Report: CF in K'Har "Bodes Well" for Counter-Insurgency Ops

[The Bread Guy]

Interesting reading.....

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369966&printthis=1

"Kandahar Province and the New Wave of Violence"
Waliullah Rahmani, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 20 Apr 06

Conclusion:

"In response to increasing attacks in Kandahar province, Afghan Defense Minister Abdur Rahim Wardak announced a new defense and security strategy. This strategy ostensibly "includes new tactics to combat the terrorist groups and Taliban insurgents" (Taraqi, April 4).

Moreover, the replacement of U.S. forces with Canadians and the expansion of NATO involvement in Kandahar bodes well for counter-insurgency operations. While many Kandahari residents believe that Canadians forces will not be able to stop the insurgency, they are optimistic that Canadians will be able to deal "justly" with the opium problem (Fajre Omid, April 4).

In the final analysis, a comprehensive counter-insurgency plan will require the Afghan government and local Kandahari officials to devise a single and clear strategy and stick to it over a prolonged period. The central aspect of this plan must focus on the role and political sympathies of the shuras and how this can be altered to isolate the Taliban and Pashtun nationalists."

 

[The Bread Guy]

I've finally had a chance to read the report, written by an organizatin billing itself as follows:
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/about_us

The Senlis Council is an international security and development policy think tank, established by The Network of European Foundations. One of the key projects of the Council is the Drug Policy Advisory Forum - a programme dedicated to evaluating the effectiveness of the current global drug policy.

Even thought the news release mentions some level of optimism re:  Canadian deployment to K'Har, a summary from the report itself makes for even MORE interesting reading....

"The Canadian Military Presence in Kandahar: Militarism and Lack of Communication

The Canadian military recently took over the Kandahar PRT. The troops have initially made efforts to distinguish themselves from the US presence in Kandahar, which is viewed with extreme hostility. However the initial goodwill generated by these attempts at differentiation quickly evaporated. It is evident that the local population resents the manner in which the Canadian military manages their presence in Kandahar, which is one of aggression, indifference and lack of communication. During this field investigation, the Canadian military shot and killed a taxi driver for driving too close to a Canadian military vehicle, causing deep hostility. The Canadian Prime Minister visited Kandahar but to the chagrin of the local
population, he did not make any ‘proper’ visits to them.  The local population considers the Canadian forces’ interaction with them as overly aggressive and militaristic. Moreover, the majority of the military vehicles and convoys travel without flags, preventing differentiation between the actions of US, Canadian military and the PMCs involved in poppy eradication (Dyncorp). Because of this, and because foreign
military elements have been reportedly involved in the forced eradication campaigns, Kandahar locals believe that the Canadian military are complicit in the US/Dyncorp eradication activities." (p. 23)

Another tidbit (p. 24)

According to many farmers, the
"US and Canadian alternative livelihoods plans are farcical: US and Canadian agencies talk about building roads, schools and electricity while simultaneously contributing to the destruction of the farmer’s livelihoods and means of survival."

The report is worth reading, but it's a VERY scary snapshot of the security and opium eradication efforts in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces.

 

[Blue Max]

This is a very optimistic appraisal by Strategy Page of Counter Insurgency Ops this year in Afghanistan and the effects on future Taliban recruiting.

Taliban Spring Offensive Sputters Forward

http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/afghan/articles/20060424.aspx

April 24, 2006: The Taliban are making a major effort, but are squeezed by thousands of NATO troops moving into southern Afghanistan, and 80,000 Pakistani troops operating along their side of the border. In the last week, four Canadian soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb. The Canadians are newly arrived in a Pushtun area that favors the Taliban. Pushtun tribes are on both sides of the province, and it's southern Afghanistan where the Taliban always had most of their support. Taliban casualties have been much higher. By the time this "offensive" is over, it will be a lot harder to recruit for the next Taliban offensive.

The war along the border is one of patrol, ambush and raid. The small groups of Taliban (a dozen or so gunmen, enough to overwhelm most police patrols) sneak about, trying to avoid American patrols (who are better armed and trained, and get air support very quickly). The Taliban are looking for Afghan army and police patrols they can ambush. They hope to wipe out the patrol, after which they can steal weapons and other gear off the dead. If the ambush is not a success, the Taliban must flee, quickly, because they are now the prey. These are the situations which often lead to a dozen or more Taliban being killed or captured by pursuing Afghan and American forces. In addition to ambushes, the Taliban units look for villages they can go to, and make sure the locals are still pro-Taliban (will provide food and shelter for Taliban men, and not inform on them.) Threats will be made, and sometimes carried out, in villages that have been less loyal. Unlike Iraq, there are not a lot of cell phones, or any kinds of phones, in the back country of Afghanistan. So when the Taliban come by, they have a captive audience. But eventually an army or police patrol will come through, and the villagers will have to decide what is less dangerous, supporting the government or the Taliban. The villagers know of the UAVs and recon aircraft, that can often document Taliban visits, eliminating the possibility of lying about it. It's a nasty war, out there in the hills.

The Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists are tying to turn Kabul into Baghdad, but the bad guys don't have the numbers, local support or technical skill. More bombs are going off, but the timing and placement are wrong, and few casualties result. But the explosions are loud, and out of place in Kabul. The terrorists put out a press release, claiming non-existent casualties and promising more of the same.

This open intelligence appraisal sounds great, can anyone dispute any of its conclusions, without a crystal ball of course.

 

[Blue Max]

Another story from Strategy Page re the anti-Taliban fight/tactics in Afghanistan.

Rounding Up the Rogue Bikes

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr/articles/20060424.aspx

April 24, 2006: Police in Afghanistan noticed that the Taliban's favorite form of motorized transportation was the motorcycle, usually Japanese models. So now the police are going after unregistered motorcycles, as the ones used by the Taliban generally don't bother with registration. Actually, in the back country, many people don't bother with much government paperwork at all. That's now changed, and the police are trying to deny the Taliban one of their more effective forms of transportation. At the very least, this will force the Taliban to get real, or false, documentation for their bikes.

In 2003, the Taliban bought 1,150 such bikes in Pakistan, preparatory to staging a new offensive. Many Taliban attacks, including bombings (suicide and otherwise) as well as killings, have been carried out by men on motorcycles. Groups of men on bikes will make attacks, and then speed off, and often get away, by going off the roads, and up trails that normally only carry horses or people on foot.