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Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)

Underway said:
You'll probably find on further research that the element balance is different.  The CAF is very army heavy.  The Aussies have a much larger Navy (pers wise) than we do.  They also operate more aircraft.  Also you'll find that the Aussies are the highest paid military in the world.  Canada is second (though I can't find the ref where I read that).  Cost differences are found there.

This might get me banned here, but why is the army so large in relation to the Navy and Air Force? We depend more on sea lanes and air lanes for trade and communications, and a larger standing army vice a well equipped Navy and Air Force doesn't seem to be the proper way to spend limited funds.
 
FSTO said:
This might get me banned here, but why is the army so large in relation to the Navy and Air Force? <snip>

The over-simplified answer is optics. "The army is cheaper and more versatile" to sell to the public compared to the RCN or RCAF. The cost of a few hundred or thousand [**fill in item here**] is far cheaper sounding than 12 ships for $55 billion over 40 years. The cost comparison to the average taxpayer just doesn't sell as easily, even when the accounting process is the same. Over those 40 years, what the army eats up in funding equals or surpasses the navy or air force, but nobody notices because the incremental costs are so much lower for specified items (boots, uniforms, trucks ect...)
 
FSTO said:
This might get me banned here, but why is the army so large in relation to the Navy and Air Force? We depend more on sea lanes and air lanes for trade and communications, and a larger standing army vice a well equipped Navy and Air Force doesn't seem to be the proper way to spend limited funds.

I have thought similarly, but I don't think our army is large, by comparison to the other branches it is, but not being able to sustain a battle group long term in A-stan shows the army isn't what it needs to be. That said I believe our navy should be double it's current size, ditto for the airforce. Problem is that costs money. The way I see it, if we had the budget to do so I would do the following,

Army

- Increase the regular force to 27,000, add a new Coy to existing units, or stand up new reg force units that were put to null strength in the 90's
- New units could be based out of existing facilities after some upgrades
- Increase the PRes to 18,000, both by expanding current units, and reactivating units on the supplementary order of battle
- Invest in a well rounded army including robust GBAD, and Anti-armour capabilities

Navy

-Increase personal to 13,000 Regular, and 10,000 NAVRES
-increase the number of surface vessels by 1.5, and triple our submarine force
-Build a fully capable facility in Manitoba to act as a midway point for arctic operations

Airfoce

-Increase Reg force personal to 18,000, and AirRes up to 8,000
-invest in using smaller existing airports for airRes to train, or have property at larger airports that could be joint reg/res facilities
- increase our rotor wing capabilities, double our SAR capabilities to increase response times coast to coast
- double our combat aircraft from out current ~70 CF-18's to 140 aircraft of what ever we decide to buy
- double our super herc fleet to give us a larger transport capability


Now I am no expert, but these are just my thoughts
 
Army Res is already around 18K, so you are proposing no change.
 
kratz said:
The over-simplified answer is optics.
You're probably right.  Canadians have this peacekeeper mythology, and they tend not to picture sailors or air.. force-persons standing in dusty, dirty, impoverished, garbage-strewn dumps wearing light blue berets.  They think army.  It's not personal; it's just optics.

kratz said:
"The army is cheaper and more versatile" to sell to the public ....
I suspect that you'll be hard pressed to find 1 Canadian in 20 who is really tracking defence spending -- whether media-driven or actually informed, so I doubt that's remotely a factor in the size of the three services.

If you want a more useful metric, maybe look at the size of the operational army, navy, air force, and contrast those  with the amount of HQ and 'other' elements (Base support, staff colleges, ceremonial/show dog&pony); that may give you a more valued argument than simplistic army vs navy vs air force.
 
Related thought:

How many of us are aware of the cost of policing Canada?  Providing fire response?  Ambulances and Emergency Rooms?  CSIS? CSE?  Private security?  Coast Guard?

The CAF falls within that group of services.
 
Underway said:
You'll probably find on further research that the element balance is different.  The CAF is very army heavy.  The Aussies have a much larger Navy (pers wise) than we do.  They also operate more aircraft.  Also you'll find that the Aussies are the highest paid military in the world.  Canada is second (though I can't find the ref where I read that).  Cost differences are found there.

I would still assert that they maintain a more robust capability set with significantly fewer people which merits some thought for our own posture.  That said, let's do a quick comparison of the full time component: 

Canadian Army:22,800
RCN:8,500
RCAF:14,500
Other Commands: 22,200
Total: 68,000

Australian Army: 28,568
RAN:14,215
RAAF:14,120
Total: 56,903

The Army is by far the largest element in both forces (proportionately larger in the Australian Army), but as you say the Australians have clearly emphasized their Navy relative to what Canada has done. That said, the comparison is a bit skewed due to the organic aviation capabilities found within the RAN and Australian Army, and the fact that there is no easy way break out the purple component of the CAF by the environments they support.

To compare the structures of the Armies as an example, there are a lot of similarities:

Canadian Army: 3 Maneuver Brigade HQs, 9 Inf Battalions (6 mech, 3 light), 1 Armored Regiment, 2 Armored Recce Regiments, 3 Arty Regiments, 3 Combat Engineer Regiments, 1 Engineer Support Regiment, and 1 Air Defence Regiment (with no AD equipment).

Australian Army: 3 Maneuver Brigade HQs, 6 Inf Bn (all light), 3 Armoured Cavalry Regiments (each consisting of 1 tank squadron, 1 recce squadron, and an APC squadron providing appx 1 Battalion of lift), 3 Arty Regiments, 3 Combat Engineer Regiments, 1 Engineer Support Regiment, 1 Air Defence Regiment (with equipment), and 1 Aviation Brigade (with dedicated recce, utility, heavy lift and attack platforms).

In this way, they are quite similar to us with the exception of the fact that they maintain 6 infantry battalions compared to our 9. However, with fewer units and perhaps fewer personnel in those units, they generate an equivalent or better capability. 

Through the Army Managed Readiness Plan, the Canadian Army force generates a Brigade Headquarters and a single mechanized infantry battle group for sustained expeditionary operations and a much lighter infantry battalion with enablers for a single rotation, risk managed deployment. 
http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/assets/ARMY_Internet/docs/en/waypoint-2018.pdf

Through plan Bersheeba, the Aussies rotate each of their three brigades through their high readiness cycle (superficially similar to us), and in each cycle they generate a high readiness capability of a brigade consisting of the equivalent capability of one mechanized battle group, one light infantry battalion, and a surprisingly robust reserve battle group. 
http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Projects/Plan-BEERSHEBA
http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Speeches-and-transcripts/Defence-Reserves-Association-Annual-Conference

Further, they have done that while maintaining anti-armor, infantry mortar, air defence, and attack helicopter capabilities within their Army.  Most significantly, their Air Force and Navy have all the capabilities we do, and lots we don't with amphibious lift and airborne EW being two examples that come to mind. 

Now the Aussies  obviously have a bigger budget than we do, but in terms of how they allocate funds, they are clearly prioritizing capabilities (which implies personnel and equipment in the right combination) over pure personnel strength. The inevitable conclusion here is that we could maintain a broader capability set with the same funding envelope and fewer full time personnel.  As I have said, I would love to see some growth in the defence budget, but if we made some hard choices on personnel and procurement (and I appreciate that there is a huge political consideration with that), we could do a lot more with the resources we have.

 
FSTO said:
This might get me banned here, but why is the army so large in relation to the Navy and Air Force? We depend more on sea lanes and air lanes for trade and communications, and a larger standing army vice a well equipped Navy and Air Force doesn't seem to be the proper way to spend limited funds.

This was the US defence policy up until the 1890s, where there was an extremely small regular force used primarily for constabulary duties in the west and a large coastal defence cadre to deter invasion. The USN, in those days, was seen as an offensive arm that, in defence, was only expected to sortie out and engage an invading force from Europe.

For Canada, the threat of invasion is miniscule with virtually no existential threats to us (and I dont believe for a second that ISIS/terrorism is existential). Canada could, in theory, invest in anti-shipping missiles such as China does to 'secure the coast' at a low cost and invest in a few more capable ships to do naval tasks that require more of a presence (fisheries, anti-piracy, etc).

The only real external threat, aside from terrorism, to Canada is from ballistic missiles so we could invest in counter-BM capabilities to secure key cities with the air force focusing on DCA/the odd bear bomber through NORAD and expeditionary ops.

The army, then, has two real roles- expeditionary and domestic. For expeditionary, we are  basically now set up to support a coalition operation with a brigade group or battle group. We also have a reserve that is unable to do anything outside of one-for-one augmentation of the regular force due to the legal limitations. We would be better to rationalize the reserve system and perhaps go to a system more like what the US has... some key capabilities kept in the reserve that can be called up COMPLETE if the Div/brigade go to war. The capabilities moved to armour could be logistical (such as in the US with transport) or even combat arms units that are less likely to deploy (armour, artillery have been suggested before). For domestic, there needs to be a standing unit(s) tasked with "homeland" tasks as a primary duty, preferably at the reserve level. Finally, I would see us closing austere bases such as Shilo and Petawawa (close as in close the garrison and keep the training area) and moving garrisons to larger centres such as Edmonton, Quebec City, and Borden (Toronto). Second line support requirements would be smaller, and most base side services could be contracted, reducing logistical manning requirements. This would also make the provision of mental health, food, and other services cheaper due to proximity and minimize money used for postings. Just some thoughts.
 
One needs to be a bit cautious when comparing; we've centralized certain functions and thus account for them differently.  For example, the ~7000 untrained in the Reg F are part of the "Other Commands" count; that group also includes a number of support units and formations (medical, for example), training institutions, and others which are buried in the Aus Army, Navy & Air Force.

How you count and what you count are important questions to consider when making comparisons.
 
dapaterson said:
One needs to be a bit cautious when comparing; we've centralized certain functions and thus account for them differently.  For example, the ~7000 untrained in the Reg F are part of the "Other Commands" count; that group also includes a number of support units and formations (medical, for example), training institutions, and others which are buried in the Aus Army, Navy & Air Force.

How you count and what you count are important questions to consider when making comparisons.

Absolutely.  I am less concerned about the ratios than the capabilities they deliver relative to their total personnel resources which is why I dived fairly deep into a comparison of the Army managed readiness plans in both forces.  That said, the large number untrained RegF personnel is significant and expensive. When I worked in recruiting, it was reported as closer to 10k, and the consensus was that number could be cut in half by hiring based on the start date of occupational training and including a window to complete basic instead of the hiring against basic training serials and hoping for the best like we do now for most occupations. 
 
RCPalmer said:
Absolutely.  I am less concerned about the ratios than the capabilities they deliver relative to their total personnel resources which is why I dived fairly deep into a comparison of the Army managed readiness plans in both armies.  That said, the large number untrained RegF personnel is significant and expensive. When I worked in recruiting, it was reported as closer to 10k, and the consensus was that number could be cut in half by hiring based on the start date of occupational training and including a window to complete basic instead of the hiring against basic training serials and hoping for the best like we do now for most occupations.

sounds like this would get a lot of people out of PAT platoons more quickly, heck at one point the PAT platoon in Borden was more like PAT Battalion
 
RCPalmer said:
Absolutely.  I am less concerned about the ratios than the capabilities they deliver relative to their total personnel resources which is why I dived fairly deep into a comparison of the Army managed readiness plans in both armies.  That said, the large number untrained RegF personnel is significant and expensive. When I worked in recruiting, it was reported as closer to 10k, and the consensus was that number could be cut in half by hiring based on the start date of occupational training and including a window to complete basic instead of the hiring against basic training serials and hoping for the best like we do now for most occupations.

I suspect that was in the years when the Reg F was growing to 68K.  In a period of growth, BTL requirement grows until a more or less steady state is achieved.  The number of untrained positions required for the steady state can be estimated based on the attrition rate, and time to train to OFP.

Since we average 7% attrition, and our target strength is 68000, we therefore need to recruit 68000 x 7% or 4760 Reg F members every year.  While it varies between trades, a rule of thumb is that it takes 1 year to get an NCM to OFP (the more technical trades take longer), and about 3.5 years to get an officer to OFP (ROTP students skew that number higher, due to 4 years in university plus whatever occupational training is not completed during summers).

If we assume a 75% / 25% NCM / Officer split, then the requirement is 4760 x 75% x 1 = 3570 NCM BTL positions, and 4760 x 25% x 3.5 = 4165 Officer BTL positions, for a steady-state total of 7735 for the BTL (and, for the pedants out there, the SUTL as well).
 
dapaterson said:
I suspect that was in the years when the Reg F was growing to 68K.  In a period of growth, BTL requirement grows until a more or less steady state is achieved.  The number of untrained positions required for the steady state can be estimated based on the attrition rate, and time to train to OFP.

Since we average 7% attrition, and our target strength is 68000, we therefore need to recruit 68000 x 7% or 4760 Reg F members every year.  While it varies between trades, a rule of thumb is that it takes 1 year to get an NCM to OFP (the more technical trades take longer), and about 3.5 years to get an officer to OFP (ROTP students skew that number higher, due to 4 years in university plus whatever occupational training is not completed during summers).

If we assume a 75% / 25% NCM / Officer split, then the requirement is 4760 x 75% x 1 = 3570 NCM BTL positions, and 4760 x 25% x 3.5 = 4165 Officer BTL positions, for a steady-state total of 7735 for the BTL (and, for the pedants out there, the SUTL as well).

Those ratios are very interesting (particularly the officer ones) but I would assert that the rough calculations still hide a lot of waste.  There are a lot of NCM MOSIDs where members can be taken to OFP in 6 months if they complete their courses back to back. Also, that officer BTL bill is huge, and ties into some of the earlier discussions about officer to NCM ratios and TOS. Of course, the BTL is far from the only place where personnel bloat exists.
 
The challenge is that there are other NCM MOSIDS that take years to qualify to the OFP.  One year is an average across them all.  Better alignment of training is fine in theory and is actively pursued, but in practice Bloggins breaks a leg in week one of her DP1 while doing Tae Kwan Do, and is stalled until the next serial begins after she's healed.
 
dapaterson said:
The challenge is that there are other NCM MOSIDS that take years to qualify to the OFP.  One year is an average across them all.  Better alignment of training is fine in theory and is actively pursued, but in practice Bloggins breaks a leg in week one of her DP1 while doing Tae Kwan Do, and is stalled until the next serial begins after she's healed.

Fair enough, but we have to look somewhere.  How else can we account for the fact that the Aussies are maintaining an equivalent (arguably significantly more capable) Army, crew more ships, and fly more planes than us with 10,000 fewer people in uniform?
 
No disagreement there.  I am hopeful that the pending Defence Review may identify ways to economize and optimize.
 
RCPalmer said:
Fair enough, but we have to look somewhere.  How else can we account for the fact that the Aussies are maintaining an equivalent (arguably significantly more capable) Army, crew more ships, and fly more planes than us with 10,000 fewer people in uniform?

maybe the fact they don't have meaningless HQs? They have two division HQ, we have five for about the same amount of forces. Comparing structure below

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9e/Australia_Land_Forces_2016.png/1920px-Australia_Land_Forces_2016.png

vs the Canadian Army

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2a/Canada_Land_Forces.png/1920px-Canada_Land_Forces.png

I see ALOT more HQ on the Canadian side of things

 
Defence Policy Review is supposed to look at CAF and cyber--Dick Fadden weighs in on the military (the post also has lots on what some allies' militaries are doing and what the Canadian gov't as a whole mostly is not):

Offensive Cyber Capability for Canadian Forces? Is the New Government Cyber Serious?
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2016/06/23/mark-collins-offensive-cyber-capability-for-canadian-forces-is-the-new-government-cyber-serious/

Mark
Ottawa
 
The conclusion of a submission to the Defence Policy Review by Prof. Steve Saideman:
http://www.cgai.ca/fellows#Stephen%20Saidman

...
I do think that the best decision would be for Canada to spend more on its military, but I recognize that this is probably a non-starter. Whatever increases will probably not catch up to inflation. I also recognize that Canada will continue to spend more and get less due to the insistence on buying Canadian built equipment even when better/less expensive kit is available. Given these trends, the CAF is in for hard times ahead (although calling a new decade of darkness is a bit much)–expected to keep up the pace of operations while avoiding hard decisions about priorities. Perhaps the Defence Review will lead to some difficult decisions actually being confronted.
http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/docs/montreal/saideman-montreal-submission.pdf

One suspects that final sentence may be a tad optimistic. Still…All the submissions here:
http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/perspectives.asp

Mark
Ottawa
 
Romeo Dallaire suggested that the army work with the Romeo Dallaire foundation.... shocking.

Good suggestions by some, even if some of the names on the list are a touch partisan. I hope that, one way or the other, we get a white paper and some direction. Most times it feels like the different tribes in the army are all moving in separate directions with more concern on making sure their empires remain in tact than on advancing the overall cause.
 
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