Why Arabs Lose Wars

[winchable]

Thirteenth century mentality + twentieth century Eastern European technology (AK series rifles) + no regard for human life and radicalism = self-erradication

Explain yourself

 

[Pieman]

Too much waving shoes around in crowds and screaming Allah Akbar and too little sophisticated planning, intelligence and tactics. 

Someone saw that Indiana Jones movie one too many times.  : Remember the scene where that huge Arab jumps in front of Indy with the sword, starts spinning it around in a big impressive display, and then Indy pulls out his gun and shoot him. <snicker> I love that scene.
Oops! Getting off topic.

As far as the comment on Arab tactics being unsophisticated, it would appear the current modern tactics the Arabs are using are pretty effective against the American forces. They are are not winning the war but they are certainly putting up a good fight, and making things pretty difficult to say the least.

I think one of the most famous sayings about war is 'know your enemy', but I think another equally important message would be 'never underestimate your enemy'....the strategy works in chess games too

 

[Acorn]

Why Arabs lose wars?
Too much waving shoes around in crowds and screaming Allah Akbar and too little sophisticated planning, intelligence and tactics. Funny bunch those Arabs though. Thirteenth century mentality + twentieth century Eastern European technology (AK series rifles) + no regard for human life and radicalism = self-erradication.

Have a detailed and critical look at the events of 1973. Prepare a paper, and come back to us. Otherwise sod off.


Acorn

 

[Infanteer]

Have a detailed and critical look at the events of 1973. Prepare a paper, and come back to us. Otherwise sod off.

Don't you love it when people cherry pick through history and leave out the obvious....

 

[48Highlander]

As far as the comment on Arab tactics being unsophisticated, it would appear the current modern tactics the Arabs are using are pretty effective against the American forces. They are are not winning the war but they are certainly putting up a good fight, and making things pretty difficult to say the least.

Look at the casualty figures for Americans in Desert Storm 1 and 2.  Then look at the casualty figures for Iraqi's in the same wars.  I don't know about you, but to me the comparison of those figures in no way indicates that Iraqi's "put up a good fight".  Then there's the fact that their military fell apart in 3 days in 1991, and in a few weeks the second time around.  Now if you're refering to the current "resistance" which consists mainly of suicide bombers...well, yeah I suppose you could call that a "good fight"....except that they've killed more Iraqi civilians than coalition soldiers.  Oh wait, I know, you must be talking about Fallujah!  Right, where the number of foreign combatants killed has been only 10 times higher than the number of dead Americans.  Ofcourse, FIBUA combat is supposed to produce 3-5 times as many casualties amongst the attackers....but I guess the Americans just got lucky.

C'mon, admit it, your statement was just plain silly 

 

[Pieman]

Oh wait, I know, you must be talking about Fallujah!   Right, where the number of foreign combatants killed has been only 10 times higher than the number of dead Americans.   Ofcourse, FIBUA combat is supposed to produce 3-5 times as many casualties amongst the attackers....but I guess the Americans just got lucky.

C'mon, admit it, your statement was just plain silly

No, I don't think it is silly. Your points comparing the death ratios is well taken. But you are painting a picture that is saying the American and British forces are having a cake walk, easy time there. Don't forget the insurgents there have been pretty good at preventing the Americans establish stability and control, they have been pretty good at destroying oil pipelines, and those civilian casualties were often Iraqis signing up to be police working for the Americans (a.k.a.   The enemy) The goal of their tactics does not appear to be to head off the Americans and push them out, rather just make things too difficult for the Americans to complete their goals.

Like I said, their tactics are certainly not winning the war, but it is foolish to think that their efforts have had little effect on the efforts of the American forces. Their object of their game is to prevent the Americans from estabishing control and stability in Iraq, and given the apparent success they are having doing that, I would say they are putting up a good fight. Last time I checked Iraq did not appear to be too stable or safe. In fact, I don't think I will go there for vacation this year, my wallet might get stolen!

 

[kruger]

Have a detailed and critical look at the events of 1973. Prepare a paper, and come back to us. Otherwise sod off.


Acorn

Have a detailed and critical look at the events of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1982-1984, 1991, 2001, 2003 etc. and don't waste our time with half-assed rebuttals.

 

[Infanteer]

Not that it matters because this shitbird is gone, but if anybody cares to pick up his reigns....

If you're so intent on doing a thorough historical analysis, set the clock back to the Roman Empire and trace the complete military history of Arabs; you'll find your thesis doesn't really hold any water.

P.S.   I'm trying to remember for the life of me which Arabs lost a war in 2001; unless of course he means that huge Arab population in Afghanistan.... :

P.P.S.

48, Torlyn is correct.   One can't judge "effectiveness" on casualty figures alone - if we were to do that, the German invasion of Russia and the American intervention in Vietnam would be unqualified successes.

 

[48Highlander]

48, Torlyn is correct.  One can't judge "effectiveness" on casualty figures alone - if we were to do that, the German invasion of Russia and the American intervention in Vietnam would be unqualified successes.

    That's true.  This all depends on which arabs we're talking about.  The original topic was "why arabs lose wars", not "why arabs are ineffective terrorists".  The invasion of Iraq was a war.  What's going on there now....maybe I'm splitting hairs here, but I wouldn't consider it a war, no more than two airplanes crashing into the world trade center constituted a war.  And yes, I know that the Bush administration is calling the whole thing a "war on terror".  That terminology is probably part of the reason why the insurgents in Iraq are having as much success as they are; because they US forces are trying to fight a war, while the insurgents use mainly hit-and-run tactics and indiscriminate bombings.  Same thing if you look back to when Israel was first formed and attacked.  The Arabs lost the war, but the terrorist tactics going on now are "effective".  The way I see it....any idiot can pick up a weapon and start taking out civilians....or make a bomb and drive it into the middle of a military formation....and on a man-for-man basis it'll seem to be pretty effective.  It's much harder to create a fighting force which can stand up on the field on battle and engage and destroy their enemies.

 

[Infanteer]

That's true. This all depends on which arabs we're talking about. The original topic was "why arabs lose wars", not "why arabs are ineffective terrorists". The invasion of Iraq was a war. What's going on there now....maybe I'm splitting hairs here, but I wouldn't consider it a war, no more than two airplanes crashing into the world trade center constituted a war. And yes, I know that the Bush administration is calling the whole thing a "war on terror". That terminology is probably part of the reason why the insurgents in Iraq are having as much success as they are; because they US forces are trying to fight a war, while the insurgents use mainly hit-and-run tactics and indiscriminate bombings.

So what you are really trying to address is the definition of war.   How is an Republican Guard soldier taking on an American soldier any different than an Insurgent in Fallujah taking on an American soldier?   You may want to be careful on how you answer that lest the answer be confined to the box of "Westphalian state actors".

Some thinkers believe that terrorist attacks and insurgency fighting are just as relevent to the dialogue of conflict and war as high intensity battles.   I think they're on to something:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/19350.0.html

Same thing if you look back to when Israel was first formed and attacked. The Arabs lost the war, but the terrorist tactics going on now are "effective". The way I see it....any idiot can pick up a weapon and start taking out civilians....or make a bomb and drive it into the middle of a military formation....and on a man-for-man basis it'll seem to be pretty effective.   It's much harder to create a fighting force which can stand up on the field on battle and engage and destroy their enemies.

And despite the best efforts of the most powerful military force on Earth, two years later they are still fighting for control of Iraq with these "idiots who picked up weapons".   Again, perhaps your focusing too narrowly on the conflict through the lens of Western, Westphalian norms and placing too much emphasis on the physical level of conflict - try moving to the moral level.

 

[48Highlander]

So what you are really trying to address is the definition of war.  How is an Republican Guard soldier taking on an American soldier any different than an Insurgent in Fallujah taking on an American soldier?  You may want to be careful on how you answer that lest the answer be confined to the box of "Westphalian state actors".

    How often do these insurgents "take on" American soldiers?  A lone sniper does not an army make.  Or a guy with an RPG, or a suicide bomber.  If you want definitions, look in the geneva conventions.  You'll notice that enemy combatants in civilian clothing are not considered soldiers, and are dealt with quite differently.  Can you have a war without an army?  That's usualy called a revolution, or an uprising.  You want to talk about wether or not Arabs can organize effective revolutions, hell, that's a different subject entirely, and I'd deffinitely agree that they're quite good at that.  They should be, they've been engaged in revolts against one another for a few centuries 

Some thinkers believe that terrorist attacks and insurgency fighting are just as relevent to the dialogue of conflict and war as high intensity battles.  I think they're on to something:
http://army.ca/forums/threads/19350.0.html

    I totaly agree.  Any time anyone has the desire and capability to kill you, that's pretty relevant to how you're going to fight your battles.  But terrorist attacks alone do not make a war.  Not by the definition.  People who think of it as a war tend to fight it like a conventional war, which is just setting yourself up for failiure.  That's why we have so many different terms to describe different types of conflict.  War, terrorism, insurgent fighting, uprisings, rebelions, revolutions, tribal warfare, peacekeeping, peacemaking, gang warfare, guerilla warfare...they may all have death and destruction as their basis, but they ARE different types of conflicts which cannot be resolved by using the same methods.  Every problem has a different solution, so before you can implement a solution, you have to identify the problem.  That's why I disagree with people refering to the current conflict in Iraq as "war".  And why I can make the statements that arabs are historicaly pretty ineffective when it comes to war.

And despite the best efforts of the most powerful military force on Earth, two years later they are still fighting for control of Iraq with these "idiots who picked up weapons".  Again, perhaps your focusing too narrowly on the conflict through the lens of Western, Westphalian norms and placing too much emphasis on the physical level of conflict - try moving to the moral level.

    Moral level?  Sure.  Can you start me off here?  What are the moral issues pertaining to how well Arabs fight wars/conflicts?  Are you talking about the fact that the insurgents are succeeding in making Americans look like the bad guys in the forum of public opinion?  I'd agree with that.  That's about the only thing they've actually had success in.  But then again, that's not a very difficult.  World opinion has been turning against the US for a long time.  It also doesn't have much to do with morals, but a lot to do with public perception of world events.

 

[Acorn]

A couple of things directly to the topic:

1948 - Jewish (proto-Israeli) forces in fact outnumbered Arab forces. The Arab nations surrounding the fledgling Israeli state were juvenile themselves, and committed troops to Palestine soley for their own territorial agrandizment. Numbers committed reflected that.

1956 - British and French involvement had a certain amount of influence. It is interesting that Israel is considered to have won, while her closest allies at the time - UK and France, clearly lost.

1967 - Pre-emption. It can work. It was the single most successful Israeli operation, and is too often conflated with other conflicts.

1973 - A "damn near run thing." If one wishes to analize "why Arabs lose wars" it is probably the best example. Defeat was snatched from the jaws of victory, unless one is Israeli - they consider it a defeat. Israel's casualties were greater than those of all previous conflicts combined.

1979-1982 - This is where the paradigm shifted. No longer would Arab forces challenge the Israelis on the conventional battlefield.

Subsequent conflicts, '91 and '03, were a case of hyper-power superiority. The US is conventionally so far beyond any other force on the planet that this should not be a discussion. That applied in '91 as well.

Acorn

 

[enfield]

I quickly Googled the 1948 war and found the following numbers for the 1948 war, and please correct me if these are inaccurate. It appears the Israeli's were slightly outnumbered, fighting from a tiny territorial area against much larger foes. And I believe some of the Arab troops, such as the Arab Legion, were considered quite good.

"Over the next few days, approximately 10,000 Lebanese, 60,000 Syrian, 4,500 Iraqi, 50,500 Egyptian, and 60,000-90,000 Transjordanian troops entered the former Mandate. Together with the few thousand irregular Arab soldiers, they faced a Zionist army numbering 30,000-35,000. Both sides increased their manpower over the following months, but the Zionist advantage grew steadily"
from: http://www.brainyencyclopedia.com/encyclopedia/1/19/1948_arab_israeli_war.html#Phases%20of%20the%20War

1973 Yom Kippur War - By rights, Israel should not exist, given they were outnumbered 12:1 (according to some Israeli sources I Googled up). What is  surprising is not that they did so badly, but that they did so well. The entire Arab world (including Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Tunisia, Sudan,Lebanon, Morocco as well as the usual suspects), with massive Soviet support and overwhelming size, attacks a tiny state with a 12 to one advantage in forces, and STILL ends up losing? The war ended with Israeli forces closing on Cairo... not too bad. 2,688 Israeli soldiers died, and Israel does consider it a military failure despite battlefield victory, although I'd say they were being too hard on themselves.

 

[Pieman]

48, Torlyn is correct.

Hey! Torlyn is the white Knight!

48, I am not sure the opposing forces in Iraq can really be considered to be terrorists, if I had to choose a word  I would use rebels or insurgents.

But really, I am sure the tactics of battling a terrorist, rebel, army, or whatever are certainly different. But should the insurgents/terrorists/army continue to disrupt the stabilization process to the point where the Americans pull out in frustration (let's pretend for the moment), wouldn't that constitute winning the war? It is quite possible to lose every battle, yet still win the war.

So if you are saying the current conflict is not a 'war' then what is it? And why is it different? Are we arguing over semantics here, or is there really a definite difference? I honestly don't see it, but please clarify if you do.

 

[Acorn]

Those Jordanian numbers alone lead me to believe there is some error in the rest of them; they look like the figures for the entire Jordanian Army of the time. In any case, I don't have the source here, my apologies.

King Abdullah only committed the Arab Legion (about a bde group) to actually sieze Jerusalem, and some other forces elswhere. He may have had 60-90 thousand troops on hand, but they were not committed to battle. Lebanese forces actually committed, IIRC, numbered around 5,000. Those are the only numbers that come to mind from memory.

We have the same problem with the Arab-Israeli wars that we once had with WWII in the East. Lack of souces from one side usually lead us to accept the other side's view less critically. Our Western predjudice against both the sides that we lack info on - Arab and Soviet - makes it easier to accept the accounts from the other side.

Acorn

 

[enfield]

Fair enough, not exactly the best source for info.

I still have to believe, however, that the combined weight (land mass, resources, population, GDP, military forces) of the Arab combatant states in 1948 was greater than that of Israel, either in pure numbers or in equipment, material, and weapon systems. If Israel did hold a numerical superiority in combatants, I could only see that as because every fit person grabbed their .303 and headed towards the sound of the guns, which while it speaks of bravery, it does not equate to well-equipped soldiers with combined arms support. The Arab states may have been infant states as well, but Israel was fresh from the womb.

I'll poke around and see if I can find something more reliable and substantial - maybe something to actually back up what I'm saying 

 

[winchable]

but Israel was fresh from the womb.

Does anyone know if mommy was still watching over baby when the Arab states invaded?

 

[Infanteer]

Interesting article from William Lind.  I have three other books by the author (John Poole) and they are all excellent tactical primers by a Marine Corps NCO.  I'm going to take a look at the book to see what it's all about.

http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,Lind_111704,00.html

William S. Lind: Tactics of the Crescent Moon

November 17, 2004

U.S. forces have taken Falluja. Were we fighting a war in the Spanish Netherlands in the 17th century, and were Falluja the fortress city of Breda, the victory might mean something. Caught up as we actually are in a Fourth Generation war in Iraq, the event is almost meaningless. Most of the guerillas fled before we attacked, as guerillas are supposed to do ("When the enemy attacks, we retreat.") U.S. forces are finding few dead resistance fighters; the 1,200 to 1,600 "body count" the American command is claiming will prove as phony as those in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the resistance is hitting us elsewhere. When U.S. forces leave Falluja, they will return there too. And the U.S. military has again destroyed the village in order to save it, giving its enemies a victory at the moral level. Will we ever learn?

If we do ever learn, a good bit of the credit should go to one of the most innovative and practical modern writers on military tactics, retired Marine John Poole. His first book, The Last Hundred Yards, was the best small unit tactics manual published in many years. Now, just in time for Iraq, Afghanistan and wherever else the neo-cons want to send American soldiers to die, he is offering his take on how Islamic non-state forces fight. Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods should be in the backpack of every American soldier and Marine.

Here's a sample paragraph that might usefully have been read by those who planned the Falluja operation:

Through better tactics, U.S. forces could take fewer casualties at close range without alienating the local population and without sacrificing their long-range capabilities. More powerful than firepower in this new kind of war will be the preservation of infrastructure. For it is the lack of social services that gives the foe his recruiting base. In the 21st century - as it was at the end of World War II - food, water, clinics and jobs will do infinitely more to secure the ultimate victory than bombs. Better small-unit technique costs nothing. It requires only a slower operational pace and the authority to experiment at the company or school level.

Interestingly, Tactics of the Crescent Moon begins at Gallipoli, where the British were handed a major defeat by the Ottoman Turks during World War I. How did they do it? Poole argues that the Turks won in part because of better tactics.

It would appear that Middle Easterners were using "maneuver warfare" at the individual and squad level some 65 years before Americans could do it at the regimental level. To lure an entire British battalion into a trap, the Turks had needed only bogus orders, harassing fire, and deliberate withdrawal...When they reemerged to stalk the flanks and rear of the British formation, they may have further enticed it to advance. By the time their quarry realized that it was alone and fragmented, it was too late.
After examining lessons from the Iran-Iraq war and Israel's expulsion from southern Lebanon, Poole goes on to consider each of the main Islamic Fourth Generation forces the U.S. may find itself facing. His discussions of the Afghan resistance to U.S., not just Soviet, invaders and the Iraqi opposition could not be more relevant. 

Part Three of Tactics of the Crescent Moon offers his prescription for how U.S. forces should act. As in his other books, Poole stresses small-unit tactics and techniques. Seeing clearly the moral disadvantages that massive use of American firepower brings, he notes how good small units - true light infantry, which America sadly lacks - can win without the vast collateral damage and civilian casualties that work against us. The keys are high levels of small unit autonomy and far better peacetime training, training that permits experimentation and adaptation rather than forcing everyone into a cookie-cutter sameness.

For those who want to learn, Tactics of the Crescent Moon is an invaluable resource. The question is whether the U.S. military can learn and adapt. At the small unit level, it can, when it is allowed to do so. The problem is that, typical of a Second Generation military, the U.S. armed forces must bear the burden of a vast, centralized, bureaucratic command structure that has little interest in adaptation. Populated with rafts of modern major generals who cannot tell at sight a Mauser rifle from a javelin, but know all too well how to grab more bucks for irrelevant high-tech weapons, our headquarters resemble the British at Gallipoli more than the Turks. The result is likely to be more flattened Iraqi cities like Falluja, more victories on the moral level for our opponents, and in the end, ignominious withdrawal and defeat. Now, if we could just convert all those headquarters and their staffs into mine-clearing platoons...

 

[Acorn]

Interesting article Infanteer. I'll  have to start looking for Poole to add to my library.

Enfield, one of the oft-ignored aspects of the 1948 war was Arab politics and motivation. Contrary to the subsequent mythology, Palestine's Arab neighbours had little interest in an independent Arab Palestine - they wanted key terrain and resources to themselves. Water played a major factor (as it does today), control of the river Jordan and lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) remain important regional objectives (as a side note: Arab farming "inefficiency" is better at preserving regional water supplies than the Israeli mythology around "making the desert bloom.")

These Arab states were looking for an easy land-grab off of a weak opponent. They also wanted to preserve their fledgling new armies, thus they failed to commit significant forces to the actual battle, and when they did commit it was half-hearted.

In regard of training, the Israelis had a significant number of combat veterans from British and other Allied forces. The only well-trained Arab force was the Arab Legion - trained by the British and commanded by a British officer (BGen Glubb, known to the Arabs as "Glubb-Basha.") It's a matter of record the difficulty the Israelis had in shifting Arab Legion troops out of West Jerusalem, and they were unable to secure the whole city.

As well, the Israeli project had captured the minds of many world-wide. There were a number of experienced soldiers and airmen who aided them, either directly by travelling to Israel to fight, or by expediting equipment. Canadian fighter pilot George "Buzz" Beurling, a WWII ace with 32 victories and a very, shall we say, unconventional style, died en-route to Israel when the aircraft he was travelling in crashed taking off from Rome. He had been recruited by the Israelis to fly P-51s for their fledgling airforce.

Acorn

An interesting side-note is that Syrian armour included 1940-era French equipment and some surplus German Panzers. I don't recall that any were engaged.

 

[Infanteer]

Interesting article Infanteer. I'll have to start looking for Poole to add to my library.

Don't let the covers of his books fool you - the artwork is rather childish; one book has the picture of a Ninja while another is some sort of Rambo dude with a bandana.  The material inside is good stuff, mostly tactical primer and individual to platoon level stuff.  His main focus is on the indirect approach (such as infiltration) of non-Western infantry forces (to make up for their material deficiency) and how we could learn from them.