• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Should Canada adopt the LAV III (AKA: Stryker) as its primary armoured vehicle family?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Brock
  • Start date Start date
T.S.Rea said:
As should be obvious, I am definitely not a fan of the LAVIII, and that view is based entirely on the vehicle itself.   A simple web search will reveal that I am not alone.

I'm not trying to shit in your hand or anything - my experience is close to nil, so I'm basing my analysis off of numerous "first-hand" sources.  I could care less about the Congressman's Report on the Stryker; we have members on these forums who've used the LAV family of vehicles from missions ranging from Humanitarian/Peace Support Ops to a full blown shooting war.  I'm going to take their word that although the LAV isn't the "all-singing, all-dancing" platform that some make it out to be (find me a system that is), it can do a good job if employed right.
 
Modern infinite pivot steer hydrodynamic transmissions are employed in current tracked vehicles to control vehicle turning, a process that can be refined further with modestly sized hybrid electric drive components and ABS-derivative traction control, both of which are currently entering the civilian automotive market.  The small electric drive motors would further boost available torque, provide more electrical power for vehicle systems, as well as provide a modest backup and/or silent creeping drive, although there is no great need to employ large motors beyond what are available for hybrid vehicles produced by companies like Toyota or Honda (as examples).

Steering without turning wheels is not new, its been used in the ubiquitous Bobcat front end loader found on most construction sites as well as various types of ATV's for decades.  The above technologies make it possible to employ this type of drive in higher speed vehicles with smooth gradations of turning action.  Positive drive steering provides higher traction under all conditions, which is the reason it was developed from the original ABS technology to improve traction on water or snow covered roads when the steered wheels have little to no effect on vehicle directional control.  Moreover, a Canadian LAV was tested with tracks on the two rear axle sets, but lacking differentiated power to the tracks it was incapable of being steered by the front wheels.  Bobcats and some of the ATV's have optional tracks, although they are not used often because their large balloon like tires relative to their weight provide adequate traction under the vast majority of situations.

Steering wheels consume a lot of empty space, resulting in much longer suspension arms and less space for the hull of the vehicle, which must be made narrower and sit higher up, as like it is on the LAV family of vehicles.  It is for these reasons that an equivalent wheeled armoured vehicle will be upwards of a third heavier in weight for a given package of armour, space, systems, etc., when compared to a tracked armoured vehicle, and negates any significant improvement in fuel economy gained by wheeled drive.  The narrower and higher configuration of a wheeled armoured vehicle hull in concert with the farther inboard connection to the hull in turn makes it less stable and prone to being top heavy.  If fixed wheels are employed with differential drive to port and starboard driving two shafts buried into the bottom edge of the side armour (in practice, a little more involved than described here), then you would have the benefits of better traction, weight efficiency, more stability, and the option of tracks for deep snow, soft beach sand, and similar situations.  Digital rotary hydraulic suspension components would save some additional weight over the torsion bars, as well as allow a degree of tuning for different terrain conditions (or even recoil absorption if relevant).

Bobcats and similar ATV's have length to width ratios ranging from 1-1.5:1 in order to facilitate their ability to pivot on the spot, since they frequently are performing this maneouvre.  An armoured vehicle would benefit in many tactical situations from being able to pivot on the spot, but it is not the normal mode of movement.  Tracked vehicles, or the wheeled with optional tracks configuration advocated here, do not suffer from ratios of ranging from 2-2.5:1.  A complication occurs with any four-wheeled light vehicle derived from the powertrain components, since the distance of the wheel base and the peak stress loadings on individual wheels could induce high shearing loads on the tires; however, the lower weight and reduced width criticality would allow some degree of steering of the wheels to be restored without any significant penalty.

Far from being a critic of wheeled armoured vehicles in general, I actually am a strong advocate of a complete army of weight efficient wheeled vehicles based on a single set of power and drive train components.  Tracks are necessary under some circumstances for traction and protection, but there is no reason to labour under the lower automotive efficiency and higher maintenance burden of tracks only armoured vehicles.  What I do object to is the technical means by which wheeled drive is implemented in the LAV family of vehicles, and not to the fact that they are wheeled vehicles.  The radically modified M113 is probably the most cost efficient means by which the LAV family could be replaced and sold after removal of the electronics, sensors, and weapons from them.  A country as large as our own with modest global commitments needs as mobile an army as is techological feasible, or else it will continue to suffer from diminished relevance and subsequent neglect.
 
You lost me after "infinite".

For some reason I'm seeing echos of David Hackworth and Co. screaming that the M2 Bradley was going to be the end of the US Army.   Perhaps you should focus on the strengths of the LAV III instead of dancing around the weaknesses.   The end-users seem to say it works fine.
 
I think he is arguing the fact that the LAV cannot turn in its own length? And cannot be turned into a Half-track?

So here is that website again from earlier.

http://www.baesystems.se/default.asp

Is it a LAV. No. It is an alternative.

We are still getting the LAV, and arguing about it is moot. Believe me, I've tried ;D.

We need to come up with ways of using the LAV to its best advantage, which is dealt with on other threads.

So should I make another thread? Or can I ask the question about the TLAV's? What role are they going to fill?

Thanks


 
The question in this thread, for which my post was actually bumped from one about the MMEV, is whether or not the LAV should be the sole armoured vehicle.

My replies have little to do with the specific weaknesses or merits of the LAV in isolation, but more with what could satisfy the needs of a sole armoured vehicle type based on a couple of decades of continuous rework.

The LAV's and M113's will continue on for the next two decades regardless.  The question in this thread has already been answered in practice, is not this a hypothetical question about possible paths to take from the present?

 
T.S.Rea,
Was that giant post to tell me that, by "convert M113 vehicles to a wheels and tracks configuration," you suggest that we should convert the M113 into a wheeled skid-steer? 

 
The steering system is not the skid-steer of old, it is differential steering, which is actually being considered for future versions of the LAV and FCS.
 
So, you figure our primary armoured vehicle should be an M113 with a more powerfull engine, most of its hull replaced to improve armour, and the tracks replaced with a next generation skid-steer?    . . . and you figure this could be done cheaper than buying the LAV?  You do know this would require an entirely new suspension and power delivered to all of the road wheels, right?  You are asking for a whole new vehicle.
 
Interesting article from the Washington Post.

Keep in mind that the US Stryker is not the same as our LAV III.  Our LAV III has a higher centre of gravity and is heavier, due to the addition of the Delco turret.  The US Stryker uses a Remote Weapons Station (RWS).

Stryker Army vehicle comes up short
Classified study says vehicle puts troops at risk
By R. Jeffrey Smith
The Washington Post
Updated: 8:19 a.m. ET March 31, 2005

The Army has deployed a new troop transport vehicle in Iraq with many defects, putting troops there at unexpected risk from rocket-propelled grenades and raising questions about the vehicle's development and $11 billion cost, according to a detailed critique in a classified Army study obtained by The Washington Post.

The vehicle is known as the Stryker, and 311 of the lightly armored, wheeled vehicles have been ferrying U.S. soldiers around northern Iraq since October 2003. The Army has been ebullient about the vehicle's success there, with Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, telling the House Armed Services Committee last month that "we're absolutely enthusiastic about what the Stryker has done."

But the Army's Dec. 21 report, drawn from confidential interviews with operators of the vehicle in Iraq in the last quarter of 2004, lists a catalog of complaints about the vehicle, including design flaws, inoperable gear and maintenance problems that are "getting worse not better." Although many soldiers in the field say they like the vehicle, the Army document, titled "Initial Impressions Report -- Operations in Mosul, Iraq," makes clear that the vehicle's military performance has fallen short.

The internal criticism of the vehicle appears likely to fuel new controversy over the Pentagon's decision in 2003 to deploy the Stryker brigade in Iraq just a few months after the end of major combat operations, before the vehicle had been rigorously tested for use across a full spectrum of combat.

The report states, for example, that an armoring shield installed on Stryker vehicles to protect against unanticipated attacks by Iraqi insurgents using low-tech weapons works against half the grenades used to assault it. The shield, installed at a base in Kuwait, is so heavy that tire pressure must be checked three times daily. Nine tires a day are changed after failing, the report says; the Army told The Post the current figure is "11 tire and wheel assemblies daily."

'Functionality shortfalls'
"The additional weight significantly impacts the handling and performance during the rainy season," says the report, which was prepared for the Center for Army Lessons Learned in Fort Leavenworth, Kan. "Mud appeared to cause strain on the engine, the drive shaft and the differentials," none of which was designed to carry the added armor.

Commanders' displays aboard the vehicles are poorly designed and do not work; none of the 100 display units in Iraq are being used because of "design and functionality shortfalls," the report states. The vehicle's computers are too slow and overheat in desert temperatures or freeze up at critical moments, such as "when large units are moving at high speeds simultaneously" and overwhelm its sensors.

The main weapon system, a $157,000 grenade launcher, fails to hit targets when the vehicle is moving, contrary to its design, the report states. Its laser designator, zoom, sensors, stabilizer and rotating speed all need redesign; it does not work at night; and its console display is in black and white although "a typical warning is to watch for a certain color automobile," the report says. Some crews removed part of the launchers because they can swivel dangerously toward the squad leader's position.

The vehicle's seat belts cannot be readily latched when troops are in their armored gear, a circumstance that contributed to the deaths of three soldiers in rollover accidents, according to the report. On the vehicle's outside, some crews have put sand-filled tin cans around a gunner's hatch that the report says is ill-protected.

Eric Miller, senior defense investigator at the independent Project on Government Oversight, which obtained a copy of the internal Army report several weeks ago, said the critique shows that "the Pentagon hasn't yet learned that using the battlefield as a testing ground costs lives, not just spiraling dollars."

Asked about the report, Army officials who direct the Stryker program said they are working to fix some flaws; they also said they were unaware of some of the defects identified in the critique. "We're very proud of the Stryker team," said Lt. Col. Frederick J. Gellert, chief of the Army's Stryker Brigade Combat Team Integration Branch in Washington, but "it hasn't been something that's problem-divorced."

According to the latest Army figures, 17 soldiers in the Stryker combat brigade have died in Iraq in 157 bomb explosions, but no delineation is made for those who perished inside the vehicle and those who were standing outside it; an additional five soldiers have died in two rollovers. No current figure was provided for those who perished in grenade attacks, although one officer said he thought it was less than a handful.

Neither the lessons-learned report nor more recent Army data state how many soldiers have been wounded while inside the vehicle. The report states that in one case, a soldier was struck by shrapnel that penetrated both the vehicle's armor and his own body armor; in another case, an entire crew escaped with minor injuries after a vehicle sustained nine grenade hits.

'How much nicer'
The criticisms of the Stryker's first performance in combat seem likely to give new ammunition to critics of the Army's decision in 1999 to move away from more heavily armored vehicles that move on metal tracks and embrace a generation of lighter, more comfortable vehicles operated at higher speed on rubber tires.

Senior Army officers in Iraq, like those at the Pentagon, have been surprised by the intensity of hostilities there since mid-2003, and lately some officers have said they depend on heavy armor to protect their soldiers in urban warfare, even though tanks in Iraq have also suffered unexpected damage.

But Maj. Gen. Stephen M. Speakes, the Army's director of force development, said that when he rode in the Stryker for the first time, he "marveled at how much nicer it was" than riding in a Bradley vehicle or an older troop transport, the M113, which he likened to being inside an aluminum trash can being beaten by a hammer. He said the Stryker was "amazingly smooth" and quiet by comparison.

In a report completed at the time of deployment, the Pentagon's operational test and evaluation office rated the Stryker vehicles sent to Iraq "effective and survivable only with limitations for use in small-scale contingencies." Congressional auditors at the General Accounting Office in December 2003 said the first brigade "did not consistently demonstrate its capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses."

Independent groups and a loose-knit group of retired Army officers who dislike the Stryker vehicle have alleged that the Stryker's 2003 deployment was motivated partly by the desire of the Army and the manufacturer, General Dynamics, to build congressional support for buying additional brigades. But Speakes said that was nonsense and that the brigade was deployed in Iraq simply because the Army needed it.

Researchers Bob Lyford and Madonna Lebling contributed to this report.
© 2005 The Washington Post Company

URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7342394/
 
There was a report on CNN about this.  The conclusions were that the vehicle was too heavy (to tpt readily), too vulnerable (even with the slate armour it was only good 5 out of 10 times), to expensive.  These Stykers had the automated .50 or grenade launcher and not what we use.  The slate armour adds 3 more feet in width and 3 more tons in weight.  P.S.  They still have heavy armour in conjunction with this.
 
Quote from the Stryker report cited earlier:
"According to the latest Army figures, 17 soldiers in the Stryker combat brigade have died in Iraq in 157 bomb explosions, but no delineation is made for those who perished inside the vehicle and those who were standing outside it; an additional five soldiers have died in two rollovers. No current figure was provided for those who perished in grenade attacks, although one officer said he thought it was less than a handful."
    Now I'm sorry, but I did my patrols in a bleeding Iltis, and I can tell you our figures would have been a heck of a lot worse than 17 KIA in 157 bomb attacks.  You can kill an Iltis with a poorly timed sneeze.  This report is not going to make me condemn the LAV III as being less well armoured than the Bismark, its going to make me wish I had the freaking thing when I had to hang my Jr ranked a$$ on the line.  For a Light Armoured Vehicle, it has performed well.  It is not an MBT, it is an IFV, and the protection it offers its infantry is superior to what Canadian light and mechanized infantry have known in the past.  To the horde of M113 lovers in the crowd, what do you think the numbers for the tin toasters would have been after 157 bomb attacks?  The Iltis offered about as much protection as CF issue bug juice, and the M113 was an RPG gunners wet dream (heck, an LMG would do it).  The LAV III is not unkillable, but it is not only a better protected carrier than our Infanteers have ever been given, but able to configure in ways to leave our infantry better supported than it has been since WWII gave us the Priest/Kangaroo combination.
 
Here is a Stratfor's take on the Washington Post story.

Media Report on 'Stryker' Misleading

By Andrew Teekell


On March 31, The Washington Post reported that the U.S. Army's Stryker Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), which has been operating in Iraq for a year and a half, is not faring so well in the war zone. The eight-wheeled vehicle is inadequately armored, its computers are too slow and crew accommodations provide inadequate protection during rollovers.

Deficiencies noted, but the media is a bit behind the curve.

The report cites a four-month-old Army report on the LAV's performance in Iraq that did in fact find room for improvement in the Stryker -- improvement that already has been implemented or soon will be. Since first arriving in Iraq in October 2003, the vehicles and their crews have been adapting well to the mission and the environment.

Army personnel at Fort Lewis, Wash., home to the units that deploy the Stryker, tell Stratfor the LAV is experiencing many of the same problems that new weapon systems often do during their shakedown cruise in combat.

One problem, which most likely will be addressed on the assembly line, is that the tire pressure has to be checked too frequently because of the weight of the extra armor that protects the crew from insurgent rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The armor is a field modification installed when the vehicles arrive in Kuwait and before they cross the border into Iraq. Although the armor is saving lives, the Stryker's suspension and tires were not designed to handle the extra weight.

The Army report also cites problems with the Stryker's computer systems. The commander's display fails to function properly and the computers slow down or freeze up when processing large amounts of data. Sources at General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., the Stryker's manufacturer, say the computer issues have been addressed with software upgrades. The data processing and command and control equipment in the Strykers are completely new systems that had never been used in combat vehicles before the Strykers went to Iraq.

In addition, the vehicle's grenade launcher has proven to be difficult to operate under combat conditions. This is a problem that can be remedied with interim field modifications or improvements on the assembly line.

The Stryker is deployed with the 3rd Brigade of the Army's 2nd Infantry Division in Iraq. Since February 2004, when the "Stryker Brigade" deployed to Kirkuk and Mosul, two vehicles have been lost to RPG fire. Other vehicles have been totaled by landmines and improvised explosive devices. Casualties have been sustained in most cases, but few Stryker crewmembers have been killed.

The first version of a weapon system often requires refinement after being used operationally. During World War II, the M4 Sherman tank was plagued by inadequate firepower and thin armor and was shot full of holes by the powerful German tanks it encountered in Normandy. To give themselves a better chance of surviving encounters with the Panzers, Sherman crews took to bolting scrap armor plate to the front and sides and tying sandbags to the front.

An even more notable example of military field expediency is the rapid "up-armoring" of the Army's "Humvee" fleet in Iraq, which was introduced into a combat environment that it was not designed for. There have been dozens of modifications to the F-16 fighter and
M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle since these systems were first deployed. Even the mighty
F-117 Stealth fighter performed poorly when first used in combat in Panama in 1989.

These problems are not exclusive to the U.S. military. The suspensions of Soviet T-72 tanks used in Afghanistan were found to be inadequate for the country's rough terrain, so the T-72 was replaced by the older T-62. During Russia's involvement in Chechnya, the gas turbine engines on their T-80 tanks proved to be problematic and were replaced with diesel engines in later models. The British army's Challenger tank was completely redesigned to address problems noted during gunnery exercises and the 1991 Gulf War.

The Stryker was developed for the emerging doctrine of a lighter and more rapidly deployable force. It was a controversial shift from an Army based on heavy divisions meant to engage massed Soviet formations to a force more suited to low-intensity conflict and intervention.

When it was introduced, the Stryker was derided by critics of the new, lighter Army. So far, however -- despite some teething troubles -- the Stryker has proven itself in combat. Experience in Iraq has shown that the Main Battle Tank still has a place on the urban battlefield -- U.S. troops like the firepower and psychological advantage that the 70-ton
M-1 gives them. And, from all accounts, they like the Stryker too.
 
There are problems with the strykers and LAV III's. Fact.

There have been role overs in the Canadian LAV III's that have seriously injured their crews. Fact.

The LAV III is what we are getting. Fact.

The LAV III is better then the Grizzily. Fact.

The LAV III offers more protection then the M113's. Fact.

We are no longer using track as our main vehicles. Fact.

No arguments. Just get on with it and find ways to use them properly.

 
We do need to pay careful attention to the AARs to see what sorts of modifications we may need to add to our LAV fleet. Based on various things I have read:

1. Bolt on external armour. Non explosive reactivce armour pannels (NERA) bolted over the most vulnerable points of the vehicle would improve performance with minimal weight and not increase the size the way a cage does.

2.  Upgraded suspension system to deal with weight increases. New tires with wider footprints to reduce ground pressure would also improve mobility somewhat.

3.  Crew ergonomics. "Wrap around" seats to protect the vehicle crew, and improved seats and harness systems for the dismounted troops would make the vehicle more survivable in an accident or when struck by a weapon.

4. Weight control. Wherever possible, replace steel components with lighter ceramic or composite materials. This would mostly offset the weight gain from other improvements

Since we have so few LAVs, this will be rather expensive since most of the components will be hand built. Increasing the LAV fleet and adding these mods on the assembly line will lower the unit costs for the "LAV 3.5".

 
Here we go again...Why are we putting all our eggs in a basket we know can't take a punch?  It seems to my tiny mind, that if you have to "add armour", then the vehicle isn't armoured in the first place, is it?  And, glueing those little ceramic pucks all over your wagon is just plain naf, IMHO..

CHIMO,  Kat
 
Lt.-Col. Petit said the Styker MGS fits the Canadian army's needs, adding that the Iraq war proved the worth of the vehicles. â Å“For the type of missions that we do on a regular basis, that vehicle would be very useful,â ? he said. â Å“If we had that vehicle today, it would be in Afghanistan.â ?

I didn't think these things had even come close to deployment yet? So how is he saying that the US is using them? Or is he just talking about the chassis?

One of the main issues with the Stryker involves a steel cage-like contraption the U.S. army attached to the vehicles to give them more protection against rocket-propelled grenades. The extra weight of that system has put undue stress on the vehicle's drive shaft and engine, resulting in more maintenance problems.
Lt.-Col. Petit acknowledged that rocket-propelled grenades pose a threat to Canada's LAV-3s and the Stryker MGS. But he said the Canadian army has no plans to use the cage system its Amencan counterparts have installed on the Strykers. Instead it hopes to develop its own add-on armour system.

Now this is cause for concern. Extra maintence is something we cannot afford. Not to mention is the whole reason we're getting away from track (so they say) in the first place. Also the idea of us developing our own system of additional protection? More money for something that is hypathetical.

Please tell me if there is something NOT politically driven coming down the pipes?

 
Zipper said:
I didn't think these things had even come close to deployment yet? So how is he saying that the US is using them? Or is he just talking about the chassis?
The one thing I don't think was made clear in David's article is that the US has not used the Stryker MGS in Iraq.  It has been Stryker APC variants (which are more similar to our LAV III than an MGS in role & layout) that have seen Iraqi service.
 
Thats what I thought.

Now the question is, was LCol. Petit misquoted about the MGS? Considering that happens on a regular basis in the media. Or did he actually say that? Which calls into question he credibility as "director" of this program.

Normally I would question the media source. But considering the BS that comes from NDHQ most of the time, I cannot call it so clearly.
 
Back
Top