SITREP ON MILITIA INFANTRY UNITS

[Full_Militia_Bullet]

What is the situation for militia infantry units out there?
I believe the picture below is representative of infantry units around my area (34 CBG - Montreal):

1. All support weapons are pooled within the Brigade. If a PSWQ is running at the same time as an Ex, platoons sometimes have no C6.
2. 84mm Carl Gustav is almost impossible to get for Ex
3. No 60 mm mortars in the vaults either. A refresher on that wouldn't hurt...
4. There are is no other range time other than the yearly PWT-3 on IBTS.
5. That very same PWT level 3 is run without any range practices.
6. The only troops who get to fire C9 or C6 live for IBTS are the soldiers who have been assigned that weapon. i.e. infantry soldiers might go for three or four years without firing an MG live.
7. There is hardly any time and/or budget allocated for PT.
8. Ridiculous amounts of blank ammo on Ex (e.g. 4 mags for a whole weekend of Platoon Attacks)
9. An obsessive focus by RHQ on "numbers" and recruiting, almost at the expense of retention.
10. No adventure training whatsoever.
11. No 60mm Mortar in the vaults
12. Even rappelling is rare. I haven't gone down a rappell tower in at least two years.
13. Pugil sticks? I vaguely remember doing that four or five years ago...
14. Refresher of C6 in SF role/C2 sight for those who are qualified? Let me get back to you on that one....
15. Anyone actually qualified on the GPS? I think its covered in the Basic Recce Patrolman course we don't get.

I hear reserve infantry units out in LFWA (perhaps elsewhere too) have taskings: Urban S&R, Amphibious Ops, Mountain Ops, etc. This has been unheard of in LFQA for almost a decade. "

Sometimes I get the feeling that NDHQ believes it is only a matter of time before Quebec separates - and they have already written us off. The English-speaking units in QC (mostly around Montreal) tend to feel they're caught in the middle: written off by one side and despised by the other.

But then again, It just might be a case of the grass being greener elsewhere...

How are things in your unit, Brigade, your area/province?

 

[McplWagar]

frustration setting in eh? Well my advice is to relax a little you the world isn't crashing in on itself. Every unit in every brigade is different some things get pushed down from brigade (ie support weapons being sent to courses) but for the most part your unit makes decisions on things like what ranges they do etc.

1)in 33 Brigade weapons will get called up for courses but I've never seen it to the extent where a unit did not have a single C6 (except over the summer months when the units are completely stood down minus support staff)
2)84's do go out on Ex's when they are required, if you're doing winter indoc and you have to lug Carl around for no reason other then to carry it you're going to tick off troops fast.
3)60's are out there and you're definitely right about refreshers, they usually don't bring them out for the same reason as I stated above. Dead weight sucks.
4)That's your units budget planning in my experiance. My unit is doing it's 3rd range weekend since Sept at the end of Jan, all live. We have run pwt 1's and 3's on the first two and will on the third as well. We also fired C6, C9, and M203.
5)many units do not do the practice shoots because they are famil shoots. The only time I have EVER seen them fired is when I taught on CAP (common army phase) so the officers could practice running a range, and on the ISPWQ so the candidates could practice coaching.
6)only troops assigned C6/C9 firing it is a common problem I have seen as well. This is a leadership problem (again in my experiance) where people get too comfy with the same guys always doing the same job, at my unit I have the discreation to switch up my C9 gunner and C6 gunner for a weekend ex if they are capable and I have done it but again for budget reasons if you only have enough ammo to fire through a small amount of soldiers who should your priority be?
7)We had the same problem so we had some Mcpl's organize a voluntary running group that is working out pretty well.
8)It is pretty bad if you're doing section attacks and only get 4 mags and the best of luck. The past couple years we've been pretty lucky in 33 with a decent amount of ammo
9)a)Numbers means money, some units do focus on recruiting but usually this means they are hurting. I've seen units that were pretty hurting and had to switch to this focus. One of our 3 garrisons was almost closed when we were not allowed to run a Co Op course for 2 or 3 years and they were hurting badly, this year they are running a Co Op and will have a good turnout again. It all depends on your current parade state.
b)I broke this into 2 because I think retention is a different problem that often gets stuffed in with mass recruiting when in my experience it is usually a training problem. Every friend I have seen leave the CF has been for one reason, the reserves are boring all we do is boring training that I did on my basic. They want excitement and are not getting it. I myself have been frustrated at our training and focused my attention on training troops going away on courses to give them a heads up and a little extra training. I'm in a position where I can do that but even the lowliest private can approach their leaders through the chain of command with training ideas. This is probably the biggest problem for the reserves that I have seen.
10)Again this is leadership not stepping up. Many units throughout 33 Brig have Amazing UTA's who bring with them experience from the regular force, I wish I could name them because we have some of the best folks out there who have brought many subjects of interest to different units. This year we have had a guest speaker who has recently returned from Afghanistan, rope crossings, we were set to do rappelling but conflict of timings occurred, some fun winter training including bangy boards, snow mobiles things of that nature. It would be nice if instead of another tent up tent down ex if we did some real adventure training but it just happening out here.
11)again this is probably a unit thing, we have them and they don't come out unless we need them
12)rappelling is rare because most units don't have the instructors nor the facilities to run them, this is unfortunate but by working on courses and taking courses I have rappelled at least once every year since I joined (excluding this year, apparently there is no rappelling on CAP). I agree though we should definately step up with more fun training like this if nothing else it will help with retention.
13)we had difficulty getting pugil sticks from brigade so we decided to try and acquire our own. We are lucky and have a qualified instructor so all we need is the sticks.
14)This is my 6th year now and I have done both QL4 C6 and DB2a. Many people on my original course have had to come back and take both to advance into the rank of Mcpl but it is also a good refresher. I have also seen those who really enjoyed the 6 go up to their Sgt's and ask if they could get some time practicing their drills on the guns and this has never been denied. It never hurts to ask. At our unit the Officers like to push stuff down to section commanders as "pocket training" but recently we have covered the C6 drills (none SF kit) in detail for IBTS and for those qualified a "pocket training" course on the SF. I agree though it's not sufficient.
15)Many people are qualified on the GPS, I am not BRP qualified I picked it up in Gagetown as all instructors had to take a course on it. We have also discussed running famile courses at the unit but the intrest just wasn't there. Most people have switched to civy brand anyways

Unit tasks vary, I don't know of any unit in 33 that has any of the tasks that you listed. The only tasks I can think of off hand would be a jump tasking.

I think the grass is a mutual brown across Canada but that's just the way I see my brigade. I know a lot of guys in our unit who have since left talked about the Western training area, I haven't worked with any reservists from out there so I don't hear too much about what they do but maybe someone out there can post what it's like for them.

(edit:had some thoughts I wanted to adjust)

 

[Full_Militia_Bullet]

1. in 2003 34 Bde implemented joint companies: companies made of 3 Inf platoons from diffrent units, one of these 3 units is tasked to run the Coy HQ, plan the training, etc. and every year it all gets reshuffled around. Last year the training calendar, budget decisions, etc. were all made in an armoury an hour's drive away, by officers I didn't know... Not to say there isn't a crisis of leadership in my own unit but the system doesn't help...

However it makes us train in the field with other units: I can tell you that with very few exceptions the portrait I am painting is representative not just of my own unit but of the Brigade in general.

2. Its not matter of uselessly lugging around C6, Carl G, etc. on winter indoc: Fighting patrols or platoon attacks with no C6??? on a weekend ex? Yep.  that's right buddy. Oh yeah: Comms equipment and GPS's are also pooled in the same way... Carl G's, which are no longer taught on DP1 Infantry are becoming a rarity...

3. We are in Montreal: There's an armoury 15 minutes away with a rappel setup, there's a rappel tower 45 minutes away in CFB Farnham... facilities are definitely not the problem...

4. COs have been desperately trying to delay and fight an order to merge Officers' and Sr NCO's messes (physically, not just the accounting and bar operation) in order to turn messes into classrooms, offices, storage, etc.

5. Of course leadership is not stepping up... And the few who do step up make he rest look bad so they get ignored. There IS a crisis in leadership. most problems in the army can be traced back to leadership deficiencies.

6. Boring training, etc. : Once the budget for all the boring mandatory trg has been spent (SHARP refresher, Alcohol and Drug Policy, etc.) Once the joint companies have made up a boring training schedule to meet their assigned collective training objectives (and make their own bosses happy) what money/time left for any other "cool" training?

7. Most units are worse than Scrooge on Christmas day when it comes to sending NCO's on courses like rappelmaster or unarmed combat instructor. They don't wouldn't see the benefit if it hit them in the back of the head. My unit (and others also) hasn't sent anyone on the small arms for at least a decade. Now with the DP3 Sec Comdr course they have to...

 

[Michael Dorosh]

7. There is hardly any time and/or budget allocated for PT.

this has been discussed ad nauseam here.  What benefit is there in scheduling PT for a guy who only works 3 hours a week?  The onus is on him to stay in shape - 30 minutes of heavy breathing at parade night once a week isn't going to do much is it?

 

[GO!!!]

Not to play too much of the "mo-hater" here, but given that resources are scarce, even in the Reg Force, how do you justify getting a larger share of them, given that you are a part - time unit, with no operation taskings?

My unit is training to send troops to Afghanistan, where a training deficiency could get them killed.

I am not ashamed to say that we need Jumpers, Snipers, Machine Gunners and Signallers far more than you do. We need to train more, and properly, with enough ammo to get everybody proficient and comfortable with their weapons and jobs.

If you do want to go on a deployment, put your name in, and I guarantee you, you will fire so much ammo on your six month workup trg you will be sick of the sound of it.

 

[enfield]

Not to play too much of the "mo-hater" here, but given that resources are scarce, even in the Reg Force, how do you justify getting a larger share of them, given that you are a part - time unit, with no operation taskings?

My unit is training to send troops to Afghanistan, where a training deficiency could get them killed.

A fair question. I believe the basic question is what role and capability do we want for the Reserves? Or really - Do we need or want a Reserve Army?
If we decide we need a Reserve Army, then there is a basic level of investment that needs to be met, or we might as well not bother. If soldiers are unable to keep up even the most basic skills they lose the ability to contribute to the CF, and should be cut away.

"no operational taskings"? As far as I know, Inf Reservists have taken part in most of the major and minor operations of the CF over the past 15 years, and have a role in upcoming operations in Afghanistan and a continuing role in domestic operations. True, Militia units need not pretend to train like a LIB or like they will be in combat next week, but there is a basic level of training and realism that needs to be met. The part-time soldiers at Medak, the part-time soldiers called out to fight forest fires, or the part-time soldiers deploying to Kandahar this year all require a solid foundation. 

I am not ashamed to say that we need Jumpers, Snipers, Machine Gunners and Signallers far more than you do. We need to train more, and properly, with enough ammo to get everybody proficient and comfortable with their weapons and jobs.

Agreed. The Regs need resources, money, and training time immediately for real operational needs. Many specialized jobs can and should only exist in the Regs.
But again - why have an Army Reserve if they aren't trained? Operational requirements should always take priority. Is the Militia relevant to current and forseeable CF operations? In many ways cutting the Reserve budgets and training resources is the same idea as cutting the resources to Reg F initial training courses - St Jean has as much relevance to what is happening in Kandahar as the Militia does, since both provide pools of trained manpower.

If you do want to go on a deployment, put your name in, and I guarantee you, you will fire so much ammo on your six month workup trg you will be sick of the sound of it.

If training deficiencies aren't solved, then the Reservists who show up for tours will be so untrained and inexperienced they will be useless, and unable to fire any of that ammo. Getting a tour is a random process that leaves many frustrated, and is not an option for older more settled reservists. If the only way for a Reservist to get decent training is to go with the Regs, we should shut down the Militia.

I think we're close to that now. Reservist volunteers for the Afghan roto are looking at an 18 month commitment, meaning one year of training. To me, that means the reservists need to be trained from the ground up. Taking guys off the street may be just as effective.

I don't have up to date in depth knowledge on how my brigade is operating, but I will make two comments:
-Before I went to Bosnia, the Militia provided me and all others going with a 5 day TCCCS conversion/familiarization course. This course consisted entirely of computer modules, since there were no available instructors, and worse, no radios.
-On one weekend ex in the fall, the focus was section and platoon attacks. There was no available blanks, so everyone spent two days yelling "bang". On a following ex, which focused on raids and had some company and platoon attacks, the ammo was drastically increased - 4 mags for the entire weekend.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

"no operational taskings"? As far as I know, Inf Reservists have taken part in most of the major and minor operations of the CF over the past 15 years, and have a role in upcoming operations in Afghanistan and a continuing role in domestic operations. True, Militia units need not pretend to train like a LIB or like they will be in combat next week, but there is a basic level of training and realism that needs to be met. The part-time soldiers at Medak, the part-time soldiers called out to fight forest fires, or the part-time soldiers deploying to Kandahar this year all require a solid foundation. 

GO!!! is being disingenuous here; in other thread just today he mentioned that 6 people on their way to operational duty in his company alone are from one single Militia battalion. I think he is aware of the extent to which the reserves are supporting operational taskings of regular units.

Having said that, it is possible he disagrees with that policy, so yes, it does come back to - what do you want your Militia to do?

 

[dapaterson]

Michael asked "What do you want the Militia to do?" - a valid question.

Right now, the very grown ups in the Army are working off a concept called the Managed Readiness Plan, or MRP.  Hanging in one wall in many places you can see a poster lovingly dubbed "The Conveyor Belt of Doom" which shows every task force from Feb 2006 to Aug 2008.  It works like this:

There are nine Regular Force Infantry Battalions and three Regular Force Armoured Regiments.  The HQ of each of these units will in turn command a task force; these task forces will be tailored to meet the specific situation where they will be deployed, mixing and matching sub-units.

Notice that that give us twelve task forces.  The current concept is that the Army can deploy two task forces every six months, and continue to do so indefinitely.

But there's a problem: between the 9 Inf bns, 3 Armd Regts, 3 Regts of the Royal Regt of Artillery and the three CERs of the RCE (Yes, I know, Hellyer killed off the RCE... I can dream, can't I?)  the Reg F lacks the requisite personnel to sustain 12 TFs.  The people are not there; the positions are not there.  Even with the planned growth of the Regular Force by 5000, there will be a considerable period of time before those positions are all filled; new Sgts do not appear overnight.

So where do you go to find personnel to augment the Regular Force?

Well, there is always the Reserve Force.  Under their current training mandate, they are to train up to level 3 in a level 4 context (that's platoons in a company context for those of you not infected with NDHQ-itis).  Certain training is not delivered to the Reserve force, as it is not deemed to be necessary for the majority of Reservists (this reflects the train to need philosophy).

So, there is usually some delta training to be filled for Reservists prior to deployment.  The majority of those are at the Pte(T) / Cpl level, and closing the training gaps is relatively simple - the qualification standard explicitly states "Reservists do not train on PO 305 - Emergency Field-Expedient Basketweaving"; all you need to do is deliver PO 305 (and any others).  There are some situations where someone is selected who requires additional qualifications; this may increase the time to train them up.

But 18 months full-time is atypical for most reserve augmentees; for the majority, there will be a few weeks of delta training, at which point they join their TF and begin the TF training.  The Regular Force TF members are undergoing the same training - it's the entire TF that must be declared ready.

Right now, we're seeing 10-20% of TFs as reservists.  The ongoing review of the Reserve establishment has as one of its parameters to examine whether the current structure will be able to sustain supporting the Regular force at that level - while keeping in mind that creating a structure that meets only today's demands may e entirely obsolete tomorrow.


But going back to the original point of this thread:  There is a great deal of latitude left to the four Land Force Areas in conducting their reserve training.  But often units are not aware of what is available; courses are run nationally with vacancies that cost only TD and salary to attend, yet no one is nominated.  Are there better way to communicate courses to units?  (I'm asking, and want to hear ideas)

Training can be made interesting - in fact, I think it's harder to make it boring, yet we somehow succeed at that.

As for leadership: to my (heretic's) eye, one of the biggest problems in the Reserve Force is the constant pressure to create new LCols and CWOs within units.  So young officers and NCOs are often pushed too fast, when more seasoning in rank and more experience would serve them and their units better.  And given that few units routinely parade any more than a company (a fact), why can't those command and Sergeant-Major positions be established for Majors and Master Warrant officers.  In the event of WWIII and a national mobilization, those companies could be expanded - with an officer corps, NCOs and Warrant Officers with the experience to make the leap to the next level.  Right now we give lip service to the experiential pillar in development, but experience requires time - a Reserve CO without a CD probably lacks that military experience.

Just my 2 cents - and definitely not national policy!

(edit: The Reg F is growing by 5000, not to 5000)

 

[GO!!!]

GO!!! is being disingenuous here; in other thread just today he mentioned that 6 people on their way to operational duty in his company alone are from one single Militia battalion. I think he is aware of the extent to which the reserves are supporting operational taskings of regular units.

Having said that, it is possible he disagrees with that policy, so yes, it does come back to - what do you want your Militia to do?

Those six are not "on their way" they are component transfers they forsook the Militia for the Regs, so I dont believe they are supporting us, they have been assimilated. (insert borg voice here) I would say that they are indicative of what is wrong with the Militia - the people who want to soldier are leaving.

As for the "supporting operational taskings" comment, I'm not so sure. Reg Force elements of certain recent TF have left fully trained and ready sub-units behind, in order to make space for militia sub-units that were added at the last minute. This was not an issue of "support" or operational necessity, it was pure politics that someone, somewhere wanted the militia to get their fingers in the pie too, so I have my doubts about the requirement of the militia, at least in the Cbt Arms.

The number one reason for not re-signing a second BE or IE is "we don't go anywhere but the US and Wainwright". Until this situation is remedied, I think that our militia should be restricted from operational deployments. RegF soldiers should have the opportunity to deploy far ahead of their militia bretheren. There is no need for them in the Cbt arms other than the one created by the "kingdom protectorate" in Ottawa.

What do I want the Militia to do? - I want them to do aide to civil power, taskings and enemy force. But that is just me. I think that if you want to soldier, you should join the regs. 

 

[combatcamera]

As someone who has served in both, I'd say the Militia definitely helped me in my Reg Force career.  My overseas deployments with the Reserves (NATO Reforger in the early 80's, plus Reg Force courses) definitely gave me a very good idea of what operational life was like in the Infantry.  I topped my TOW course as a Reservist.  My Reserve leadership training helped me top both platoons of ISCC in 1987 in Wainwright as a Regular when I joined 3RCR, so I can't say it was all bad - though I can easily point to horror stories of Reservists I've served with in the Regs!

EDIT:  One ISCC and one CLC

 

[Full_Militia_Bullet]

What do I want the Militia to do? - I want them to do aide to civil power, taskings and enemy force. But that is just me. I think that if you want to soldier, you should join the regs.   

GO!!!:  But aren't there alot of military forces out there which are overwhelmingly manned by reservists? It was in fact the case with Canada until the mid Fifties. Both world wars were fought mainly by Militia.  Soldiers will only be as good as their training allows them to be. As others have stated, the Reserves often do not train at the most basic level.  Your bias against the "Mo" stems from that very fact. When courses have to fight even to get  basic PPNS what do you expect?

How much would it cost to bring the Regs up to the strength required to operate without Reserve augmentees? Where would all this people be found? Since It is cheaper to train a reservists anyway, wouldn't it be a better investment to provide the existing body of reservists with a solid foundation?

By "solid foundation" I mean:
No more bullshit courses with next to no equipment, 2 days of instructor prep time and a "no fail policy" imposed from above;
Progressive, challenging and realistic training;

The "train to need" philosophy has all the tell-tale signs of something dreamed-up in NDHQ without too much thought as to the consequences:
Anything outside of TF pre-deployment training, (e.g. weekend training ex's) is likely to be seen as not much more than a way of keeping the troops busy. Reservists will never be taken seriously unless they are well trained... But why bother train reservists since they are not taken seriously? Let's remember that many leave the reserves out of boredom and lack of challenge. While some go to the Regs, many simply leave for good. By investing a little more money a energy in proper training, attendance and retention will improve...

Do they expect reservists returning from Kandahar to go back to their old units and yell "bang bang" on ex?

In starting this thread, I only wanted to compare the standard of training and ressources available within different regions. After working with militia from FLWA in Wainwright I noticed a qualitative difference in the level of training and expected standard of professionalism as well as a closer integration with the Regs, when compared to 34 and 35 Bde (LFQA),

My intent was not to question the role or the very existence of the reserves, but then again, the two are closely related.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

GO!!!:  But aren't there alot of military forces out there which are overwhelmingly manned by reservists? It was in fact the case with Canada until the mid Fifties. Both world wars were fought mainly by Militia. 

Don't buy into the "Militia Myth".  The Militia was successful only because they had several YEARS of full time training, often by professional instructors from the pre-war regulars.  The Militia Myth holds that all Canadians are natural soldiers; just give them a gun and some training in tactics.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Hard lessons were learned in both world wars.  Second Ypres cost the Canadian Division 6000 of 10000 men - my own regiment helped launch an idiotic two-battalion frontal assault Napoleonic style against Kitcheners Wood.  Brave, yes, and we remember the battle every year proudly.  Foch called it the bravest act of the war.  But it was professional soldiers - that is what those Militia who survived had become by 1916 - who found better ways.  Tactical acumen was rather short in 1915; see K.5 and Festubert.

More of the same in WW II.  Those soldiers hunkered under the wall on Blue Beach weren't Militia men.  They were in 1939.  By 1942 they had 3 years of professional training and were no longer amateurs.

Had the 1st Canadian Division made contact in June 1940 as intended, we may have seen put paid to the Miltia myth once and for all.

 

[darmil]

All I can say is the Canadian army is way to small, not to have reservists doing the same job as the regular force.Just have a higher standard for us, weed out the weak ones.Bring back the PPCLI battleschool QL2/3 my course had 51 to start 28 graduated it seems they pass everybody and their dog now, this SQ BMQ crap is not helping.I've noticed the poor level of troops coming in cause of this new training.There has been a big difference in the last ten yrs in training its getting worse and worse.

 

[Old Sweat]

I would go farther and say that the vast majority of men that fought in both World Wars, as well as in the Boer War and Korea, had no previous contact with either the permanent force or the militia. One only has to look at the total number of troops enlisted compared to the size of the pre-war armies to come to that conclusion. In my opinion, the only times that militia units fought as such were during the Fenian Raids and in the North West Rebellion.

In the Boer War, the Canadian units were formed as part of the permanent force, but then were considered part of the British regular army once they arrived in South Africa. The CEF had more of paper link to the militia then any real tie, which is why several forests were consumed over the subject of the transfer of CEF battle honours to militia units. In the Second World War, while active units adopted the same name as the militia unit which raised them, legally there was no direct connection. Moreover these militia units remained in the reserve army. Last, the special force for Korea was embodied out of a combination of troops from the regular army, the militia and men enlisted from civilian life. Still, while the tie in the Second World War may have been more symbolic than real, it mattered squat, as the public, the press and the members all considered them to be Little Black Devils or Black Watch or 1st Hussars or . . .

 

[Michael OLeary]

Here are a few numbers for Canadians in the World Wars, from my own paper of The Regimental System:

http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/the_regimental_system.htm

Another great and often perpetuated myth is the degree of participation by the Militia in the First and Second World Wars. A simple comparison of Reserve strength figures prior to each war to the numbers deployed overseas in 1914 and 1939 quickly dispels this claim. The number of trained personnel in the Canadian Militia for the year 1913-14 was only 57,527 (xxviii) while the Canadian Expeditionary Force saw a total of 628,462 Canadians in its service. (xxix)

While a better case may be made for the participation of the Militia in the mobilization of 1939, (xxx) their role was as often to form local defence units as it was to help generate battalions for the Canadian Active Service Force. Granatstein notes that "the Permanent Force had only 4,261 all ranks in mid-1939, every unit being under strength." (xxxi) The Militia saw another 46,251 train in 1938-39. (xxxii) So who, exactly, were the other men and women that made up the wartime strength of the Canadian Army, which saw the service of 730,625 (xxxiii) soldiers and support personnel, in Canada and abroad, during the Second World War. They were Canadians, not the Regular Army of pre-war years, and equally not the Reserves to the degree some would advocate. They were Canadians, most of whom had given little thought to Army service before 1939.

 

[Kirkhill]

GO!!!:  But aren't there alot of military forces out there which are overwhelmingly manned by reservists? It was in fact the case with Canada until the mid Fifties. Both world wars were fought mainly by Militia.

Another point of confusion in the Canadian system is "double-hatting" the Militia as Reserves.  In most armies Reserves are full-time soldiers that on completing their contract are bound over for a period of time in which they can be called back to the colours after they have re-entered the civilian world. That is to say that they are fully trained and experienced soldiers even though many of them may have got their training as conscripts.  This has been especially true of continental European armies like the Germans, French, Russians, Swedes, Swiss etc.

The Militia, or Home Guard, or National Guard or even the Territorials, are another matter entirely and they are recruited for domestic service.  The training regimen for these forces normally is more akin to what we think of when we think of the Militia.

Militia and Reserve are not necessarily synonymous.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

I would go farther and say that the vast majority of men that fought in both World Wars, as well as in the Boer War and Korea, had no previous contact with either the permanent force or the militia.

Quite completely correct.

 

[GO!!!]

I've learned alot over the last few posts!

At the end of the day, we have scarce resources. All militaries do.

I believe that we should use our Regular forces for deployments outside of Canada, and militia for service within. The "participation" of militiamen on deployments is just that. Mandated participation, for no reason other than to guarantee continued existence.

There is a wealth of work within Canada in the post 9-11 context. We should be re-tasking our militia units into useful domestic jobs like NBCD defence/detection/cleanup, aid to civil power specialists, riot/crowd control, and for use in low level taskings within the reg force training system.

Two distinct branches, with what should be distinct responsibilities.

 

[the 48th regulator]

Must resist answering....Can not type......


Malarkey....no no  can't say it...

Although GO!!  brings up an excellent suggestion...Reg outer duties...Militia internal security....Obviously there would be no restrictions as you would get reg force experience rotated within to train the reserves, and reservists that qualify for certain criteria being able to supplement the Reg force "other duty' (time allowed to leave, training, time in with the internal group etc)

dileas

tess

 

[enfield]

There is a wealth of work within Canada in the post 9-11 context. We should be re-tasking our militia units into useful domestic jobs like NBCD defence/detection/cleanup, aid to civil power specialists, riot/crowd control, and for use in low level taskings within the reg force training system.

Two distinct branches, with what should be distinct responsibilities.

This doesn't sound like an Army to me - most of what you describe could be better covered by other agencies. The money could be better spent on improved local first responders, RCMP resources, and fire/emergency services. I'm suspicious of any concept that makes non-warfighting tasks a primary role for any military body. If the Reserves are unqualified to go overseas, the last thing they should be doing is aid to civil power/riot control, or something as important NBCD.

If the Reserves and Regs remain two distinct branches, and the Regs granted a monopoly on overseas roles, I see the Militia withering away. Making the Militia a pool of untrained manpower for GD tasks would destroy recruiting and retention, and make the Militia non-viable. I don't view the politically-forced Composite Reserve units as a solution either.

I would advocate the opposite: bring the two branches together, make movement between the two much more fluid, and blur the line between Reg and Res troops. 10/90 was before my time, so I'm not familiar with the details of it, but I think we need to see the Regs and Mo' brought together and stop seeing them as separate empires. There seems to be agreement that there is not a need for R031 augmentation at this time - in this case, we need to look at the bigger picture. I think there is a long-term role for the Militia. 

I also believe that the Army has failed in properly utilizing the Militia, in comparison to the Navy and Air Reserves. From what I've seen, the infantry (maybe all combat arms) reserves have been especially hurt. A Reserve MP friend of mine leaves shortly for Kandahar - his total "build up training"? 4 weeks. Mine for Bosnia was 6 months, and Infantry reservists are looking at 12 months for upcoming tours. Obviously the Reserve R031's are considered skilled or trained in their trade.

I think we need to step back and define exactly what the Reserves are for in the modern context. The Militia definitely needs a serious re-org (training system, regimental system, etc.) but the concept is sound. Relegating the Militia to a civil defence role, and away from overseas missions and warfighting, is a very short-sighted idea.