which was augmented by 13 Bradley Scouts IIRC with 24 Dismounts.

That pattern seems to my non-SME eyes to be rather close to what the Scandinavians are doing with their Leos and CV-90s.

By the way:
3x19=57
6x9=54

Didn't we buy more than that?
Don't the Aussies field three full squadrons of tanks from a buy of 57 Abrams?
Shouldn't we be able to field more than 57 vehicles from a buy of 80 to 100 plus?

6x14=84

Thoughts from the peanut gallery.

 

[vonGarvin]

The HLTA problem can be solved by various means including back-fill TAVs or not doing HLTA. 

:nod:

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

So we don't actually have 3 Large Squadrons of 19 .... we actually have 6 small squadrons of 9?

Curiously that is the number of tanks in an old, cold US Cavalry Troop - which was augmented by 13 Bradley Scouts IIRC with 24 Dismounts.

That pattern seems to my non-SME eyes to be rather close to what the Scandinavians are doing with their Leos and CV-90s.

By the way:
3x19=57
6x9=54

Didn't we buy more than that?
Don't the Aussies field three full squadrons of tanks from a buy of 57 Abrams?
Shouldn't we be able to field more than 57 vehicles from a buy of 80 to 100 plus?

6x14=84

Thoughts from the peanut gallery.

No - we have three squadrons of nineteen.

The US Army Heavy Cavalry Troop with two tank platoon and two scout platoons was organized for security roles. Screens, Guards, RAPZ and economy of force tasks were the intended tasks. If your whole army was organized that way you wouldn't be set for those other critical tasks like block, clear, seize etc. Bear in mind that those Bradleys and dismounts were not infantry - they were Scouts.

Twenty of so of our tanks are dedicated to the School to conduct individual training. Double-tasking those as an operational squadron would mean something would slip somewhere else. If we went with squadrons of three troops then we could, in theory, have a fourth operational squadron. The bottom line, though, wouldn't change.

Half squadrons are meant to be temporary. The squadron should be kept together. As mentioned earlier, the lack of real integral Anti-Tank weaponry in the infantry can mean that tanks get split up. Its a problem.

I've been in a tank squadron with four troops and a tank squadron with three troops. You can get the job done with three troops, but your lose flexibility and balance. Four troops allows for slick squadron movement and gives you better punch in your assault/breach. A squadron with two troops can certainly occupy battle positions and shoot into a KZ, but you lose some shock action. Offensive operations are much more difficult as you don't really have much power in your assault force.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Not to mention splitting Sqns can become hell for the SSM and his echelon.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Not to mention splitting Sqns can become hell for the SSM and his echelon.

Absolutely!

C2 is also a problem when the OC and BC are split up.

 

[Kirkhill]

Beyond hope ....

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/308/192/johns.pdf

We can spin this .... all we need is to decide how we are going to use them, how we are going to maintain them and invest in a lot more infrastructure. Oh, and bring them all back up to factory condition.

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/24/192/Timms.pdf

 

[Kirkhill]

So riddle me this

- Why is it up to the RCAC to define the need for, and availability of, tanks?

- Why is it up to two of three RCAC regiments to begin to study possible light armour or cavalry roles due to the lack of tanks?


Similarly

- Why is it up to the Light Infantry to sort out the need for and roles of Light Infantry so as to justify their existence?

 

[GR66]

So riddle me this

- Why is it up to the RCAC to define the need for, and availability of, tanks?

- Why is it up to two of three RCAC regiments to begin to study possible light armour or cavalry roles due to the lack of tanks?


Similarly

- Why is it up to the Light Infantry to sort out the need for and roles of Light Infantry so as to justify their existence?

But...but...but...you don't expect the GOC or the CAF leadership to actually define the roles and requirements for the Army, do you???

 

[dapaterson]

Asking units who practice certain activities for input into crafting doctrine that should be informed by what they do just strikes me as common sense.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I am not sure why an old thread is being brought back from the dead by the addition of a snip from a CFC service paper?

The army has a capability development process and governance for its organization, doctrine and training. Corps' have influence and have people inside them with ideas, but they are not left to their own devices either.

 

[dimsum]

So riddle me this

- Why is it up to the RCAC to define the need for, and availability of, tanks?

- Why is it up to two of three RCAC regiments to begin to study possible light armour or cavalry roles due to the lack of tanks?


Similarly

- Why is it up to the Light Infantry to sort out the need for and roles of Light Infantry so as to justify their existence?

Because they are the subject matter experts in their fields.

 

[dapaterson]

Clearly the CAF can abandon all force development activities and just refer to FakeName78 on Reddit instead.