Syria Spins Out of Control
Adam Garfinkle
Yesterday’s massive bombings in Damascus portend a new stage of the Syrian crisis. The apparent involvement of al-Qaeda in Iraq in these bombings, and other evidence of the increased jihadi radicalization of the opposition movement, puts an end most likely to any prospect of an organized external military intervention in Syria.
That intervention was unlikely anyway, because the key actor in any such effort, the United States, absented itself long ago for reasons having to do with domestic politics. I suggested months ago a Turkish-led intervention, backed by the United States and NATO and the Arab League, designed to trigger a coup in Syria against the Assad regime. I suggested that along with that operation a diplomatic contact group be established to ease the transition to a better, perhaps even in some form a democratic, constitutional arrangement in Syria. The Obama Administration refused even to discuss the matter privately with the visiting Turkish Foreign Minister when he raised the question.
I (and others) also warned at the time that, absent an intervention to put an end to the conflict, the longer it went on, the more likely it would be radicalized. A very similar pattern manifested itself in Bosnia, and has done so also in other places. That warning now seems to have been validated.
I would be worried right now if I were a Lebanese. It is impossible to say if the Assad regime can hold out against a radicalized Syrian opposition, with volunteer support pouring in from neighboring countries. Most likely, in my view, it cannot. But it could take many months, even a year or two, for this bloody drama to play out. In the meantime, the conflict will pour across borders, including the Lebanese border, as it has already begin to do. If, in the fullness of time, a jihadi-led or strongly influenced state arises in Syria, or parts of it, then it is virtually inevitable that the Shi’a-tilted status quo in Lebanon will be upset. Sunni radicals in Damascus will not get along with Hizballah, and there are homegrown Sunni radicals in Lebanon that “friends” in Damascus would encourage and support on their behalf. The likely result? A new civil war, with a beginning epicenter most like in and around Tripoli.
I would also be concerned if I were an Iranian leader, because radical Sunnis in Damascus will not be able to get along with the mullahs in Iran either. From the U.S. point of view, that is not such a bad result, but losing its only state ally could nudge the Iranian leadership further toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In any event, the complexities of the three- and four-sided rivalries that will emerge in the region are very hard to predict, but the results will not be pretty or easily influenced by outside powers.
All of this is, of course, sort of tragic, because strong American leadership, a leadership that understood the strategic stakes involved in Syria and showed itself willing to take commensurate risks to secure them, probably could have prevented all this. Too late now.
