Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)

[Eye In The Sky]

And we are on V 2.0  [

Hey I guess that is right.  So, does that mean we have "new" new ranks?  Or is it *new* "new" new ranks now?  They are changing so fast I can't keep up!

 

[The Bread Guy]

Technically no, but unless we self-identify as a CAF member, how would they know? The Minister needs to show some leadership here, and issue a directive that CAF members can participate. I even got a nice email on DWAN inviting me to help.

Another option:  one could host a "consultation event" ...

 

[MilEME09]

"This has all happened before, and it will happen again"

http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/douglas-bland-get-ready-for-the-defence-cuts

Douglas Bland: Get ready for the defence cuts

Prime Minster Justin Trudeau promised Canadians that he would “invest in our Armed Forces,” but to date he has not explained how he will do so. Rather, on April 6, the National Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan announced not a review to develop a new defence policy, but a “defence consultation” meant to “help set future direction and priorities” for the Canadian Forces.

Why has the government launched this complicated public consultation, instead of a focused defence policy review? Previous policy reviews always provided opportunities for citizens, scholars, and defence-related organizations and institutes to contribute directly to such policy reviews. Why could a wide survey of Canadian’s opinions on defence policy not be incorporated into a comprehensive review?

It appears that Trudeau’s consultations are merely intended to cloak until next year or beyond the government’s intention to make deep cuts to the Canadian Forces and the defence budget. This isn’t a new approach. Prime minister Jean Chrétien used the same tactics in 1994

On Feb. 23, 1994, with Chrétien’s support, the Senate and the House of Commons created a Special Joint Committee (SJC) on Canada’s Defence Policy to undertake “a review of Canadian defence policy.” Later that year, the SJC presented its recommendations as to “the principles, purposes, and objectives (that) should guide our government in setting out Canada’s defence policy.” The committee’s final report was widely praised by citizens, scholars, senators, and members of parliament. Chrétien, however, was not pleased.

Almost immediately after the eport was made public, then-defence minister David Collenette, tabled the government’s Defence White Paper, a policy developed in great secrecy while the SJC was in session. In his introduction to the white paper — and to the outrage of some members of the SJC — Collenette simply declared: “The SJC played an integral role in shaping Canada’s new defence policy. … (However) the committee’s recommendations concerning the size of the Regular Force were judged to be inconsistent with the financial parameters within which the DND must operate. Cuts deeper than those envisioned by the SJC will be required to meet the Government’s deficit reduction target.”

No more was heard of the SJC report during Chrétien’s time in government.

The reality was that Chrétien had decided, as he makes clear in his memoir, to reduce significantly defence spending and that objective became Canada’s national defence policy.

Prime Minister Trudeau is following Chrétien’s lead, but he needs a credible rational to support his defence budget cuts and time to construct an “in the national interest” rationale for them. Thus, his scheme to let Canadians “inform the development of a new defence policy for Canada” may simply be — as was the 1994 SJC for Chrétien — a shield meant to protect the government in the short term should anyone ask, “What’s Canada’s national defence policy?”

If the advisory panel concludes that Canadians support the need for an increase, and not cuts, in defence spending, we should expect Sajjan one day to announce — Collenette-like —  “The public consultations recommendations concerning defence policy were judged to be inconsistent with the financial parameters within which the DND must operate.”

Afterward, perhaps close to the next election, Trudeau’s real defence policy will be unveiled.

National Post

Douglas Bland is a retired Canadian Army officer and professor emeritus at Queen’s University.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

:bravo:

I believe our friends in Armour would say to this: Target! .... traversing left.

 

[Kirkhill]

:bravo:

I believe our friends in Armour would say to this: Target! .... traversing left.

Agreed.

Trudeau's Modus Operandi is looking more and more like the old Liberal game plan.  Have lots of meetings.  Say lots of stuff.  Do whatever they please.

For the Press, well they get lots of stuff to cover.

 

[Canuck_Jock]

How long before we hear that old chestnut of "smaller but more capable force.." It is pretty well scripted for politicians, but the logical end state is that the smallest force is the most capable?

 

[RCPalmer]

How long before we hear that old chestnut of "smaller but more capable force.." It is pretty well scripted for politicians, but the logical end state is that the smallest force is the most capable?

Now, I would obviously love to see both funding and personnel growth within the CAF, but sometimes I wonder what we would do with additional resources if we got them.  There are some macro comparisons that are a bit troubling.  Now, I think that it can be fairly reasonably argued the ADF maintains all of the capability sets that the CAF does (with the possible exception of some arctic capabilities), and quite a few that we don't such as attack helicopters and amphibious assault ships.  Geographical considerations such as distances between bases and units impact the operations and maintenance of our forces in similar ways.  Benefits are comparable, and the size and structure of the reserve force of both nations is quite similar.  However:

Canada spends 14 Billion (U.S.) annually to maintain a full time force of 68,000.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Armed_Forces

Australia spends 22 Billion (U.S.) annually to maintain a full time force of 57,000.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Defence_Force

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures

In short, they do more with more money and fewer personnel.  So, it begs the question, "what are the differences"?  I hope it isn't just building winterization and heating.  At first blush, it looks like the Aussies spend more of their money on capital projects, while Canada spends a greater portion of its budget on keeping people in uniform full time.  I'm not necessarily saying that the Aussies it right and we have it wrong, but we must not immediately decry any call for re-alignment or reform, and at some point we may have to trade capabilities for personnel to operate within a finite funding envelope.

 

[dimsum]

In short, they do more with more money and fewer personnel.  So, it begs the question, "what are the differences"?  I hope it isn't just building winterization and heating.  At first blush, it looks like the Aussies spend more of their money on capital projects, while Canada spends a greater portion of its budget on keeping people in uniform full time.  I'm not necessarily saying that the Aussies it right and we have it wrong, but we must not immediately decry any call for re-alignment or reform, and at some point we may have to trade capabilities for personnel to operate within a finite funding envelope.

I wonder how much $ would be saved by bundling all of the squadrons of a type in one place, like the Aussies do with all their assets besides fighters.  For example, the two line squadrons and training squadron of their AP-3Cs (Aurora equivalents) are all in Adelaide, so people posted there can expect to stay there for a while instead of getting posted every 3 or so years to the opposite coast like what happens in the RCAF. 

It's not to say that no one ever gets posted in the RAAF, but unless it's for a staff posting in Canberra or similar, they seem to get moved less.

 

[MilEME09]

I think you have to look at the personal break down as well, we are very top heavy as a military, where I suspect the ADF isn't. If the CAF expanded we don't need more officers, we have enough already, they just need to get moved around. I would be interested to see what the average procurement time is for the ADF as well, and compare our two systems.

 

[RCPalmer]

I wonder how much $ would be saved by bundling all of the squadrons of a type in one place, like the Aussies do with all their assets besides fighters.  For example, the two line squadrons and training squadron of their AP-3Cs (Aurora equivalents) are all in Adelaide, so people posted there can expect to stay there for a while instead of getting posted every 3 or so years to the opposite coast like what happens in the RCAF. 

It's not to say that no one ever gets posted in the RAAF, but unless it's for a staff posting in Canberra or similar, they seem to get moved less.

I'm sure the cost of postings is a factor, and I have heard anecdotally that members move around less in the ADF.  With regards to the cost savings of consolidating aircraft by type, I would imagine that an operational imperative in the CAF driving up a cost (in this case two widely separated coasts requiring surveillance capabilities) would have some ADF equivalent to balance things out. Maybe they have to fly further in hotter climates driving up fuel costs?...I don't know.  My point here is that it is not unfair for the government to ask us to become more efficient. I am sure there is a lot we could do.  That said, my worry is that when cuts have come in the past, we have been inclined to cut meat, not fat.

 

[dapaterson]

I think you have to look at the personal break down as well, we are very top heavy as a military, where I suspect the ADF isn't. If the CAF expanded we don't need more officers, we have enough already, they just need to get moved around. I would be interested to see what the average procurement time is for the ADF as well, and compare our two systems.

Except when we expanded the Reg F we grew the number of officers.  And continue to do so.  We have more LCols in a Reg F of 68K today than we did in a Reg F of 87K in 1990.

 

[MilEME09]

Except when we expanded the Reg F we grew the number of officers.  And continue to do so.  We have more LCols in a Reg F of 68K today than we did in a Reg F of 87K in 1990.

thus our problem, I remember one of my Mcpls did the math and it's like 1 officer for every 3 NCM's. That is a ridiculously high ratio for a military of our size, I think we need a reduction in our officer intake, and the elimination of some positions via attrition.

 

[Flavus101]

There was an interesting conversation had in my unit about officers intruding into what was traditionally NCO territory for day to day operations. I am not sure if this is a localized thing (keep in mind we are talking reserve force) or if this is CAF wide?

Perhaps this train of thought deserves a whole other topic.

 

[PuckChaser]

There was an interesting conversation had in my unit about officers intruding into what was traditionally NCO territory for day to day operations. I am not sure if this is a localized thing (keep in mind we are talking reserve force) or if this is CAF wide?

Perhaps this train of thought deserves a whole other topic.

When you have too many officers, they run out of tasks and get into my world. Some take the correction, and others use the entitled attitude given to them at RMC to annoy the living daylights out of us.

 

[RCPalmer]

thus our problem, I remember one of my Mcpls did the math and it's like 1 officer for every 3 NCM's. That is a ridiculously high ratio for a military of our size, I think we need a reduction in our officer intake, and the elimination of some positions via attrition.

I would assert that this issue is more TOS driven.  The CAF needs a lot more officers at the bottom of the pyramid than at the top, but we let pretty much everyone stay to CRA.  Most other armies employ "up or out" (in the case of the Americans), or fixed career lengths (in the case of the Brits).  Prior to unification there was a different retirement age for every rank.  We must of course respect the charter, which means that anything age based is likely out the window, (and I bet CRA won't stand up to a charter challenge in the long run) it doesn't mean that we need to keep every member until retirement.

I would also note that there are some areas where we are still short officers. The reserve force for example is as a whole desperately short of trained junior officers (Lts and Capts), and that has significant CT and IT implications for us.

 

[Brasidas]

I would assert that this issue is more TOS driven.  The CAF needs a lot more officers at the bottom of the pyramid than at the top, but we let pretty much everyone stay to CRA.  Most other armies employ "up or out" (in the case of the Americans), or fixed career lengths (in the case of the Brits).  Prior to unification there was a different retirement age for every rank.  We must of course respect the charter, which means that anything age based is likely out the window, (and I bet CRA won't stand up to a charter challenge in the long run) it doesn't mean that we need to keep every member until retirement.

I would also note that there are some areas where we are still short officers. The reserve force for example is as a whole desperately short of trained junior officers (Lts and Capts), and that has significant CT and IT implications for us.

What about just not promoting Capts?

 

[RCPalmer]

What about just not promoting Capts?

Very true.  In the reserve world, we have an annoying habit of tolerating no gaps at the top of the hierarchy but enormous gaps at the bottom, so we are constantly promoting our best people which takes them away from the activities that matter (ie training soldiers).  At the LCol and CWO level, we often promote them out of a job entirely.  If we are ever going to stabilize the PRes personnel state, we are going to have to stop doing that.

However, this concept has limitations.  Just as the Corporal with 20 years of service isn't likely to be in a rifle section, the 20 year Capt isn't likely to be suitable for employment in a core role either.  Now, I'm not saying that there is never a place for long term Capts or Cpls (and I realize that tech trades are a somewhat different animal), but because we keep everyone, we have a glut of pers who are only suitable for the non-core roles.  This contributes to the institutional bloat, and apart from being very expensive, leads to our current situation of ever growing staffs chasing, (micro)managing and tasking increasingly hollow organizations.

 

[Edward Campbell]

This, BGen (ret'd) Jim Cox, in the Vimy Report, ought to be required reading.

Brooke Claxton was, in my mind, the "very model of a modern defence minister," he had a fine, legal mind and he was in no awe, at all, of the admirals and generals in the CF ... he had, himself, only limited military experience (as a battery Sergeant Major in the First World War) but that didn't matter: he (and St Laurent) had a clear eyed view of the world, of Canada's place in it and of the resources available. The world was infinitely more complex and dangerous than anything any Canadian government, especially this one, has faced since: there were emerging real, existential threats to Canada and a national grand strategy was required (which St Laurent provided) so that a clear, comprehensive and flexible defence policy could be crafted. It was:

    “to defend Canada against aggression, to assist the civil power in maintaining law and order within the country, and to carry out any undertaking which by our own voluntary act, we may assume in cooperation with
    friendly nations or under any effective plan of collective action under the United Nations.”

That was it. If Prime Minister Trudeau had set that forth as a start point then I would have some hope for the Defence Review, as it is ...  :dunno:

 

[Old Sweat]

The Canadian Press reports in this story reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act that a retired admiral has testified that politicians and bureaucrats paralyze the defence decision making process.

DND paralyzed as politicians and bureaucrats pass the buck, says retired admiral

By The Canadian Press — Apr 28 2016

OTTAWA — A retired admiral is telling the Trudeau government's defence review that National Defence is often paralyzed by timid bureaucrats and politicians who pass the buck on decisions.

Retired vice-admiral Bruce Donaldson, who until a few years ago was second-in-command of the military, says in a written brief that the system is set up to avoid risk and accountability.

That, he says, leads to costly delays and failure to deliver necessary equipment and support.

Donaldson, who retired in 2013, also says the public has little understanding of government finances and has been encouraged to see spending on the military as wasteful.

He suggests government has done a poor job of educating citizens on the necessary cost of doing business as a country.

The Liberals held the first in a series of six public consultations this week in Vancouver as Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan attempts to craft an updated vision for the military.

 

[Underway]

Now, I would obviously love to see both funding and personnel growth within the CAF, but sometimes I wonder what we would do with additional resources if we got them.  There are some macro comparisons that are a bit troubling.  Now, I think that it can be fairly reasonably argued the ADF maintains all of the capability sets that the CAF does (with the possible exception of some arctic capabilities), and quite a few that we don't such as attack helicopters and amphibious assault ships.  Geographical considerations such as distances between bases and units impact the operations and maintenance of our forces in similar ways.  Benefits are comparable, and the size and structure of the reserve force of both nations is quite similar.  However:

Canada spends 14 Billion (U.S.) annually to maintain a full time force of 68,000.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Armed_Forces

Australia spends 22 Billion (U.S.) annually to maintain a full time force of 57,000.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Defence_Force

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures

In short, they do more with more money and fewer personnel.  So, it begs the question, "what are the differences"?  I hope it isn't just building winterization and heating.  At first blush, it looks like the Aussies spend more of their money on capital projects, while Canada spends a greater portion of its budget on keeping people in uniform full time.  I'm not necessarily saying that the Aussies it right and we have it wrong, but we must not immediately decry any call for re-alignment or reform, and at some point we may have to trade capabilities for personnel to operate within a finite funding envelope.

You'll probably find on further research that the element balance is different.  The CAF is very army heavy.  The Aussies have a much larger Navy (pers wise) than we do.  They also operate more aircraft.  Also you'll find that the Aussies are the highest paid military in the world.  Canada is second (though I can't find the ref where I read that).  Cost differences are found there.