SITREP ON MILITIA INFANTRY UNITS

[Haggis]

Harldy any of A sqn did get war fighting either as most of us were rerolled tankers.
Same training all around.

So what you're saying is that the Reserve C Coy was as well trained as the Reg F A Sqn?

Hey, guess what??  We're still on topic!

 

[orange.paint]

Hey look at us! ;D
no doubt recceguy will be all happy now lol.

Yes I got along well with our reserve guys (zgon anyway).They were all fit young keen guys for the most part.It sucked they got stuck on gate after month two,I wouldnt want the job.

So basically from a reg force point of view they were professional and fit,what more can you ask for?

And it was a cpl (name is a pirate) with the pistol...one of the retards in the section!(even the res guys hated him)

 

[Haggis]

Hey look at us! ;D
no doubt recceguy will be all happy now lol.

Yes I got along well with our reserve guys (zgon anyway).They were all fit young keen guys for the most part.It sucked they got stuck on gate after month two,I wouldnt want the job.

So basically from a reg force point of view they were professional and fit,what more can you ask for?

And it was a cpl (name is a pirate) with the pistol...one of the retards in the section!(even the res guys hated him)

There was only one D&S Pl and it was in BLMF, thence onward to VK.  The platoon in Zgon was 2 Pl of C Coy but was under command of A Sqn.  (The sqn, and the SSM paticularly, treated them quite fairly IMO.)  They started out on NFO and then took over the bulk of MOST (along with gate) in A Sqn's AOR.  I know the pirate Cpl (he was from 2 Pl) and you are correct.

Clearly we're not talking about the same pistol incident...

 

[HItorMiss]

Haggis it was B-Coy 1 RCR that deployed with the RCD on Roto 13, C-Coy was opcon 3 RCR for Athena FYI.

If I misread what Coy you put as going with the RCD BG my bad and I apologise in advance.

 

[orange.paint]

especially when we went brigade recce....had no time for our tiny AOR suddenly it was all of Bosnia and srpska.

 

[Haggis]

Haggis it was B-Coy 1 RCR that deployed with the RCD on Roto 13, C-Coy was opcon 3 RCR for Athena FYI.

If I misread what Coy you put as going with the RCD BG my bad and I apologise in advance.

You're right and wrong at the same time.  ;D

Bravo Coy 1 RCR went wih the RCD BG to Bosnia.  Charles Coy 1 RCR went with the 3 RCR BG to A'stan.

However, C Coy (not "Charles") was a composite 100% Reserve Infantry Company drawn from every Infantry Regiment in LFCA.  Originally called the CRIC (Composite Reserve Infantry Company) it later became known as the LPV (Light Patrol Vehicle) Coy as it was to use the LPV "Iltis" in theatre.

Soon after joining the RCD BG, the CO and OC LPV/CRIC christened it C Coy as the labels "CRIC" and "LPV" were, at best, unimaginative and did little to make C Coy feel like part of "the team".  

Why "C" and not Charles or Charlie?  Because the RCD letter thier squadrons without using the phonetic descriptor.  Bravo Coy 1RCR (Maj Malikowski and CSM Appleton)  rightfully kept their traditional "Bravo" name since the RCD already had a B Sqn.

How's that?

 

[orange.paint]

And seeming we have no "c" sqn anymore no one got confused and ran into walls.

 

[HItorMiss]

Seen  8)

 

[Haggis]

Seen  8)

... and for the record, there were RCR cap badges in C Coy.

The tour (Sep 03 to Mar 04) encompassed Kowang San Day, The RCR Regimental Birthday and Paardeberg Day.  Thier Royal Canadians were invited to and welcomed at all Bravo Coy's celebrations.

C Coy soldiers were also invited to and participated in the RCD's  Lilefontein Day.  They participated in every BG and Bde competition.  After winning the Camp Black Bear ball hockey league championship in VK,  they unfurled a banner which read "Part-time Soldiers - Full Time Champions", much to the dismay of the NSE. All previous winners had erected a "trophy board" in the gymnasium.  C Coy was denied that right since they "weren't part of the NSE".  They did it anyway.

In fact, the only time C Coy soldiers were treated as second-class was when they moved in with the NSE/NCE after Bihac closed.

Are we still on topic?

 

[Forgotten_Hero]

Im sorry, can someone enlighten me on the pistol thing? 

 

[orange.paint]

reserve gate guard guy cpl (but was a mcpl back at his regiment as he so said anytime you seen him) decided to get on a bus full of reg guys and point his pistol around at other soldiers like a f*cking moron.

He later gave a weapons brief in front of our whole squadron.....we had just got back off a 4 day op,and all of a sudden instead of bed we had to listen to this idiot for a 40 minute weapons safety.

Haggis,reg or reserve is beating NSE something to be proud of  ;D

I know we had bad ideas about the reserves prior to the tour but except for a few of their very lets say "hippies" that we were warned not to kill on multiple occasions they were pretty good.

If haggis is wondering he was they guy with the communist shirts etc... college kid.

 

[Haggis]

rcac_011:  I know exactly who he is.  There were worse, though.  Just had to go to VK or BLMF to find 'em.

The Roto 13 experience proves that you don't need to give a Reservist months and months of Battle School style workup to deploy them.  The key is in proper screening and selection at the parent unit/brigade level.  C Coy proper (three rifle platoons and Coy HQ) had no disciplinary repats, three medicals and one compassionate (death in the family).  Many of the D&S Pl soldiers also volunteered to extend thier three-month tours and were re-deployed to Camp Black Bear.

Start with good people.  Train them sensibly.  Give them adequate resources.  Lead them well.  Make them feel like they belong.

Still on topic??? ;D

 

[GO!!!]

The Roto 13 experience proves that you don't need to give a Reservist months and months of Battle School style workup to deploy them.  The key is in proper screening and selection at the parent unit/brigade level. 

Now, would you compare Roto 13 to the current Ops in Afghanistan, in terms of the intensity of the conflict, the difficulty of the mission or the number of casualties being experienced?

Example:

Given that vehicle accidents and rollovers are a leading cause of injury/death, and that in most cases, the driver of the vehicle in question has at least a year of trg under his belt (usually more) and the number of accidents is still high, how can you make a case for deploying even less experienced/trained soldiers? Would this not be tantamount to setting them up for failure?

The two options, (in my mind) are to either train the reservists to a reg force standard (a common point raised on this site) or use reg force troops in the first place. I fail to see how neglecting to give reservists "months and months" of training will serve anyone's interests.

 

[Kirkhill]

Now, would you compare Roto 13 to the current Ops in Afghanistan, in terms of the intensity of the conflict, the difficulty of the mission or the number of casualties being experienced?

That's a good point GO!!! but would it not be fair also to suggest that by tasking Reservists to Roto 13 that that freed up Regulars like yourself to undertake other missions, such as Afghanistan?

Some missions may not require the full array of skills that a 20 year Regular can bring to the field.  Especially a troop that has had recent experience of combat.

Training at home.  Sentry duty in Canada. Sentry duty in operational environments.  Local patrols in low threat environments.  Don't all these tend to add to the experience of the assigned troops making them more valuable and both helping them become more useful in higher risk operations and also freeing up well-seasoned Regulars for the more risky operations - operations where risk is mitigated by having well-trained and lead troops?

Is it worth investing some of that seasoned talent into producing a larger number of Reservists to free up the remaining Regs for other operations?

Cheers.

 

[orange.paint]

Go!!! I do understand where your coming from.But. Here we have guys who have been part of the military for years (eventhough it may only be part time) compared to guys who have 6 months at the regiment with a lack of basic skill's.on the most part reservist have a solid knowledge of basic skill's i.e radio's,wpns,map and compass.What would be the difference between a reserve soldier and a young guy at the regiment.

And lets face it we all deploy on op's with OLDER soldiers who have gotten by on lack standards and lack of personal information.To say reserve soldiers need the "cock" poured to them for months and months to bring them up to a certain standard is not correct.

In saying this I believe only the TOP reservist should be sent to do the job.Not the only ones available by the regiments.For example I alluded to a idiot in a previous post.He finished roto 13 Bosnia and 6 months later I seen him in meaford beginning his work up training for Afghanistan.This is what we have to prevent from going on deployment.It seemed to me that where the reserve regiments only have certain amounts of people available to go they send who they can so they can up their numbers,this should not be the case.

Now, would you compare Roto 13 to the current Ops in Afghanistan, in terms of the intensity of the conflict, the difficulty of the mission or the number of casualties being experienced?

No.Was the job any less important? Thats up to argument.But as you said we are sending guys with less than a year AT REGIMENT to drive...what is the difference?

Now  please don't get me wrong I'm not the reg guy who once was part of the north west pony regiment back in my "mo" days.I joined the Reg's at the ripe age of 17 with mommy's signature.I do believe the reserves play a part BUT reg force guys are becoming too weak in discipline.When a reserve private comes up to you as a reg force cpl he should be addressing you by your rank period.He has a few weeks in the army.When a guy has 10 years in the reserve,and proves he has a good knowledge why should he be treated like shit?I don't get it.

Having said all that,any reservist/regular militia who does not perform well on work up training should be fired on the spot. It seems every course in the army is 60 percent attendance mark. stricter standards would keep the trouble children home in their armouries and give the reserves a good name with the regular force.

 

[Haggis]

Now, would you compare Roto 13 to the current Ops in Afghanistan, in terms of the intensity of the conflict, the difficulty of the mission or the number of casualties being experienced?

Never even consider it.  Bosnia and A'stan are apples and oranges.  Bosnia was (is) a mature theatre wherein any threat has been pretty well castrated by the application of the GFAP.  There is still a threat, however, or we wouldn't have to be there.  If, for example, Serbian General Ratko Mladic were to be taken down, that could start the spiral all over again.  That being said, the indicators would be pretty easy to see.

Given that vehicle accidents and rollovers are a leading cause of injury/death, and that in most cases, the driver of the vehicle in question has at least a year of trg under his belt (usually more) and the number of accidents is still high, how can you make a case for deploying even less experienced/trained soldiers? Would this not be tantamount to setting them up for failure?

I think Afghanis and Bosnians went to the same driving schools anyhow .  The Bosnians just have better vehicles and infratructure.  The Infantry Reserve Roto 13 drivers logged thousands of kilometers (PLUS ferrying the majority of the TF's "B" vehicles from VK to Split, an 8 hour trip - one way - three days a week) with an accident rate no higher that the the rest of the BG or the previous rotos.  Many said that driving in Toronto, Ottawa or Montreal during a long weekend was a similar experience.  ;D

The two options, (in my mind) are to either train the reservists to a reg force standard (a common point raised on this site)

  The funny thing is that the Air Reserve and the Naval Reserve seem to be able to do it, why can't we?

or use reg force troops in the first place.

Which is one of the reasons why Rotos 0, 1 (and possibly up to rotos 4 or 5) should be populated with a significant number of Reg F.   By that time, there is usually a place for substantial Reserve participation because, if there is ever any hope of relieving the Reg F in mature theatres (like Bosnia now and, possibly, A'stan in 4-6 years), the Reserves have to be able to get some operational experience.    Tour fatuigue can set in after 5 or  more rotos.  Many Reg F soldiers have been to Bosnia 4-6 or more times.  (How many times did you go to Bosnia?) It gets old, fast.  How many time will you go to A'stan?  How many times would you want to go, particularly once A'stan has become "Bosnia-ized" and the new, sexier Roto 0 is about to launch.

I fail to see how neglecting to give reservists "months and months" of training will serve anyone's interests.

Nobody's "neglecting" anything.  Part of it is a monetary thing.  Roto 13's troops were limited to no more than 365 Class C days by DCDS (which included DAG, TMST, MSIT, Warfighter Trg, two validation ex's, the tour and earned leave).

Back in post 161, you noted that your chain of command had declared:

a bunch of reservists with two weeks workup get to go instead

Clearly that indicates that not every Reservist has to start at square "0" in order to deploy. If they don't need it (due to good selection, screening and preparation by the parent units/bdes/ASU) then why put them through it?  Save some money for other things (like ammo...).

It's a fact of life that most Reservists who show up for pre-training with a yellow DAG are that way because the supporting ASU has failed to provide the services needed (dental, shots, I cards, kit, etc.) to DAG the soldier green.