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Role of Officer vs job of NCM [Merged]

  • Thread starter Thread starter Argyll 2347
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Yes Lance, the devil is in the details.  I am sure the next step if this was to be taken seriously would be to look at the numbers of Officers being recruited and the speed of assession (promotion to different command levels) of ALL Ranks within the Army.  As well, a bottom up review of positions within the Army would need to be down, to see what was required and what was extraneous (NDHQ would be a good start).

I am of the personal opinion that the Officer Corps, CF wide, could be pared down.  I have looked at the figures, and I see that the current numbers have Officers at 22% of the strength of the Reg Force (1 Officer for every 4 NCMs...).  From all the reading I've seen on Army efficiency, a ration of 5-10% is historically shown to be the optimal level.  I've yet to see a good argument for why we need such a large Officer Corps; I refuse to accept mobilization for an answer, because that is just preparing for the last war.  Obviously, their are bureaucratic processes at work here (unification, civilianization) that have allowed the level to creep up to the bloat it is at today.

If we were willing to accept a professional military education as being better for the vitality of the profession of arms, we could move this discussion into discussing the best ways to intergrate this into the Army (and the Forces in general).  I have my own ideas, I'd love to hear what your experience has given you.
 
Michael,

You have stated your (dare I say our) position well.  PBI (who I know in passing) has some valid points.  Although I must say that it is exceedingly difficult to articulate and quantify the perceived benefits of a PSE in terms of "broad officer qualities".  This is particularly difficult within the Canadian Army context, where meaningful "command" ends at the battalion level or below. 

I would tentatively support PBI's contention that PSE "can't hurt".  But I would also argue that it provides nothing of quantifiable benefit at the entry to mid-levels of commissioned service.  And therein lies the rub.  Insistence upon an entry-level post-secondary education "can't hurt", right?  Well, only if you accept the notion that such "prerequisites" preclude a substantial body of potential commissioned recruits.  The minute you make PSE a recruitment and/or junior (eg. Capt to Major) promotion gate-way, you preclude (or unduly discourage) an untold number of otherwise suitable candidates for the commissioned profession of arms.  Factor in the bilingualism requirement (even if you've never had a reason to use it in 17 years of service) and you have yet another "pointless hoop" for the prospective officer to leap through. 

At the end of the day, If we can't state with certainty that PSE is a quantifiable "must-have qualifier" for entry-level comiissioned service, then we do ourselves an enormous  potential disservice by making the BA/BSc a PREREQUISITE for commissioned service.  Such operationallly irrelevant artificial gateways for entry-level service only serve to reduce our prospective recruiting base.

Moving on, I wont dispute PBI's argument that PSE and/or a Master's Degree is "good" for encouraging free/out-of-the-box thought in higher appointments.  But to suggest for a moment that a "Basket-Weaving 101" degree from Seneca College is a prerequisite for Battalion Command or anything below?  I'm sorry, but I don't buy that for a second. 

I will take the argument a step further in suggesting that an MBA or a Masters in "Military Studies" from RMC does absolutely zero to prepare an officer for the intellectual demands of higher operational duty.  Note that I don't say "higher operational command", because within the Canadian Army there is none.  Even Battalion Commanders in today's Army are sub-unit "force generators", but that is a whole other topic, isn't it?  An MBA is an admittedly desirable qualification for today's battalion DCO, given his/her broad scope of financial responsibility for Public and Non-Public Funds.  But that's not really the point, is it?  Show me where a Post-Grad degree has any appreciable bearing upon an officer's abillity to "force generate" at battalion level and below, and I will quite willingly concede the point.  With all due respect, I am not holding my breath.....

So, if the basic bachelor's degree has zero quantifiable bearing on the ability of an officer to perform tactical command at the platoon and company levels, and the post-grad degree has no discernable impact upon the same officer's ability to fulfill his/her responsibilitiies as a unit-llevel "force generator" producing "plug and play" sub-units for the employment of others, just where does this oh-so-precious higher education come into play?  As "second fiddle" officers within allied coalition HQs?  Ooohhhh - big influence there...  As formation Commanders?  We don't have formations - our Brigade HQs are now nothing more than "force generators" twice-removed. 

So somebody please tell me, where does the PSE or Post-Grad Degree come into meaningful play?  And please, spare me the "it makes for a better all-round officer" tripe.  My personal experience has been the exact opposite.  Those who join the Army and seek a commssiion by virtue of a DEO or ROTP degree would be exceedingly fortunate to find their own ass with a seasoned (and very patient) WO guiding their hands. 

I am going to stop here, before I really get myself on a roll.  Suffice it to say that I believe APPLICABLE degrees and the "higher" academic experience have a role to play.  But to disenfranchise operationally-proven serving members who lack such "qualifications?  To inisist that everyone pursuing commissioned service possess such a pedigree as basic enrolment criteria?  Such "politically-correct" policies are utterly counter-productive madness.  Full-Stop.

 
I'm back. It's just after morning brief so I have a few minutes. Some excellent posting has been going on while I was ZZZZZZ. That is the great joy of this site.


Your arguments are well thought out, cohesive, and persuasive.

I agree. In general I think Infanteer has advanced the argument in a far more capable manner than I could have.

It is difficult to find fault with your logic.But ( you knew there was a "but", right?)  if your thoughts were implemented, and made in to official policy, just how many officers would we end up with?  Now, I know, the argument about quality over quantity, but there has to be a medium, where we get the best of both.  Your thesis (no, I never had any PSE, but it sounds like a good thesis topic) would undoubtedly give us professional officers, but in too few a quantity to meet our needs.

While I remain unconvinced that in the Army we currently have "too many" officers (Based on what I see in LFWA and in our Bde, I think we actually have them ill-distributed, since there are a number of critical shortages), I am a believer in re-examining how we employ our WO class vice our officers. Having worked in both an Area and a Bde HQ, and now being in a US-driven Div-level HQ, I think that we wrongly insist on too many staff positions being filled by Capts that could be ably done by various grades of WO. The US seems much better at this, both in the employment of their senior E-grades and their WO grades. As well, I see no reason that at least one platoon/troop in a subunit could not be commanded by a WO. De facto, they often are now. I believe that the Germans do this (I'll have to ask my boss...). Another obvious target is the Canadian insistence that a rotary-wing pilot be a commissioned officer, as opposed to other forces such as the US or UK who permit WOs or even Sgts to be RWAC pilots.

The second "but" is how would your policy be accepted by our political masters?  I have thoughts on this, but I would like to hear yours....


It was, I believe, political pressure (or at least encouragementl) at the MND level that led to the adoption of the requirement, as an outcome of recommendations arising from the Somalia inquiry(TBC..) I think the government would be only too happy because it would achieve three results:

-continue the transition that has already begun, and which Treasury Board (and therefore the Govt) has agreed to fund and which is to my way of thinking a benefit for the Army;

-benefit the country as a while by increasing the educational level of the nation through the first order result of more graduates, and the second order result that the children of graduates tend to go on to PSE themselves; and

-benefit the individual for the reasons that have been ably expressed here by others.

I think they would be for it.

On reflection, and to go back to my original question at the start of all of this, I also believe that a combination of service in the ranks with PSE (preferably in a civilian university but acceptable in a military setting if it does not degenerate into rote learning) will produce a solid, well-rounded officer corps. This would be something like the modern German system. We might not train as many officers, but as I reflected above we might want to ask ourselves how many we need. Cheers.
 
You all have made very good pros and cons for higher education for the Officer Corp.
A Degree does not make an Officer.

What say you if we had a just a Collage like Sandhurst were you pass or fail as an Officer as Sandhurst only teaches the Art of War in all repsects from logistics to the front line and all in between.
Sandhurst is a true War Collage should we have the same?
No RMC is not the same.

Out of Sandhurst the Brits. have produced some of the best and worst but it is still true Miliatary Collage.
All's I care is that those above me now the Art of War and can lead me.
I have served with Sappers with Degrees which blew me away!!
 
Mark C:

I would tentatively support PBI's contention that PSE "can't hurt".   But I would also argue that it provides nothing of quantifiable benefit at the entry to mid-levels of commissioned service.   And therein lies the rub.   Insistence upon an entry-level post-secondary education "can't hurt", right?   Well, only if you accept the notion that such "prerequisites" preclude a substantial body of potential commissioned recruits.   The minute you make PSE a recruitment and/or junior (eg. Capt to Major) promotion gate-way, you preclude (or unduly discourage) an untold number of otherwise suitable candidates for the commissioned profession of arms.   Factor in the bilingualism requirement (even if you've never had a reason to use it in 17 years of service) and you have yet another "pointless hoop" for the prospective officer to leap through.  

At the end of the day, If we can't state with certainty that PSE is a quantifiable "must-have qualifier" for entry-level comiissioned service, then we do ourselves an enormous   potential disservice by making the BA/BSc a PREREQUISITE for commissioned service.   Such operationallly irrelevant artificial gateways for entry-level service only serve to reduce our prospective recruiting base.

Rather then view the argument as one for or against a PSE, would it make more sense if the "for" position was arguing that some academic subjects, presented in a classroom setting, are just as vital to the training of young Officers as are tactics and techniques taught in the field in Gagetown?   Look over the fields I presented in my original proposition and tell me if you think it would be advantageous to instill these in our young officers in a environment in which they are forced to think and evaluate the concepts and ideas as opposed to checking the box off as "passed".

The only reason the topic falls back upon a PSE is because making a military education a degreed program helps to define the level of training an officer is provided.   I would like to think that their is more of a difference between a Warrant Officer and a Lieutenant then time-in and the rank slip on they wear.

PBI

While I remain unconvinced that in the Army we currently have "too many" officers (Based on what I see in LFWA and in our Bde, I think we actually have them ill-distributed, since there are a number of critical shortages), I am a believer in re-examining how we employ our WO class vice our officers.

Since you have more direct experience with this, I'll take in the ill-distributed point.   Whether it is "too many" or "ill distributed", both problems (or a combination of these, which may be the most plausible) would point to organizational problems.   That being said, any implementation of the ideas many of us have put forward here would require some sort of organizational reform within the CF.

These are difficult questions, that is why there is fierce debate on both sides.   But it is best that we address them.   One can't always blame our shortcomings on the easy problems (we need more privates), because if all our problems were that simple, wouldn't they have been figured out years ago?

Having worked in both an Area and a Bde HQ, and now being in a US-driven Div-level HQ, I think that we wrongly insist on too many staff positions being filled by Capts that could be ably done by various grades of WO. The US seems much better at this, both in the employment of their senior E-grades and their WO grades. As well, I see no reason that at least one platoon/troop in a subunit could not be commanded by a WO. De facto, they often are now. I believe that the Germans do this (I'll have to ask my boss...).

I agree fully.   I see no need to fritter away the capabilities of a professionally trained Officer in positions like "Assistant Adjutant".   As well, many of these positions that the Army insists on filling with Captains are probably better suited to the vocational excellence that a Warrant Officer has developed with 15-20 years of service.

Another obvious target is the Canadian insistence that a rotary-wing pilot be a commissioned officer, as opposed to other forces such as the US or UK who permit WOs or even Sgts to be RWAC pilots.

Yep, I agree there as well.   There should be a split between those who simply want to fly, and those who want to commit themselves to the profession of Air Power or the Fleet.   I have some ideas; I would like to hear from Zoomie, Inch, and Ex-Dragoon about what they feel on the necessity of a professional education for Air Force and Naval Officers.   I am currently reading the biography of USAF Colonel John Boyd, so there should be some interesting points on the flyer side of that to draw from his life.

I also believe that a combination of service in the ranks with PSE (preferably in a civilian university but acceptable in a military setting if it does not degenerate into rote learning) will produce a solid, well-rounded officer corps.

I will agree with that statement except for the civilian university part.   By doing so, we would risk the required elements of a military education not being instilled in Cadets.   If we send them to a civilian university, they will learn about 18th Gay and Lesbian Literature and the Artwork of Phoenicia.   This type of education is irrelevant to a military professional, and the "against" people would be correct in opposing it.   It is the "degenerate into rote learning" that is the key.  

The military schooling at the RMC that Cadets must receive should be among the best that Canada can provide.   We must attempt to draw in the best instructors, both civilian and military, in order to ensure a first-rate military education.   I remember a great quote (can't find it now) about the American Colonel that Marshall put in charge of Officer Development in the US.   This Officer had managed to get on an exchange with the German Army and get his military education there in the early 1930's.   His military education consisted of lectures by Oberth and Von Braun on the development of their rocket technology and physics, Guderian's and Liddell Hart's theories on warfare, and some preeminent German politicians, who had been at Versailles, lecturing about international relations.   This opportunity, when provided in an academic setting that requires critical thought, will ensure that our officers will be true professionals.

Earl:

What say you if we had a just a Collage like Sandhurst were you pass or fail as an Officer as Sandhurst only teaches the Art of War in all repsects from logistics to the front line and all in between.
Sandhurst is a true War Collage should we have the same?
No RMC is not the same.

That is what I advocated.   I said earlier that RMC was no different then a conventional civilian university with a bit of Cadet training.

I've advocated turning RMC into a facility capable of providing a full military education as I detailed earlier.   It would be designed along the lines of the German Kreigsacadamie, which turned out the some of the finest military professionals for over a century (and which Sandhurst was modelled on as well).
 
Infanteer: Good points. I think that is probably possible to develop a true military university, one that concentrates on developing the mind rather than on making beds and beasting junior cadets (you can tell I'm not a ringknocker...). Quantico was run very much like a university, with electives, self-study, a fantastic guest speaker program, etc. However, I'm not quite as dismissive as you are about the value of a civilian education. First off, I think you can probably get a BA without taking any BS "PC" courses at all. If you are forced into taking electives like that, then the officer should take it as a challenge to stand up and demolish these sods. That is what I loved about the residence classes when I did UTPO: the chance to bring 20 plus years of life and military experience into the classroom and use it to gun down (but also to educate...) some of these little leftwing babblers who would otherwise spout off unopposed. We shouldn't be afraid of challenges like that. The real problem might not be the civilian university itself, but the possible idleness of the young officer in selectin BS subjects. Cheers.
 
Not to re-open the wound, but as promised I finally had a chat with our Chief of Staff here in CJTF76, a US Army Infantry Colonel with lots of service. What he had to say on the subject can be distilled to the following.

An officer's previous service in the ranks or his basic human traits will take him as far as platoon commander and maybe company commander. There is no real direct need for PSE at those levels. After that, at battalion and beyond, the COS stated that an officer "would be lost" without PSE. He felt that there has to be a broader outlook, an ability to study, to analyze, to consider the opposing point of view. The type of ops CJTF76 are engaged in here (in his opinion) are an example of the demands that the modern Army puts on officers and why these skills and traits are needed  . When I asked him, he didn't distinguish between a civvy or military degree, saying that didn't matter, although he did say that he thought there was a need for some political studies, philosophy, psychology, etc. in whatever course of studies was followed. He explained that the US Army gets its officers from West Point, ROTC and OCS (mostly for soldiers in the ranks) When I broached the idea that some people see the requirement for a degree as an obstacle to an otherwise able officer, he stated that in his opinion for an able officer it was not an obstacle.

While the COS comes from an Army that has been all-degreed for a long time, it was interesting to hear his opinion. Take them for whatever they may be worth to you. Cheers.
 
Well, dragging up this excellent thread, I wanted to reply to something that Mark posted that has been nagging me in the back of my mind with regards to how we train our Officers.

Mark C said:
I will take the argument a step further in suggesting that an MBA or a Masters in "Military Studies" from RMC does absolutely zero to prepare an officer for the intellectual demands of higher operational duty.   Note that I don't say "higher operational command", because within the Canadian Army there is none.   Even Battalion Commanders in today's Army are sub-unit "force generators", but that is a whole other topic, isn't it?   An MBA is an admittedly desirable qualification for today's battalion DCO, given his/her broad scope of financial responsibility for Public and Non-Public Funds.   But that's not really the point, is it?   Show me where a Post-Grad degree has any appreciable bearing upon an officer's ability to "force generate" at battalion level and below, and I will quite willingly concede the point.   With all due respect, I am not holding my breath.....

So, if the basic bachelor's degree has zero quantifiable bearing on the ability of an officer to perform tactical command at the platoon and company levels, and the post-grad degree has no discernable impact upon the same officer's ability to fulfill his/her responsibilities as a unit-level "force generator" producing "plug and play" sub-units for the employment of others, just where does this oh-so-precious higher education come into play?   As "second fiddle" officers within allied coalition HQs?   Ooohhhh - big influence there...   As formation Commanders?   We don't have formations - our Brigade HQs are now nothing more than "force generators" twice-removed.


The Canadian Forces constantly preaches the capability of a commander to think "two-levels up".   This is doctrine dragged from the manuals of the German Army.   It goes along with other concepts such as commander's intent (central to Aufstragstaktik) and main effort (Schwerpunkt) that I've seen bandied around the Canadian Army in the effort to make us appear as a rapid and fluid fighting force.   Whatever the degree of lip-service that is paid to these doctrinal concepts, I believe it is essential to train and educate our commanders "two levels up".   The most effective way of doing so is by teaching the student the top level first.   Lieutenants learning to command an Infantry Platoon will first be taught how to fight with a battalion while a Captain/Major preparing to become an OC of an Armoured Squadron or an Artillery Battery will be trained first to fight with a CMBG.   By doing this, we enable the commander at any level to see the context in which his unit will operate in and how he can best ensure that every effort of his unit will be directed towards the effort of the higher headquarters (the commander's intent).

Thus, if the lowest level of Officer command (the platoon) begins with the Officer being taught how to fight with a battalion, then right from the start the Officer is trained in the operational art.   The tactical level in which a junior commander operates in does not let him carry out his duties in a vacuum.   Despite operating on a purely tactical level, he must be educated and trained to step outside of the box and see his unit and its role within the operational context.   This logic carries on as a commander progresses to higher and higher levels of command.

Even if the only Brigade or Division that a commander ever maneuvers is a paper tiger in high level/coalition wargames or training exercises, at least he is maintaining that ability for when the balloon goes up and Canada, against all odds and for some necessity, deploys a Brigade or   :o a larger formation (We all love to talk about how we are geared for mobilization).   Just because the current mission creep of Small-Scale Contingenices has forced us to break up units and formations into tactical units for "plug and play" global contributions does not eliminate the possibility of a Major Regional Contingency (or worse, a Global Conflict) landing in our lap.   By ensuring that our tactical commanders are trained and educated from the start to have a firm grasp on the operational art while our mid-level commanders are given the command and staff training to operate in formation level strategic planning and execution, we prepare our Officers to successfully fulfill their number one job, winning wars through the command of fighting soldiers, at any level required by the State.   To ignore this is the adverse of a professional Officer Corps, it is amateurism with the only consequence being that we are forced to re-invent the wheel, while having to pay the butchers bill in the process of doing so.  

A perfect example of this would be the US Army following the Civil War; along with demobilization it, for cultural reasons, completely eliminated any professional aspects of its Officer Corps which developed the path to victory over the Confederacy.   Reduced to small unit skirmishes in irregular conflicts with Native Americans, it was completely unprepared to fight the Spanish American War and World War I.   I can think of many examples in our own Military history that play out like this.   The opposite would be the interwar German Army that, despite crushing sanctions by Versailles, was able to preserve the professional outlook of its Officers and as such was prepared to to fight the next war when it came in 1939.

As they say, Failure to plan is planning to fail.

Cheers,
Infanteer
 
Infanteer: there is much wisdom in what you say. I am of two minds on this matter, but I think that a balance can be struck.

I agree that our officer training, and PME need to be broader, earlier. I never understood why, under the old "OPDP" program, the unit on "War and the Military Profession" was studied LAST, after the one ones on pers admin, etc. It should have been first.I for one am a fan of examing the concept of a single Combat Branch whose officers are trained and developed as masters of  the application of all manner of combat effects and functions to achieving victory (however we define that at that moment). If the AJ publishes my next scribble, you will see me expanding on this a bit. Oversimplified somewhat, it would be like making sure that every officer was a Combat Team Commander graduate.

On the other hand, it has taken us over a century of experience to learn that a junior officer must posess and demonstrate good soldier skills for a number of reasons. There is a danger in following the COA above in that if done badly we would end up with officers who were useless theoreticians only. My thought is that pursuing a progam similar to the BundesHeer, in which officers must serve in the ranks first, would probably take care of this requirement. Cheers.
 
Infanteer,

I won't dispute your "two level's up" training model at the present time, although I do think that it has problems in terms of training real leaders for real Canadian operations - both present and future.  Where I have a fundamental problem is in the base-line presumption that a purely academic post-secondary education somehow has any bearing whatsoever of a senior leader's ability to "evision the operational environment" and extrapolate to the "operational imperative".

Jeez, call me a "dummy".  I have grade 12 (B.C.) and a year of meaningless "every-ology" based on the available curricullum at (the time) at a recognized university.  It was precisely the abject meaningless of the university B.A. that let me to the conclusion that it was not worth my time, my parent's money, nor my (admittedly stunted) intellectual effort to continue pursuing a university education.  Granted, this occurred when such a degree was not necessary for enrolment nor advancement as a officer within the Canadian Army.  Part of the problem is that with the ever-reduced focus/influence of our Army in regards to coalition operations, I fail increasingly fail to see how such a university degree is somehow now suddenly relevant or substantiated.

On an somewhat unrelated note, PBI is off fulfilling the role of a Canadian Army LO to the CJTF HQ  for the Coalition "War on Terror" in Afghanistan.  But I have to ask....  Notwithstanding the fact that PBI is undoubtedly doing a fine job (perhaps by virtue of his education) in the Canadian LO role, the fact remains that as a national representative he is representing.....nothing.  We have no contribution to the true war-fighting coalition in Afghanistan.  Furthermore, we have nothing substantive to offer said coalition "waiting in the wings".  It was a (marginally) different story when the first such Canadian LO to CJTF HQ deployed as a representative of the Canadian JTFSWA HQ in 2002.  Back then, we actually had "troops in the fight" so to speak.  One could even argue that when we transitioned from a Coalition war-fighting role to the NATO-led "peace-support" operation, Canada still had a role to play, and therefore need for a voice within the "Warfighter HQ".  Yes, we were (by our own choosing) confined to securing Kabul for the benefit of President Karzai, but we were still fulfilling a promiinent and meaningful role which coincided with the Warfighting effort (eg.   legitimizing the interim government and setting the conditions for elections).  At that point we were leading the multinational ISAF contingent, and therefore had a justifiable reason to deal with the U.S.-led "war-fighters" on a daily basis for a whole host of reasons.

But TODAY we are relegated to providing a modest operational sub-unit of dubious value to the Kabul Multi-National Brigade.  We contribute a Recce Sqn with Coyote-based STA capability to the KMNF, with 2/3 of our personnel contribution committed to "sustainment" and "force protection" for both the logistics tail (Camp Julien) and the the meagre "force protection capability" afforded to the Recce Sqn.  Ask most who have actually witnessed the Coyote perform in an operational context, and they will tell you that it is largely a waste of time.  Around Kandahar, even with "billiard-table-like" terrain, the Coyotes were still next to useless in detecting or identifying "asymmetric" dismounted threats to the airfield.  In the "complex terrain" of Kabul, I would suggest that the Coyotes are of even more marginal (to nil) use.  The problem with the Coyote is that despite the much-heralded mast and MSTAR/cameras, etc, it can still only see line-of-sight.  So what does a Coyote see in the desert?  It monitors the very tops of sand-dunes or other prominent terrain features.  What it DOESN'T monitor are the innumerable dismounted approaches to the defended installation through the "low ground" under the radar or thermal surveillance.  For that, you either need INFANTRY sitting in targetted OPs to watch the NAIs, or INFANTRY conducting patrols with the local forces throughout the "Area of Influence" to deter and/or intercept threats.  In urban terrain, the Coyote is even more irrelevant - both as a surveillance platform as a means of conducting effective "area of influence" patrols.  They are the last resort for presence patrolling, CIMIC patrols, or HUMINT collection.  "Beast-mounted" Coyote crews cannot perform a meaningful CIMIC or HUMINT function.  They simply kill chickens and scare children.....  

I could go on and on about the abject uselessness of Coyote surveillance in an urban evironment, but I won't (for now).  Suffice it to say that they are achieiving manifestly less than an infantry-based sub-unit equipped with light patrol vehicles could accomplish....  But I digress.  After all, the current Coyote Sqn is a KMNB "Brigade ISTAR Asset"  Still, what these platforms hope to detect in terms of urban "suicide bombers" or folks planting and executing road-side IEDs is completely beyond my admittedly simple mind....

If we as a nation are not committing anything to the Coalition "War on Terrorism" in Afghanistan, and if all we are committing to the NATO-led Kabul Multi-National Brigade is a largely useless Coyote-based "Recce Sqn", then what do we hope to achieve by having a Canadian LO attached to the US CJTF that is actually prosecuting the war?  

The LO position was created 2 years ago when Canada had a (admittedly very small) "dog in the fight"  represented by 3 PPCLI.  Today however, we contribute nothing to the Coalition war-fighting effort.  Which leads me to believe that our LO position with the CJTF is little more than an "indulgent hold-over" from the time when we actually had a stake in the game.  

No offence to PBI's current role, but just who is it that our Canadian LO is currently "liaising" with in a meaningful manner, and on behalf of what?  Is it the nation of Canada as far as the war-fighting aspects of OEF are concerned?   Since we have zero physical contribution to that effort, I am highly doubtful.  Is the position merely "tolerated" because Canada "once ponied-up" and may someday do so again?  Or is there something that I am missing?  I am quite honestly curious, because I simply can't see why the Americans would continue to tolerate a senior Canadian LO at a time where our nation is contributing zero to the Coalition combat effort.   If OPSEC is involved, then I will cease and desist.   But I can't honestly see us playing "secret squirrel" in regards to the Coalition effort in Afghanistan at this pont......

Just some random thoughts - I would very much like to hear from PBI as somebody "in the know" just what it is that we think we (as a nation) are currently presuming to achieve in Afghanistan - both in terms of our "support" to KMNB and in the broader context of the Coalition fight outside of Kabul......

Colour me confused about our collective role and current contribution.......
 
Mark-feel better now?

If I was actually here as the Canadian LO to CJTF76, everything you said would be true, more or less. However, that's not my job. In fact, I have almost nothing to do with TFK except incidentally. I'm  filling a NATO staff position, not a Canadian national position.

My job here is to be the Land Operations LO from ISAF HQ to the HQ of CJTF76. The Canadian Recce Sqn (for better or worse) forms only a tiny part of what ISAF is doing. In fact it is two command levels removed from me, although I see them from time to time.

As ISAF's Land LO, I am qiute busy coordinating between two HQs of approximately Div size (the Coalition HQ being much moreso). If you can think of an issue that could come up between two such flanking HQs, particularly as we approach the decisive point of the Afghan Presidential Election next month, then I am probably in there somewhere. That's why it's such a great job: I cover a huge waterfront and I get pretty well the free run of the CJTF76 HQ. I love it.

It's sadly true that we've apparently decided to go the ISAF route instead of the OEF route: the US thinks quite highly of us and we would be very welcome to play. The days of LGen Hillier are fondly remembered here. Cheers.
 
Where I have a fundamental problem is in the base-line presumption that a purely academic post-secondary education somehow has any bearing whatsoever of a senior leader's ability to "evision the operational environment" and extrapolate to the "operational imperative".

I completely agree with you; that is why I've consistently argued for a military education throughout this debate.   It is the presentation of essential concepts of leadership and command in an academic setting, forcing the young officer to think and develop his own thoughts on the subject matter, as opposed to being told "this is the way we do things...", which in my opinion is just getting ready to fight the last war.   This type of learning would be incorporated with the other half of Officer training, the normal "practical" training of tactics and techniques in the field.

Anyways, everybody has dug into their respective fighting positions on the matter; I am posting another Officer's perspective on both issues we have covered in this thread (officer education and service in the ranks) for a new approach to the issues.   I found an interesting quote that effectively substantiates some of the complaints I've seen here (and agree with):
 
The fundamental weakness in the requirements outlined in the above study is that they automatically assume that those who graduate academic institutions with an undergraduate degree, be they military or civilian, will possess the requisite maturity, competence and leadership skills to qualify them to lead soldiers effectively and make the appropriate decisions even though these decisions may not be remotely relevant to their specific field of education or expertise.   As will be outlined shortly, Martin van Creveld expresses the concern that various military organizations â Å“would surely question any system by which aspiring officers receive the bulk of their training in a special institution, separated from the enlisted men whom they will ultimately command.â ? Surprisingly enough, there are critical opinions surfacing within the civilian community that these officer candidates are only attending military training not so that they can proudly serve their country or have the honour of leading soldiers in operations, but â Å“for a cheap education and guaranteed job on graduation."

Going on this, the author gives a proposal for a system that draws officers from the ranks and proceeds to give them a variation of a military education; he uses the Israeli and the German Armies for models to go off of (which I have been proposing).   Interesting read, here is the link if anyone has the time to take a look:

http://198.231.69.12/papers/csc30/exnh/datchko.htm
 
I've met LCol Datchko, before he ever dreamed of being promoted so high.  I will admit that I must have misread him at the time.  I never imagined he had that much common sense.

Well written article, well argued.

Plus, I agree with him, which must prove that he is intelligent!
 
pbi said:
Mark-feel better now?

As a matter of fact Sir, yes I do feel much better - thank-you very much for asking.    :)

My "relief" comes as the result of several factors, all of which are related to this forum and others.   First and foremost my "mental betterment" is a function of the opportunity to occasionally "vent" about issues pertaining to the "Army of Today" and the "Army of Tomorrow" which drive me to distraction because they make absolutely no rational sense to my (admittedly narrow and stunted) mind.   Second is the opportunity that such forums offer in which to discuss a broad range of issues pertaining to the Canadian Army and our collective "way ahead".   And finally is the fact that this forum (and others) offer a venue in which all ranks can discuss such matters with a reasonable expectation that they will not be subjected to formal repercussion nor sanction.   I will quite willingly concede that the latter may very well prove to be "wishful thinking", but for the time being I am comfortable here.   As I have (and will continue to be) on the SOCNET "Canada" Board.

Regarding my earlier post and your very welcome response, I can only thank you for having educated me as to your particular role in Afghanistan.   That portion of my earlier "rant" was based on the mistaken belief that you were continuing to fill a uniquely Canadian LO role which would by this point, be entirely superfluous.   Indeed, LCol Melanson filled such a role well after Canadian participation in the ground component of Operation Enduring Freedom had ended.   Although he apparently enjoyed a terrific time as a "national LO without portfolio", it all struck me as being rather pointless.   Indeed, I would question whether or not his presence was an outright insult to our closest ally.   I say this in the sense that we didn't have anyone on the ground, yet we persumed to expect access to sensitive information nonetheless.   That was rather presumptuous for a nation that ponied up for a mere 6 months of combat operations, and then proceeded to leave our allies hanging.....

In any case, I sincerely appreciate your having taken the time to define your "NATO-generic" staff officer role.   In the context of a non-nation-specific senior officer fulfilling the NATO ISAF/CJTF76 liaison function, I am sure that you have a very meaningful and busy role to play as the primary interface between those two HQs.   Quite frankly, given what I know to be your inherent ability and intellect, combined with the USMC Staff College background, I can't think of a more competent and able officer for the role.   Thanks for clarifying precisely what it is that you are doing over there.  

Suffice it to say that your role as a NATO ISAF LO to CJTF76 makes emminent sense.   I only wish that I could say the same about Canada's current role and force-structure in Afghanistan.....
 
Mark-thanks for that.

The ideal (although politically impossible) COA would be for us to be here in some significant capacity as part of OEF. The combat learning that is going on here by US forces is phenomenal: my first impressions are that the US Army will be changed, for the better, in many ways. I would warn my fellow Canadian soldiers to be prepared to drop some of our comfortable smug assumptions about our American friends: I have certainly had a few blown away already.

The second preferable COA would be to be the big dog on the block for ISAF, much as we wer but perhaps even stronger, including air and SF. We would, IMHO, do a 100% better job than what is going on now in ISAF. There are some frustrations that I won't bring up here but believe me I miss dealing with good Canadian staff types, work ethic, sense of urgency, concept of teamwork, etc.etc.etc. Sadly, this COA is out of our reach due to inability to sustain it.

Finally, IMHO the least desireable COA is what we are doing now. In truth, we are really "bit players" in a pond of 37 other troop contributing nations. This is NO WAY to denigrate our troops: far from it. It is just that we have gone from being the stars to being the peanut vendors. (I don't like to say that, and I sincerely do apologize to anybody in TFK who reads it, but it is my personal opinion about our policy NOT about our troops).

On another note, like you I really enjoy Army.ca. In particular as you point out it is great to have all ranks, Reg and Res here, thrashing it out. We get an idea mix that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. I am saddened and disgusted by tales of senior types who have allegedly "spied" on Army.ca in order to "turn in" naughty people who have the temerity to think differently. Of course, I have also heard who one of those senior types allegedly was, and it does not surprise me he would do that.He has done a number of rather questionable things in his time.  Not enough to do, I suppose. Idle hands....etc.  Cheers.
 
Maybe next month, instead of sending spies, they'll send talent scouts.... 

Great thread - thanks everybody....

 
I just went through the article by LtCol Datchko and he has two great points which apply to the topic a system of drawing Officer's from the ranks; the first point deals with   the first one is that

"[Martin Van Crevald's] criticism is based on the fact that this type of system [that takes Officer's from the street] does not depend on any actual proven performance that would indicate a candidate's suitability to lead, but "the decision as to who will be allowed to enter officer training rests with examiners and interviewers rather than with people who know the candidate and are familiar with his or her character [ie: his commanders].

he goes on to argue that

"Of prime importance [of drawing Officer's from the ranks] is that the end-user has a direct role in the selection of candidates that have proven leadership abilities prior to the CF investing in their military and academic training as officers"

and that the current methods such as DEO and ROTP "completely overlook the fundamental building block of the officer: the natural leadership abilities that are inherent in our soldiers."

I really recommend the article I posted above to get an insight on other military forces that draw their Officer Corps from the ranks, good reading.



As for the military education and its essential role in the profession of arms, I found a good article by an Royal Australian Air Force officer on the development of the operational art within the RAAF through the application of a military education.   Here is the article"

http://198.231.69.12/papers/csc27/keir.doc

(If that doesn't work, you can find it here; look for an article by Squadron Leader R.J. Keir)
http://198.231.69.12/papers/csc27/index.html

This link is a treasure trove of good articles by military officers.

Anyways, I thought the article was really interesting because Squadron Leader Keir does a good job in underlining why a military education is important to the development of Air Force Officers.   As I have said before, too much technical training means the Air Force is in danger of becoming a group of glorified truckers with no real education on how to apply Air Power doctrine to the airframes that they fly so well.   SqL. Keir argues that "Professional mastery is defined in The Air Power Manuel as 'the discipline of striving continually to achieve the most appropriate, effective, and efficient air power for Australia's security'." and that "Professional mastery therefore relies on education and training in formal and informal environments, private study, and experience."

Going off of SqL. Keir's definition of "Professional Mastery" we can see two distinct requirements; a rigorous military education provided in an academic setting (education in formal and informal environments and private study) and the more traditional "field training" of tactics and techniques that cover the fundamentals of command (training in a formal and informal environments and experience).

As SqL. Kier's develops his arguement for a "Center for Aerospace Warfare", he concludes that "Too often the RAAF has had a technocratic or platform-centric view of aerospace power" and that "Learning institutions are therefore the key to the intellectual strength of military organizations."

I find myself agreeing with SqL. Kier's analysis.   If we ignore instilling a military education upon our Officer's we risk a degradation in the profession in the sense that we get too wrapped up in the technical nature of the profession of arms.  We learn all the techniques and can accomplish them according to the PAMs and how the checkboxes at the CTC require, but there is no implicit understanding of how those tactics and techniques apply to the larger framework of armed conflict.  Sure we will have Officers capable of pulling off Platoon attacks according to "the book", but the Officer Corps as a whole will not have much understanding beyond what is directly infront of it.   An Officer can pull an envelopment, but cannot understand how it developed or how it has succeeded historically or how it fits into a the larger framework of operations.   Military Genius will be able to do these things without any formal training, but we cannot wait and hope for genius when the situation requires it.

Anyways, just some more material and thoughts on the issue if anyone was still interested,
Cheers,
Infanteer
 
Basically Infanteer's last post somewhat says what I'm about to say.

I believe first and most importantly that a school must not only teach a student the knowledge, but also how to use that knowledge to the benefit of the student.
Some students go to the university just for the knowledge but fails to apply the knowledge in his/her life. As far as I'm concerned, if you go to university for that shiny piece of paper which cost a lot of your time and money, you wasted a lot of valuable resources.

Going to university is probably easier way to get the knowledge and know how to use it. University is (supposedly) a place where the experts can teach you the stuff. You learn how to read, write, analyze, discuss, debate and all those wonderful skills that you need in an academic world in order to succeed there.

That does not mean self education does not have merit. If you can learn by yourself and know how to apply the knowledge, good for you. There are a lot of smart guys who learn by themselves and never went to university.

So I think university is a wonderful place because it is probably more quicker to expand a person's mind to knowledge and application of that knowledge because there are others and experts who are part of that system to help you out.

But do I believe a degree should be a pre-requisite to being an officer? No, because officer is foremost a leadership position and a degree does not teach a person how to lead.
 
No, because officer is foremost a leadership position and a degree does not teach a person how to lead.

True, leadership is something that is inherent in the character of many soldiers.   The one article I linked has a good analysis of the Kaba system that the IDF uses to gain empirical data, supported by proven service in the ranks, to determine who will be the best leaders.   The article states that the Kaba system is pretty good at doing so.

However, the idea of a military education is not so much that an Officer learns how to lead, but rather that he gains a great appreciation on what he is to lead.   It is all great if the Officer is well-liked and is a good leader in the field, but if he lacks the knowledge of both the tactical and operational art and is given no foundation to adequately understand the theory and history behind leading troops into battle, all his good leadership is wasted when he blows his whistle and orders his soldiers over the trenchline.
 
Well, I went through all eight pages of this thread and I must say that I am impressed with the level of input of soldiers from all levels of experience.

Now, the question remains, has anybody's views or opinions changed from this little "learning experience?"
 
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