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True enough....but part of the reason that Boeing was in the game was to build their jets cheaper....which seems to be something that hasn't happened with the F-35.
NS
NS
- Reaction score
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F-35 production a troubling example of Pentagon spending
By Walter Pincus, Published: December 26
There are 56 F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters being assembled at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Fort Worth. But because only 20 percent of the testing for the most advanced fighter-bomber in U.S. history is completed, each will probably have to get million-dollar-or-more fixes later.
The F-35 is already the most costly U.S. weapons program underway at about $385 billion. But that figure may go higher with overrun of the per-plane contract price for the 56 craft being assembled — along with the future multimillion-dollar fixes likely to be required for them — and the 15 F-35s completed but not yet delivered to the military services.
The plane is being built with the most sophisticated stealth technology, but initial flight tests have turned up hot spots and cracks associated with metal and composites used on most new aircraft. The development of the software controlling the F-35’s major warfighting functions, the most complex ever planned for an airplane, has been delayed so that the last block will not be introduced to the aircraft until at least June 2015.
Earlier this month, Vice Adm. David J. Venlet, executive officer for the F-35 program, said in an interview with the online service AOL that he recommended slowing down current production lines to reduce the replacement costs that will be necessary in aircraft produced before testing is completed.
Production had already been slowed twice. Then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates pushed back the building of 122 aircraft in February 2010 as problems became apparent, and again in January as he lowered near-term production for another 124 planes, boosting future production needs.
Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) took the Senate floor on Dec. 15 and described the F-35 fighter program as “a mess.”
What upset the senator was not just that the cost of each plane had risen nearly 100 percent from its original estimate of $69 million to $133 million today, or the fact that testing was only 20 percent complete while more than 90 planes had already been bought, or the fact that software — key to 80 percent of the stealth plane’s warfighting capability — wouldn’t be ready for another four years.
It was, he said, that the Pentagon had “sold this program as a fifth-generation strike fighter that would — more so than any other major defense procurement program — be cost-effectively developed, procured, operated and supported.”
McCain faulted the Pentagon for using what he called “a concurrent development strategy to procure a high-risk weapon system.” Production of the first airplanes began as testing was in its infancy.
McCain said the Pentagon was attempting “generational leaps in capability” but at the same time moving before the underlying design was stable. Developing needed technologies and being able to integrate them remain risky and manufacturing processes are still “immature,” he said.
A Government Accountability Office report from April said the forecast was for “about 10,000 more [engineering design] changes through January 2016.” The GAO added, “We expect this number to go up given new forecasts for additional testing and extension of system development until 2018.”
Making this initially a cost-plus contract was “a recipe for disaster,” according to McCain, who noted that development costs alone have topped $56 billion.
At a time when government discretionary budgets — including defense — face sharp reductions over the coming decade, the F-35 story is a troubling example of Pentagon spending.
By January, when the new Defense Department budget will go up to Capitol Hill, it is expected that the current cost estimate per F-35 will again increase, while production will be slowed to limit future fixes.
At the beginning of the program, there were to be 3,000 F-35s built, since it would replace the fighter-bombers in each of the three services and also be sold to foreign allies.
For the Air Force, the conventional takeoff and landing F-35A would replace the F-16 and the A-10 and add to the stealth F-22A. The Navy’s version, the F-35C, was to be carrier-suitable and complement the F-18E/F Super Hornet. The Marines wanted the F-35B, a short takeoff and vertical landing version, to replace the F/A-18C/D and AV-8B Harrier aircraft.
In March 2004, when development problems caused the Defense Department to extend time and increase projected costs, the Navy and Marine Corps cut their number of the planes by 400, reducing the total U.S. purchase to 2,457.
The Simpson-Bowles deficit-reduction commission in December called for eliminating the Marine Corps vertical-lift version, which has had serious development issues, and canceling 600 planes planned for the Air Force and Navy, using instead new F-18s or F-16s. The panel’s reasoning: The Pentagon “does not need an entire fleet with the stealthy capabilities” provided by the F-35.
In his new book, “The Wounded Giant,” Brookings Institution senior fellow Michael O’Hanlon calls for cutting the overall purchase to 1,250, canceling the more costly Navy version, reducing the Marine Corps F-35Bs by 10 percent or more, and limiting the Air Force to 800 F-35As. The difference would be made up by buying more F-16s and recognizing the role of unmanned aircraft.
There is a cautionary tale to be found in what happened to the F-22. When concept development of that stealth fighter began in 1986, the Soviet Union was the enemy and the Air Force needed 750 of the planes for the air-to-air superiority mission. By 1991, when the first development contract was signed, the Soviet Union had collapsed . By 2006, the Air Force cut its needs to 381 F-22s and added air-to-ground attack and intelligence-gathering capabilities.
In 2009, faced with several crashes and other problems, plus the oncoming F-35, Gates limited the purchase to 187 F-22s. Reasons given for ending the F-22 program were cost overruns and budget restraints.
Ironically, the last F-22 came off the Lockheed assembly line just two weeks ago and is to be delivered to the Air Force next year. Considered a more capable air-to-air combat fighter than the F-35, F-22s have been sent to the Pacific, where their intelligence-gathering is considered useful. Air Force testimony on Capitol Hill in May put the cost of the last F-22s at $153.2 million per aircraft and noted that upgrades were still being made to the plane’s software.
Changes in the 20 years between 1986 and 2006 caused a reduction of almost half the original F-22s sought. We should expect no less to happen between now and 2021. Prepare for that by limiting the F-35 purchases and looking into new technologies to plan what the future mix of manned and unmanned aircraft could be to meet the threats of 2031.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/f-35-a-troubling-example-of-pentagon-spending/2011/12/23/gIQAGINIJP_story.html?tid=pm_pop
Seems fairly straightforward but not so much when Fantino or Mackay do the talking.
MacKay and Fantino’s F-35 Communications Disconnect: Fantino Says There is A Plan B For the F-35 Purchase But He Doesn’t Reveal It. Meanwhile, MacKay Contradicts Fantino
Links to, or articles by this person are not allowed at Milnet Link to reporter removed by Staff
By Walter Pincus, Published: December 26
There are 56 F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters being assembled at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Fort Worth. But because only 20 percent of the testing for the most advanced fighter-bomber in U.S. history is completed, each will probably have to get million-dollar-or-more fixes later.
The F-35 is already the most costly U.S. weapons program underway at about $385 billion. But that figure may go higher with overrun of the per-plane contract price for the 56 craft being assembled — along with the future multimillion-dollar fixes likely to be required for them — and the 15 F-35s completed but not yet delivered to the military services.
The plane is being built with the most sophisticated stealth technology, but initial flight tests have turned up hot spots and cracks associated with metal and composites used on most new aircraft. The development of the software controlling the F-35’s major warfighting functions, the most complex ever planned for an airplane, has been delayed so that the last block will not be introduced to the aircraft until at least June 2015.
Earlier this month, Vice Adm. David J. Venlet, executive officer for the F-35 program, said in an interview with the online service AOL that he recommended slowing down current production lines to reduce the replacement costs that will be necessary in aircraft produced before testing is completed.
Production had already been slowed twice. Then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates pushed back the building of 122 aircraft in February 2010 as problems became apparent, and again in January as he lowered near-term production for another 124 planes, boosting future production needs.
Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) took the Senate floor on Dec. 15 and described the F-35 fighter program as “a mess.”
What upset the senator was not just that the cost of each plane had risen nearly 100 percent from its original estimate of $69 million to $133 million today, or the fact that testing was only 20 percent complete while more than 90 planes had already been bought, or the fact that software — key to 80 percent of the stealth plane’s warfighting capability — wouldn’t be ready for another four years.
It was, he said, that the Pentagon had “sold this program as a fifth-generation strike fighter that would — more so than any other major defense procurement program — be cost-effectively developed, procured, operated and supported.”
McCain faulted the Pentagon for using what he called “a concurrent development strategy to procure a high-risk weapon system.” Production of the first airplanes began as testing was in its infancy.
McCain said the Pentagon was attempting “generational leaps in capability” but at the same time moving before the underlying design was stable. Developing needed technologies and being able to integrate them remain risky and manufacturing processes are still “immature,” he said.
A Government Accountability Office report from April said the forecast was for “about 10,000 more [engineering design] changes through January 2016.” The GAO added, “We expect this number to go up given new forecasts for additional testing and extension of system development until 2018.”
Making this initially a cost-plus contract was “a recipe for disaster,” according to McCain, who noted that development costs alone have topped $56 billion.
At a time when government discretionary budgets — including defense — face sharp reductions over the coming decade, the F-35 story is a troubling example of Pentagon spending.
By January, when the new Defense Department budget will go up to Capitol Hill, it is expected that the current cost estimate per F-35 will again increase, while production will be slowed to limit future fixes.
At the beginning of the program, there were to be 3,000 F-35s built, since it would replace the fighter-bombers in each of the three services and also be sold to foreign allies.
For the Air Force, the conventional takeoff and landing F-35A would replace the F-16 and the A-10 and add to the stealth F-22A. The Navy’s version, the F-35C, was to be carrier-suitable and complement the F-18E/F Super Hornet. The Marines wanted the F-35B, a short takeoff and vertical landing version, to replace the F/A-18C/D and AV-8B Harrier aircraft.
In March 2004, when development problems caused the Defense Department to extend time and increase projected costs, the Navy and Marine Corps cut their number of the planes by 400, reducing the total U.S. purchase to 2,457.
The Simpson-Bowles deficit-reduction commission in December called for eliminating the Marine Corps vertical-lift version, which has had serious development issues, and canceling 600 planes planned for the Air Force and Navy, using instead new F-18s or F-16s. The panel’s reasoning: The Pentagon “does not need an entire fleet with the stealthy capabilities” provided by the F-35.
In his new book, “The Wounded Giant,” Brookings Institution senior fellow Michael O’Hanlon calls for cutting the overall purchase to 1,250, canceling the more costly Navy version, reducing the Marine Corps F-35Bs by 10 percent or more, and limiting the Air Force to 800 F-35As. The difference would be made up by buying more F-16s and recognizing the role of unmanned aircraft.
There is a cautionary tale to be found in what happened to the F-22. When concept development of that stealth fighter began in 1986, the Soviet Union was the enemy and the Air Force needed 750 of the planes for the air-to-air superiority mission. By 1991, when the first development contract was signed, the Soviet Union had collapsed . By 2006, the Air Force cut its needs to 381 F-22s and added air-to-ground attack and intelligence-gathering capabilities.
In 2009, faced with several crashes and other problems, plus the oncoming F-35, Gates limited the purchase to 187 F-22s. Reasons given for ending the F-22 program were cost overruns and budget restraints.
Ironically, the last F-22 came off the Lockheed assembly line just two weeks ago and is to be delivered to the Air Force next year. Considered a more capable air-to-air combat fighter than the F-35, F-22s have been sent to the Pacific, where their intelligence-gathering is considered useful. Air Force testimony on Capitol Hill in May put the cost of the last F-22s at $153.2 million per aircraft and noted that upgrades were still being made to the plane’s software.
Changes in the 20 years between 1986 and 2006 caused a reduction of almost half the original F-22s sought. We should expect no less to happen between now and 2021. Prepare for that by limiting the F-35 purchases and looking into new technologies to plan what the future mix of manned and unmanned aircraft could be to meet the threats of 2031.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/f-35-a-troubling-example-of-pentagon-spending/2011/12/23/gIQAGINIJP_story.html?tid=pm_pop
Seems fairly straightforward but not so much when Fantino or Mackay do the talking.
MacKay and Fantino’s F-35 Communications Disconnect: Fantino Says There is A Plan B For the F-35 Purchase But He Doesn’t Reveal It. Meanwhile, MacKay Contradicts Fantino
Links to, or articles by this person are not allowed at Milnet Link to reporter removed by Staff
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 160
So we'll end up with Super Hornets as a stop gap against any possible delay in F-35 acquisition...sure beats buying Typhoons at $150M a copy which will be retired in 2030 anyways.
After all, the two platforms - JSF's and Supers - are said to complement each other.
There isn't any other plane out there that meets the requirements set out in the SOR, and once production numbers of the aircraft are increased we'll see a lower cost platform that has significantly better air to ground capabilities than the Raptor and with sensor fusion capabilities which will allow for sharing of battlefield data with our allies on an even higher level than they currently do.
When you combine that with Super Hornets variants (-F, -G), Canada will finally have a multi purpose fleet which will bring fast air back to the prominent level a country like Canada needs.
And along the way we get new FWSAR, TAC Hel, et cetera...after all, one can't rely on 50 year old platforms forever....
After all, the two platforms - JSF's and Supers - are said to complement each other.
There isn't any other plane out there that meets the requirements set out in the SOR, and once production numbers of the aircraft are increased we'll see a lower cost platform that has significantly better air to ground capabilities than the Raptor and with sensor fusion capabilities which will allow for sharing of battlefield data with our allies on an even higher level than they currently do.
When you combine that with Super Hornets variants (-F, -G), Canada will finally have a multi purpose fleet which will bring fast air back to the prominent level a country like Canada needs.
And along the way we get new FWSAR, TAC Hel, et cetera...after all, one can't rely on 50 year old platforms forever....
- Reaction score
- 3
- Points
- 430
Just stumbled upon this video and decided to share. 
F-35B initial sea trial
http://www.yuma.usmc.mil/videos/videos.html
F-35B initial sea trial
http://www.yuma.usmc.mil/videos/videos.html
- Reaction score
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Baden Guy said:Just stumbled upon this video and decided to share.
F-35B initial sea trial
http://www.yuma.usmc.mil/videos/videos.html
Nice and smooth landing. On a side note, I love the mess menus at Yuma (right side of window at link)! Everything sounded tasty.
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 60
Not sure if this should be posted in a different thread but this is a very interesting article on F-35 vs X-47B (UCAV). I am not going to farm for quotes either way but to have Super Hornets and X-47Bs when they come fully online sounds like the ideal to me. Have a read...
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/planes-uavs/are-pilots-or-robots-the-future-of-naval-aviation
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/planes-uavs/are-pilots-or-robots-the-future-of-naval-aviation
- Reaction score
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http://www.defense.gov//contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=4693
Comes to:
CTOL = $24,792,873 each
STOVL = $129,033,030 each
CV = $27,785,074 each
http://www.defenseworld.net/go/defensenews.jsp?id=6433&h=Pratt%20&%20Whitney%20Awarded%20$1.12Bn%20Contract%20for%20F135%20Engine%20from%20US%20DoD
A
aesop081
Guest
Italian troubles...........
http://theaviationist.com/2012/01/06/defense-cuts/
http://theaviationist.com/2012/01/06/defense-cuts/
- Reaction score
- 35
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What everyone who is thinking of pulling out of the F-35 program has to answer is what aircraft can be purchased to fill the capability gap that will be left?
the F-35 STOL trials were interesting, considering the small size of the USS Wasp compared to conventional aircraft carriers. Various navies have small "Harrier carriers" or helicopter carriers in service, this version of the F-35 would provide even small navies with a big seaborne punch, if they were willing to invest the resources for a new capability.
the F-35 STOL trials were interesting, considering the small size of the USS Wasp compared to conventional aircraft carriers. Various navies have small "Harrier carriers" or helicopter carriers in service, this version of the F-35 would provide even small navies with a big seaborne punch, if they were willing to invest the resources for a new capability.
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 160
Next Generation Fighter Capability
Project Management Office
(NGFC PMO)
Enjoy some reading, and have a gander at Page 9!
Project Management Office
(NGFC PMO)
Enjoy some reading, and have a gander at Page 9!
Colin Parkinson
Army.ca Myth
- Reaction score
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Thucydides said:
While this seems to be the most problematic of the versions, the aircraft it would replace has always been a bit dicey as well. As a niche role this might be where the F-35 shines and be worth the costs.
I am having serious doubts about it's more conventional role. As I see it the main selling point is the sensor system and weapon control system. The aircraft itself without the above is not that much of a leap ahead other than a lesser radar profile.
I guess one of the questions to be asked is what is the cost difference between a Super Hornet and F35 both equipped with the same level of sensors and weapon systems? Or what does the airframe of the F35 bring to the table that another aircraft can't for cheaper?
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We don't know how much those sensor/weapons systems cost. To retrofit a Super Hornet it might cost more than the F35 outright. Radar profile and sensor/weapons systems seem to be where upgrades are being had.
Colin Parkinson
Army.ca Myth
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It would not surprise me if Boeing was already looking at producing a model of Super Hornet with the same level of sensor arrays and fire control as the F35, it would be a smart business move I suspect. As I understand it even the first F-35's won't have the full package for at least 5 years after delivery.
A
aesop081
Guest
Colin P said:
Super Hornet international roadmap.........
Colin Parkinson
Army.ca Myth
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Link and quote removed, as they refer to David ********.
A
aesop081
Guest
That is only part of the future development plan for the Super Hornet and is certainly a good place to start integrating more advanced sensors without the risks of retrofit to the existing SH design. With the international roadmap, the SH design is already in flux and open to customer requests. If we wanted DAS in a SH.............
- Reaction score
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A
aesop081
Guest
Ok, that i didn't see coming.....
(note the "partial mistake" in the first paragraph. I say "partial" because the USMC is indeed getting a small quantity (80) of the C-model)
http://rt.com/news/f-35-design-flaw-917/
(note the "partial mistake" in the first paragraph. I say "partial" because the USMC is indeed getting a small quantity (80) of the C-model)
http://rt.com/news/f-35-design-flaw-917/
