I'll believe it when I see it.
Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending
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lenaitch
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And no doubt cheaper property taxes.
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This article broadly agrees with you.
Who qualifies as a Canadian?
Casinos.
Money laundering.
Difficulties prosecuting.
Drugs seen as a health issue and not a national security issue....
Election interference.
Canada needs more than drones, helicopters to ease cross-border drug crime concerns, advisers to Trump say
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has pledged 25-per-cent tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico until they halt an ‘invasion’ of powerful narcotics and immigrants
www.theglobeandmail.com
lenaitch
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All of those activities are either enforcing federal law they are empowered to enforce (i.e. Criminal Code) or provincial statutes).
If the plan is to 'team up with' CBSA/RCMP members, then they are simply assisting peace officers; that is already happening, at least in Ontario and, I think Quebec, with IBET.
This assumes there will be patrolling CBSA/RCMP members to team up with. I'm sure the federal members will appreciate the help.
One of the articles I read stated they would be able to stop people within 2km of the border (or something) 'suspected' of crossing illegally. I wondered what the authority for that is. We don't live in a 'papers please' society. Perhaps federal members appointed for the Act have that authority, I don't know but, working alone, I doubt they would have the authority.
lenaitch
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I'm not sure trying resurrect a defunct federal police service and all the backoffice and bureaucracy that would go with it is the way to go. Better to stff/equip up the CBSA. Neither option has a next-week solution.
RangerRay
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Yep, exactly. This is what the Yanks want us to do. We’re too wrapped around the axle talking about border patrols and drones and helicopters. They’re important, but important for us, not the Yanks. They don’t care who or what comes into Canada.This article broadly agrees with you.
Who qualifies as a Canadian?
Casinos.
Money laundering.
Difficulties prosecuting.
Drugs seen as a health issue and not a national security issue....
Election interference.
Canada needs more than drones, helicopters to ease cross-border drug crime concerns, advisers to Trump say
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has pledged 25-per-cent tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico until they halt an ‘invasion’ of powerful narcotics and immigrants
I forgot to say we need to focus more on who we’re letting in, beefing up our capabilities at airports, where most of these criminals come into our country from.
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One thing that I didn't see included in the shopping list was the helicopters.
Assumption - the Alberta Border Zone, 298 km subtended by 51 uniforms, would require a flight of 3 LUH/UTTH type helicopters. Let's call them Gryphons just to make @KevinB happy.
If the same density were applied along the border then that could suggest a fleet 90 new Gryphons.... or a number equivalent to the number already in service with the RCAF.
RangerRay
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Another article from The Bureau about a CBSA whistleblower on where the Americans’ real concerns lie and how CBSA has dropped the ball or is complicit.
www.thebureau.news
Whistleblower Alleges Systemic CBSA Failures Behind U.S. Tariff Threats, Terror Concerns
Key to Luc Sabourin’s allegations is a Canadian record that reveals a catastrophic theft of over 300,000 travel documents.
www.thebureau.news
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Another article from The Bureau about a CBSA whistleblower on where the Americans’ real concerns lie and how CBSA has dropped the ball or is complicit.
Whistleblower Alleges Systemic CBSA Failures Behind U.S. Tariff Threats, Terror Concerns
Key to Luc Sabourin’s allegations is a Canadian record that reveals a catastrophic theft of over 300,000 travel documents.
I wish I could say I’m surprised.
Brought to you by the same senior bureaucratic mentally that approved Phoenix. Better to meet a timeline with ‘issues to resolve’ than check progress until the issues are properly addressed…
FJAG
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I fully understand the difference between the two and if it wasn't for the calcification of our procurement system I wouldn't even dream of doing what I suggested, but let me give you a multi-part example of how things can work if you go by the UOR first route.
In 2005 the artillery was faced with a major dilemma. It had been stripped of its M109s, left with two, by now, second rate 105mm guns and actually gone to war in Afghanistan with mortars transferred to it by the infantry. There were several projects at DLR for gun replacement on the books as well as nascent projects for counter mortar radars and UAVs by way of the ISTAR DLR 8 office. All were unfunded.
When Athena 1 ramped up for Kabul DLR quickly UORed Sperwer purchases and ARTHUR radar leases which were procured within weeks and given to the artillery to train on. They deployed operationally to Kabul. Subsequently more UORed UAVs and radars were brought into play until eventually "projects" for MMRs and BlackJack SUAVs were acquired for 4 RCA(GS). It took around a decade or more for those projects to deliver, but in the meantime, the UOR'd kit enabled the army to develop the organizational structure, and the doctrine and TTPs, to utilize the final kit. On top of that we learned the logistics needs that that type of equipment (which hadn't been in our system for many decades, needs.
The same situation occurred with the M777. While DLR2 had a project on the books for the replacement of the M109 medium calibre guns in 2005 it was unfunded and it was estimated there would be a 10-year capability gap until the precision, medium calibre system would eventually enter service. When Athena 2 was ramped up six M777s were acquired by UOR at the beginning of that guns initial production line by the good graces of the USMC. When six guns were inadequate to both deploy to Afghanistan and provide a training ca[ability in Canada, another 6 were UOR'd the following year. The M777 and its electronic gun management system were revolutionary for Canadian gunners and again, the period served as a vehicle for developing doctrine, TTPs and the maintenance and logistics structure to employ them in a counterinsurgency role. By the time the army agrred that there was enough value to equip at least a portion of the RegF with them under a proper "project" in 2009 almost all the building blocks were in place. I say almost because there were some critical project gaps for the vehicles needed to properly support a regiment (people kept thinking in battery level - and badly at that)
Currently we've been out of the air defence business for over a decade. There has been a GBAD project slowly weaving its way through the system but is far short from delivering even though funded. Luckily there is a need for air defence in Latvia and we have stood up UOR projects for both a SHORAD and C-UAV element. Once again we have the opportunity to learn how to train, operate, and maintain systems that will allow us to more rapidly deploy the final "project" when it is ready.
There is a tremendous benefit at the user and maintainer level to start "playing" with new and novel capabilities. I would suggest that if we were less anal about the hoops we have to jump through when acquiring off-the-shelf capabilities we could easily incorporate buy-and-try concepts. Currently we have a serious operational deployment going on. It needs new systems now. DLR has numerous unfunded projects under development and does have a pretty good understanding of what is out there and what is needed by the force. Pushing some of those out the door as UORs provides a tremendous leg up in delivering the final product even when it turns out to be a different item than what was used under UOR.
There is one thing that I've been noticing. All of our actual "projects" do not seem to be delivering what I would consider a quantity sufficient for the army as a whole. We seem to be limiting it to current operational needs and a modest stock for training and perhaps contingency ops. Canada does not seem to be reequipping the whole army. Again, I look at the artillery because that is what I'm most familiar with. Close support regiments have two batteries of four guns each. That is not due to a tactical evaluation. Its based on a zero PY transfer of gunners from the gun line to create bigger FSCCs, more FOO parties and a surveillance and target acquisition capability. As a result nine six-gun batteries (54 detachments) were reduced to six six-gun batteries. When the M777 was acquired it was again at a zero PY change which ignored the fact that an M777 had a ten man detachment vice a seven man one. That, and some other minor adjustments meant that a battery could only effectively operate two troops of two guns each which leaves the regular force artillery with a grand total of 24 gun detachments vice the 54 it had in 2004. We bought a few more M777s than we had RegF detachments (37) to provide spares, ones for the RCAS and ones to deploy operational, but the strategic theory is that we use reservists to augment detachments on operations (which is a good idea) but that realistically we plan on operationally deploying no more than two gun batteries of six each at a time (which is a bad assumption).
In short, our procurement strategy is extremely short sighted and based on serendipitous decisions too often based on branch-based PY infighting, funding constraints and allocation priorities rather than a master plan or vision.
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That would be egg on our face for certain.Another article from The Bureau about a CBSA whistleblower on where the Americans’ real concerns lie and how CBSA has dropped the ball or is complicit.
Whistleblower Alleges Systemic CBSA Failures Behind U.S. Tariff Threats, Terror Concerns
Key to Luc Sabourin’s allegations is a Canadian record that reveals a catastrophic theft of over 300,000 travel documents.
The timeframe of 2014-2015 of the thefts points to the fact that any of these passports would be expired or just about expired by now - so it begs the question if any of them have been renewed....that would be an even bigger issue.
McG
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These are not what success looks like. When you launch a UOR to deliver the same capability as an existing major project, the your project director, project management staff, and procurement team all stop working on the main effort to deliver the bandaid. And because project team salary is costed against the project, you consume massive amounts of money by doing work twice … that means the real capability is not only delayed, but it will likely be further reduced as the overall CAF equipment budget is is more heavily consumed by pay.
Not only can the UOR result in two completely different fleets when the main contract delivers, the UOR fleet may not even be suitable for use in Canada. We still have ongoing projects to upgrade kit urgently bought for the Afghan mission so that it is usable in Canadian winter. We have divested other Afghan equipment for lack of being able to use it in Canada despite enduring operational requirements.
Despite ministers publicly suggesting we might move quicker to get to 2% GDP, the department cannot spend beyond its budget. Most projects continue to deliver lesser quantities than are required because all projects are constrained by budget.
FJAG
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Actually I found the mil rates close to the same for comparable Blenheim and Chatham residences. The lake house had gas, electric and garbage pick-up, just no cable - we needed to use an IR internet and satellite TV - nor sewer - so holding tank. I had septic in Brandon too and found that the septic service in Ontario about four times what I paid in Manitoba.
Fabius
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When was the last time Canada, the Canadian Government, DND, the CAF or the CA sought to equip the entire Army vs its smaller deployed forces?
We have only been equipping our deployed forces since at least the 1970s, and generally only to the minimum needed to do their assigned mission no more.
Honestly despite the Army’s supposed preference for projects vs UORs, it would seem historically the CAF and DND clearly prefers UORs for specific missions as they come up for the Army. RCAF and RCN get slightly different approaches.
In terms of cost, that’s likely cheaper as long as we can avoid ground missions of necessity and continue to choose the time, place, scale and degree of involvement and risk with our ground deployments.
Given our glacial approach to procurement, the likely hood of a project delivering the right capabilities at the right scale at the right time is basically zero. Even delivering good enough is highly improbable although not impossible.
We have only been equipping our deployed forces since at least the 1970s, and generally only to the minimum needed to do their assigned mission no more.
Honestly despite the Army’s supposed preference for projects vs UORs, it would seem historically the CAF and DND clearly prefers UORs for specific missions as they come up for the Army. RCAF and RCN get slightly different approaches.
In terms of cost, that’s likely cheaper as long as we can avoid ground missions of necessity and continue to choose the time, place, scale and degree of involvement and risk with our ground deployments.
Given our glacial approach to procurement, the likely hood of a project delivering the right capabilities at the right scale at the right time is basically zero. Even delivering good enough is highly improbable although not impossible.
FJAG
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In fairness, the LAV III purchase was technically big enough to equip six battalions (albeit it relied on an older fleet for the logistics component) leaving three battalions - quite properly IMHO - as light battalions. At the time we still had enough old Leopards for a regiment of tanks, enough new Coyotes for at least two recce regiments, a couple of hundred fairly new Bisons and enough rebuilt M109s and new LG1s for three full regiments not to mention a fairly robust AD capability. All f the foregoing was done through regular planned procurement.
It would have remained viable if the money for sustainment had been there but the writing was on the wall during the decade of darkness and we started getting into operations that leveraged UORs and divested equipment considered a) unaffordable and/or b) no longer required.
One shouldn't forget as well that the structure and purpose of Mobile Command in the 70s and into the 1980s was a different beast. It really had only one proper mechanized brigade group at that time - 4 CMBG in Germany. The four organizations in Canada were originally title Combat Groups and the Airborne Regiment and were more lightly equipped for a more rapid deployment roles. We did have some mech equipment - a few M113 battalions - for AMF(L) and CAST - and even some tanks and M113s as training equipment to prepare people for rotations to 4 CMBG. In '76 one of those Combat Groups got even lighter as it combined with the Airborne as the Special Service Force. The other two CGs basically became lightly mechanized infantry brigades equipped with AVGPs. We more or less had the gear in the 1970s and into the 1980s for what we were supposed to do. Effectively, with a bit of M113 redistribution, we could have deploy two mech brigades and the SSF but would have only the razor thin depth of another lightly equipped AVGP brigade behind that. We even had a short-lived divisional structure.
While @McG and I might disagree as to whether there is some use to UORs as a stepping stone to a proper in-service project, I do agree with him that UORs are an imperfect panacea to deal with a gone bad procurement process. They should not, in a perfect world, replace a proper planned acquisition program for an in-service capability. IMHO, Afghanistan taught some bad lessons that have been institutionalized as a crutch for our force in Latvia.
I'll throw out one more final thought. There was a plan that started in 2006 but gained strength once the end date for combat in Afghanistan was announced in 2008 to re-equip the army post Afghanistan. Unfortunately it collapsed as a result of the 2008 financial crisis which took a major toll on the post 2011 budgets. Its unfortunate that one of the few survivors from the plan was the TAPV project which was an army-wide and not merely operationally focused. Another more recent one is the ACSV where, while the purchase is still low IMHO is more than what is merely needed for current ops. I have no insight as to what is going on but it wouldn't surprise me if more ACSVs are purchased in the future.
Fabius
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The regular planned procurement though for LAV 3, 6, ASCV etc. never extended to the entire Army though only the Reg component of it, which I will agree is more than the deployed forces plus a training component. The LAV family is interestingly one thing that is present in significant numbers.
It’s the smaller things that are no less important that are often minimal quantity, although still more than simply required for overseas deployments. Radios, STANO, ATGMs, software licenses (now a thing) etc.
I guess it’s the specific equipment needed above a baseline peace support operation type force that is trained for high intensity combat that I see as only present in deployed forces numbers. From the Afghan era that was ECM, EROC, CIED, etc. For Latvia that is Anti Tank weapons, CUAS, SHORAD, Battle Management Software and maybe SP artillery.
I agree that UORs are only an imperfect panacea that are a bad idea with lots of negatives but I also strongly suspect they are cheaper short term if only measured in pure dollars than properly maintaining a full service army for a number of contingencies for years, decades.
It’s the smaller things that are no less important that are often minimal quantity, although still more than simply required for overseas deployments. Radios, STANO, ATGMs, software licenses (now a thing) etc.
I guess it’s the specific equipment needed above a baseline peace support operation type force that is trained for high intensity combat that I see as only present in deployed forces numbers. From the Afghan era that was ECM, EROC, CIED, etc. For Latvia that is Anti Tank weapons, CUAS, SHORAD, Battle Management Software and maybe SP artillery.
I agree that UORs are only an imperfect panacea that are a bad idea with lots of negatives but I also strongly suspect they are cheaper short term if only measured in pure dollars than properly maintaining a full service army for a number of contingencies for years, decades.
FJAG
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We violently agree here. IMHO the current concept only works (marginally) if the concept for reserve utilization is as Class B "office overload" workers and as augmentees. the last two decades have reinforced those concepts within the CAF. What people do not face up to - using the excuse that there is no money for it - is that without "reserve" equipment you have neither depth nor breadth within your force structure.
We're not unlike the Brits in a lot of ways. Their equipment heavy reserve units are twinned with regular force ones so as to have access to major equipment for occasional training. In fact, they have far fewer combat arms and combat support reserve units than Canada albeit their units are manned to much higher levels. (There are only 5 arty regts, 3 recce regts, 13 inf bns, 3 engr bns and 4 signals/int regts. OTOH, there are a 10 logistics regts and 12 medical regts - that's 49 units (with an overall strength of 25,000 compared to our 130 weak-assed units with a total strength that around 20,000 on a good day) While the reserve units are, for the most part, equipment poor, they are at least organized in a way that permits a form of mobilization.
Is it any wonder that I support a form of amalgamation.
That's the price of readiness. You can create a military where a portion of the force is on part-time service and that's a definite cost saving - roughly 1/6th per annum after DP1 qualified. Equipment is also less expensive in reserve service because of its significantly lower usage rate on training. In short it lasts longer. A perfectly workable system is to buy major equipment for the RegF and after appx two thirds of its useful service life (long before it becomes clapped out) replace it and convert the partially used equipment to reserve service. That will extend the last third of its service life several fold. A properly designed logistics system can easily support that. Yes, it does cost more to replace the equipment for the RegF at a more frequent rate, but you quickly grow the force's ability to mobilize.
FSTO
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From the Business Council of Canada:
From my quick perusal there seems to be a lot of decent ideas, but a little light on how to pay for it.
www.thebusinesscouncil.ca
From my quick perusal there seems to be a lot of decent ideas, but a little light on how to pay for it.
Security & Prosperity | Business Council of Canada
A new strategy will safeguard Canadians, help Canada honour its international commitments, and increase workers’ economic security and prosperity As the Business Council of Canada (BCC) argued last year in its report, Economic Security is National Security, many of Canada’s […]
www.thebusinesscouncil.ca
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2%
2.5%
3%
....
5%
Trump has just upped the ante.
www.telegraph.co.uk
And he wants Europe to buy more Alberta Oil and Gas.....
After he has got his mark up and resold it through American ports.
2.5%
3%
....
5%
Trump has just upped the ante.
Trump to demand Nato nations spend 5pc of GDP on defence
Countries told to bolster their budgets as president-elect passes burden of Ukraine war to Europe
www.telegraph.co.uk
And he wants Europe to buy more Alberta Oil and Gas.....
After he has got his mark up and resold it through American ports.
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