Military concerned by Canada's absence from American-British-Australian security pact

[ueo]

Given our situation with China, and the fact that things tend to leak here (i.e. Canada's National Microbiology lab leak in 2019) would we really be a positive addition to this alliance? Not to mention the fact we don't have big toys, all those countries plan to field nuclear submarines, attack helicopters, lots of armour, the real stuff to fight a big enemy. It seem we're a small player and maybe even a potential liability with the current government...

Small player with a whole s###load of strategic raw minerals, investors please apply.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I was "in the room" when we were told to develop and issue a "distinctive environmental uniform." The decision was 99% political - yes, there was, still, after 15ish years a bit of grumbling in the ranks - not just the Colonel Blimps - about the "jolly green jumper," but most people, even most sailors, had many more important things to worry about. Then came 1984 and the first Mulroney government - a career backbencher from Cumberland, Nova Scotia named Bob Coates became MND ... we called the project Coates of Many Colours in his honour.

We never went far enough with the disunification of the CAF.

 

[Edward Campbell]

We never went far enough with the disunification of the CAF.

I know I'm being pedantic, but unification - joint commands like Maritime Command, Mobile Command and Material Command and the Canadian Forces Communications System - was a good idea. Integration - a single uniform and things like an integrated Training System were less good to downright silly ideas.

Our allies, I was told by a source I consider 100% reliable, told Mr Hellyer and his minions that integration (the Americans called it "purple suiting") wouldn't work, the USMC was NOT a good model for a national military force. But there was an internal political battle being waged in the Liberal Party and Mr Hellyer needed something that would be "big," in the public's imagination to fuel his leadership ambitions and while unification was welcomed as a cost-saving measure and an operational improvement, integration was almost totally a public reaction/political "stunt" designed to capture the public's imagination and put Mr Hellyer's picture on more and more front pages.

 

[dimsum]

In that case, some might say we’re doing pretty well with the “disintegration” of the CAF

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

It is an immutable law that all discussions on Army.ca decay to a discussion of dress.

 

[GR66]

It is an immutable law that all discussions on Army.ca decay to a discussion of dress.

and Army Reserve restructuring...

 

[ArmyRick]

It is an immutable law that all discussions on Army.ca decay to a discussion of dress.

...and the 758th proposed re-org of the ORBAT

 

[Good2Golf]

...and the 758th proposed re-org of the ORBAT

…I thought we were North of 1000 now?

 

[ArmyRick]

…I thought we were North of 1000 now?

I stopped counting at the 23rd bottle of rum....

 

[FSTO]

I know I'm being pedantic, but unification - joint commands like Maritime Command, Mobile Command and Material Command and the Canadian Forces Communications System - was a good idea. Integration - a single uniform and things like an integrated Training System were less good to downright silly ideas.

Our allies, I was told by a source I consider 100% reliable, told Mr Hellyer and his minions that integration (the Americans called it "purple suiting") wouldn't work, the USMC was NOT a good model for a national military force. But there was an internal political battle being waged in the Liberal Party and Mr Hellyer needed something that would be "big," in the public's imagination to fuel his leadership ambitions and while unification was welcomed as a cost-saving measure and an operational improvement, integration was almost totally a public reaction/political "stunt" designed to capture the public's imagination and put Mr Hellyer's picture on more and more front pages.

Hellyer should have realized that once PET was on the scene any leadership ambitions were fubard.

 

[torg003]

Hellyer should have realized that once PET was on the scene any leadership ambitions were fubard.

He should have, but from what I've read, it seems that he had too big of an ego. He did quit the Liberal party and started his own political party in '73. It didn't go anywhere though.

 

[FSTO]

He should have, but from what I've read, it seems that he had too big of an ego. He did quit the Liberal party and started his own political party in '73. It didn't go anywhere though.

All true. He was the worst person possible to be tasked with becoming Minister of National Defence.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

Lots of dress/unification threads out there.

Always interesting reading the swerves that occur here, but let's try and get this one back to the topic of "why not us?" please.

Thanks,
Bruce

 

[GR66]

Lots of dress/unification threads out there.

Always interesting reading the swerves that occur here, but let's try and get this one back to the topic of "why not us?" please.

Thanks,
Bruce

This thread swerve actually perfectly explains the "why not us". Like us forum members, the CAF leadership is more interested in Ribbons & Bows and navel gazing about what "could be" rather than actually making the CAF an effective military. That's why nobody takes us seriously enough to actually include us in anything important.

 

[daftandbarmy]

This thread swerve actually perfectly explains the "why not us". Like us forum members, the CAF leadership is more interested in Ribbons & Bows and navel gazing about what "could be" rather than actually making the CAF an effective military. That's why nobody takes us seriously enough to actually include us in anything important.

Just keep taking the Soma!

 

[Navy_Pete]

This thread swerve actually perfectly explains the "why not us". Like us forum members, the CAF leadership is more interested in Ribbons & Bows and navel gazing about what "could be" rather than actually making the CAF an effective military. That's why nobody takes us seriously enough to actually include us in anything important.

Case in point, Commander of CJOC worried about strategic capabilities that aren't currently in the SSE (vice the giant organization that is responsible for that). CRCN thinking he's going to start replacement projects for ships (which is again under a big organization under VCDS). How many after action deployment reports just recycle recommendations that CJOC improve support to deployed units (and streamline reporting requirement to reduce duplication of effort and LOE). Or sort out logistic support. Or just generally be an asset not a burden.

If they have capacity, focus on the current operational bits where they are shitting the bed first, instead of being capability magpies for whatever the shiny new thing is.

 

[dapaterson]

The CAF as a rule is more interested in shiny and new than in maintaining and fixing what they already have.

Buying new ships gets your photo in the paper. Keeping the current ones running doesn't.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Case in point, Commander of CJOC worried about strategic capabilities that aren't currently in the SSE (vice the giant organization that is responsible for that). CRCN thinking he's going to start replacement projects for ships (which is again under a big organization under VCDS). How many after action deployment reports just recycle recommendations that CJOC improve support to deployed units (and streamline reporting requirement to reduce duplication of effort and LOE). Or sort out logistic support. Or just generally be an asset not a burden.

If they have capacity, focus on the current operational bits where they are shitting the bed first, instead of being capability magpies for whatever the shiny new thing is.

Perhaps we should remove CJOC from the equation.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Perhaps we should remove CJOC from the equation.

From the deployment equation? Definitely some areas where they add no value and just add time delays (approving travel in/out of theatre, TAVs, etc).

Some of the deployements seem to be effectively identical operational roles (and ROEs) as things we normally do in other op areas, just doesn't happen to be under a named operation with CJOC. I'm not sure if it's because ships are more self contained to operate independently with a mix of technical, logistics and operators as part of the crew.

Still not convinced that MCC was actually ever reading our daily updates for what we were actually doing, based on their pushback on some of the defects and impacts we were reporting. CJOC imposed a drinking limit for people ashore off duty like we were doing combat ops, while MCC/N37 didn't want to support some basic capabilities directly related to what we were actually doing. Mind boggling.

 

[Halifax Tar]

From the deployment equation? Definitely some areas where they add no value and just add time delays (approving travel in/out of theatre, TAVs, etc).

Some of the deployements seem to be effectively identical operational roles (and ROEs) as things we normally do in other op areas, just doesn't happen to be under a named operation with CJOC. I'm not sure if it's because ships are more self contained to operate independently with a mix of technical, logistics and operators as part of the crew.

Still not convinced that MCC was actually ever reading our daily updates for what we were actually doing, based on their pushback on some of the defects and impacts we were reporting. CJOC imposed a drinking limit for people ashore off duty like we were doing combat ops, while MCC/N37 didn't want to support some basic capabilities directly related to what we were actually doing. Mind boggling.

Do we need CJOC ? Were the L1s not capable of organizing and deploying forces on their own, and working together ?

To me we have over complicated things. And probably for the sake of GO/FO and CWO/CPO1 multiplication.