The Congo (merged)

[PPCLI Guy]

Expeditionary COIN - which apparently equals FID....

 

[OldSolduer]

Do you think anyone will notice this?

http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/100823/world/af_congo_rapes

 

[medicineman]

Someone with a bleeding heart will I'm sure...question is will it be the NDP and will they scream like little girls for us to take over the mission?  Of course, the Congolese government doesn't want us there anyway...hey, didn't we have a problem with that place back in the 60's?  And didn't they have a bit of a problem with us?  Maybe I'm just getting my history screwed up.

MM

 

[Journeyman]

Hey, there's big changes happening.

Why just last month, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to change the mission's title from United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

If that doesn't sort out the rebels and the Congolese Army, I don't know what will  :nod:

 

[Kat Stevens]

Victory declared, peace in our time.  now back to headquarters for debriefing and cocktails.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

I would not be at all surprised if we found ourselves in the Congo over the next few years

 

[SeanNewman]

While I certainly make no effort to speak for the CF or for anyone else, I strongly get the feeling that if Canada ever sends us on a blue beret mission like they did in the 90s (or earlier), they are going to get very different mission results.

Even with oppressive ROE, I just don't know of anyone I serve with that would allow that sort of thing to happen nearby without making all efforts to stop it.

I'm not saying that peacekeepers in the 1990s didn't do a great job, just that most of today's soldiers went through training and went through their first tour in a full-combat environment.  Those factors, plus listening to lessons learned like those from Gen Dallaire himself, and you end up with (I believe) a force on the ground that won't be content with "Please stop what you're doing or I'll write it down".

 

[Edward Campbell]

While I certainly make no effort to speak for the CF or for anyone else, I strongly get the feeling that if Canada ever sends us on a blue beret mission like they did in the 90s (or earlier), they are going to get very different mission results.

Even with oppressive ROE, I just don't know of anyone I serve with that would allow that sort of thing to happen nearby without making all efforts to stop it.

I'm not saying that peacekeepers in the 1990s didn't do a great job, just that most of today's soldiers went through training and went through their first tour in a full-combat environment.  Those factors, plus listening to lessons learned like those from Gen Dallaire himself, and you end up with (I believe) a force on the ground that won't be content with "Please stop what you're doing or I'll write it down".

If, more likely when we get involved in the slow motion explosion (one little fire after another, at ever increasing frequencies until, for all intents and purposes, the whole place has exploded) in Africa it is likely that, despite the blue berets, the ROE will be pretty robust. I do not detect any political or bureaucratic stomach for even the slightest risk of another Rwanda. That being said, people are fickle and governments tend to react to public opinion, not lead or form it. The spark that ignites public outrage, and consequential demands to "do something, now (even if it's wrong and even if we'll hate it tomorrow)" could be just something like this incident - inconsequential, in and of itself (I apologize to those who find that cruel, but ...) but able to inflame uninformed, unthinking public opinion and, subsequently, to force governments to react. Further, bad leadership, a hallmark of UN missions - even when they are led by Canadians, can also have the effect of making even good troops, with good, robust ROE look bad.

I have a hunch that the situations tend to dictate their own outcomes - much more so, anyway, than do the troops on the ground.

 

[tomahawk6]

Peacekeeping in Africa can be just as messy as it is in Afghanistan. I'm all for logisitcal support but putting first line troops in a peacekeeping role is a waste of resources. The Indians and others want to do this type of work and its cheaper to pay them to do it.

UN peacekeepers hacked to death in Congo
By Africa correspondent Andrew Geoghegan

Updated Thu Aug 19, 2010 5:20am AEST

A rebel attack in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has killed three Indian peacekeepers and injured several more.

Rebels believed to belong to the Mai Mai, a Congolese militia group, ambushed an Indian army peacekeeping post.

Between 50 and 60 rebels attacked the military camp in the middle of the night.

Three Indian soldiers were hacked to death with knives and machetes while seven others suffered injuries.

The peacekeeping force opened fire on their attackers, driving them into the jungle.

The victims were all serving with the United Nations stabilisation force in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

It is unclear what prompted the brutal attack, although the Mai Mai have been responsible for ongoing violence in the region in recent years.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

The Indians and others want to do this type of work and its cheaper to pay them to do it.

Ah yes - the old send in the Colonial troops 'cus it looks messy.  That worked out real well for the British and Roman Empires...

 

[tomahawk6]

What can be done with a battalion task force ? The Indians have plenty of manpower which is their strength. The US is not going to deploy a division in the Congo and keep it there for an extended period of time. The Indians dont have global commitments that we have. So its not "send in the colonials",rather its an acknowledgement that the ABCA countries dont have large standing armies like we used to. The Indians and Chinese do. Of the two I would rather see large numbers of Indians doing the business.

 

[Edward Campbell]

If anyone is going into Africa in any useful strength then I am pretty sure they will be working alongside a larger Chinese contingent. China has more interests in Africa than just resources ~ any solutions to Africa's manifold problems will have a Chinese component to them.

 

[MGB]

Pardon this dated article:  http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/04/30/canadian-military-congo-deployment.html

While I do not have the breadth of knowledge to tackle this subject, I do want to say that I don't think we're heading to the Congo as it seems far too politically messy. And while there have been strong commitments to by our government to pull out of Afghanistan next year, the opposition has said they would continue our combat role. A fall election could change many things... and I don't think that means we're heading to Africa.

 

[Edward Campbell]

MGB is correct: Congo, all of Africa in fact, is politically messy and there is no discernible will in Ottawa, discernible to me anyway, to jump from one mess to another. I doubt that the Liberal 'world view' is or will be much different from that of the Tories; the NDP will continue to demand that we offer "all aid short of help." But I reiterate my point that events (and ill-informed public opinion about the relative importance of those events) tend to drive policy, not vice versa.

 

[Marlowe]

The Congo mission was floated a few months back and the decision was made that it was a frikkin' mess and we need to step back. However, that was based on a desire to get a command. By the time we are out of Afghanistan and the UN comes calling again, someone might be stupid enough to commit resources.

Unfortunately, due to Canada's interests in Sudan, it is likely that we'll get pressured into beefing up either UNAMID or--more likely--UNMIS. Neither is a good idea. I think UNAMID might be the best bet. Freedom of Movement restrictions, inability to make a difference, hated by all sides, sure, but UNMIS has all of the above, plus a front row seat to a country falling into anarchy, no matter how much aid money we pump in there.

 

[Edward Campbell]

... bad leadership, a hallmark of UN missions - even when they are led by Canadians, can also have the effect of making even good troops, with good, robust ROE look bad.

I have a hunch that the situations tend to dictate their own outcomes - much more so, anyway, than do the troops on the ground.

Further to my comment, this, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, illustrates why the UN is ill suited to keep the peace unless and until there is a real, stable, peace to be kept:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-mideast/un-peacekeepers-unaware-of-congo-mass-rape-for-two-weeks/article1685840/

UN peacekeepers unaware of Congo mass rape for two weeks
Despite being in the area of rebel-occupied Luvungi town, ‘horrific’ rapes of at least 154 women and children escaped detection

Edith M. Lederer

The Associated PressPublished on Thursday, Aug. 26, 2010

The top UN envoy in Congo said Wednesday that two peacekeeping patrols were not informed by villagers that mass rapes were taking place and the United Nations is now working to improve communications and prevent any recurrence.

Roger Meece, the new UN special representative, said peacekeepers didn't learn about the “horrific” rapes of at least 154 Congolese civilians for nearly two weeks, which showed that the force's actions to protect civilians were insufficient and need to be improved.

He said one idea being pursued was to have villages report to the UN’s forward operating base at Kibua every day. If the force did not receive a report, he said, it would assume there was a problem and send a patrol to investigate.

Meece gave the most detailed account of the U.N.’s actions since Monday's report that Rwandan and Congolese rebels gang-raped nearly 200 women and some baby boys over four days not far from Kibua in eastern Congo's mining district. He spoke to reporters at U.N. headquarters by videoconference from Goma in eastern Congo.

Will F. Cragin of the International Medical Corps said Monday that aid and UN workers knew rebels had occupied Luvungi town and surrounding villages the day after the attack began on July 30. He told The Associated Press his organization was only able to get into the town after rebels ended their brutal spree of raping and looting and withdrew of their own accord on Aug. 4.

The UN wasn't made aware of the attacks until more than a week later, despite the fact that UN patrols had been in Luvungi twice after the attacks began.

Pressed on why two UN patrols learned nothing about the mass rapes, Mr. Meece said he could only speculate, noting that communication is always a problem in Congo.

“There is, of course, a significant amount of cultural baggage ... associated with rapes in this area, as well as elsewhere.” he said. “Is it conceivable that the local villagers were afraid of reprisals if they reported anything to MONUSCO? Possible. Is it conceivable that they were ashamed of what has happened in some form? That's possible.”

“I can only speculate as to what may have been the reasons, but I know that these can be very powerful in the local society and environment,” he said.

According to an American aid worker and a Congolese doctor, the rebels gang-raped nearly 200 women and some baby boys.

Mr. Meece, a former U.S. ambassador to Congo, said the UN peacekeeping force, known as MONUSCO, first received information on July 31 that combatants from the Rwandan rebel FDLR group were in the area, but there was “no suggestion at this point of an attack, much less of ... the mass rape in the villages in the area.”

The following day, the UN received information that Congolese Mai-Mai rebels were also moving to the area, probably to establish a roadblock of commercial traffic to get money, Mr. Meece said.

The UN learned later on Aug. 1 that a roadblock had been established, he said.

Early on Aug. 2, Meece said, a Congolese army patrol took off from its base at Mpofe toward Kibua and the UN later learned that the roadblock was removed, that Congolese soldiers and “remnants” of the rebel groups exchanged fire, and that the number of rebels in the area “dramatically decreased.”

The UN had no direct contact with the Congolese patrol “nor was there any information to suggest that there was large-scale rape,” he said.

A UN patrol also stopped in the village of Luvungi on Aug. 2, he said, “but the village people did not make any reports of what had happened in the preceding days.”

Mr. Meece said another MONUSCO patrol stopped in Luvungi on Aug. 9 and “once against there was no information that rapes had taken place, no less mass rapes.”

“The first reports that we got of the widespread rape ... was on Aug. 12” from the International Medical Corps, and the following day a U.N. Joint Human Rights and protection team went to the area to investigate.

Mr. Meece said the UN force is reviewing its patrol activities and considering holding meetings with local officials in the villages to increase contact.

He said about 80 peacekeepers based at Kibua are responsible for 300 square kilometres.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has sent Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Atul Khare to Congo to help investigate. He also sent his Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallstrom, to take charge of the U.N.’s response and follow-up to the attacks.

Mr. Ban also urged the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday to “seriously consider what more we can do” in Congo and elsewhere to protect civilians during peacekeeping operations.

If the UN really wants to “protect civilians” it is going to have to insert a large, militarily capable peacemaking force. Those two attributes require that e.g. the African Union is out, but who is to be ‘in?’ Britain, France, Canada and Australia, for example, do not have enough forces for large scale peacemaking in a huge country like Congo (2,345,409 km2 – twice the size of Ontario which has an area of 1,076,395 km2). Maybe we do have to call on China and India. We certainly should call on someone because the current UN force is inept - that is we should call on someone if we actually give a damn.



Edit: typo

 

[SeanNewman]

.... Those two attributes require that e.g. the African Union is out, but who is to be ‘in?’...

Too many African countries to keep track of, but in Sudan I know the big thing was that the UN wasn't even invited* and their government stated that any intervention had to be African-only troops.

At least the Congo seems like it's more open to having larger external forces there.

 

[a_majoor]

What is lacking is a clear definition of what our national interest is in spending blood and treasure in the Congo (or Haiti or Afghanistan or the Sudan or....)

Even though it seems pretty clear to me why we should be in Afghanistan (promote stability in a region literally ringed with nuclear armed nations, and prevent the use of the territory to shelter terrorist groups), this was never clearly and forcefully communicated to the public, which means we are now backed into a corner of leaving by an arbitrary date rather than according to some clearly defined metric. (If I were Generalissimo, we would not leave until at least 2015, when the first batch of the 6 million children who started going to school in 2005 graduated and there was now a critical mass of educated people to actually run things in Afghanistan. You may choose your own measure of success). I cannot even imagine what sort of achievable metric we could use in the Congo given our tiny resource base; even providing logistical and C3I support to a vastly larger Indian contingent still begs the question: What are we supposed to achieve there?

I suppose we *could* decide that being totally ruthless is in order; we choose one warlord and train and equip his army to defeat all opposition so then we at least know who we are dealing with, but optics aside, what is to stop other nations from training and equipping their favorite warlords and fighting us by proxy?

In the end, going into Africa will be like jumping into a pool of quicksand. These so called humanitarians want us to go in there with no plan, no end state, minimal resources and expect us to achieve a miricle. They will also be the very first to scream in outrage as we take casualties or engage hostile militias, terrorists and local warlords in the Congo; a loose/loose situation all around.

 

[Blackadder1916]

If the UN really wants to “protect civilians” it is going to have to insert a large, militarily capable peacemaking force. Those two attributes require that e.g. the African Union is out, but who is to be ‘in?’ Britain, France, Canada and Australia, for example, do not have enough forces for large scale peacemaking in a huge country like Congo (2,345,409 km2 – twice the size of Ontario which has an area of 1,076,395 km2). Maybe we do have to call on China and India. We certainly should call on someone because the current UN force is inept - that is we should call on someone if we actually give a damn.

The whole of the Congo may be twice the size of Ontario, but most of the action is in the eastern/central half of the country.  That being said, it is still a massive area to cover.  The attached map gives some indication of the current UN troop deployment.  Again making a comparison with Ontario, imagine the forces needed to control Northern Ontario (which has a better road system and probably easier terrain) if half (or somewhat less) of a population of 52 million was spread out over that region.  Though there are some large population centres, it is still a very rural and remote area.  I readily agree that the current UN force is inept, however, I can also understand some of the challenges they face.  For instance, mobility off the main roads can be exceedingly difficult.  Being able to provide a reasonable presence to protect civilians is (IMO) impossible with the current troop levels, even if those troops were “ept”.  There has been as much "mandate creep" as there is usually "mission creep".  Originally, the main focus of the force's mandate was to be similar to:

In the area of stabilization and peace consolidation in the DRC, MONUC would, among other things, assist the Government, along with international and bilateral partners, in strengthening its military capacity, including military justice and military police; support the reform of the police; develop and implement a multi-year joint United Nations justice support programme in order to develop the criminal justice chain, the police, the judiciary and prisons in conflict-affected areas and a strategic programmatic support at the central level in Kinshasa; support the Congolese Government in consolidating State authority in the territory freed from armed groups.

Protecting the population has now became the primary mandate of the mission.  Expecting the DRC military (probably as incompetent as they are corruptible) to join them as protectors of the population would be a pipe dream.

India is currently the largest contributor of troops to the mission (over 20%) including the present force commander.
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml

Current strength
These figures reflect the strength of MONUC, the preceeding UN Mission in the DRC, as of 30 June 2010

20,586 total uniformed personnel
  - 18,653 military personnel
  - 704 military observers
  - 1,229 police (including formed units)
982 international civilian personnel
2,787 local civilian staff
641 United Nations Volunteers

Note: Statistics for international and local civilians are as of 31 May 2010

Country contributors

Military personnel
Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada (10 pers), China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia.

Police personnel
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, France, Guinea, India, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen.

Too many African countries to keep track of, but in Sudan I know the big thing was that the UN wasn't even invited* and their government stated that any intervention had to be African-only troops.

At least the Congo seems like it's more open to having larger external forces there.

There is a significant difference between the two situations.  Khartoum probably doesn’t want robust foreign military forces acting as a buffer between warring parties on its territory because of their involvement in Darfur, even if peripherally.  The UN force in the Congo, however, is there to support the government, not stand between it and other actors.  The Kabilas (father and son) probably had enough of the military forces of other African nations being on their turf.  It was fine when Uganda and Rwanda supported them in their successful rebellion against Mobutu, but they didn’t want to leave when the older Kabila (before his assassination) told them to go home.  The ensuing “Second Congo War” was mainly to get them to leave.  When that conflict ended (well at least when the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed) there were also forces from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Chad (as well as Sudan and Libya on the edges) inside the country.  The Kinshasa government may suspect that a stabilization force exclusively from AU nations may not be able (or want) to support it against the other anti-government armed bodies remaining (or want to leave when the mandate is fulfilled, like most of the other African nations which have helped them in the past).

I suppose we *could* decide that being totally ruthless is in order; we choose one warlord and train and equip his army to defeat all opposition so then we at least know who we are dealing with, but optics aside, what is to stop other nations from training and equipping their favorite warlords and fighting us by proxy?

Whether good or bad, we (in the form of the UN) have already chosen; surprisingly, the winner is the “legitimate” government of the Democratic Republic of Congo.  How it got to be the legitimate government and has been for several years is as convoluted and bloody as any political process in Africa.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

What is lacking is a clear definition of what our national interest is in spending blood and treasure in the Congo (or Haiti or Afghanistan or the Sudan or....)

What do you consider to be our vital national interests?