Ricks Napkin Challenge- The Infantry Section and Platoon

[Brad Sallows]

however if we are going to employ a gun group / assault groups methodology

Depending on what is being undertaken, I have to suppose that not everything has to be taken along everywhere all the time. I further suppose that this is mainly a problem only for a section acting in both roles - it's tactically reasonable in platoon context for an entire section to leave its heavy baggage somewhere while it acts as the assault element?

I'd draw up the equipment table based on whatever the maximum usage is, and that might be better done from the defensive perspective.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Didn’t say it was great, just that it existed.



I would imagine that’s broadly similar to what I saw with the Spanish and Italian lighter vehicle ATGM mounts.



Absolutely.



Right so the question is how do you still project HE / AT rounds while dismounted and offensive if you’re all in on something the size of a Javeline?

A great question. I think in a defensive situation the OC and Pl Comd might lean into have Javelins out in fighting positions accepting that it means less dedicated riflemen. On the offence I expect that the systems would be left mounted - you already have three folks in the vehicle so might as well have a Javelin at the ready.

In an unconstrained world maybe you have a lighter ATGM like you mentioned for the Section and Javelin for the Battalion, but I figure we try to get one through and go for Javelin.

Right now, our infantry platoons and companies are essentially spectators if tanks enter the chat. That's a problem that needs solving! Nine or ten Javelins in the company in a defensive position and the situation changes radically.

 

[markppcli]

I'm wondering if something reusable and multi-purpose like the Carl-G would be better replacement for the M72 or a single-shot ATGM in the Section. Still much lighter than the Javelin but effective against a wide range of targets and not just a one-shot wonder.

Still have that same two man operation issue

Perhaps a spot for a single NLAW could be found in the LAV as well for those "oh shyte" moments as well.

Yes very much.

Depending on what is being undertaken, I have to suppose that not everything has to be taken along everywhere all the time. I further suppose that this is mainly a problem only for a section acting in both roles - it's tactically reasonable in platoon context for an entire section to leave its heavy baggage somewhere while it acts as the assault element?

I’m working off the early consensus that, as @Infanteer said very well, nothing wins the fire fight like HE. So we need to be able to project that and suppress at section level. While I agree that the section will always have its platoon to support it, it should be capable of assaulting an isolated positions on its own.

To your second question, I don’t think so, I wouldn’t have a support weapon free section in my platoon, what happens when the others start taking casualties, or the assault section is culminated and has to support the forward movement of the others ?

I'd draw up the equipment table based on whatever the maximum usage is, and that might be better done from the defensive perspective.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Still have that same two man operation issue


Yes very much.


I’m working off the early consensus that, as @Infanteer said very well, nothing wins the fire fight like HE. So we need to be able to project that and suppress at section level. While I agree that the section will always have its platoon to support it, it should be capable of assaulting an isolated positions on its own.

To your second question, I don’t think so, I wouldn’t have a support weapon free section in my platoon, what happens when the others start taking casualties, or the assault section is culminated and has to support the forward movement of the others ?

I've got a question?
Has there ever been a purely HE variant of the M 72 ever mooted?

 

[Infanteer]

The more crew-served weapons (C6, Javelin, etc.) we push down to a dispersed Section, the fewer riflemen we have remaining to protect those crews. Does this pose a risk, as the crew-served weapons can only engage a single point target at a time and if dispersed (and outnumbering their protecting riflemen) become more vulnerable to enemy action?

First off, don't disperse sections, save for very specific tasks such as a patrol. Just because you can (due to technology, etc), doesn't mean you should. In Afghanistan, I never had a section out of reach of the Pls guns.

Second, I would argue to stick to the principle in the post I wrote that you quoted:

Sect = 1x Crew-Served Weapon + 2 Rifle teams (defined as a pair of infanteers with bayonets). Direct fire (the grenade launcher is not an indirect system). Potential, in the future, add a micro-UAS to spot the next corner.
Platoon = 4x Crew-Served Weapons + 6 Rifle teams. Direct fire, with NLOS capability if ATGM provided to Pl Wpns Det. Potential, in the future, add a micro-UAS to spot the next bound.

Don't complicate it more than that.

what prompts the need for a weapons company in the light battalions? Obviously system weights play a big role, but I would think as well that in a light battalion, the ability to mass all your heaviest anti-armour/anti-personnel weapons according to the battalion's overall need is also a crucial requirement. In the CA and Stryker battalions, the heavy armament is tied directly to each section's vehicle therefore, it can't be easily redistributed throughout the battalion.

It may be that the fundamental difference as between what a light company/platoon/section can carry and what heavy weapons already come as part of the EIS of the LAV 6.0 that makes it clear that we need two very different establishments and TTPs when it comes to how we distribute and employ the heavier crew-served weapons.

I would argue that the need is prompted by principally by the advantage of concentrating these capabilities to maximize competencies, while also allowing the CO to weight his or her main effort appropriately. A Platoon has an officer and a WO focused on advanced skills, and who can manage the training of said capability throughout the year. This is optimal compared to dispersing a single AT, Mortar, Sniper, Recce, and Pioneer section to each Company and calling it a day (this is also the same reason we don't simply push a battery of artillery to each BG).

 

[FJAG]

I would argue that the need is prompted by principally by the advantage of concentrating these capabilities to maximize competencies, while also allowing the CO to weight his or her main effort appropriately. A Platoon has an officer and a WO focused on advanced skills, and who can manage the training of said capability throughout the year. This is optimal compared to dispersing a single AT, Mortar, Sniper, Recce, and Pioneer section to each Company and calling it a day (this is also the same reason we don't simply push a battery of artillery to each BG).

Point taken.

Your last sentence is counterproductive because we essentially jumped through hoops over the last decade and a half "pushing a battery of artillery to each BG." We are slowly and painfully unlearning that practice.

Just as an aside, something you said made me think:

A Platoon has an officer and a WO focused on advanced skills, and who can manage the training of said capability throughout the year.

Obviously, one would strive to develop a high set of skills and competence in a professional platoon/section through such training. We have two armies, however, of roughly equal size, and we're pretty confident that many reservists will never reach that level of competence without lengthy and intense pre-deployment training.

When I think about the artillery I mentally subdivide the functions performed into a continuum of those easily performed by reservists without additional training and those a reservist will never be able to do without that lengthy training phase. I see the infantry also working in that way when it assigns roles to reserve units in filing various support platoons.

To a large extent, the concept of rapidly "bulking out" the force requires a structure within a battalion that can optimize the use of highly trained individuals as well as adequately trained ones. Ages ago, the company was one of those structures that could be "bulked out" by adequately trained reservist platoons. Ukraine, on the surface at least, seems to show that's still possible. Have we moved away from being able to utilize adequately trained reserve rifle platoons? And if so is that a risk aversion issue or a complexity of the job issue?

 

[KevinB]

First off, don't disperse sections, save for very specific tasks such as a patrol. Just because you can (due to technology, etc), doesn't mean you should. In Afghanistan, I never had a section out of reach of the Pls guns.

How do you define dispersed?
It's a legit question, not trying to be a smart ass.

Second, I would argue to stick to the principle in the post I wrote that you quoted:

Sect = 1x Crew-Served Weapon + 2 Rifle teams (defined as a pair of infanteers with bayonets). Direct fire (the grenade launcher is not an indirect system). Potential, in the future, add a micro-UAS to spot the next corner.

Looking at the Platoon Crew Served that can be kicked down to the section:
The C6, which probably won't be implemented in a Mech Unit outside of a defensive.
The C16, which probably won't get kicked down to a section ever, and would only be used in a defensive, and frankly should be probably at Coy level anyway outside of Prepared Defensive positions.
The CG84, which is a decent hard structure system - but the CAF version outside the LIB's is the M2 Dinosaur, and can really only be used effectively in the defensive at section level - or a depth section in the attack brought up to clear an obstacle.

Platoon = 4x Crew-Served Weapons + 6 Rifle teams. Direct fire, with NLOS capability if ATGM provided to Pl Wpns Det. Potential, in the future, add a micro-UAS to spot the next bound.

Don't complicate it more than that.

All of the Crew Served Weapons available in Canada are cumbersome, and very unwieldy at the section level.

I would argue that the need is prompted by principally by the advantage of concentrating these capabilities to maximize competencies, while also allowing the CO to weight his or her main effort appropriately. A Platoon has an officer and a WO focused on advanced skills, and who can manage the training of said capability throughout the year. This is optimal compared to dispersing a single AT, Mortar, Sniper, Recce, and Pioneer section to each Company and calling it a day (this is also the same reason we don't simply push a battery of artillery to each BG).

I don't think you have enough Arty BTY to even push one to each BG...

 

[markppcli]

Looking at the Platoon Crew Served that can be kicked down to the section:
The C6, which probably won't be implemented in a Mech Unit outside of a defensive.

It would require a shift in how we do mechanized attacks, but maybe we shouldn’t default to hasty frontals with a dismount on the objective anyways ?

The C16, which probably won't get kicked down to a section ever, and would only be used in a defensive, and frankly should be probably at Coy level anyway outside of Prepared Defensive positions.

I’d argue it should be in a Bn AGL Pl but who has the PYs for that.

The CG84, which is a decent hard structure system - but the CAF version outside the LIB's is the M2 Dinosaur, and can really only be used effectively in the defensive at section level - or a depth section in the attack brought up to clear an obstacle.

Shockingly even us mere mortals in mechanized Bns have the m3.

All of the Crew Served Weapons available in Canada are cumbersome, and very unwieldy at the section level.

True of most crew served weapons no?

I don't think you have enough Arty BTY to even push one to each BG...

Touche

 

[markppcli]

To a large extent, the concept of rapidly "bulking out" the force requires a structure within a battalion that can optimize the use of highly trained individuals as well as adequately trained ones. Ages ago, the company was one of those structures that could be "bulked out" by adequately trained reservist platoons. Ukraine, on the surface at least, seems to show that's still possible. Have we moved away from being able to utilize adequately trained reserve rifle platoons? And if so is that a risk aversion issue or a complexity of the job issue?

No I don’t think we have, we just prefer to bulk out sections and platoons with reservist where the training gulf can be hidden. Additionally if you’re an organization that has spent decades and countless man hours working in a 3 Pl Company context is there a pro / con to having a 4th platoon all of a sudden ?

 

[KevinB]

It would require a shift in how we do mechanized attacks, but maybe we shouldn’t default to hasty frontals with a dismount on the objective anyways ?



I’d argue it should be in a Bn AGL Pl but who has the PYs for that.

They are fantastic systems when either mounted of a vehicle - or emplaced in a defensive -- just painful to move on foot...
Plus the ammo is heavy and bulky and requires a robust method of resupply.

Shockingly even us mere mortals in mechanized Bns have the m3.

Interesting I didn't realize it had finally made it there, appreciate the info. I still think even the M4 is fairly awkward for an ATC, unless it's urban terrain I'd leave it with CQ, or in a LAV if your mech.

True of most crew served weapons no?

Fair point - the SF kit is the major awkward aspect of the C6, in the light role, it's heavy but not in a brutally annoying way that the SF kit is, two barrels and the tripod manages to find any soft spot you have with great ease.

 

[Infanteer]

How do you define dispersed?
It's a legit question, not trying to be a smart ass.

I would define dispersed as an element being away from mutual support from its parent element. Therefore, if a section couldn't be supported by its parent platoon with direct fires and quick link up for casevac.

For a SOF element, or a trained element such as a recce patrol, the risk of dispersion can be mitigated, but for a combat manoeuvre element that has the principle task to fight and win engagements, things happen so fast that dispersion probably offers more risk than reward. A dispersed section only has to take a couple casualties before it would be overrun.

Looking at the Platoon Crew Served that can be kicked down to the section:
The C6, which probably won't be implemented in a Mech Unit outside of a defensive.

I wouldn't say that. In complex terrain, to include urban areas, there will likely be numerous areas where the LAV coax can't cover, or chances the LAV and the dismounts are separated. Having the ability to put a C6 in a building, or on a wooded hilltop, could be key.

The C16, which probably won't get kicked down to a section ever, and would only be used in a defensive, and frankly should be probably at Coy level anyway outside of Prepared Defensive positions.

Agreed.

It would require a shift in how we do mechanized attacks, but maybe we shouldn’t default to hasty frontals with a dismount on the objective anyways ?

Bingo!

I’d argue it should be in a Bn AGL Pl but who has the PYs for that.

Yes. The entire "swap the 60mm mortar for the C16 AGLS" fiasco was a perfect example of swapping an apple for a transmission. The AGLS is such an awkward system (if not mounted) that I can only think of limited options for utility in a Bn and Coy.

 

[Infanteer]

Have we moved away from being able to utilize adequately trained reserve rifle platoons? And if so is that a risk aversion issue or a complexity of the job issue?

In my view, no. A baseline Reserve Rifle Pl/Armd Tp/Gun Tp/Fd Tp should require little to no additional individual training to plug into a deploying organization - just sufficient IBTS and CT to make up the time delta.

 

[FJAG]

No I don’t think we have, we just prefer to bulk out sections and platoons with reservist where the training gulf can be hidden. Additionally if you’re an organization that has spent decades and countless man hours working in a 3 Pl Company context is there a pro / con to having a 4th platoon all of a sudden ?

I was thinking more along the lines of a two company battalion that expands to three with each company getting a reserve platoon or alternatively having a third company headquarters where all the platoons are reservists or even collapsing all the brigade and RSS RegF leadership in a brigade into one battalion with all platoons being reservists.

The dual issue is to create much better trained reservists and a RegF middle tier leadership which will allow for more rapid expansion of the force than it's capable of doing now.

We currently set high standards of excellence for ourselves for any force we wish to deploy, which is good, but there needs to be a back-up system that allows us to offer the government an option for a rapid expansion to a "good enough" force when we do not have the advantage of time to go through managed readiness cycles.

The issue is examining the weak points where only a properly trained RegF individual with a reasonable amount of practical experience is required. We can easily change the reserve training system to ensure every reservist is properly trained to a certain level. Gaining a proper level of experience is the hard, and perhaps insurmountable, part.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The issue is examining the weak points where only a properly trained RegF individual with a reasonable amount of practical experience is required. We can easily change the reserve training system to ensure every reservist is properly trained to a certain level. Gaining a proper level of experience is the hard, and perhaps insurmountable, part.

That's nothing that a month or so in Wainwright every summer couldn't fix.

 

[FJAG]

That's nothing that a month or so in Wainwright every summer couldn't fix.

I keep thinking once they've had their DP1 then 8 monthly mandatory weekends to keep the BTS etc up; 2 mandatory weekends to shake out the section/platoon drills and then a mandatory two to three week collective training exercise in the summer. Everything else is voluntary.

 

[markppcli]

Ah I see we’ve now come fully round to force 2025.

 

[markppcli]

That's nothing that a month or so in Wainwright every summer couldn't fix.

That would almost be long enough for a LAV gunner course

 

[GR66]

I was thinking more along the lines of a two company battalion that expands to three with each company getting a reserve platoon or alternatively having a third company headquarters where all the platoons are reservists or even collapsing all the brigade and RSS RegF leadership in a brigade into one battalion with all platoons being reservists.

It may be a bit early to draw concrete conclusions from the Russian experience in Ukraine so far, but one of the convincing arguments I've heard for the generally poor combined arms performance of the Russian units is that due to their decision not to call up their Reserves at the start of the conflict, the reduced readiness Regular units didn't have enough dismounted infantry to properly protect their armoured vehicles. They used all of their available troops to man the vehicles but because the units were not manned at 100% peacetime strength, they didn't have enough GIBs to succeed.

If we are ever required to respond quickly to an unexpected attack our forces could be in the identical situation if forced to deploy quickly before we can fill out the units. I think a key takeaway we should take from this conflict is that our units should be fully manned with Reg Force personnel. If that were to mean we drop from three to two Brigades then I say so be it.

If you're looking for an expansion role for the Reserves I'd instead have a 4th (and 5th and 6th) Company HQ for each Battalion and fill these out with Reserve Platoons. These Companies could either be used as a source for individual augmentees in a low casualty conflict, or could be rotated into theater to replace Reg Force Platoons/Companies that need to be pulled out of the line and reconstituted in higher casualty conflicts.

In the absence of significant new vehicles and gear for the Reserves as well as the entire support infrastructure required to support additional Reserve Brigade Groups (including the war stocks and transport capability to supply them) then I think our best bet is to aim for maintaining the combat effectiveness of our existing units rather than adding new units.

Sorry for the additional derail.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Given the current mindset that currently infects the federal government concerning the way it deals with any crisis. Which is to pretend there is no crisis.
I am assuming that if the Balloon ever did go up. You would have difficulty even drawing ammunition and extra rations. Getting the Civil Service and the political side to actually activate the reserves might actually require an act of god much less the Privy Council.
Having said that this actually looks quite doable.

 

[markppcli]

It may be a bit early to draw concrete conclusions from the Russian experience in Ukraine so far, but one of the convincing arguments I've heard for the generally poor combined arms performance of the Russian units is that due to their decision not to call up their Reserves at the start of the conflict, the reduced readiness Regular units didn't have enough dismounted infantry to properly protect their armoured vehicles. They used all of their available troops to man the vehicles but because the units were not manned at 100% peacetime strength, they didn't have enough GIBs to succeed.

If we are ever required to respond quickly to an unexpected attack our forces could be in the identical situation if forced to deploy quickly before we can fill out the units. I think a key takeaway we should take from this conflict is that our units should be fully manned with Reg Force personnel. If that were to mean we drop from three to two Brigades then I say so be it.

If you're looking for an expansion role for the Reserves I'd instead have a 4th (and 5th and 6th) Company HQ for each Battalion and fill these out with Reserve Platoons. These Companies could either be used as a source for individual augmentees in a low casualty conflict, or could be rotated into theater to replace Reg Force Platoons/Companies that need to be pulled out of the line and reconstituted in higher casualty conflicts.

In the absence of significant new vehicles and gear for the Reserves as well as the entire support infrastructure required to support additional Reserve Brigade Groups (including the war stocks and transport capability to supply them) then I think our best bet is to aim for maintaining the combat effectiveness of our existing units rather than adding new units.

Sorry for the additional derail.

The Russian army doesn’t really have a reserves system:

The Best or Worst of Both Worlds? | The Post-Soviet Post | CSIS

The reformed and revitalized Russian military is increasingly powerful and proficient. However, Russia remains suspended between the large but limited mass army of its past and the expensive but proficient Western professional military model.

www.csis.org

“Fewer than 10 percent of conscripted soldiers carry out any refresher training in the five years after they end their active service. The Ministry of Defense admitted in 2015 that the whereabouts of ex-soldiers are not effectively tracked, making targeted mobilization impractical.”


That aside I don’t know if I like the idea of having a full third dependant on part time volunteers and never having the ability to train companies to use their depth. Additionally no way can’t they maintain the required qualifications. All that aside probably not relevant to the topic of this thread.