The RCAF's Next Generation Fighter (CF-188 Replacement)

[PuckChaser]

Life cycle cost makes a little more sense in this case, because it's an increase in capability (more parts/maintainers/pilots) and a one-off purchase.  Applying it for a replacement program is just dumb as we're paying for all that jazz regardless of what we buy.

 

[jmt18325]

I think the net lifecycle costs would be a far more useful measure.

 

[dapaterson]

Any time we replace an existing capability, we are deciding whether or not to continue doing things the same way, with the same number of people doing the same thing.  If, for example, we decide to fully contract out second line for a vehicle fleet, that in turn impacts the number of vehicle techs (and potentially civilian mechanics) we have on our establishments. If we buy ten trucks to replace forty, there are potential reductions in the number of operators.

All those represent costs to DND.  That we may reallocate that effort elsewhere does not mean that capturing those costs is not relevant; it's part of making informed decisions.

Too often, though, the Army, Navy or Air Force begins with the assumption "I will keep all the people to do what I want, and the new equipment will sort itself out".  Unfortunately, in a zero sum game like Reg F personnel (the Government has said "You've got 68 000, all in"), that's not necessarily an optimal decision; those positions need to be moved - so if we retire the Airbuses and don't replace them (hypothetical example), then maybe those positions get converted from aircrew and ground crew into Bosuns, stokers and MARS officers to man HMCS Bonnie the Second.

Of course, those costs need to be well explained - and often DND does a poor job of explaining them.  So a press release announces "$600M for trucks!" when in fact, DND should have said "We're spending $100M to buy new trucks; $50M to replace obsolete garages and workshops; $300M for personnel costs in support of the trucks over 20 years (drivers and mechanics); $60M for fuel over 20 years; $60M for spare parts over 20 years; $25M for driver and mechanic training over 20 years; and $5M at end-of life to dispose of them safely."

 

[Kirkhill]

Any time we replace an existing capability, we are deciding whether or not to continue doing things the same way, with the same number of people doing the same thing.  If, for example, we decide to fully contract out second line for a vehicle fleet, that in turn impacts the number of vehicle techs (and potentially civilian mechanics) we have on our establishments. If we buy ten trucks to replace forty, there are potential reductions in the number of operators.

All those represent costs to DND.  That we may reallocate that effort elsewhere does not mean that capturing those costs is not relevant; it's part of making informed decisions.

Too often, though, the Army, Navy or Air Force begins with the assumption "I will keep all the people to do what I want, and the new equipment will sort itself out".  Unfortunately, in a zero sum game like Reg F personnel (the Government has said "You've got 68 000, all in"), that's not necessarily an optimal decision; those positions need to be moved - so if we retire the Airbuses and don't replace them (hypothetical example), then maybe those positions get converted from aircrew and ground crew into Bosuns, stokers and MARS officers to man HMCS Bonnie the Second.

Of course, those costs need to be well explained - and often DND does a poor job of explaining them.  So a press release announces "$600M for trucks!" when in fact, DND should have said "We're spending $100M to buy new trucks; $50M to replace obsolete garages and workshops; $300M for personnel costs in support of the trucks over 20 years (drivers and mechanics); $60M for fuel over 20 years; $60M for spare parts over 20 years; $25M for driver and mechanic training over 20 years; and $5M at end-of life to dispose of them safely."

You make an excellent point about prioritizing the "effort".

My personal sequence of events.... FWIW

Decide the effort
Decide the kit
Decide the bodies
Decide the command

Surplus PYs after the bodies have been determined to be assigned to the infantry - the only trade that, IMO, can't be replaced by a motor.  (That sounds harsher than I want it to - but better words escape me just now.)  And Privates are cheap.

 

[PuckChaser]

I think the net lifecycle costs would be a far more useful measure.

Also clearly indicating what "life cycle costs" are included in the numbers, but that doesn't sell headlines.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Review of article by Ottawa U. Prof. Srdjan Vucetic (knows his stuff) on how Canadian print media handled Conservatives' effort to acquire the F-35--almost all about politics and supposed costs, not substance of what plane should be bought and why.  Surprise:

H-Diplo Article Review 678 on “Who Framed the F-35? Government-Media Relations in Canadian Defence Procurement.”
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/165289/h-diplo-article-review-678-%E2%80%9Cwho-framed-f-35-government-media

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Kirkhill]

Also clearly indicating what "life cycle costs" are included in the numbers, but that doesn't sell headlines.

So, maybe, the "life cycle costs" of maintaining the CAF for the life of the longest lived piece of inventory should be the bench-mark?  So, Korean War vintage guns in service until 2050 gives a window of 100 years and a budget of $20,000,000,000 = a Baseline Cost of $2,000,000,000,000 to supply the capability (and that is $ Trillion x 2).

How much of that budget do the fighters consume?  And how often do they have to be refreshed, in whole or in part?

Of course the same logic should be applied to Canada Post, the CBC, (edit: the RCMP) and all of the Government of Canada Administration.

 

[Good2Golf]

Of course the same logic should be but isn't applied to Canada Post, the CBC, (edit: the RCMP) and all of the Government of Canada Administration.

FTFY, just to be clear.

Regards
G2G

 

[suffolkowner]

Are not some of these institutions mandated to overturn their capital equipment on a certain time frame and roll whatever they get into the replacement equipment. I'm thinking specifically about the RCMP but I'm sure I've seen others

 

[Colin Parkinson]

So, maybe, the "life cycle costs" of maintaining the CAF for the life of the longest lived piece of inventory should be the bench-mark?  So, Korean War vintage guns in service until 2050 gives a window of 100 years and a budget of $20,000,000,000 = a Baseline Cost of $2,000,000,000,000 to supply the capability (and that is $ Trillion x 2).

How much of that budget do the fighters consume?  And how often do they have to be refreshed, in whole or in part?

Of course the same logic should be applied to Canada Post, the CBC, (edit: the RCMP) and all of the Government of Canada Administration.

or WWII pistols....

 

[MarkOttawa]

From PM Trudeau/President Trump joint statement today (Feb. 13)--statement overall could almost have mainly written by Canadian side.  But have we lost price leverage with Boeing?:

...
The United States welcomes Canada’s recently announced decision to launch an open and transparent competition to replace its legacy fleet of CF-18 fighter aircraft. The United States also welcomes Canada’s decision to explore the immediate acquisition of 18 new Super Hornet aircraft as an interim capability to supplement the CF-18s until the permanent replacement is ready. Canada appreciates the cooperation of the United States to facilitate these processes...
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/02/13/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-and-prime-minister-justin-trudeau

No direct mention of missile defence, nothing on Canadian defence spending nor on UN peacekeeping--cf. these two Globe and Mail pieces:

Trudeau to emphasize common ground in Trump meeting

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau will use his first face-to-face meeting with President Donald Trump on Monday to propose broad areas of co-operation to boost jobs and continental security – ranging from joint infrastructure projects to cyber and energy security and possibly Canada joining the U.S. missile-defence shield...
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/trudeau-to-emphasize-common-ground-in-meeting-with-trump/article33995593/

Justin Trudeau will tread carefully on global security in Trump meeting

Justin Trudeau was going to bring Canada back into UN peacekeeping. Now, that’s on hold as he waits to understand Donald Trump’s global priorities...
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/justin-trudeau-will-tread-carefully-on-global-security-in-trump-meeting/article33995381/

I think the preparations by our government were excellent; and LGEN Flynn surely distracted POTUS today.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Kirkhill]

From PM Trudeau/President Trump joint statement today (Feb. 13)--statement overall could almost have mainly written by Canadian side.  But have we lost price leverage with Boeing?:

No direct mention of missile defence, nothing on Canadian defence spending nor on UN peacekeeping--cf. these two Globe and Mail pieces:

I think the preparations by our government were excellent; and LGEN Flynn surely distracted POTUS today.

Mark
Ottawa

Acquisition - the acquiring of. 

Purchase is one option.  Lease, loan, beg, steal or borrow. 

Perhaps 18 Super Hornets, based over seas with US supplying support and training and Canadians supplying 18 pilots and contribution to the US budget.

 

[dimsum]

So this appeared 4 hours ago on Laurie Hawn's FB (highlight mine):

Speaking truth to power can be risky

I re-confirmed that this week by speaking out rather more forcefully than was appreciated to the Commander of the RCAF and the Chief of the Defence Staff, on the issue of the CF-18 replacement. This is a condensation of some of my main points, and I know that senior military leaders have their hands tied. As followers will know, I have been very critical of the 100% politically motivated plan to buy 18 “interim” Super Hornets for some time and the story only gets worse.

We could fill the fabricated “capability gap” with 27 F-18C/D aircraft from Kuwait at the bargain basement price of $330 million, but we’re not pursuing it. We could also upgrade our 76 CF-18s to Super Hornet system status for about 20% of what it will cost us to buy 18 Super Hornets. Rather than pursue either of those options, we’d rather waste about USD 5.4 Billion on 18 aircraft with no real increase in capability. The cost of 90 F-35As will be USD 8.5 Billion (USD 94.6 million per) in the latest contract; and that unit cost will come down to USD 85 million by the time we should be receiving our first aircraft about 2020. What is wrong with this picture?

The F-18C is virtually identical to our CF-18s, while the Super Hornet is very different in size, radar, engines, mission computers and other systems. We don’t have the qualified technicians, pilots and support capacity to manage our current fleet; and adding a dissimilar fleet will make a very difficult job impossible. We are losing pilots to release at a rate that is unsustainable, and there is no ether that we can dip into to hive off more to get trained on the Super Hornet.

Neither the CF-18 nor Super Hornet actually has the kinematics to properly execute our primary mission of peacetime air sovereignty, with commercial aircraft operating above 40,000 feet. F-35 can properly execute that mission, and many more. The real experts were not consulted and, in fact, 240 of them have been muzzled with lifetime non-disclosure agreements. Why would a government with nothing to hide do that? The answer is that they wouldn’t, and this government has a lot to hide. It would be nice if the Auditor General and the Ethics Commissioner would take an interest. The options analysis that was conducted and clearly showed F-35 to be the answer has been suppressed, because it didn’t conform to the Prime Minister’s foolish and inaccurate statements during and since the 2015 campaign. And you thought that Donald Trump was the only purveyor of “alternate facts”.

Super Hornet also has serious safety concerns with the oxygen system that has resulted in 297 (reported) incidents that have resulted in the permanent grounding of some aircrew. Can we afford that and has anyone done a risk analysis of operating Super Hornet?
An open and fair competition could be started tomorrow and take no more than a year; but the government wants to kick the can down the road until after the next election. If the Statement of Requirements (SOR) is not “modified” to eliminate F-35, that aircraft would win any fair competition, just as it has in so many other cases. There’s good reason to believe that the SOR is being “massaged”. There will be nothing interim about a Super Hornet buy. Even if F-35 were to win a rigged competition, the sudden realization will be that, “Gosh, we just cannot afford a mixed fleet and we’ll just have to buy more Super Hornets.” The first part of that statement would be correct – we cannot afford a mixed fleet of Super Hornet and F-35 down the road, just as we cannot afford a mixed fleet of CF-18 and Super Hornet today.

The latest bit of insanity is that we are looking at buying two-seat Super Hornets and putting navigators in the back seat as Weapons System Operators (WSO). Our primary mission is air defence and there are no two-seat air defence fighters in the world today. There is a reason for that - navigators in fighters and many other applications have been overtaken by technology years ago. To be sure, fighter pilots will also eventually be overtaken by technology; but for the next few decades they have a job to do. We have no capacity to train WSOs, even if someone did invent a reason to want to do so.

The bottom line is that we can’t afford to do what we’re doing for a wide variety of reasons – Canadian sovereignty and security, financial, technical, personnel, moral, alliance support, Canadian industry, etc. If we carry on, I firmly believe and many others share my belief that we will kill the fighter force. I simply can’t support that and my conscience will not let me stay silent and be deemed complicit by that silence. I have been in and around the RCAF for 53 years and it is soul destroying to see what is happening in the name of politics. As anticipated, my vocal opposition to the plan was not well received by the most senior leadership of the RCAF and Canadian Armed Forces. I was asked to resign my position of Honourary Colonel of 401 Tactical Fighter Squadron (the oldest Squadron in the RCAF, 20 Nov 1918). That, I dutifully did, but since I’m not important enough to have sword, I just fell on my pen-knife.

I will continue to advocate for what I think is in the best interests of the RCAF, Canada, our aerospace industry AND taxpayers. Most Canadians may not really care about Super Hornet versus F-35, but I think they do care about the waste of billions of dollars for very little return, especially if it’s purely in the name of politics.

I agree broadly with everything except for the yellow bit.  Sure, the CF-18 role domestically is NORAD, but we've been using them to hit ground targets in far off places for a few decades now, and that makes it de facto "multi-role" even if it wasn't written into the spec.  The USN, USMC and RAAF use Ds and Fs - both with WSOs - in addition to their single seat Cs and Es.  I'm not wading (again) into if that is better or worse, but the point is two-seater aircraft are still used for fleet air defense. 

The "training system" bit is a red herring.  Sure, the initial cadre would be trained elsewhere (USN or RAAF primarily) but then it'd be a matter of bringing a few more PYs into 410 Sqn or wherever their OTU ends up being.  If we were to adopt the F-35, the initial cadre of Pilots would be trained elsewhere too. 

https://www.facebook.com/laurie.hawn.9/posts/1294479427303345

 

[SupersonicMax]

This is a capability we don't have and that would need to be built from the ground up. It would take years to create such a capability then maintain it for a squadron of 18 aircraft?  What exactly is this going to add in term of net capability?  We can do the job without now.  Would the pain of creating this capability outweigh the benefits?  In my informed opinion, no. 

From my experience operating with our ACSOs/EWOs and sharing a cockpit with USN's WSOs (and speaking in general terms), there would need to have a shift in focus and attitude from the ACSO's community to fit in the fighter community.  Perhaps training pipeliners through USN's training pipe would be the better option.

 

[dimsum]

This is a capability we don't have and that would need to be built from the ground up. It would take years to create such a capability then maintain it for a squadron of 18 aircraft?  What exactly is this going to add in term of net capability?  We can do the job without now.  Would the pain of creating this capability outweigh the benefits?  In my informed opinion, no. 

From my experience operating with our ACSOs/EWOs and sharing a cockpit with USN's WSOs (and speaking in general terms), there would need to have a shift in focus and attitude from the ACSO's community to fit in the fighter community.  Perhaps training pipeliners through USN's training pipe would be the better option.

To be honest, I'm not of the opinion that we need Fs either - my comments were directed in that it's not a monumental undertaking, and that we're not blazing new ground (or going back to archaic ways) if this were to happen.

What is the shift needed in your opinion for ACSOs to work in the fighter community?  The RAAF does what we do now for the Supers - stream all ACSOs through a common wings program, then off to OTUs to teach the real meat of the stuff.  The shift in focus and attitude can be done in the OTUs. 

Unless things have changed drastically, Nav school and OTU are totally separate beasts in focus/attitude already - I doubt very much that any Sea King TACCO uses much of the stuff they learned from 1 CFFTS.

:2c:

 

[Colin Parkinson]

So is the recruitment and retention issues afflicting the RCAF more of the same that afflicts all of the Forces or are there additional issues?

 

[Kirkhill]

Actually, I think including a couple of F's in the buy is an excellent idea.

Then you can take the programme managers from Public Services and Procurement Canada along for the ride when operating over Syria, the Black Sea, the Baltic....the Sea of Japan.....

It would be a useful experience for them, I'm sure.

 

[Quirky]

So is the recruitment and retention issues afflicting the RCAF more of the same that afflicts all of the Forces or are there additional issues?

It's pretty bad here in the fighter world, can't blame them for wanting to leave the shit hole that is cold lake.

 

[Loachman]

When I was in Germany, 80% of the fighter guys posted home put their releases in, because they'd had their good tour, and knew that the rest of their careers would be spent between Bagotville and Cold Lake.

 

[SupersonicMax]

my comments were directed in that it's not a monumental undertaking, and that we're not blazing new ground (or going back to archaic ways) if this were to happen.

This is exactly my point: it is not a simple process.  You can't compare us to the RAAF.  They had this capabilities for at least the last 40 years, with their F-111s and now Rhinos/Growlers.  They have people with experience at all levels of training to decide whether an individual have the required traits to make it in the stream.  We don't.  Also, it would not make sense to get an OTU for 18 jets.  I suspect we'll train our pilots and potential WSOs at the USN RAG.  For me, taking new ACSOs and sending them to the Navy for WSO training would provide screening and expert, tailored training for the role.

Loachman: Bagotville is probably th best hidden secret in the Air Force.