SITREP ON MILITIA INFANTRY UNITS

[Long in the tooth]

Enfield - you rightly make the point that navy and air force components are more integrated between RegF and Res.  In word, they are proponents of the 'plug and play' philosophy and allow their members an easier transition between components.  Many of those trades have harmonized trades training that is completely up to one standard.  The Militia has always complained that RegF timeframes for training were too long, expensive and inconvenient.  Unfortunately this leads to a sniffy attitude in the RegF when transfers/direct entries are taken in.  I recall being warned not to mention my militia experience when I transferred and was routinely chided (or worse) for it.

The hurdle to process transfers is just horrid.  I've administered reservists transferring to the Regs or going Class C both departing the reserves and arriving at a RegF unit (Battalion and Naval Base).  It's such a mess that you might as well enroll them as civilians because we reinvent the wheel every time we do it.

We should also make transfers from the Regs to Res easier as we lose many good people do to the friction of the bureaucracy of it all.  It would also allow RegF members to take what I'll call sabbaticals after completion of a BE and still retain links to the military.

 

[GO!!!]

From what I've seen, the infantry (maybe all combat arms) reserves have been especially hurt. A Reserve MP friend of mine leaves shortly for Kandahar - his total "build up training"? 4 weeks. Mine for Bosnia was 6 months, and Infantry reservists are looking at 12 months for upcoming tours. Obviously the Reserve R031's are considered skilled or trained in their trade.

Enfield.

This is the problem. The current trg system, as it exists, could generate a RegF soldier in your abovementioned timeframe, from civilian through the completion of collective training.

This soldier would not be permitted to say "well, that was fun" and hang up his boots for good the minute the tour was over. There is a slightly better than 50/50 chance that he will stick around for a few years afterwards.

The militia is just not required in the current operational context. It is pure partisan politics that keeps the whole machine moving at all. If the militia was serious about being an effective force, it would forfeit all of it's butdget to the schools for the creation of "one standard" soldiers. It would do away with ridiculously inefficient practices like having a CO and RSM of a unit that parades 12 troops, and three seperate messes for the same unit. It has not, which tells me that the militia (as an organisation) is either happy with the status quo, or is unwilling to work to change it.

For the militia to be truly effective, it would have to be forced to participate in major trg events, and legislate job protection for those who enlisted. None of this will happen, so the constant claims that "the mo can do everything the regs can with enough money" will go unheeded, and the fifteen hundred or so reservists who do multiple tours will continue to do this, while the rest just coast.

my 2 cents.

 

[Kirkhill]

Looking for the middle ground again.

The Militia needs to be something other than skull-crushers and strike-breakers or alternately urban search and rescue types.  The urban civil defence scenario killed the Militia in the 50s and 60s and the skull crusher model, very popular in eastern Europe, didn't encourage recruiting or make them very reliable soldiers.

The Militia needs to be seen, and needs to see themselves, as soldiers. Every bit as much as the Regs see themselves as soldiers.  That means the Militia needs to learn soldiering skills.  The same skills that  Regs learn  though not necessarily as well nor as many.  They would not be ready for foreign deployment as a unit, or possibly not even as individuals, without transition training.  Pretty much the situation as it currently exists.  However, it seems reasonable to me that Militiamen deployed with the Regs should have gone through the exact same training as the Regs if for no other reason than to prove that they are capable.

The Soldiering skills that the Militia does learn should be taught by Regs or at least by Militiamen that have been and seen.

The training emphasis could be on urban operations (combat and non-combat), on Vital Point Security, on Patrolling, possibly on EOD/Hazmat operations.  That would give a military focus to their training, minimizing the delta necessary to bring individuals up to speed for deployments and at the same time give them familiarity with the environment, with comms, transport, support and logistics in their own backyard that would be useful in a civil crisis.

Riot training/Aid to the Civil Power- although a necessary evil, shouldn't be the focus of their training.

There needs to be regular movement of Militiamen into the ranks of the Regs and vice versa so that a common ethos is maintained.

Two Branches of One Army.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

:boring:

 

[enfield]

It seems clear that the Militia (Infantry at least), as it stands today, is useless. It takes the same amount of time to train a reservist R031 to operational standard as a civilian and when moving to the RegF, a reservist essentially has to re-join the army. Thus, reservist=civilian. To me this indicates a serious problem, and a waste of current budgets and man hours.

I agree with GO!!!, there are too many inconsistencies, contradictions, and problems in the Militia (our inane regimental system, our training system, our lack of job protection legislation, etc) to allow us to be effective. Some are our own fault, but many are just as much the fault of out Big Brothers in the Regs and the Army leadership. In the end, I would say that the Army has failed to adequately utilize its reserve forces. However, I believe there is a need for an Army Reserve. If we don't need a pool of reserve R031's today, we may in a year or two or ten, and tat investment in the future has to be made now.

As Worn Out Grunt as mentioned, the Navy and Air Force Reserves are effective and important components of those branches. The reserve Infantry regiments can barely run a few E-Cabs and MLVWs, and the Navy Reserve is maintaining operational warships! The Composite Reserve units were a poor (and, I believe, failed) attempt to find a similar role for the combat arms reserves.

I still hesitate from any sort of training that focuses on civil defence, and I see little evidence that the Militia would be effective as a NBC/Hazmat team or urban SAR. The military's contribution to domestic emergencies has to revolve around its skills and tools as warfighter - otherwise it should cease being a military organization and focus properly.

I don't see the problem in bringing the training of reserve R031's, and the overall skills of a reserve unit, in line with their full-time counterparts. Not as good, and lacking the specialization, but at least in the same ballpark. I think the first step is for the Militia to admit it is broken, and accept RegF rules, standards, and courses - and the associated loss of 'empire'. Smoothing the component transfer process, and actively encouraging (and giving enticements) to Regs to retire into the Militia is another starting point.

I see Two Branches of One Army as the death of the Reserves. The Army has one set of missions. The solution is integration, amalgamation, and cross-pollination.

 

[rifleman]

Militia and Reserve are not necessarily synonymous.

There is no confusion. There is only an army reserve in Canada. We traditionally call them the Militia. How we employ them should have no connection to how other countries name thier citizen-soldiers

 

[Kirkhill]

There is no confusion. There is only an army reserve in Canada. We traditionally call them the Militia. How we employ them should have no connection to how other countries name thier citizen-soldiers

I respectfully disagree. When people discussing the role of the Militia/Reserves look outside the borders of Canada and see other countries forces with similar names they are inclined to believe that they are similar entities and directly comparable.  This can lead to erroneous assumptions such as suggesting that a Swedish Reserve Battalion where there is a cadre of professional officers, troops that have a year of full-time training as conscripts and regular call-ups for service of up to four weeks at a time, all equipped with up to date materiel, might be comparable to what the Canadian Reserves/Militia might be able to field.

Words matter.

While there may be no internal confusion as to the Militia/Reserves role or service (a debatable proposition given the amount of hours/years devoted to the discussion) there is certainly confusion when other nations are examined for applicable doctrine.

Cheers

 

[Forgotten_Hero]

Bring back the PPCLI battleschool QL2/3 my course had 51 to start 28 graduated it seems they pass everybody

Although I'm only a Pte with limited time in, I agree. I've seen too many people who shouldnt have passed, pass.  These people then go on to give a bad name to reservists.
I have heard of people doing their leadership course, and only 1/4 of the people passing. Good. I dont want unqualified people leading... do you? I've heard of some people complaining about reserves on their leadership course failing because the reg force instructors judged them at a reg force level. I completely disagree with him. The reserves SHOULD be trained to a reg force level. Why not? They're expected to do the same job as their reg force counter parts, and they deploy alongside the reg force. I dont think the reserves should be scrapped... I think they should be braught up to par instead, so that no reservist is a detriment to the reg force. 

Another one of the things that would help the cohesion between reg force and reserve force, I think, would be mandatory joint exercises.

 

[JBP]

As a newer reservist, just fresh out of my training this past summer and have only 1 year under my belt as of Jan 6th 2006, maybe I have a different perspective than many of you. Especially those of you who are Reg F.

I agree that the reserves are NOT trained to a high enough degree, but I don't agree we should be trained to the same level as the Reg F, because then what's the difference? And really it would require WWAAAAYYY more money, and part of the point of the reserves is to have a viable pool of availible basic-trained manpower to augument the Reg F in times of need right? So, to not be as expensive to maintain.

What I would propose, is 2 training nights a week, not 1, and at least 2 field ex's a month and simply not 1. This would double the training time, not be as rediculously expensive as putting all the reserves on Reg F courses, and it would give reserve troops enough time to do mandated training and improve/work on the skills they don't get a chance to perform very often. Of course, doubling the time we committ to the reserves would cost more, but certainly not as much as changing the very nature and skillsets of the entire R031 reserve platform.

I always wondered why it was only 1 night a week and 1 weekend a month! Most of the people who attend regularly in my unit would be exstastic about a change like that! If it's a "part-time" job like they tell people now days, why not add another working day?

Just my opinion, a basic Pte's from the Reserve. Not meant as a counter to any of your suggestions but just what I would see as a potential "go-between" to give us more training and skills with the least amount of expense or change.

???

 

[Forgotten_Hero]

I agree that the reserves are NOT trained to a high enough degree, but I don't agree we should be trained to the same level as the Reg F, because then what's the difference?

The difference would be the amount of experience due to the reserves being part time. Why should there BE any other difference?

And really it would require WWAAAAYYY more money, and part of the point of the reserves is to have a viable pool of availible basic-trained manpower to augument the Reg F in times of need right?

Why would it require waaaayyy more money to judge reservists by the same standards they judge the reg force?

And really it would require WWAAAAYYY more money, and part of the point of the reserves is to have a viable pool of availible basic-trained manpower to augument the Reg F in times of need right?

Although it is benificial in a world war type scenario when you need plenty of people quickly, with only limited training... right now, as people have shown, in the amount of time it takes for a reservist to do workup training to go overseas, a reg force guy could have been trained, and he would be bound to 5 (its 5,right?) years of service.

What I would propose, is 2 training nights a week, not 1, and at least 2 field ex's a month and simply not 1.

It should be, yup.

This would double the training time, not be as rediculously expensive as putting all the reserves on Reg F courses, and it would give reserve troops enough time to do mandated training and improve/work on the skills they don't get a chance to perform very often. Of course, doubling the time we committ to the reserves would cost more, but certainly not as much as changing the very nature and skillsets of the entire R031 reserve platform.

Why is money an issue? We're not talking about turning reserves into the Reg force, we're talking about judging them by the same standards as the Reg F. Doing the Reg F courses is another thing, but it would make sense. Money shouldnt be a problem.  Why would it be? Infact, as I see it, it would be LESS expensive that way. Not only is Canada looking to expand its military (Reg F included), it would make sense to spend the money to train the reserves properly the first time, rather than spending money to train them at first, and then spending more money to retrain them again when they go on tour.



I always wondered why it was only 1 night a week and 1 weekend a month! Most of the people who attend regularly in my unit would be exstastic about a change like that! If it's a "part-time" job like they tell people now days, why not add another working day?

Just my opinion, a basic Pte's from the Reserve. Not meant as a counter to any of your suggestions but just what I would see as a potential "go-between" to give us more training and skills with the least amount of expense or change.

 

[Full_Militia_Bullet]

one night a week? not where I come from buddy!

If you are an NCO or officer perhaps... in my unit the Jr ranks train aboutevery second Tuesday night. I know of some units out in the hinterland who hardly ever parade on weeknights. Training once a week would already be an improvement. (actual training - not admin, not "NCOs trying to look busy in the office" night, etc.). A second night each week for admin and/or leaders' prof dev. would ensure the training be well prepared and admin would get too much in the way of training proper.

2 training exercises a month would be a little too much for those with full time civvy employment, university students during finals, etc, especially for the few NCO's, who are under pressure to be present all the time (lest the Corporals be section commanders, which is already the case so often). So many NCOs are already double-tasked on weekend SQ or PSWQ courses...

But a few extra training exercises during the year wouldn't hurt. There is often a lull in the training from mid April to the end to mid May... and I have hardly ever seen any field training done in early December...

However... what should stop me from filling a position on an weekend exercise run by a neighboring unit within the same brigade? Conversely, I wouldn't mind volunteers from other units showing up at our Ex's and take up a few sentry shifts...

At this point I wouldn't mind one or two Reg force infantry NCO's being posted with the units: specifically as ressource personnel for the reserve NCO's and Officers. Extra training time isn't enough: you need readily-available expertise (not your typical burnt-out Reg force Ops WO posted to your unit while awaiting his pension, who never sets foot in the field...)

The Regimental system need not disappear completely but it mustn't become an obstacle to effective training. There must be more money and more training scheduled but there must also be more flexibility, more imagination, and less red tape.



There is also a singular lack of imagination with regards to positive/negative incentives to attendance:

In the reserves, attendance ought to count for someting when calculating seniority : Why should someone who joined 1 year ahead of you but only shows up just often enough not to be NES should be considered senior to you, when you have attended every singe Ex in the last 5 years???

Likewise, there ought to be some kind of bonus/gratuity for soldiers meeting a certain training days quota. For all I care,  this measure could have been implemented at minimal cost, instead of the pay raises we had in the last few years.

Right now, short of counseling interview with their superiors, there is no repercussion whatsoever for soldiers showing only minimal dedication to their unit or their job. The thought of moving down to the bottom of the merit list for courses can only scare the keen and ambitious - those who usually show up for training anyway.

 

[pbi]

I have observed this with interest. Full Militia Bull: as a recent former COS of 38 CBG (in LFWA) my take is that while your unit certainly faces some problems that are common to all Res units at one time or another (and were common when I was a Militia Inf soldier 1974-1982), there are some indications of a severe lack of organization and will, possibly at Bde. (But then, I should be careful, as I don't know the entire picture, and the Bde staff aren't here to defend themselves...). I'm particularly surprised by your statement that the unit parades only on alternate Tuesday nights. Is this budget-driven? How is the unit meeting the mandated number of training days? In 38 CBG we had a few units who altered their parading schedules (generally to take into account the distances that many soldiers must travel to get to their units in SK, MB and NWON) but I am not aware that any made such a drastic reduction. One armoury parade weekend might be exchanged for two parade nights, but the total amount of time remained the same or was slightly more.

As for training activities, I can safely say that during my tenure (2002-2005) soldiers in 38 CBG took part in all of the types of training you described. Some was run by LFWA (such as adventure trg in the Rockies), some by Bde, and some by units (LSSR and 18 Svc Bn participated in a joint ex that included boat ops). Units were encouraged to make use of local facilities where it was safe and intelligent to do so. As I was leavving we were commencing planning for a spring exercise in and around the city of Winnipeg, using a "Three Block War" scenario but focussing at the platoon/coy levels.

As for the accompanying (and apparently immortal...) Regs vs Res argument...well, I guess it will go on for as long as we still have two components with their own problems and interests. The move by the CDS to break down the transition between the two components, as well the initial signs of willingness to think rationally in the Res about restructure, may lead us to something totally different from what we have grown up with. My only caveat (as I have expressed on other posts) is that any move to turn the Res into a version of the 1960's Civil Defense is misplaced. If we need more volunteer firemen and police reservists, then give the money to the appropriate governments to get on with it.

The Res exists to give us an additional capacity. Let's not be so myopic as to think that just because the last few decades have not seen Canada engage in a major conflict that required an expansion capability, that somehow we are guaranteed that history will continue to unfold in a comfortable and familiar way. Slicing the Army Res off and relegating it to sand bag filling or giving out soup and blankets may seem like a good short term move, but once we have destroyed whatever capability the Res represents, it will be very, very hard to restore it.

Maybe the most important thing about Res soldiers is not their skills (which can be taught, as we know...) but their mentality: they represent a group of Canadians who have decided that, in addition to leading their civilian lives, they are willing to take a direct part in the affairs of this country, includig by risking their lives if necessary. In this way I see them as much like the traditional volunteer firefighter, who is willing to risk his life to protect his community, but does it as a secondary calling. Do we want to  make the final disconnect that would be represented by relegating the Reserve in the way some have suggested?

The Reserve will only get better as more of its members go on ops. I saw this with my own two eyes: we now have Res Bde Comds, BRSMs and unit COs with op experience, not to mention lots of soldiers at more junior rank levels. So, they do NOT all rush off to the Reg F. The goal of increasing the military capability of the Res is an important one. If it means that, from time to time, we remove a RegF battery or company from the rotational schedule in order to deploy Reservists in their place, maybe that is the cost of achieving this goal. The better way is to do it with the Res component as an addition to the TF structure, and AFAIK this is how the Army intends to go under the Army Managed Readiness Program (I will admit to being about a year or so out of the loop on this)


Cheers

 

[GO!!!]

If it means that, from time to time, we remove a RegF battery or company from the rotational schedule in order to deploy Reservists in their place, maybe that is the cost of achieving this goal.

In that case, it would be only fitting to let you be the first OC/CO to withdraw yourself and your unit from an operational tour, in order to improve the militia.

When can we expect the press release?

 

[rifleman]

Gee, you make it sound like it's reservists are stealing your job. Damn immigrants

 

[GO!!!]

Gee, you make it sound like it's reservists are stealing your job. Damn immigrants

THEY ARE!!!

 

[rifleman]

What a load.

 

[pbi]

In that case, it would be only fitting to let you be the first OC/CO to withdraw yourself and your unit from an operational tour, in order to improve the militia.

When can we expect the press release?

In my case, probably never. But, I highly suspect that you misunderstood what I posted. My preferred option is in bold:

The goal of increasing the military capability of the Res is an important one. If it means that, from time to time, we remove a RegF battery or company from the rotational schedule in order to deploy Reservists in their place, maybe that is the cost of achieving this goal. The better way is to do it with the Res component as an addition to the TF structure, and AFAIK this is how the Army intends to go under the Army Managed Readiness Program (I will admit to being about a year or so out of the loop on this)

And, anyway, the option you proposed isn't really how it works anymore-the rotation of units and even sub-units isn't really up to COs anymore: the TFs are built from coy/bty/sqns by the Army and the LFA staff.  (but I  bet you know that, too...)

You are right to suggest that no CO/OC wants to be the one to tell troops that they are not deploying, but then since when was it our job to only stand up with the good news? I know of CO's who have chosn to do it in different ways, depending on their personalities: some have pitched it to the troops as "sorry-not my fault-we have to be politically correct and let these ****** Mo guys deploy", which is basically the kind of cowardice some people engage in when they decide to pass on orders they don't like. Other COs have explained "why things are seen" and then gotten on with it. As a third option you can allways fall on your sword: it is just  a matter of when and for what.

The Res won't get better without more op exposure, and anyway, given the manning levels of most Inf bns I would have thought that it wasn't really a question of leaving troops behind,  but rather of trying to find enough in the first place.

Cheers

 

[Haggis]

The Res won't get better without more op exposure, and anyway, given the manning levels of most Inf bns I would have thought that it wasn't really a question of leaving troops behind,  but rather of trying to find enough in the first place.

A search of the forums will show that some still believe that:

1. The Reg F has sufficient deployable troops;

2. The Reg F neither needs or wants Reserve augmentation.  It is being forced upon them for political reasons;

3. Reg F members would eagerly accept a higher op tempo, particularly the Infantry;

4. Reservists should not be deployed outside of Canada;

5. Reservists should be trained for combat support.

6. Reservists should only be employed in DOMOPS.

Therefore, one could reason that the oft stated role of the Reserve Infantry to provide 'depth' capbility is no longer a requirement.

 

[muskrat89]

.. and if I make my own summary.. it seems that:

a) The Militia sucks

b) Any attempt to bring them up to an acceptable standard is either impractical, or latently unfair to the Regular Force

To me it is ironic that the biggest "criticizers" of Reserve Force standards are also the biggest naysayers when it comes to suggestions for improving them.

Maybe I'm reading it wrong...

 

[GO!!!]

There are still some issues that the previous three posts have neglected to mention.

60-80% of troops at the end of their BEs elect not to renew - why? Boredom!! If the infantry is so overworked, why are some soldiers not able to deploy in 3 years when we are at war?

There may be a terrible shortage of troops in the CSS trades, but this does not appear to be the case in the cbt arms. This is a self fulfilling prophecy as well - no deployment means no young soldiers stick around means the reg force SUPPOSEDLY becomes more dependent on the militia.

As for the "style" of leadership that tells their troops that the reservists took their jobs - it is called the truthful style - and not being paternalistic and evasive when speaking to your men. We would rather the truth than a rambling, politically correct speech on the army's managed readiness plan. We can handle it - and we deserve to know.