- Reaction score
- 5,963
- Points
- 1,260
I think we have to recognize a few factors:
• Aboriginal Canadians have a large number of legitimate grievances against the “mainstream” society. Some grievances are related to treaty rights, others to simple racism;
• The aboriginal Canadians are deeply divided amongst themselves. I detect two major groupings that I call the pickpockets and the separatists. The pickpockets want tograb harvest as much money – with the fewest strings attached – as they can while the legal sun shines,* while the separatists want to use the prevailing legal climate to establish a new (second, third or fourth) “order of government” that will give aboriginal communities substantial “sovereignty” – whatever that may mean;
• The aboriginals – of all stripes – have won the PR war. Most Canadians are persuaded that (most? all?) aboriginal grievances are well founded and that redress, on the aboriginals’ terms, is overdue;
• Most Canadians do not understand the potential dimensions of the “settlements” demanded by the many and varied aboriginal factions; and
• Canadian governments, national, provincial and local are terrified – because they are easily terrorized – of aboriginal uprisings.
With regard to this specific dispute:
• I think the Mohawks of Akwesasne are, essentially, separatists, and I recognize that my solution is a “win” for them; but
• I also think that collocating the Canadian border post with the US one (on the US side) is the worst of all possible solutions. It gives the Mohawks a “win” without cost. Putting a “tight” border post on the Canadian mainland – isolating Cornwall Island – puts a price on sovereignty. There’s an old engineering maxim that says “you can’t manage what you can’t measure.” (That’s why trade unions , for example, have performed such a useful service: they give us afair useful measure of the cost and value of labour.) Giving the Mohawks a taste of real “sovereignty” (Zap! You’re foreign!) with it’s “price” – international borders on both ends of the road - lets them “measure” the cost and value of sovereignty.
By the way, unlike some others, I was quite (totally) detached from the 1990 events. My directorate had (near) zero involvement (I don’t think anyone in NDHQ was totally, 100% uninvolved, but we were pretty darn close to that (zero) level) so my views on the issue may be skewed.
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* Recognizing that the legal decisions may not go their way forever.
• Aboriginal Canadians have a large number of legitimate grievances against the “mainstream” society. Some grievances are related to treaty rights, others to simple racism;
• The aboriginal Canadians are deeply divided amongst themselves. I detect two major groupings that I call the pickpockets and the separatists. The pickpockets want to
• The aboriginals – of all stripes – have won the PR war. Most Canadians are persuaded that (most? all?) aboriginal grievances are well founded and that redress, on the aboriginals’ terms, is overdue;
• Most Canadians do not understand the potential dimensions of the “settlements” demanded by the many and varied aboriginal factions; and
• Canadian governments, national, provincial and local are terrified – because they are easily terrorized – of aboriginal uprisings.
With regard to this specific dispute:
• I think the Mohawks of Akwesasne are, essentially, separatists, and I recognize that my solution is a “win” for them; but
• I also think that collocating the Canadian border post with the US one (on the US side) is the worst of all possible solutions. It gives the Mohawks a “win” without cost. Putting a “tight” border post on the Canadian mainland – isolating Cornwall Island – puts a price on sovereignty. There’s an old engineering maxim that says “you can’t manage what you can’t measure.” (That’s why trade unions , for example, have performed such a useful service: they give us a
By the way, unlike some others, I was quite (totally) detached from the 1990 events. My directorate had (near) zero involvement (I don’t think anyone in NDHQ was totally, 100% uninvolved, but we were pretty darn close to that (zero) level) so my views on the issue may be skewed.
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* Recognizing that the legal decisions may not go their way forever.