Precision Guided Artillery Munitions

[Infanteer]

WRT Artillery munitions and the role of the Guns in future conflicts; I think it is a little hasty to be relegating artillery to the dustbin of history, Artillery has been part of the combined arms team since a caveman decided to heave a rock at his enemy instead of trying to stickfight with him.

I just finished reading Col Douglas MacGregor's Transformation Under Fire.   In his dealing with the future of artillery, he believes that the technological advances in both the mechanisms and munitions that Gunner's will deploy should force us not only to look at changing our kit, but changing our organization as well to ensure that the advantages conferred by the technology is best utilized (this is how the Germans beat the French in 1940, superior organization).

Obviously, MacGregor (A tanker) believes the Artillery is here to stay; here is an interesting quote from his book

The fires conundrum.
From October 2001 through July 2002, U.S. forces in the 101st Airborne Division (air assault) battalions that fought Operation Anaconda in March 2002, had no artillery support.   As most soldiers know, the decision to leave artillery at home and rely exclusively on precision air power in Afghanistan left troops unnecessarily vulnerable.   When those troops found themselves under heavy mortar fire during Anaconda, the only fire support available other than their own mortars was close air support from AH-64 Apache helicopters and precision-guided bombing from air force or navy fighters.   This approach had significant drawbacks, not the least of which was the difficulty of coordinating suppression missions - those requiring a heavy volume of fire over an area rather than against a single target - when only precision munitions were available (emphasis mine). The assertion that other strike options just as effective as conventional artillery are available to ground forces is not yet the case in every setting.   Artillery that is not in direct support of ground-maneuver forces is of dubious utility, but artillery that provides quick responsive fires to forces in contact is still necessary.   Why?

What many advocates for the precision paradigm of warfare do not understand is that contemporary air power comes with limitations of a largely fixed aim point paradigm, reduced operational flexibility linked to the lengthy air-tasking-order process, and costly logistics.   It might take several hours for an aircraft to get on station, and it takes many other aircraft to get that one to the weapons-release point.   To date, the quickest response time in Afghanistan to a request from a unit on the ground for an air strike that is not part of the air-targeting order is reportedly two hours.   Tanker aircraft, AWACS, electronic-attack escorts, combat air patrol, and combat search-and-rescue are problems that must be added to the strike package.   These limitations, requirements, and vulnerabilities do not attend fire missions executed by ground-based systems, which are therefore more responsive in the battle of minutes.

Col Douglas MacGregor, Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights   pp. 267-268

I think MacGregor echos the fact that anyone who makes the pronouncement that artillery is obsolete is as foolhardy as the former Prime Minister of Britain Stanley Baldwin, who in the 1930's chastised any military official who disagreed with his theory that "the bomber will always get through".   However, MacGregor argues that the dispersed and sporadic nature of ground combat demands that we change the way we organize our indirect fire assets in order to provide the most quick and efficient suppressive fires in the muddled and often fluid ground combat of anything less then a high intensity war.

He argues that armies must organize their strike assets into a single, cohesive strike battalion.   These battalions will combine both conventional tube artillery as well as rocket forces, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (Such as the armed Predator drone that killed the Al Qaeda terrorists in Yemen), and Observation Parties for joint operations with Naval and Air Force assets.   MacGregor at some levels even advocated mixing both Army Aviation assists with stand off strike abilities (UH-60's equipped with rocket pods, AH-64 with stand off missiles) with their artillery brethren in order to ensure total cohesion of strike and suppresion assists for a ground force commander.  

The kicker of this organizational change is that Artillery, like the Armoured and Infantry units it intimately supports, must become more fluid and dispersed on the modern battlefield.   Gone are the days when a company sends it request up to Brigade or Division for the mass effects of the Brigade or Divisional commanders artillery support.   Rather, the increased lethality and firepower of modern artillery facilitates the packaging of smaller "strike" sub-units which can deliver on call indirect fire to the maneuver commander in the field (whether he be an Infantry recce patrol commander or an Armoured Squadron OC).   I think the one anecdote from Afghanistan serves as a good example of this idea.   Rather then inundate an enemy bunker position (I think it was a mud house) with bracketed, massed fire, the soldiers on the ground used a laser range finder and a GPS and radioed the results of the first "shot put" to the commander of the mortar position.   The next shot was bang on, resulting in a dead enemy who stood around awaiting bracketed fire.   Technology can be a great aid in acting as a force multiplier if it is organized properly to do so.

Naturally, these changes would be facilitated through the need to change the way the Artillery Corps views its Gunners, its NCO's, and its Officers.   For example, the "strike" officer of the Artillery would have to be well versed in the effects of each system under his command, whether it be rockets, missiles, cannon, aircraft or a variety of each, so as to ensure that the support he can deliver is adequate to the task and provides the best effect for the effort of the Gunners.   I think Canada's military has gone in the right direction by giving our UAV assets to the Artillery, however, I can think of some more changes (to both our equipment and our organization) that can help to ensure that the Artillery remains to live up to its motto of "Ubique" through the mastery of delivery of timely, effective indirect fires.

I found the above quote and ideas quite interesting.   Looking forward to thoughts, responses and criticisms by others.

Cheers,
Infanteer

 

[Yard Ape]

You are correct about my lack of experience RE: artillery, but I think you are relying on obsolete tactics and weapons information.

I think you have read too many one sided promotions of the RMA

Two hours after a 9-11 attack an air package of B-1 and B-52 bombers can leave US bases with CAP and refueling assets sufficient to get them into the theater and engage the enemy. They can fly the distance and be in the battle 12 hours later. They can attack armor and troop concentrations in any weather conditions using GPS based weapons such as the AGM-154 and or laser guided munitions. The US hasn't produced a daylight, fair-weather aircraft in 20 years. Everything flies all the time, providing the guys hunkered down on the ground can find them targets.

You are confusing strategic assets with tactical.  I believe the B-2 bomber was the only one that was able to fly from the continental US during the Afghanistan war.  Almost everything else requires a large support element deployed to a forward location.  Most military aircraft are considered tactical (meaning the range is so short they must be in theatre to participate).  The air bases or aircraft carriers that sustain these tactical aircraft would be just as at risk (or even more so) that the arty units that you have chosen to slam.

I will add that artillery also functions at all times of day in all weather.  This statement is more true of artillery than of aircraft.  Precision air weapons were unable to bring victory in Kosovo because the laser designators could not aim through the clouds.  With precision weapons, artillery can provide all the support of tactical air but with a quicker response time and the ability to select from a wider range of munitions on site (precision guided, DPICM, ScatMine, HE, Smoke, Illum) than would be available to an aircraft on station.

Your SP won't last till sundown on the first day against a foe with standoff anti-armor bombing capabilities, or ATACM BAT P31 type rocket counter-battery fire the AF didn't knock out.

Counter battery fire works both ways & even against elements conducting counter battery fire missions.

The primary issues are therefore, how much does it cost, and how fast can it get into the fight. An arty shell is cheap, but that doesn't take into account the fact that to get the gun to fire it into position the AirForce first had to win the air war, and then a few tens of thousands of troops had to be shipped into the theater, along with all of their equipment, and to do that a half dozen airbases had to be captured, repaired and defended.

Arty comes into the theatre with the rest of the ground forces.  Arty follows the manoeuvre elements on the battle field.  This means that Arty is available to the ground forces within minutes of when it is first needed.  This is not always true of aircraft.

I will therefore repeat. Arty is now a defensive weapon.

No.  It is a tactical weapon useful in all phases of war.  It can provide area suppression and, with new munitions, it can provide precision fire against all types of targets (mobile or static).

To get back to the original topic, precision artillery munitions make guns effective against all battlefield targets.

 

[Infanteer]

Interesting, while flipping through English and Gudmundsson's On Infantry, I noticed the following quote:

"The relationship between Einheitsgruppen (early German infantry sections) and the German battalion had an analog in the relationship between the battalions and the division.  In the latter case, the role of the machine gun company was played by the division artillery.  Sometimes called the commander's main effort weapon, the German division artillery would generally be divided into two unequal segments.  The larger segment cooperated directly with the infantry of the main effort.  The smaller segment performed economy of force missions, to include cooperation with infantry units that were not of the main effort.  In keeping with the presumption that Germany would be fighting a highly mobile campaign, the barrage fire of the Great War (to include the elaborate German version of the creeping barrage, the Feuerwatlz) was largely replaced by short but intense concentrations of fire.

Commanded by officers who considered personal observation of the battlefield and rapid adaption to changing battlefield conditions among the higher military virtues, the German machine gun companies and artillery batteries were able to perform their functions without excessive expenditure of ammunition.  The chief service they provided to maneuver units, after all, was not so much to protect by fire but to prevent surprises.  This was done by keeping the battlefield under continuous observation and, to prevent the enemy from taking the full measure of German strength, keeping a portion of the heavy weapons and artillery batteries silent until a truly lucrative target appeared.  This, in turn, allowed enemy units that showed themselves to be fired upon as soon as they appeared rather than sometime after fire support had been requested."

John English and Bruce Gudmundsson, On Infantry: Revised Edition: pg 45

It appears that the proposal for transformational change that I highlighted in my earlier post has already existed in the historical record.  What does this mean for the discussion of PGM's?  I think that as we acquire more PGM and UAV capabilities for the artillery, when combined with more conventional capabilities (HE, Smoke, Illum), the artillery will continue to provide an essential and irreplaceable part of the combined arms team. 

However, incorporation of these new technologies must be carried out with the appropriate changes in organization, doctrine, and military culture (both Army wide and within the Artillery Corps), so as to ensure the increased speed and lethality of these advances can be most effectively brought to bear upon an enemy in the battle of minutes and seconds.

Cheers,
Infanteer

 

[Yard Ape]

So, with the value of artillery PGMs & the rarity of 105 mm PGMs, will we shoot ourselves in the foot by doing away with 155 mm?  (It does not have to be M109 to be 155 mm)