• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

The Defence Budget [superthread]

Unfortunately, the unprecedented surge in popularity and profile that the military experienced during Afghanistan may turn out to be a double-edged sword for the CF as it tries to come to grips with what is already a straitened financial environment.

The ten years or so that we fought in Afghanistan represented 0-Major, or O-Sgt/WO in military career terms. That means we have an entire generation of leaders who have not really known what it's like to serve in a "shoestring Army".

The descent from that (well-earned) "high" to what is typically the norm for a peacetime CF is going to be that much more difficult, and hurt that much more, because of this recent period of rejuvenation or rebirth.

Like E.R, I can only offer that the CF have survived this before, and are going to survive it again. Bitterness and introspection, or reverting to "buttons and bows" will not help.

IMHO what we have going for us in the CA is neither mass nor firepower nor overwhelming logistic capacity; it's just people. As long as the CA remembers that, and stays focused on developing professionals who can grab the torch when the  time comes (and it will come again-it always does, just when we least expect it...), we will do OK.

And, I guess it's worth reminding people that professional soldiers should never hitch themselves to the wagon of any particular political party. In the end, our politicians are just that: politicians. They will make their decisions for the good of the nation (we hope), or for the good of their party (too often), but rarely will they ever uphold the cause of the military at the cost of anything else critical.
 
Agreed pbi.  I joined at the start of the money wave, so I have not known what it's like to exist during the decade of darkness.  Regardless we all still have a job to do, and even with a reduced budget we have to move forward and perhaps get creative with our training to maximize the resources we have to play with.

Flexibility and economy of effort.
 
In my 20s and 30s I experienced the worst of the budget cuts, reductions, disbandments and all the rest of the integration and unification which was not well planned at all and in fact was implemented in a pretty haphazard manner. Then add on the general contempt in which the government of the day held the forces in the seventies, and it was not easy being a soldier. This also was the Vietnam and post-Vietnam era, and the dislike of the war and of the military in general migrated north of the border and we were widely viewed as baby killers and all the rest. In spite of all that, or maybe because of it, we took pride in doing our best with what little we did get, and trained as hard and as often as we could.

Two generations of Canadian service people lived through all this with no real prospect of being on the two way range. Despite that we maintained extremely high standards. Our legacy and our payback came watching you guys and gals perform so magnificently in Afghanistan and Haiti and Libya and patrolling in far distant waters and . . . Less I get too preachy, I'll just close by urging you to build on what you learned and don't ever take the easy way out. Soldiering in times of peace when the budgets shrink is not easy, but it can be done. No, it has to be done, lest ye break faith.
 
Old Sweat said:
In my 20s and 30s I experienced the worst of the budget cuts, reductions, disbandments and all the rest of the integration and unification which was not well planned at all and in fact was implemented in a pretty haphazard manner. Then add on the general contempt in which the government of the day held the forces in the seventies, and it was not easy being a soldier. This also was the Vietnam and post-Vietnam era, and the dislike of the war and of the military in general migrated north of the border and we were widely viewed as baby killers and all the rest. In spite of all that, or maybe because of it, we took pride in doing our best with what little we did get, and trained as hard and as often as we could.

Two generations of Canadian service people lived through all this with no real prospect of being on the two way range. Despite that we maintained extremely high standards. Our legacy and our payback came watching you guys and gals perform so magnificently in Afghanistan and Haiti and Libya and patrolling in far distant waters and . . . Less I get too preachy, I'll just close by urging you to build on what you learned and don't ever take the easy way out. Soldiering in times of peace when the budgets shrink is not easy, but it can be done. No, it has to be done, lest ye break faith.

Great post.  :goodpost:
 
Old Sweat said:
In my 20s and 30s I experienced the worst of the budget cuts, reductions, disbandments and all the rest of the integration and unification which was not well planned at all and in fact was implemented in a pretty haphazard manner. Then add on the general contempt in which the government of the day held the forces in the seventies, and it was not easy being a soldier. This also was the Vietnam and post-Vietnam era, and the dislike of the war and of the military in general migrated north of the border and we were widely viewed as baby killers and all the rest. In spite of all that, or maybe because of it, we took pride in doing our best with what little we did get, and trained as hard and as often as we could.

Two generations of Canadian service people lived through all this with no real prospect of being on the two way range. Despite that we maintained extremely high standards. Our legacy and our payback came watching you guys and gals perform so magnificently in Afghanistan and Haiti and Libya and patrolling in far distant waters and . . . Less I get too preachy, I'll just close by urging you to build on what you learned and don't ever take the easy way out. Soldiering in times of peace when the budgets shrink is not easy, but it can be done. No, it has to be done, lest ye break faith.


Many years ago I was asked to speak to a somewhat broad question about what kind of Army (CF) we wanted. All the good words/ideas like flexible and affordable and, and, and ... had been covered so I decided to take a soldier specific focus.

Now, this was in the midst of the decades if darkness (the plural matters because, as Old Sweat says, there were several of them. The ideas being presented had to be something we could manage under the highly constrained circumstances in which we found ourselves.

My thinking, such as it was, led to me to believe that, like the lord high executioner, I needed a little list. Mine ended up with six items, all related to the notion that the modern Canadian soldier must be: _________

Here is my little list (the first four, I insisted, must be in this exact order):

    1. Tough;
    2. Superbly disciplined;
    3. Well trained;
    4. Adequately equipped;
                                            (the next two, I suggested, were not “order” sensitive, but they were equally important)
    5. Properly organized; and
    6. Well led.

It was a somewhat lengthy presentation and I cannot remember most if but here is a encapsulated sketch of the items, from memory:

Tough refers to both physical and mental “robustness” - what Field Marshal Lord Wavell described as the ability to withstand the shocks of war. What is was not was what my old friend MGen (ret'd) Clive Addy called “macho thuggery” (this was just after the Somalia Inquiry so that sort of thing was on many minds). (I explained that toughness is not the same as brute strength and that nothing in my comments could or should be considered as, in any way, restricting the employment of women.) But, I reminded my audience, war was a rough, dirty business, not for the faint of heart, mind of body. Toughness, I opined, could be taught, in fact it had to be taught – developed and nurtured in every phase of training and employment for all officers, NCOs and men. We were never too old or too senior to need “toughening up,” I said, and I suggested that the time would come when some officers in the audience, wearing more rank than they had at the moment would have to make hard, life and death decisions and we had all better hope that they were tough enough to do it.

Discipline, I told my audience, is the sine qua non of soldiering: the toughest guys and gals in the world are useless if they are not able to submerge their (natural) fears and sense of self preservation and “soldier on” just because  they ARE soldiers and their duty requires it. Discipline, I said, is what sets really good armies apart from just good or average or just acceptable ones. Well disciplined – and I kept repeating the phrase “superbly disciplined” - soldiers, I said, would always find a way to “make a silk purse from a sow's ear,” and I reminded my audience that given our current budgetary situation, “sow's ear” pretty much described our equipment situation. I also said that we didn't need a “school of discipline” or a CF disciplinarian or anything new: all we needed was to reinforce what was already written in our (recent) military ethos documents and what was written, in blood, in our military history. Like toughness, superb discipline needed to be an everyday thing – I recall digressing, just a bit, into remarks on senior officers' dress, deportment, passing of faults (like saluting) in NDHQ, conduct at all ranks social functions and physical fitness, there was an uncomfortable silence in the room – and it needed to be instilled by example, from the top down. Quiet, almost invisible, self discipline, I said, was the goal. Square bashing and screaming NCOs was just a step on a long – permanent – quest for superb discipline in all ranks in all circumstances.

Training did (and still does) cost money and we were (and you still are) right to look closely at training to make sure it is what is needed, that it is delivered when it is needed and that it is done in an efficient and effective manner. But, I said, a separate training function, separate from the general staff in HQ and separate from combat formation and unit commanders in the field, was neither efficient nor effective. Service schools, I suggested, must be where we always find our best officers and NCOs – getting in to a school staff position should be hard, getting out of one should be easy. School postings, like HQ staff jobs, should be temporary things, between regimental duty tours, and they should be damned hard work, too – but since only the best should be posted in to a school those who are there should often be promoted when they leave – and all the hard work will be worth it. But the important training is not done in schools, it is done in units and in the field, on exercises. That's where we teach soldiers, NCOs and officers, including colonels and generals, how to apply the skills and knowledge, including “leadership” knowledge, learned in the schools.

Equipment did cost money and I suggested that we had to be sure we understood the old adage that the very best is the enemy of the good enough and we needed to question the last 5% of performance when it consumed 20% of the budget for an item. It was out duty, as staff officers, I said, to “fight,” in all our committees, for the Army's fair share of the capital budget and then to “fight” to ensure that we, the Army staff, spent it wisely.

Organization is a very subjective issue but I suggested to my colleagues and superiors that we, the CF, were not especially well organized and, more important, that poor organization cost real, measurable money. There is no “perfect” or even "right” organization but there are very imperfect and, indeed, wrong ones and it is the duty of the staff to recommend better organizations.

Leadership is “easy,” I suggested – it is, essentially, a combination of toughness, discipline and training piled on top of what an honest young man or woman learned from his family, friends and teachers. But I did mention that leadership training was (still is) vital and nowhere more than at the junior levels – corporal and 2nd lieutenant. Leadership training, I suggested, is an essential component of TQ5, 6 and 7 training.

Why is this long story relevant to budgets? Because, 20+/- years ago, we were also (still) in a budget crisis and we were looking for ways to, as Old Sweat suggests to maintain the “extremely high standards” which had been passed on to us and we had to do that with too little money and too many tasks.

I suggest that keeping our your “great little army” great isn't overly expensive and it can be done if officers and NCOs, on regimental duty and in HQs, want to make it work.

Clearly, not all my ideas found favour with those to whom they were presented but I still think they are valid.

Attitudes matter more than "stuff," and the very human business of developing tough, superbly disciplined, well trained and adequately equipped soldiers need not stop or even slow when budgets are tight. In fact, as an old friend used to say: "when the weather's bad let's step up the training;" we should say, "when budgets are tight let's use our imaginations."
 
Excellent well rounded post/presentation E.R.

I agree that many of these things are in the attitude and implementation of a high level of expectation/discipline/work by Officers and SrNCO's. 

A thread I'm reminded of in regards to training is here on army.ca where it was asked for ideas on inexpensive and free ways to do interesting and relevant training for soldiers to keep them sharp and get them out of the rut of doing the same old thing.  I know for myself when I was a Pl Comd with the G&SF I sat down with the OC's direction on training and developed a training plan that could be implemented in a 2.5 hour parade night to keep soldier skills up, instead of just cleaning weapons and hitting the mess.  It was not extremely work intensive to implement once the plan was in place, it just required some creative thought and (just as important if not more so) buy in from my NCO's to do the training.  In the end it was a great success and the Pl loved it because it was challenging and relevant for them.

Unlimited funds does not automatically produce excellent results, and therefore limited funds does not produce poor results, it is in the leadership of our military that the results will be based upon I believe.
 
Canadian.Trucker said:
Unlimited funds does not automatically produce excellent results, and therefore limited funds does not produce poor results, it is in the leadership of our military that the results will be based upon I believe.

Bingo! Which is why I'm so surprised leadership is last on the list... E.R. suggests the system will take care of that. But I think the only way the system can take care of that is if the leadership takes care of the system. How do we do make sure we go round and round the circle in a positive/beneficial way. We identify the correct people in the recruiting centers.
 
It's about time someone posted that quote about officers in the four categories with the stupid and industrious being weeded out.....
We need to do some heavy weeding....
 
UnwiseCritic said:
Bingo! Which is why I'm so surprised leadership is last on the list... E.R. suggests the system will take care of that. But I think the only way the system can take care of that is if the leadership takes care of the system. How do we do make sure we go round and round the circle in a positive/beneficial way. We identify the correct people in the recruiting centers.


I said that leadership and proper organization were not "order sensitive," in other words leadership could be first and organization last, or vice versa, or both at the top or both, as I listed them, at the bottom, but the other four, I suggested, need to be in that precise order because you can disciple a tough person but you cannot, necessarily make a disciplined person tough enough to be a soldier; equally training ought not to be wasted on people who are not both tough and well disciplined and "adequate equipment" will get good results in the hands of tough, superbly disciplined and well trained troops, but even the very best equipment will be wasted in the hands of troops who are poorly trained or ill disciplined and so on.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Get used to skrimping and saving and to doing more with less ~ some of us did it for 35 years.
Edit: spelling  :-[

A very hard truth to accept

E.R. Campbell said:
I said that leadership and proper organization were not "order sensitive," in other words leadership could be first and organization last, or vice versa, or both at the top or both, as I listed them, at the bottom, but the other four, I suggested, need to be in that precise order because you can disciple a tough person but you cannot, necessarily make a disciplined person tough enough to be a soldier; equally training ought not to be wasted on people who are not both tough and well disciplined and "adequate equipment" will get good results in the hands of tough, superbly disciplined and well trained troops, but even the very best equipment will be wasted in the hands of troops who are poorly trained or ill disciplined and so on.

I stand corrected and yep much wiser than I.
 
Jim Seggie said:
It's about time someone posted that quote about officers in the four categories with the stupid and industrious being weeded out.....
We need to do some heavy weeding....
Found on http://old-soldier-colonel.blogspot.ca/2011/07/field-marshal-moltkes-four-types-of.html

“There are only four types of officer. First, there are the lazy, stupid ones. Leave them alone, they do no harm…Second, there are the hard- working, intelligent ones. They make excellent staff officers, ensuring that every detail is properly considered. Third, there are the hard- working, stupid ones. These people are a menace and must be fired at once. They create irrelevant work for everybody. Finally, there are the intelligent, lazy ones. They are suited for the highest office.”
Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein

I would disagree about the lazy stupid ones though.  Nothing like someone rubber stamping something without even a token review, especially when you're engineers supposed to be certifying something as safe to operate.  Sadly I normally now assume when first working with someone that they haven't done anything properly and question it rather then assume their head is an external organ.

 
I think lazy, in this sense, refers to finding simple, easy ways of doing things and not over complicating military life.

 
SeaKingTacco said:
I think lazy, in this sense, refers to finding simple, easy ways of doing things and not over complicating military life.

Ah, seen, thanks.

Big fan of KISS.
 
Related:

National Post link

John Ivison: F-35 purchase may force Conservatives to chop infantry battalion from cash-strapped military

As Rob Nicholson, the new defence minister, settles in at National Defence headquarters, he will have been briefed on the war of the Two Towers — one run by DND bureaucrats who control the purse strings; the other by the uniforms of the Canadian Forces.

The on-going hostilities are likely to flare up as the new minister is forced to make some unpalatable decisions on resource allocation, including the possibility of reducing the size of Canada’s 68,000 regular forces by chopping one or more of its nine infantry battalions.

Earlier this month, U.S. defence secretary Chuck Hagel indicated the Pentagon might have to decide between a “much smaller force” or a decade-long “holiday” from modernizing weapons systems and technology. Word leaked that the cancellation of the $392-billion F-35 joint strike fighter program was being contemplated — a rumour defence officials later tried to quash.

Canada has its own cash crisis — by 2014/15, nearly $2.5-billion will have been cut from DND’s budget.


The Armed Forces want to maintain the existing number of troops and bases, while adding new gear like the F-35s. An update released late last week showed that DND is still committed to buying 65 F-35s, despite cost increases. Rather than increase the $8.9-billion it would cost to buy the planes, the department simply reduced the amount of contingency it had in place for cost over-runs from $602-million down to $342-million, to remain within the $9-billion ceiling. “The provision for acquisition contingency could be considered low for a project of this size and scope,” DND admitted in the update.

David Perry, a senior analyst at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, said the military brass’s hopes of muddling through are likely to prove forlorn. “Something has to give,” he said. “They are facing a significant budget crunch that is going to force them to make some serious reforms,” he said.


According to the 2011 transformation report authored by Andrew Leslie, the now retired former Canadian Forces general, the military was already $1-billion short in funding for the Canada First Defence Strategy acquisitions to re-equip the military. He suggested $2-billion in savings by cutting non-operational spending on things like consultants and administration to pay for the capital acquisitions and satisfy the government’s deficit-reduction plan. But the report has been gathering dust since it reached the less than enthusiastic hands of then defence minister, Peter MacKay.

The uniformed tower in DND not only resisted the Leslie report, it is fighting the prospect of any reduction in numbers or equipment cancellations. The preferred option is to find “efficiencies” in ongoing operations — a Holy Grail type search that has yielded few results in the last 20 years.

This, after all, is the department that is never able to spend its capital budget, at considerable cost to the taxpayer. When it can’t spend its capital allocation, it “reprofiles” the money but loses purchasing power because projects are not compensated to adjust for inflation, which runs at 7% annually according to the Defence Specific Inflation average. The cumulative impact has been $556-million of lost purchasing power in recent years, according to Mr. Perry.

Andrew Leslie points out that the administrative overhead has grown by 40% in recent years, since 2006, while the number of deployable troops has grown by just 10%. “Reduce overhead before you attack output,” he said.

Yet Mr. Perry estimates that, even if the Leslie report was implemented in full, it probably wouldn’t be sufficient. At some point the Canadian Forces will have to reduce personnel numbers or get out of the expensive business of fighter jet or submarine warfare, he said.

Given the expensive investments in planes and ships, the most logical place to cut is the army, which has seen numbers rise to 68,000 from 60,000 in recent years. The suggestion from some quarters is that the current structure, where Canada has three regular force regiments — the Royal Canadian Regiment in Ontario and New Brunswick; the Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry in Alberta and Manitoba and the Royal 22nd Regiment in Quebec City — is a political construct without justification in the real world. Each regiment has three battalions but the imperative for that number is more political than military, so the argument goes.
.
When asked specifically if the Conservatives were committed to maintaining a regular force of 68,000, Mr. Nicholson’s press secretary Julie Di Mambro said only that the government would maintain a “modern, first-class military that is sustainable over the long term.”

When asked if it were possible that there may be revisions in planned equipment acquisitions, she said the Canada First Defence Strategy remains the basis for defence planning. However, she added “all countries normally review their specific defence policy priorities and objectives every few years to ensure that they are keeping pace with evolving strategic realities.” All of which suggests everything is under review.

Chopping a battalion in Quebec City — the only part of the province where the Conservatives may keep their head above water at the next election — may make Mr. Nicholson blanche.

Mr. Leslie gave some indication of the likely reaction to any cuts to the army’s “teeth,” as opposed to its “tail.”

“If the decision is taken to reduce training, regular forces or reserves, Canadians should start to ask some serious questions about the fiscal competence of the government,” he said.

But if Mr. Perry’s calculations are correct, DND can’t simultaneously slash budgets, maintain headcount and invest in new gear without doing something drastic — especially when the budget was insufficient in the first place.

National Post
 
Chopping an infantry battalion is pretty drastic. And why Valcartier, as was hinted at? Petawawa has infrastructure issues, and Edmonton has attrition issues -- and Gagetown and Shilo are isolated from their parent brigades. If we were to go down the road to 8 battalions, Valcartier would be the last place I would think about for downsizing. I know that the R22eR have been recruiting more anglos lately, but the manning situation in 5 Brigade seems pretty healthy, and so did the infrastructure last time I visited there.

Anybody with recent experience in 5 Brigade want to chirp in?
 
Before we start the process of arguing, in public, over which Battalion we should cut, let us first consider this statement:

The suggestion from some quarters is that the current structure, where Canada has three regular force regiments — the Royal Canadian Regiment in Ontario and New Brunswick; the Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry in Alberta and Manitoba and the Royal 22nd Regiment in Quebec City — is a political construct without justification in the real world. Each regiment has three battalions but the imperative for that number is more political than military, so the argument goes.

Mr Ivison is a smart man, and I am a fan of much of what he writes, and I respect the manner in which he writes it.  Having said that, before he wrote this piece, I think it quite likely that he did not know we had nine infantry battalions, and would have been very hard-pressed to name the three Regiments to which they belong.

This begs the question: which "quarters" are suggesting this, and who specifically suggested it to Mr Ivison?  Perhaps more importantly, to what end did they "suggest" this.

It should be quite interesting to watch the response to this piece, both internal and external to the Army and CF.
 
Ostrozac said:
Chopping an infantry battalion is pretty drastic. And why Valcartier, as was hinted at? Petawawa has infrastructure issues, and Edmonton has attrition issues -- and Gagetown and Shilo are isolated from their parent brigades. If we were to go down the road to 8 battalions, Valcartier would be the last place I would think about for downsizing. I know that the R22eR have been recruiting more anglos lately, but the manning situation in 5 Brigade seems pretty healthy, and so did the infrastructure last time I visited there.

Anybody with recent experience in 5 Brigade want to chirp in?

I'm not entirely sure about the number of Anglos posted to the R22R battalions as I`m with 5BNS, but there are a surprising amount of Anglos posted here (none that want to be here but that`s another story)

In chats with some of the VanDoos about this article the response was generally something akin to: 'we have three half-empty battalions but when one deploys it magically becomes a full batallion.  So if they cut, for example 1R22R, we'll just have two slightly-more-than-half-full batallions without losing any guys from the regiment'

Not sure what the intent there would be.  You could make an argument for lower overhead as you'd have one less building to worry about, maybe less civilian staff and officer positions, but you're still going to have the same amount of enlisted guys.

edit - added quotation
 
Thought I'd share this blog post by a U.K. defence bureaucrat, talking about the challenges Canada and other middle powers face with shrinking budgets - well worth the read!  From the post:
.... Humphrey makes no secret of being an enormous admirer of the Canadian military – having studied in Canada, and been fortunate enough to undertake a short attachment to the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, he has fond memories of being part of a very professional organisation, and to this day thinks warmly of the people and role. Later on, his career has regularly brought him into contact with members of the Canadian military, who have always been supremely professional. Therefore, he continues to follow developments in the Canadian military quite closely.

(....)

The biggest question arguably facing Canada today is how to address what is a three pronged axis of interest. As an Atlantic and Pacific power, with substantial economic interests in both areas, Canada has an inevitable interest in both regions, which have extremely different challenges. At the same time, the emerging interest in the Arctic, where global warming and climate change is seemingly allowing an opening of trade routes, means a previously neglected region suddenly takes on far more strategic role. Beyond this home position, Canada continues to play a major role overseas, providing troops, aircraft and ships to participate in operations across the globe from the Gulf to Afghanistan.

(....)

Medium powers like Canada though struggle to balance their wider interests, desire to play  a role in global affairs against a small military and limited resources. The question for powers such as this is what do they wish to be? On the one hand there is perhaps the inevitable temptation for finance ministries to push for a gentle glide path into military obscurity – maintain the bare minimum, and replace high end capabilities like frigates or Main Battle Tanks with OPVS and wheeled vehicles – in other words abandon pretences of capability. At the same time there is a natural desire to want to play more of a role and be more than a bit player – it is perhaps noticeable how many leaders enjoy the attention and press coverage that comes from being seen as influential on the wider stage, and the plaudits that come from this. This perhaps explains the reluctance in some countries to pare down military expenditure. At the same time maintaining a reasonably sized military has wider industrial and economic benefits – the presence of a substantial defence industry is often linked to military capability – scaling this down reduces the ability to not only build and support equipment at home (with all the attendant benefits for the economy and sovereignty) but also reduces export orders which helps the economy. This is a challenge facing Canada now – invest at considerable cost in new Frigates, creating a shipbuilding programme to assure them of sovereignty, or buy overseas, saving money for wider capability, but reducing economic benefits to taxpayers – who would expect to see their tax dollars spent at home ....
 
Back
Top