The Defence Budget [superthread]

[Journeyman]

This would also result in the government falling short of its CFDS commitments.

To be fair, the CFDS  was never any form of a "strategy"; it was a Christmas 'wish list' masquerading as a coherent policy.  It was correctly judged as unaffordable and shelved before the ink was dry.

One of two things needs to happen:
1.  We drastically increase the Defence Budget
2.  We make significant adjustments to our present Force Structure by cutting personnel, equipment, operations, etc.  No more doing more with less, the future is all about doing less with less.

"1" is a non-starter...well, until we're in some crisis and it's too late.

"2" needs a complete re-think.

For way too long, our default has been "ok, they've given us x dollars; what can we do with it?"  If Canada was remotely serious about the military* the government (Party is completely irrelevant) must start discussions with "what do we want the military to be able to do?" [with sub-sets of "how many of those must we be able to do concurrently, vice consecutively"].

"OK, here's the bill for those deliverables."  <<-- see how I got a trendy buzzword in there? 

Seeing the bill, and the CAF sticking to it's guns - as opposed to we can always  make it happen - I suspect they'd go back and revisit what they see as military necessities.  Mind you, I assume that the trimmed list would still include Snowbirds, Skyhawks, Ceremonial Guard, 1.5 Military Colleges, LGBTQ2 projects [yes, it's in the budget and I had to Google since I wasn't up to speed with the latest acronym], LCol-commanded Militia platoons, etc, etc...

Of course, if.....IF....the CAF was honestly looking at what it is required to deliver, I bet we could divest a metric shitload of HQs,  Staff Officers, the Army Intelligence Regiment, Air Defence and IA (if it's not worth investing and training seriously, it's obviously expendable), and duty-CWOs stapled to officers because "Command Team" has become a kharmic chant, regardless of whether there are troops to command.    /hopeless dreamer


Gee, I hope I didn't upset any apple carts.....  op:


* Discussing military requirements comes after a larger understanding of defence and security expectations, and who does what to whom?

 

[sandyson]

One option to save money is to close the entire Dept of National Defence and move the CF to Foreign Affairs (or whatever it's calling itself this week).  The CF cannot defend Canada, and surely many people think the need is preposterous. So if the CF are a toy to play in the sandbox of someone else, why not say so explicitly and save money?  The CF would still play overseas when ever a minister is looking to the world stage for his/her footnote in history.  We could use the money for 'national infrastructure'.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

To be fair, the CFDS  was never any form of a "strategy"; it was a Christmas 'wish list' masquerading as a coherent policy.  It was correctly judged as unaffordable and shelved before the ink was dry.
"1" is a non-starter...well, until we're in some crisis and it's too late.

"2" needs a complete re-think.

For way too long, our default has been "ok, they've given us x dollars; what can we do with it?"  If Canada was remotely serious about the military* the government (Party is completely irrelevant) must start discussions with "what do we want the military to be able to do?" [with sub-sets of "how many of those must we be able to do concurrently, vice consecutively"].

"OK, here's the bill for those deliverables."  <<-- see how I got a trendy buzzword in there? 

Seeing the bill, and the CAF sticking to it's guns - as opposed to we can always  make it happen - I suspect they'd go back and revisit what they see as military necessities.  Mind you, I assume that the trimmed list would still include Snowbirds, Skyhawks, Ceremonial Guard, 1.5 Military Colleges, LGBTQ2 projects [yes, it's in the budget and I had to Google since I wasn't up to speed with the latest acronym], LCol-commanded Militia platoons, etc, etc...

Of course, if.....IF....the CAF was honestly looking at what it is required to deliver, I bet we could divest a metric shitload of HQs,  Staff Officers, the Army Intelligence Regiment, Air Defence and IA (if it's not worth investing and training seriously, it's obviously expendable), and duty-CWOs stapled to officers because "Command Team" has become a kharmic chant, regardless of whether there are troops to command.    /hopeless dreamer


Gee, I hope I didn't upset any apple carts.....  op:


* Discussing military requirements comes after a larger understanding of defence and security expectations, and who does what to whom?

Never were truer words spoken, I'm of the opinion that any Defence Policy Review is a gigantic waste of time if it isn't a nested piece of a more comprehensive National Security Review.  Our National Security Strategy hasn't been revised since 2004 and I consider the strategy to not be worth the paper it's printed on. 

Want to realize real savings?  We need better integration of the Security, Intelligence, Public Safety and Defence sectors across the board.  The trend in the Canada for the past 50+ years has been decentralization of the State security apparatus.  Repealment of the War Measures Act, Disbandment of the RCMP Security Service, Creation of CSIS, etc.  All things designed to protect individual rights and freedoms; however, has the pendulum swung too far?  My take is some of these acts were done more for the sake of a peace offering than as an actual effective piece of public policy.

The future of inter, intra and inner state conflict is 4th Generation Warfare.  ISIS, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, AQIM, FARC, etc... are all terrorist organizations but also criminal organizations.  This is not going to change and is only going to become more prevalent.

See attached graphic:

A Defence Policy Review needs to articulate how Defence is nested in a wider National Security Strategy and how Defence can be used to keep Canadians safe from internal as well as external threats.

 

[George Wallace]

One option to save money is to close the entire Dept of National Defence and move the CF to Foreign Affairs (or whatever it's calling itself this week).  The CF cannot defend Canada, and surely many people think the need is preposterous. So if the CF are a toy to play in the sandbox of someone else, why not say so explicitly and save money?  The CF would still play overseas when ever a minister is looking to the world stage for his/her footnote in history.  We could use the money for 'national infrastructure'.

Just so that you are more in the picture, once CAF members are deployed overseas, the Minister of Global Affairs, formerly Foreign Affairs, has more say on their activities than the Minister of National Defence.  It has been that way for years. 

 

[sandyson]

Exactly.  So let's cut out the middleman. >

 

[George Wallace]

Exactly.  So let's cut out the middleman. >

Well......Do we really want Global Affairs dictating internal/national policies as well?    [

 

[McG]

Should we cut the force to fit it inside a 1% budget, or should we give-up the lie that a 1% budget affords the standard of military that Canada ought to have?

MCG:  I would love to see you have the 2% budget.  But it hasn't happened yet.  And to be honest, even when the CF had more money it always felt it was insufficient and continued to draw up plans based on the money it would like to have rather than the money it had.

There are options between 1% and 2%.  A nice start would be 1.3%.  We have been living in a cycle of “shave the ice cube” then lower the standard to what we can achieve and declare success, then shave the ice cube again.

I'm afraid as long as the CF continue to make due there will be pressure to reduce cost mostly from O&M. I have seen it to many times in private industry. Lack of catastrophic failure provides all the proof that is needed to continue the current COA

Yep.  Unfortunately, until we fight a real enemy, we can keep getting away with the intellectual dishonesty of lowering the measure of success to fit the force we have atrophied into being.  No anti-tank capability?  That’s okay, we will just make sure the enemy does not have tanks in the exercise.  No air defence?  That’s okay too because we can waive a hand like Obi-Wan and that threat also disappears from the exercise.  Not enough trucks to support ourselves in the field?  We will just contract a giant rental fleet and hope real vehicles spring forth from the ground if we actually deploy.  It does not matter; the exercise always ends in Canadian victory and with the battle groups getting certified ready to go for a shooting war with a near peer.

Should the funding for the Regular force be cut first?  ???  All components and elements need funding, but there has to be a priority.  That is always, or in most instances, going to be the Reg Force pers and equip because they are the ones who need to be able to go out the door the quickest.

No i'm not suggesting that though we all know our HQ is so inflated we could find hundreds of millions in savings there.

There are lots of places for savings.  Lots of ideas already posted through the history of this thread:

[quote author=MCG]Here are a few ways that I see to immediately cut costs while protecting capability:

• Reduce/Stop the use of “tactical infrastructure” in field exercises
• Impose a moratorium on creating new headquarters
• Do not bring kitchen appliances to the field (with the exception of in field kitchens)
• Maximize the use of local training areas before traveling
• Teleconference to avoid TD for meetings and working groups
• Prohibit the deployment of pers into positions requiring WSE (We do not need to pay guys above their rank when there are other sitting at home already collecting pay at that level)  - exceptions only for in-theatre casualty replacement
• Do not deploy PRes for the sake of deploying PRes on international ops – use Reg F where the capacity exists, especially for long tours (Reg F pay is a sunk cost while a year of Class C pay for a Sr NCO of Sr Offr to train & deploy could instead add another training day for everybody in a Class A unit)
• No new “buttons & bows” initiatives
• Do not rebadged any more units for the sake of resurrecting old regiments
• Stop any unannounced plans to rebrand/rebadged/rename any branches, corps or organization for the purposes of historical sentimentalism
• Stop using rented civilian vehicles when military pattern vehicles are available and serve the purpose
• Tie pay incentives for all ranks to performance and conduct.  If you are on a remedial measure (IC through to C&P) then the pay incentive is delayed by the duration of that remedial measure.  If you receive an unsatisfactory PER, then the pay incentive is delayed until you receive a satisfactory one.
• Rebalance officer enrollment paths to reduce the number of ROTP entrants while increasing the number of DEO entrants
• Allow only one IPR move per service couple.  Instead, a reunification move will bring the first retiring member to live with the mbr continuing to serve, or if both retire at the same time then a reunification move will bring the mbr without F&E to the mbr with F&E.

And here are some options options for long-term savings (though most will cost money upfront prior to the savings being achieved later):

• Consolidate all of NDHQ and other appropriate NCR units on the Nortel Campus
• Move CFC from Toronto to Ottawa (=fewer annual cost moves, reduced PLD costs, reduced IR costs, lower property costs, …)
• Divest unnecessary niche vehicle micro-fleets (if required, increase size of standard fleets to maintain platform numbers)
• Smash LFDTS & CTC into a single layer of HQ, transfer capability development functions from LFDTS to COS Land Strat
• Re-close CMR and consolidate ROTP back into RMC
• Consolidate all of 1 CMBG in Edmonton (or Wainwright, Suffield or Shilo) to reduce future steady-state cost move requirements
• Procure more training simulators for fuel guzzling equipment (like aircraft, Engr Hy Eqpt and MBT) – include this in the initial acquisition of future systems
• Re-evaluate rank levels in HQ establishments – the goal is to reduce where unnecessary inflation has occurred
• Replace military ID cards, PKI cards, building access cards, and military driver's licences with a single universal military identification (See US CAC for example)

In the current climate, we need to look at more than just where to cut.  We also need to look at where to get better mileage from the same resources.  Here are a few thoughts to that end:

• Replace SDA, LDA, dive pay and parachute allowance with enhanced casual allowances – the current systems reward posting messages as opposed to rewarding/compensating for the behaviour that we want: going to sea, going to the field, diving, and jumping out of aircraft.
• Reduce the number of PRes unit HQs in the Army.  Individual sub-units can retain unique regimental identities, but they will be grouped under a fewer stronger battalion HQs.
• Revisit the requirement for Reg F bands.  There are 71 musicians from Sgt to CWO on Army Ref F establishments alone.  That is a lot of PYs that could be put to better purpose (especially when we have been cutting from operational units to put PYs in new capabilities)

[/quote][quote author=dapaterson]A few more contentious suggestions:

* Top to bottom compensation and benefits review to eliminate duplication and overlap
* Revisit posting policy to reduce annual move requirement (excluding off-BTL)
* Revisit IPR move policy to eliminate same-location moves (eg a paid move from Orleans to Kanata on release)
* Replace CANEX with private suppliers (who will pay market rents for CF facilities)
  * Retain small deployed NPF expertise to surge for deployments if required (hint: this does not include a Tim Hortons trailer)
* Return to annual TOS boards, particularly at ranks of LCol and above and MWO and above, to determine whether continued service meets a military requirement
* Enforce limits on GOFOs as ordered in the 1997 MND report (roughly a 1/3 reduction)
* Return to performance pay for GOFO and Capt(N)/Cols
  * Make PMAs and performance info per above public
* Make PMAs and performance information for all Public Servants public
* Restructure establishment to differentiate between Lt and Capt
* Return to competitive promotion to Capt
* Revisit Degreed Officer Corps decision
  * Permit short engagements with no promotion beyond Capt without a degree
* Eliminate full-time second language training
  * Individuals may elect to pursue SLT on their own time; a decision not to get a language profile will limit future promotion possibilities

For IM/IT

* Migrate from MS Office to Open Office to reduce IM/IT licensing costs
* Migrate from Outlook to open-source web-based DWAN email to reduce IM/IT licensing costs
* Dissolve ADM(IM), putting IM/IT support into CANOSCOM, IM/IT procurement into ADM(Mat), and comms and ISTAR systems under CJOC[/quote]

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2015-analysis-programs-strategic-outcome.page#p4_4_1
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2015-reserve-force.page

Based on the line item analysis prepared on Jason Kenney's watch I took the liberty of juggling numbers.

What I came up with was this:

Under C4ISR, to include C&C (1.3.1), Int Ops (1.3.2), Ops Spt Svcs (1.3.3), Canadian Surveillance (1.1.2), NORAD (1.1.3), North America (1.1.4), National SAR (2.2.3), OGD Assistance (2.2.5)  the allocation is 680 MCAD, and 4550 PYs

Under Reaction Forces, to include all Special Ops, Joint, SAR, Air and Maritime forces at all stages of readiness and training (line items 2.2.4, 3.1.1, 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 3.1.5, 3.2.1, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.4.1, 3.4.3, 3.4.4, 3.4.5) but explicitly excluding the Land Element the allocation is 1430 MCAD and 10,364 PYs.  The manning pool includes 3081 Naval Reservists and 1938 Air Reservists integrated into providing operational capabilities on a NTM basis.

The Forces are supported by a civilian management team of 3485 with a budget of 435 MCAD that absorbs 521 uniformed PYs (line items 6.1 to 6.10)

In addition 3998 civilians manage real estate with a budget of 1810 MCAD and absorb an additional 1505 uniformed PYs (line items 4.3.1 to 4.3.6)

IT is a joint civil/military mandate with 1536 civilians and 1367 uniformed PYs and a budget of 732 MCAD (line items 4.4.1 to 4.4.4)

And then there is Materiel (line items 4.2.1 to 4.2.6) with 5919 civilians and 7574 uniformed PYs and a budget of 6664 MCAD - by far the biggest single slice of the pie being about 30 to 35% of the budget.

On the operational front DND allots 66 bodies and 7 MCAD to respond to domestic and North American crises (2.1.1) and an additional 108 bodies and 9 MCAD (2.1.3) for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations.  And that is the extent of what I would consider the "requirements" of the CF for mandated assistance to Canadians.  There is no allocation for the defence of Canada (1.1.1) or for Counter-terrorism (2.2.1). Both of those are funded out of General Revenues on an "as needed" basis.

Line Item 1.3.4 is designated as  Military Diplomacy 286 uniforms and 394 MCAD to win friends and influence people.  I suggest that all of Canada's International Operations should actually be considered under this heading.  That would include Continuing Ops (1.2.1), NATO Ops (1.2.3), International Crises (1.2.2), and International Humanitarian Assistance to Crises (2.1.2).  All of those items together add up to a commitment of 1429 Uniforms and 675 MCAD.  A very modest contribution to saving and preserving humanity and the world order.

Up to now I have accounted for 27,486 of the allocated 68,000 PYs and 12,443 MCAD of the allocated budget of $18,286 MCAD and some 5000 of the authorised primary reserve pool of 27,000 bodies.

That leaves 40,000 PYs and 22,000 primary reservists, 8 to 12,000 supplemental reservists and 5,000 Rangers under the care of the Personnel system and with a budget of 5,843 MCAD to generate both sufficient trained personnel to meet all of the primary commitments above and also to generate an effective Land Force.

In this category I am including line items 4.1.1 to 4.1.10 which include management, recruiting, HR, training and professional development, morale, health services, and policing but also military heritage (2.3.1 for 69 MCAD) and youth programmes (2.3.2 for 234 MCAD) which I consider as part of the recruiting effort.

What I consider interesting there is that the personnel budget of 4113 MCAD is consumed by 5792 civilians and 23,110 uniforms.  I can only assume that those uniforms represent not only the cadre and instructors but also bodies under training.  I think it would be useful if these numbers were split like the Real Property, Materiel and IT budgets between those acting and that being acted upon.

Or are there really 23,110 bodies involved in generating and managing the remainder of the 68000 PYs and 27,000 PRes, 12,000 SupRes and 5,000 Rangers?

At the end of the line we have the Land Element.  I intentionally left them out of the Ready forces because I neither see them being ready nor routinely engaged.  When engaged they are employed as part of that Military Diplomacy branch of operations.

They are allotted 16,643 PYs and a budget of 1729 MCAD as well as a PRes force of 18456 bodies and the lion's share of the SupRes as well as supporting the 5000 Rangers.

Looking at all of this I would suggest that in terms of bang for buck the Government could be excused for focusing on the RCN, the RCAF and CANSOFCOM, together with the necessary C4ISR and Joint Structures necessary to employ them.

The Army and the Personnel systems (with the Army being the biggest client) appear, to my eyes, to have the biggest hole to dig themselves out of.  There seems to be ample opportunity for the available resources to be better organized, prioritized and allocated before anybody goes anywhere asking for more money.

40,000 PYs
22,000 primary reservists,
8 to 12,000 supplemental reservists
5,000 Rangers
a budget of 5,843 MCAD

 

[dapaterson]

Never confuse a report with reality.

 

[Kirkhill]

Never confuse a report with reality.

Ack.  But a starting point has to be found someplace.  Even if it is only to define what is not.

Also, can you confirm to me that if all of the budgeted 68,000 PYs were allocated to Regular Force members that would leave Zero PYs available for training and employing Reserve members?

 

[dapaterson]

1. Reg F PYs and their reporting and accountability have little to do with Res F PYs.  Simplified, Reg F pers measurements are usually in PYs (essentially FTEs, but FTEs are usually used to refer exclusively to public servants). Res F outputs may be measured in some full-time positions, but are more generally described in dollar terms, in part due to challenges In identifying a single, accepted methodology for reporting on part-time Reservists.  (Supp Res and Canadian Rangers are whole other sets of challenges in reporting - the prior is a list of names; the latter have very different employment and training constructs).

2.  The report you cite has nowhere near 40K pers involved in Pers Production.  "Ready Force Production" refers to field units in the environments, who conduct training and maintain readiness.  Those are the pers who will be rotated in and out of the "Defence Combat and Support Operations" box, as they are needed.

3.  Similarly, the Assistance to Canadians tasks you identify are, when needed, filled out by pers from either the Combat and Support box or the Ready Force Production box.  Or, in other words, we train CAF members for general combat capability, then employ them where required - we don't have 2000 soldiers sitting with snow shovels, waiting for Toronto's next crisis.

4.  Box 4.1 is the bulk of the Personnel system, and includes both schoolhouses, planning, and students.  Ballpark figures are that at any one time there will be approximately 10,000 personnel either newly entered the military or on extended career courses; those personnel are reported against this box.  As are the staff in the schools to train. And the staff who administer.  And the staff who support the training.


All clear as mud?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Ack.  But a starting point has to be found someplace.  Even if it is only to define what is not.

Also, can you confirm to me that if all of the budgeted 68,000 PYs were allocated to Regular Force members that would leave Zero PYs available for training and employing Reserve members?

The starting point comes from above, not within. 

It starts with identifying pillars of the state:

intelligence, law enforcement, armed forces, governance, economy, populace and perceptions

It is then further refined through a national security strategy whose aim is to protect these pillars.

The defence strategy is nested within the above strategy.

Chris, you need to step out of the weeds and focus on the big picture.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks for trying again DAP. 

Still in the mud (and the weeds).  And Humphrey.  I search the weeds for signs of pillars for the pillars are hard to discern.

With respect to the 40,000 -  I know (scratch that - I gather) that Personnel is only about half of that (including lawyers, MPs, doctors, nurses, career counsellors, chaplains and social workers).  I was adding in all the land force PYs as well because it was hard for me to suss out when a recruit transitions from professional development (BMQ) and occupational training to becoming part of a force element.  And when a team leader training his team leaves the training regime and becomes part of force generation.  Not to mention how those things integrate on the Reg/Res interface.

I continue to be confused - but this is not the first time and won't be the last time.

I do think though that the RCN, RCAF and SOF are more easily explained than the Army and the Personnel system on which it relies.

 

[dapaterson]

The personnel system is purple - at least at the front end.  But the principles are the same:

1.  An individual enrols.  They are part of the BTL (or SUTL, but let's keep it easy).

2.  An individual undergoes CAF-common recruit training, as an NCM or officer, still on the BTL.

3.  An individual undergoes any environmental training, still on the BTL.

4.  An individual undergoes occupation-specific Developmental Period 1 training, still on the BTL.

5.  If required for their occupation, an individual completes any required On The Job Training to meet the DP 1 requirements.  Still on the BTL.

6.  The trained individual is posted to a unit, leaves the BTL and becomes part of the trained strength.

7.  If selected for a long course, the individual may be posted to the Advanced Training List, crating a position vacancy in their old unit that the Pers System will endeavour to fill.  (Not 100% of demand is met with ATL credits, so some positions can go vacant).  Once they complete the course, they are posted back to the Trained Effective Establishment.


In the background are planners who forecast - looking at current strengths vs establishments, actual and planned, to ID intake and training requirements.  They look out with some degree of precision three years, and with less precision beyond.  This includes workforce modelling, including a forecast of releases, based on demographic information by occupation.  It's actually quite remarkable what gets studied and analyzed and recommended - but there are other limiting factors; for example, if a training institution can only train 15 people a year, then intake above 15 (or perhaps slightly more to account for attrition during training) is a waste of resources - as that excess is then not being trained, but is still being paid, and contributes to growth of the BTL.  Process optimization on the recruiting side means attempts to align training to minimize delays between courses; that's not always possible.

Resource constraints mean tradeoffs get made in terms of courses to run, numbers to enrol in different occupations, intake plans to use to bring people in.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Of course, if.....IF....the CAF was honestly looking at what it is required to deliver, I bet we could divest a metric shitload of HQs,  Staff Officers, the Army Intelligence Regiment, Air Defence and IA (if it's not worth investing and training seriously, it's obviously expendable), and duty-CWOs stapled to officers because "Command Team" has become a kharmic chant, regardless of whether there are troops to command.    /hopeless dreamer


* Discussing military requirements comes after a larger understanding of defence and security expectations, and who does what to whom?

Actually, the US of all countries has begun investing quite heavily in GBAD and the PPCLI put a UOR in for a GBAD asset for their recent deployment. I also presume by "Air Defence" you mean specifically Ground Based Air Defence and dont want to get rid of the AD fighters and would be in favour of procuring AD destroyers for the navy. If you're going to suggest a capability be fully divested, at least get the terminology right.

If we really want to divest an asset that serves no purpose than we should look at the 3 x jump companies which dont serve any tactical purpose.

 

[Jarnhamar]

[quote author=Occam]

I supported ABC, and stand by it.  Harper had to go.[/quote]

If you knew then what you know now would you still have supported ABC?

I wasn't impressed with Harper or the Conservatives at the end of their tenure but I believed the alternative was much worse. I don't feel I was wrong.

  ABC didn't put the CPC where they are today, Harper did...and the history books will reflect that.

Harper caused that himself but I wasn't very appreciative how the ABC message seemed to impart they spoke on behalf of veterans in many cases I seen. They also didn't seem to put Canada's defense needs first. The Conservatives are hardly indulgent towards military spending but I think we'd be much better off than where we are now.  ABC chose to contribute to it so IMO it's something they wear.

Quite frankly, looking at some other sites, I'm a little disturbed at veterans threatening other veterans with physical violence, calling them traitors and the like, simply because they supported ABC.

I share your disgust but ABC is hardly the sole target or victim of 'Veteran online rage'. 

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Just so that you are more in the picture, once CAF members are deployed overseas, the Minister of Global Affairs, formerly Foreign Affairs, has more say on their activities than the Minister of National Defence.  It has been that way for years.

Do tell.....with examples please

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Oh, and money for defence? Surely you all jest ... which amongst you can posit a coherent, sensible, comprehensible threat to Canada or its vital interests for which more military is the best answer? Overall, Journeyman has it about right.

There isn't a coherent argument to be made because there isn't a comprehensible threat to Canada.  I've got no problem with current funding levels.  My problem is with the way the money is allocated.  We've got too many people, not enough equipment, a large cumbersome bureaucracy and our ranks are way over-inflated. 

If I were king for a day I would keep the budget as is and cut Reg Force numbers by 15k-20k right off the bat, the Army would receive the brunt of the cuts.  Money would be reallocated to Procurement and O&M.  We'd also hopefully have far less people worrying about buttons and bows. 

 

[TCM621]

There isn't a coherent argument to be made because there isn't a comprehensible threat to Canada.  I've got no problem with current funding levels.  My problem is with the way the money is allocated.  We've got too many people, not enough equipment, a large cumbersome bureaucracy and our ranks are way over-inflated. 

If I were king for a day I would keep the budget as is and cut Reg Force numbers by 15k-20k right off the bat, the Army would receive the brunt of the cuts.  Money would be reallocated to Procurement and O&M.  We'd also hopefully have far less people worrying about buttons and bows.

Too many people? Are you kidding? Staffing on the ground has been thin for years. At my work we have gone from essentially  5 crews to 2 and can't even keep 2 full crews if everyone burns their leave at the same time. We are at 55k TES and probably half are those are deployable at anyone time. Not to mention we can't afford to train the people we have right. All our in depth training has been exchanged for "just enough, just in time". I could list a half dozen areas off the top of my head that we have manpower shortages either from lack of bodies or training.

Sent from my SM-G900W8 using Tapatalk

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Too many people? Are you kidding? Staffing on the ground has been thin for years. At my work we have gone from essentially  5 crews to 2 and can't even keep 2 full crews if everyone burns their leave at the same time. We are at 55k TES and probably half are those are deployable at anyone time. Not to mention we can't afford to train the people we have right. All our in depth training has been exchanged for "just enough, just in time". I could list a half dozen areas off the top of my head that we have manpower shortages either from lack of bodies or training.

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BUT...if the people HB is speaking about cutting was taken, as much as possible, from trimming the fat off the meat, maybe you could go up to 3, possibly 4 crews.  Consider how much of the pay budget is chewed up by the fat year after year.  Cpls are far less expensive than surplus CWOs, Snr Officers and GOFOs.

I know, we are already an embarrassingly small military but the message has come across loud and clear if this government is going to bump up defence spending (nope!  and no one should be surprised...the overall Canadian population likes things like the Snowbirds and CAF members on parade in DEU on Nov 11th...and then it starts to peter off support-wise).

If funding is not going up, what option based on reality is there to consider?