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Read this and it may eliviate some of your fears (or entrench them)
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/westview/story/2517726p-2917067c.html
IN LATE DECEMBER, DEFENCE Minister Bill Graham accompanied Lt.-Gen. Rick Hillier to 24 Sussex Drive for a chat with Prime Minister Paul Martin.
Mr. Martin must have liked what he heard, because soon after he announced that Lt.-Gen. Hillier was to be the next Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). This appointment is significant.
It means that both Martin and Graham believe Hillier is capable of helping develop and implement a new defence policy, strategic plan and structure for the Canadian Forces. Most importantly, they believe that this new military plan will be consistent with the new central pillar of Canada's foreign policy -- the 'responsibility to protect'.
This principle holds that a nation is sovereign if, and only if, it takes responsibility for protecting the rights of all its citizens. If any state abdicates that responsibility, its sovereignty begins to erode. In extreme cases, if the human rights of citizens are utterly ignored, that country will be judged a 'failed state'.
The community of nations then must pick up the 'responsibility to protect'. This might mean simply coming to the aid of the ailing state, or pressuring it with trade sanctions. In the most desperate cases --- where there is civil strife, ethnic cleansing or confirmed genocide -- outside states will undertake armed intervention in order to protect the life, liberty and other basic human rights of the civilian population.
What Martin and Graham want to see is a military leadership that is capable of responding, in concert with like-minded nations, in a manner that is precisely tailored to the specific goals of any humanitarian intervention. Each operation will be different, because each failed state will come apart in its own particular way. Enter Rick Hillier.
By great good fortune, this foreign policy requires exactly the kind of army that Hillier has been trying to construct during his time as Chief of Land Staff (CLS) -- rapidly deployable, agile, capable of speedily gathering intelligence, quick to communicate and integrate that information, always aware of the key elements in the 'battlespace', tactically nimble, and able to fight in any environment.
That is the kind of army that Hillier was shaping. And now, it will be the kind of Canadian Forces he will want to be able to draw upon.
The question is: What will the new CDS need, in the way of personnel and equipment, to make this new Forces come about?
Personnel
Hillier never gives a speech without mentioning the ordinary men and women of the Canadian Forces. This is not just PR spin; it reflects a practical reality. Of all the highly specialized equipment that Canada puts in the field, the trained soldier/pilot/sailor is the most valuable and irreplaceable.
Hillier wants to go hard on recruiting, both for regular forces and for reservists. He knows that maintaining a high tempo of missions requiring rapid deployment will depend on having well-trained, well-prepared reservists at the ready. A substantial fraction of competent reservists included in each mission will allow regular-forces personnel to take some 'down time', as needed, between rotations.
The readiness of reservists, in turn, will require legislation, similar to that in the U.S., that gives job guarantees to all those in the Reserves who are called to duty, whether for training or deployment overseas.
Land Equipment
For any expeditionary force, land equipment must be mobile, transportable and fast-moving. That means no more tanks. Hillier was a tanker. He loves tanks. But he has come to realize that these heavy, tracked vehicles are no longer giving the CF 'value-for-money'.
On Oct. 29, 2003, Hillier and then-defence minister John McCallum announced the procurement of the Mobile Gun System (MGS), a variant of the wheeled Light Armoured Vehicle. The gnashing of teeth over this decision has not ceased to this day. But Hillier has made his choice. The Mobile Gun System is actually one of a trio of 'fire support' vehicles, which also includes two missile-launchers -- the LAV TUA and Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle. All three of these vehicles are based on the Army's LAV III infantry carrier.
The controversial MGS was originally developed for the special requirements of the U.S. Army's highly mobile Stryker Brigades. The LAV TUA and MMEV are both based on existing Canadian Forces weapons systems -- the M113 TUA and ADATS -- but placed on the new, wheeled chassis. These new systems will be faster than the older tracked versions. More importantly, they need no heavy transport trailers to deploy them. LAVs can be driven -- they don't need to be dragged.
The U.S. Defense Department has been very impressed with another Canadian LAV, the reconnaissance Coyote, and asked Canada to bring our Coyotes to Afghanistan. If we had joined the 'intervention' in Iraq, our Coyotes would have been asked along as well. The capabilities of the Coyote fit well with Hillier's emphasis on 'situational awareness' of the 'battlespace'.
Serving a complementary function is the artillery's surveillance and targeting drone, the Tactical UAV. Sensor information from the TUAV and the Coyote are meant to be integrated. This sensor data, along with rapid information processing and exchange, will allow for effective command, tactical manoeuvring, and a real reduction in the 'fog of war'.
The trials and tribulations of the Sperwer TUAVs in Afghanistan were well-documented in the press. Hillier plans to appoint a senior officer to take charge of the TUAV project.
Air Force assets
For sovereignty patrols, the Canadian Forces already has upgraded versions of the CF-18, an interceptor, and the CP-140 Aurora, specialized for maritime surveillance. But Hillier will also be looking for air force assets that can play an important role in overseas deployments. (He'll need new helicopters of varying sizes for various roles, but this topic is too big to explore in this column.) The CC-130 Hercules is a tactical airlifter best suited to moving CF personnel and equipment from one location to another within the region of conflict. Canada's Hercules fleet is in bad shape. Early models need to be replaced now -- ideally with 'J' models.
The CC-150 Polaris has a longer range than the Hercules, but it is only suitable for troops and light freight. Furthermore, it can only land where undamaged airports are available.
Any rapidly deployable expeditionary force needs a military-style, long-range strategic airlifter, with some degree of 'rough-field' performance. The U.S. Boeing C-17 is an excellent aircraft, but alas, the price tag puts it out of our range. Hillier has said that he intends to stop the practice of endlessly studying systems that DND cannot possibly afford.
In the past, the CF has leased strategic airlifters. For example, enormous Antonov 124s were leased for the recent DART deployment. This is one solution to the problem, but there are other airlift options available. In past View articles, we have recommended the purchase of a handful of new or refurbished Ilyushin IL-76s. Others have proposed long-term leases of Ilyushins.
If the CF is to participate in multinational operations intended to prevent genocide, re-establish the stability in volatile regions, or protect the citizens of 'failed states', strategic airlift is a conundrum that must be resolved.
Seagoing Vessels
For sovereignty patrol, four of the Navy's frigates are quite capable of securing the outer edges of Canada's 200 nautical miles. For monitoring waters closer in, smaller offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) are being considered. Again, Hillier will be looking for sea-based assets that can support an overseas deployment. The Navy has an idea for a Joint Support Ship (JSS) at a cost of more than $2 billion. This misguided JSS project attempts to combine the job of transporting the army overseas with myriad other roles, including carrying huge quantities of fuel.
The cumbersome JSS is unlikely to fit in with Hillier's timeline or budget. This oversized project will likely be broken down into separate, more affordable ventures. For example, smaller-hulled vessels can satisfy the Navy's requirement for at-sea replenishment ships.
On the other hand, delivering the Army and its heavy equipment (eg, large engineering vehicles for reconstruction projects) requires Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) transport vessels. The U.S. Army already has such ships in service -- the Theater Support Vessels. Each of these RO/RO catamarans is much faster than DND's planned JSS and will present a much smaller target in a combat zone.
Hillier's new, more coherent, more highly integrated strategic plan will require, as a first step, the reallocation of funds recommended by former defence minister McCallum. But even striking some of the high-priced 'fantasy' projects off the DND shopping-list might not free up enough cash for the force structure desired.
An effective expeditionary force, with highly trained, specialized personnel, along with the appropriate support from air and maritime commands, will likely require an increase in defence spending. The prime minister has already said that he would be open to an increase in the defence budget, once General Hillier is chief.
Perhaps Martin could be reassured that, for the first time in living memory, Canadian defence policy (and spending priorities) would reflect both the foreign policy of this country and the expectations of its citizens.
Dianne DeMille is editor and Stephen Priestley is researcheréeditor of the online Canadian American Strategic Review [http://www.sfu.ca/casr]
Plans for the future of the CF
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/westview/story/2517726p-2917067c.html
IN LATE DECEMBER, DEFENCE Minister Bill Graham accompanied Lt.-Gen. Rick Hillier to 24 Sussex Drive for a chat with Prime Minister Paul Martin.
Mr. Martin must have liked what he heard, because soon after he announced that Lt.-Gen. Hillier was to be the next Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). This appointment is significant.
It means that both Martin and Graham believe Hillier is capable of helping develop and implement a new defence policy, strategic plan and structure for the Canadian Forces. Most importantly, they believe that this new military plan will be consistent with the new central pillar of Canada's foreign policy -- the 'responsibility to protect'.
This principle holds that a nation is sovereign if, and only if, it takes responsibility for protecting the rights of all its citizens. If any state abdicates that responsibility, its sovereignty begins to erode. In extreme cases, if the human rights of citizens are utterly ignored, that country will be judged a 'failed state'.
The community of nations then must pick up the 'responsibility to protect'. This might mean simply coming to the aid of the ailing state, or pressuring it with trade sanctions. In the most desperate cases --- where there is civil strife, ethnic cleansing or confirmed genocide -- outside states will undertake armed intervention in order to protect the life, liberty and other basic human rights of the civilian population.
What Martin and Graham want to see is a military leadership that is capable of responding, in concert with like-minded nations, in a manner that is precisely tailored to the specific goals of any humanitarian intervention. Each operation will be different, because each failed state will come apart in its own particular way. Enter Rick Hillier.
By great good fortune, this foreign policy requires exactly the kind of army that Hillier has been trying to construct during his time as Chief of Land Staff (CLS) -- rapidly deployable, agile, capable of speedily gathering intelligence, quick to communicate and integrate that information, always aware of the key elements in the 'battlespace', tactically nimble, and able to fight in any environment.
That is the kind of army that Hillier was shaping. And now, it will be the kind of Canadian Forces he will want to be able to draw upon.
The question is: What will the new CDS need, in the way of personnel and equipment, to make this new Forces come about?
Personnel
Hillier never gives a speech without mentioning the ordinary men and women of the Canadian Forces. This is not just PR spin; it reflects a practical reality. Of all the highly specialized equipment that Canada puts in the field, the trained soldier/pilot/sailor is the most valuable and irreplaceable.
Hillier wants to go hard on recruiting, both for regular forces and for reservists. He knows that maintaining a high tempo of missions requiring rapid deployment will depend on having well-trained, well-prepared reservists at the ready. A substantial fraction of competent reservists included in each mission will allow regular-forces personnel to take some 'down time', as needed, between rotations.
The readiness of reservists, in turn, will require legislation, similar to that in the U.S., that gives job guarantees to all those in the Reserves who are called to duty, whether for training or deployment overseas.
Land Equipment
For any expeditionary force, land equipment must be mobile, transportable and fast-moving. That means no more tanks. Hillier was a tanker. He loves tanks. But he has come to realize that these heavy, tracked vehicles are no longer giving the CF 'value-for-money'.
On Oct. 29, 2003, Hillier and then-defence minister John McCallum announced the procurement of the Mobile Gun System (MGS), a variant of the wheeled Light Armoured Vehicle. The gnashing of teeth over this decision has not ceased to this day. But Hillier has made his choice. The Mobile Gun System is actually one of a trio of 'fire support' vehicles, which also includes two missile-launchers -- the LAV TUA and Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle. All three of these vehicles are based on the Army's LAV III infantry carrier.
The controversial MGS was originally developed for the special requirements of the U.S. Army's highly mobile Stryker Brigades. The LAV TUA and MMEV are both based on existing Canadian Forces weapons systems -- the M113 TUA and ADATS -- but placed on the new, wheeled chassis. These new systems will be faster than the older tracked versions. More importantly, they need no heavy transport trailers to deploy them. LAVs can be driven -- they don't need to be dragged.
The U.S. Defense Department has been very impressed with another Canadian LAV, the reconnaissance Coyote, and asked Canada to bring our Coyotes to Afghanistan. If we had joined the 'intervention' in Iraq, our Coyotes would have been asked along as well. The capabilities of the Coyote fit well with Hillier's emphasis on 'situational awareness' of the 'battlespace'.
Serving a complementary function is the artillery's surveillance and targeting drone, the Tactical UAV. Sensor information from the TUAV and the Coyote are meant to be integrated. This sensor data, along with rapid information processing and exchange, will allow for effective command, tactical manoeuvring, and a real reduction in the 'fog of war'.
The trials and tribulations of the Sperwer TUAVs in Afghanistan were well-documented in the press. Hillier plans to appoint a senior officer to take charge of the TUAV project.
Air Force assets
For sovereignty patrols, the Canadian Forces already has upgraded versions of the CF-18, an interceptor, and the CP-140 Aurora, specialized for maritime surveillance. But Hillier will also be looking for air force assets that can play an important role in overseas deployments. (He'll need new helicopters of varying sizes for various roles, but this topic is too big to explore in this column.) The CC-130 Hercules is a tactical airlifter best suited to moving CF personnel and equipment from one location to another within the region of conflict. Canada's Hercules fleet is in bad shape. Early models need to be replaced now -- ideally with 'J' models.
The CC-150 Polaris has a longer range than the Hercules, but it is only suitable for troops and light freight. Furthermore, it can only land where undamaged airports are available.
Any rapidly deployable expeditionary force needs a military-style, long-range strategic airlifter, with some degree of 'rough-field' performance. The U.S. Boeing C-17 is an excellent aircraft, but alas, the price tag puts it out of our range. Hillier has said that he intends to stop the practice of endlessly studying systems that DND cannot possibly afford.
In the past, the CF has leased strategic airlifters. For example, enormous Antonov 124s were leased for the recent DART deployment. This is one solution to the problem, but there are other airlift options available. In past View articles, we have recommended the purchase of a handful of new or refurbished Ilyushin IL-76s. Others have proposed long-term leases of Ilyushins.
If the CF is to participate in multinational operations intended to prevent genocide, re-establish the stability in volatile regions, or protect the citizens of 'failed states', strategic airlift is a conundrum that must be resolved.
Seagoing Vessels
For sovereignty patrol, four of the Navy's frigates are quite capable of securing the outer edges of Canada's 200 nautical miles. For monitoring waters closer in, smaller offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) are being considered. Again, Hillier will be looking for sea-based assets that can support an overseas deployment. The Navy has an idea for a Joint Support Ship (JSS) at a cost of more than $2 billion. This misguided JSS project attempts to combine the job of transporting the army overseas with myriad other roles, including carrying huge quantities of fuel.
The cumbersome JSS is unlikely to fit in with Hillier's timeline or budget. This oversized project will likely be broken down into separate, more affordable ventures. For example, smaller-hulled vessels can satisfy the Navy's requirement for at-sea replenishment ships.
On the other hand, delivering the Army and its heavy equipment (eg, large engineering vehicles for reconstruction projects) requires Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) transport vessels. The U.S. Army already has such ships in service -- the Theater Support Vessels. Each of these RO/RO catamarans is much faster than DND's planned JSS and will present a much smaller target in a combat zone.
Hillier's new, more coherent, more highly integrated strategic plan will require, as a first step, the reallocation of funds recommended by former defence minister McCallum. But even striking some of the high-priced 'fantasy' projects off the DND shopping-list might not free up enough cash for the force structure desired.
An effective expeditionary force, with highly trained, specialized personnel, along with the appropriate support from air and maritime commands, will likely require an increase in defence spending. The prime minister has already said that he would be open to an increase in the defence budget, once General Hillier is chief.
Perhaps Martin could be reassured that, for the first time in living memory, Canadian defence policy (and spending priorities) would reflect both the foreign policy of this country and the expectations of its citizens.
Dianne DeMille is editor and Stephen Priestley is researcheréeditor of the online Canadian American Strategic Review [http://www.sfu.ca/casr]
Plans for the future of the CF
). Keep in mind, the government could be changing again soon, for all we know, Hillier might only be in for a year or two..
